Raj Kumar Sangam vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Geology And Mining Lko. And 2 Others

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mining in the Yamuna River in villages Allaharpur and Panchkuwan,
pursuant to which an order dated 05.07.2015 was passed. The
District Magistrate, Saharanpur, vide letter dated 08.07.2015, directed
the petitioner to inspect and verify the genuineness of the complaint
on the spot.
In compliance with the said direction, the petitioner conducted an
inspection at villages Allaharpur and Panchkuwan and found that one
Ranvir Singh was engaged in illegal mining. Consequently, the
petitioner addressed a letter to the Station House Officer, Police
Station Chilkana, District Saharanpur, for lodging an FIR against the
said Ranvir Singh.
In the meantime, the petitioner was transferred from District
Saharanpur to District Jalaun vide order dated 19.05.2016.
Thereafter, on 29.09.2016, the petitioner was again transferred from
District Jalaun to District Saharanpur; however, before he could join
at Saharanpur, the said transfer order was cancelled vide order dated
07.10.2016. Both the aforesaid orders are on record as Annexure-6
and Annexure-7 to the writ petition.
Subsequently, on a complaint made by one Maniram, the District
Magistrate passed an order of recovery dated 22.10.2016, which is
contained in Annexure-10 to the writ petition.
Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioner
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner, after
attaining the age of superannuation, retired on 30.06.2025 from the
post of Mining Officer in District Azamgarh. On the eve of his
retirement, the impugned order dated 30.06.2025 (contained in
Annexure-1 to the writ petition) was passed by opposite party no. 2,
whereby disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the

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petitioner under Rule 7 of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1999.
It is further submitted that the said proceedings have been initiated in
relation to an alleged incident of the year 2015, i.e., after an
inordinate and unexplained delay. While passing the impugned order,
opposite party no. 2 has recorded a finding that the petitioner had
forged a recovery notice dated 22.10.2016 (Annexure-10 to the writ
petition).
It is further submitted that no proper inquiry or exercise was
conducted by respondent no. 2 before arriving at the conclusion that
the alleged recovery notice was forged. The impugned order has
been passed in a mechanical and arbitrary manner without any
cogent material on record.
It is also submitted that the impugned action has been taken only with
a view to wreak vengeance against the petitioner. The petitioner had
earlier filed Writ-A No. 8131 of 2024, which was allowed by this this
Court vide order dated 15.4.2025, and while allowing the said writ
petition, certain adverse observations were made against the
opposite parties in paragraph 7 of the judgment. Being aggrieved and
annoyed by the said observations, respondent no. 2 has maliciously
initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner vide impugned
order (Annexure-1).
It is, thus, evident that the disciplinary proceedings have been
initiated with a mala fide intention to harass the petitioner and to
ensure that he is deprived of his rightful post-retiral dues. As such,
the petitioner is being illegally prevented from receiving his post-
retiral benefits.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amresh Shrivastava vs.

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State of Madhya Pradesh and others , reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 693 (paragraph 17), wherein it has been held that
initiation of disciplinary proceedings after an inordinate delay,
particularly at the verge of retirement or post-retirement, is liable to be
interfered with, especially when no satisfactory explanation for such
delay is forthcoming.
Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment passed by this
Hon'ble Court in Writ-A No. 9033 of 2024, Rakesh Kumar Nayak
vs. State of U.P. and others (paragraphs 18, 19 and 20), wherein it
has been held that belated initiation of disciplinary proceedings and
withholding of post-retiral dues without due justification is arbitrary
and unsustainable in law.
Although the impugned order alleges that the petitioner committed
forgery while issuing the recovery notice, the said allegation is wholly
misconceived and unsupported by the record. A perusal of the
recovery notice itself clearly demonstrates that the same was not
issued by the petitioner, but by the competent authority.
It is further submitted that, at the relevant point of time, the petitioner
was not posted in District Saharanpur and, therefore, had neither the
authority nor any occasion to issue the alleged recovery notice
addressed to the District Magistrate. In absence of any role, authority,
or connection with the issuance of the said notice, the allegation of
forgery levelled against the petitioner is patently arbitrary and
unsustainable.
It is further submitted that even in the counter affidavit filed on behalf
of the State Government, there is no specific pleading or averment to
the effect that the recovery certificate dated 22.10.2016 was forged
by the petitioner. In absence of any such categorical assertion in the
pleadings, the allegation of forgery levelled against the petitioner is

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wholly unsubstantiated and liable to be rejected.
On the strength of the aforesaid judgments, it is contended that there
was no occasion or justification for opposite party no. 2 to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner in respect of an alleged
incident of the year 2015, particularly on the eve of his retirement on
30.06.2025.
It is submitted that initiation of disciplinary proceedings after an
inordinate delay of more than ten years is wholly arbitrary,
unreasonable, and bad in law. Such belated action has been
consistently deprecated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, especially in
cases where no plausible explanation for the delay is forthcoming.
Submissions on Behalf of the Respondents
Learned Standing Counsel, while rebutting the submissions
advanced on behalf of the petitioner, submits that an FIR bearing No.
587 of 2019 has been registered against the petitioner under
Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 167 and 120-B IPC, and pursuant
thereto, a charge-sheet has already been filed by the police.
It is further submitted that the petitioner had prepared a forged
recovery memo and used the same for unlawful purposes, and thus,
the allegations against him are of grave misconduct, warranting
imposition of a major penalty.
It has also been submitted that a charge-sheet in the departmental
proceedings has been duly served upon the petitioner in March,
2026, wherein five charges have been levelled against him.
Lastly, it is contended that a writ petition challenging the initiation of
departmental proceedings is not maintainable at this stage, and
therefore, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

