I.A. DHAS vs SHRI K.K. YADAV
- Court
- Chhattisgarh High Court
1
Digitally
signed by
VISHAKHA
BEOHAR
VISHAKHA
BEOHAR
CGHC010271082022 2026:CGHC:46373
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 3644 of 2022
Order Reserved on 07.08.2026
Order Delivered on 03.11.2026
1 - M/s Mahalaxmi Trading Through Its Partner Harish Sadwani,
S/o Late Shri Jethanand Sadwani, Aged About 58 Years, Office At
Plot No. 5, G.E. Road Khursipar, Near I.T.I. College Bhilai, District
Durg, Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Union Of India through Secretary Ministry of Steel, Udyog
Bhawan, Dr. Moulana Azad Road New Delhi 110011
2 - Steel Authority Of India Limited Registered Office Ispat Bhawan
Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110003
3 - Steel Authority Of India Limited Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai,
District Durg, Chhattisgarh
4 - The Estate Officer Under Public Premises (Eviction Of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 Hindi Midium School Building
Marouda Sector Bhiali Nagar, District Durg, Chhattisgarh
5 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Durg, District Durg,
Chhattisgarh
6 - Superintendent Of Police Durg, District Durg, Chhattisgarh
2
7 - Municipal Corporation Bhilai Through Its Commissioner Bhilai,
District Durg , Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent(s)
WPC No. 3667 of 2022
1 - D.P.Bansal Commercial Company Private Limited (Previously
Known As Bansal Commercial Company) Through Its Director
Namely Rahul Bansal, S/o Late D.P. Bansal, Aged About 42
Years,office At Plot No. 3, G.E. Road Khursipar, Near I.T.I. College
Bhilai, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - Union Of India Through Secretary Ministry Of Steel, Udyog
Bhawan Dr. Moulana Azad Road New Delhi 110011
2 - Steel Authority Of India Limited Registered Office Ispat Bhawan
Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110003
3 - Steel Authority Of India Limited Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai,
District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
4 - The Estate Officer Under Public Premises (Eviction Of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 Hindi Midium School Building
Marouda Sector School Building Marouda Sector Bhilai Nagar,
District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
5 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Durg,, District : Durg,
Chhattisgarh
6 - Superintendent Of Police Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
7 - Municipal Corporation Bhilai Through Its Commissioner Bhilai,
District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent(s)
3
WPC No. 3673 of 2022
1 - M/s Lakhmi Chand Agrawal Through Its Partner Naresh
Agrawal, S/o Late Shri L.C. Agrawal, Aged About 63 Years, Office
At G.E. Road, East Of Iti, Khursipar, Bhilaingar, District- Durg,
Chhattisgarh.
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - Union Of India Through Secretary Ministry Of Steel, Udyog
Bhawan, Dr. Moulana Azad Road New Delhi. 110011
2 - Steel Authority Of India Limited Registered Office Ispat Bhawan
Lodhi Road, New Delhi. 110003
3 - Steel Authority Of India Limited Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai,
District- Durg, Chhattisgarh.
4 - The Estate Officer Under Public Premises (Eviction Of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act. 1971 Hindi Midium Bhilai Nagar,
District- Durg, Chhattisgarh.
5 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Durg, District- Durg,
Chhattisgarh.
6 - Superintendent Of Police Durg, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh.
7 - Municipal Corporation Bhilai Through Its Commissioner Bhilai,
District- Durg, Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondent(s)
WPC No. 3676 of 2022
1 - M/s Bansal Brothers Through Its Partner Namely Anoop
Bansal, Son Of Late D.R. Bansal, Aged About 55 Years, Office At
Plot No.4, G.E. Road Khursipar, Near I.T.I. College Bhilai, District :
Durg, Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus
4
1 - Union Of India Through Secretary Ministry Of Steel, Udyog
Bhawan, Dr. Moulana Azad Road New Delhi 110011
2 - Steel Authority Of India Limited Registered Office Ispat Bhawan
Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110003.
3 - Steel Authority Of India Limited Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai,
District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
4 - The Estate Officer Under Public Premises (Evection Of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 Hindi Midium School Buliding
Marouda Sector Bhilai Nagar, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
5 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Durg, District : Durg,
Chhattisgarh
6 - Superintendent Of Police Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
7 - Municipal Corporation Bhilai Through Its Commissioner Bhilai,
District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent(s)
WPC No. 3681 of 2022
1 - Durga Dharam Kanta Through Its Proprietor Namely Smt.
Karuna Bansal, W/o Late D.P. Bansal, Aged 69 Years, Office Ate At
G.E. Road Khursipar, Near I.T.I. College Bhilai, District Durg,
Chhattisgarh.
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - Union Of India through Secretary Misnistry of Steel Udyog
Bhawan Dr. Moulana Azad Road New Delhi 110011
2 - Steel Authority Of India Limited, Registered Office Ispat
Bhawan Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110003.
3 - Steel Authority Of India Limited, Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai,
District Durg, Chhattisgarh.
5
4 - The Estate Officer Under Public Premises (Eviction Of
Unauthoritzed Occupants) Act, 1971 Hindi Midium School Building
Marouda Sector Bhiali Nagar, District Durg, Chhattisgarh.
5 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector Durg, District Durg
Chhattisgarh.
6 - Superintendent Of Police, Durg, District Durg, Chhattisgarh.
7 - Municipal Corporation Bhilai, Through Its Commissioner Bhilai,
District Durg, Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondent(s)
WPC No. 4555 of 2022
1 - Md. Rafiq S/o Md. Ishaq Aged About 48 Years R/o H. No. 88a,
Ruabandha Sector, Bhilai, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - Bhilai Steel Plant, Through Ceo, Bhilai, District : Durg,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Steel Authority Of India Limited Through Deputy General
Manager (Enforcement), Town Service Department, Bhilai Steel
Plant, Steel Authority Of India Ltd. Bhilai, District : Durg,
Chhattisgarh
3 - Nagar Nigam Rishali Through Cmo, Nagar Nigam Bhilai,
District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
4 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - Collector Durg, District : Durg,
Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent(s)
WPC No. 4587 of 2022
1 - Md. Shakeel Ahemad S/o Md. Ishak Aged About 63 Years R/o
Ruabandha Sector, Bhilai, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
6
2 - Vandana Puranik D/o Late Sarju Aged About 36 Years R/o
Ruabandha Sector, Bhilai, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
3 - Md. Pyare Sahab @ Pyare S/o Md. Ishak Aged About 56 Years
R/o Ruabandha Sector, Bhilai, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - Bhilai Steel Plant Through Ceo, Bhilai, District : Durg,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Steel Authority Of India Ltd. Through Deputy General Manager
(Enforcement), Town Service Department, Bhilai Steel Plant, Steel
Authority Of India Ltd. Bhilai, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
3 - Nagar Palika Nigam Rishali Through Cmo, Nagar Palika Nigam
Bhilai, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
4 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Durg, District : Durg,
Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent(s)
WPC No. 1882 of 2023
1 - Madan Lal Agarwal Proprietor M/s Agrawal Enterprises Acting
Under The Power Of Attorney Holder Ashok Kumar Agrawal S/o
Shri Sajjan Kumar Agrawal Aged About 55 Years, R/o Telhanala,
Khursipar G.E. Road, Near Iti Bhilai, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - Steel Authority Of India Limited, Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai,
District Durg (C.G.)
2 - The Estate Officer Under Public Premises (Eviction Of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, Hindu Medium School
Building, Maroda Sector, Bhilai Nagar, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent(s)
7
CONT No. 512 of 2022
1 - I.A. Dhas S/o Shri Issac Aged About 65 Years R/o Opposite I T
I, Khursipaar, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - Shri K.K. Yadav Deputy General Manager (Enforcement), T A
Building Bhilai Steel Plant, (Town Administration Bulding), Civic
Centre Area, Sector- 5, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent(s)
WPC No. 1769 of 2022
1 - I.A.Dhas S/o Shri Issac Aged About 65 Years Resident Of
Opposite Iti, Khursipaar, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh.
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - Steel Authority Of India Limited Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai,
District Durg Chhattisgarh.
2 - The Estate Officer Under Public Premises (Eviction Of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, Hindu Medium School
Building , Maroda Sector , Bhilai Nagar, District Durg.
3 - The Additional Superintendent Of Police (City) Bhilai, District
Durg.
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from the Case Information System)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For respective Petitioners in
: Mr. B.P. Sharma, Mr.
WPC No. 1769/2022, WPC No.
Samdarsh Nirankari & Mr.
1882/2023 & CONT No.
Pushp Kumar Gupta,
512/2022
Advocates
For respective Petitioners in : Mr. Rohan Kumbhare,
8
WPC No. 3644/2022, WPC No.
Advocate on behalf of Mr.
3667/2022, WPC No.
Bhaskar Jha, Advocate
3673/2022, WPC No.
3676/2022, WPC No.
3681/2022, WPC No. 4555/2022
& WPC No. 4587/2022
For Respondent – Steel
: Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pande,
Authority of India
Advocate
For State : Mr. Abhyuday Tripathi, P.L.
For Respondent-Municipal
: Mr. Sandeep Dubey,
Corporation in WPC No.
Advocate
3644/2022, WPC No.
3676/2022, WPC No. 4555/2022
& WPC No. 4587/2022
For Respondent-Municipal
: Mr. Pankaj Agrawal,
Corporation in WPC No.
Advocate
3667/2022 & WPC No.
3681/2022
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SB-Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV Order
1. Since common questions of fact and law are involved in all
these writ petitions, they are being heard together and are
being decided by this common order.
2. By way of these petitions, the petitioners, who are similarly
situated occupants of the premises situated at G.E. Road,
Khursipar, Bhilai, have challenged the action of the
9
respondents seeking to evict them from the respective
premises on the basis of the orders passed under the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971,
contending, inter alia, that they are lawful
licensees/occupants, have been in possession for several
decades, and have regularly paid the rent in respect of the
premises.
3. Since the facts of all the connected writ petitions are
substantially similar, arising out of the same background and
involving common questions of fact and law, the facts of
WPC No. 3644 of 2022 are being taken as the lead case for
the purpose of convenience. The facts of the cases are that
the respective petitioners are occupants/license holders of
plots situated at G.E. Road, Khursipar, Bhilai, in respect of
which agreements were executed with Bhilai Steel Plant in
the year 1976. The petitioners have been carrying on their
respective businesses from the subject premises and claim
to have regularly paid the rent/license fee, electricity charges
and property tax. In the year 2004, orders of eviction were
passed by the Estate Officer under the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. The
petitioners contend