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Rejoinder Submissions
In reply to the submissions advanced by the learned Standing
Counsel, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, in Amresh Shrivastava vs State of Madhya Pradesh
and others
, has categorically held that inordinate and unexplained
delay in initiating departmental proceedings, particularly where the
alleged misconduct was within the knowledge of the department,
constitutes a valid ground for interference by the Court even at the
stage of issuance of the charge-sheet.
It is submitted that where the proceedings are vitiated on account of
gross delay, mala fide, or lack of jurisdiction, the writ petition is clearly
maintainable, notwithstanding the stage of the proceedings.
Therefore, the contention of the respondents that the writ petition is
not maintainable is misconceived and liable to be rejected.
On a specific query made by this Court, learned Standing Counsel
has fairly admitted that no independent subjective satisfaction,
preliminary inquiry, or fact-finding exercise was conducted by the
disciplinary authority to arrive at a conclusion that the petitioner had
forged or issued the alleged recovery notice dated 22.10.2016
(Annexure-10 to the writ petition). It has also not been clarified as to
who, in fact, issued or prepared the said recovery notice, which forms
the very basis of the impugned order dated 30.06.2025.
A perusal of the counter affidavit further reveals that there is no
specific and categorical denial or pleading to the effect that the
petitioner himself had forged the recovery notice dated 22.10.2016.
The stand of the State primarily rests upon the investigation
conducted in Case Crime No. 587 of 2019 under Sections 420, 467,
468, 471, 167 and 120-B IPC, wherein the Investigating Officer is
stated to have found the charges to be proved and, on that basis, the

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matter was referred by the Directorate of Geology and Mining to the
State Government, culminating in the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings under Rule 7 of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1999, read with Article 351-A of the Civil Service
Regulations.
However, this Court finds that the disciplinary authority has not
independently applied its mind nor recorded any satisfaction on the
basis of cogent material to connect the petitioner with the alleged
forgery. Furthermore, there is no explanation in the counter affidavit
as to how the petitioner could have issued or fabricated the recovery
notice when, admittedly, he was not posted in District Saharanpur at
the relevant time and was serving elsewhere, namely in District
Jalaun.
Conclusion on Delay and Merits
The issue of inordinate delay in initiating departmental proceedings is
also of significance. The proceedings have been initiated in the year
2025 in respect of an alleged incident of the year 2015, i.e., after a
lapse of about ten years, without any satisfactory explanation.
In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amresh Shrivastava vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh and others (supra) has categorically held
that inordinate and unexplained delay in initiating disciplinary
proceedings can be a ground for quashing such proceedings even at
the stage of charge-sheet. Paragraph 17 of the said judgment, being
relevant, is extracted below:-
"As to the second question, regarding whether delay is a
ground for stopping the departmental proceedings at the
stage of the chargesheet itself, suffice it to say that this
varies from case to case. However, in the instant case
where there is unexplained inordinate delay in initiating

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departmental proceedings despite the alleged misconduct
being within the knowledge of the department, but still no
departmental proceedings are initiated, the answer must go
in favour of the employee. However, there may be cases
where the department was not even aware of such
irregularities or the misconduct, which is of such a nature
that it is indica tive, based on material considerations of
factors other than merit, such as extraneous influences and
gratifications. In such cases, such a delay, by itself would
not be a valid ground to scuttle the initiation of the process
of departmental proceedings. "
A Coordinate Bench of this Court, while relying upon the judgments of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bani
Singh and another , AIR 1990 SC 1308, as well as State of Andhra
Pradesh vs. N. Radhakrishnan , reported in (1998) 4 SCC 154, has
held that in cases involving inordinate and unexplained delay in
initiation of disciplinary proceedings, prejudice to the delinquent
employee is writ large on the face of the record. It has further been
observed that such delay makes it virtually impossible for the
employee to gather relevant documents and evidence in his defence.
In the present case, it is an admitted position that the petitioner was
not posted in District Saharanpur at the time when the alleged
recovery notice dated 22.10.2016 (Annexure-10) was issued; rather,
he was posted in District Jalaun. This factual aspect is not in dispute,
as fairly conceded by the learned Standing Counsel.
Further, it is evident that while issuing the impugned order, no
subjective satisfaction has been recorded by the competent authority,
nor has any preliminary or fact-finding inquiry been conducted to
arrive at even a prima facie conclusion that it was the petitioner who
was involved in the alleged forgery of the recovery notice dated

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22.10.2016.
Coupled with the aforesaid, the impugned order (Annexure-1) has
been issued after an inordinate delay of about ten years from the date
of the alleged incident, that too on the eve of the petitioner's
retirement on 30.06.2025. Such extraordinary delay in initiating the
departmental proceedings has not been explained at all in the
counter affidavit.
Final order
Thus, in view of the aforesaid judgments and the discussion made
herein-above, the writ petition is allowed and this Court has no
hesitation in holding that the impugned order dated 30.6.2025
contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition cannot be sustained in
the eyes of law and is hereby set aside.
So far as the second relief prayed for by the petitioner is concerned, it
is evident that a specific pleading has been made in paragraph 22 of
the writ petition. However, in the counter affidavit filed by the State
dated 28.11.2025, there is virtually no reply to the averments made in
the said paragraph, and the same remains unrebutted.
Liberty is granted to the petitioner to move a representation before
the competent authority/opposite parties for consideration of his claim
for notional promotion to the post of Senior Mining Officer, in case his
juniors have been promoted to the said post.
In the event such a representation is filed, the competent authority
shall consider and decide the same, strictly in accordance with law,
by passing a reasoned and speaking order, within a period of three
months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order.
April 22, 2026
Madhu J.R/P.S
(Karunesh Singh Pawar,J.)
Digitally signed by :-
MADHU KUMARI
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench
Digitally signed by :-
MADHU KUMARI
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench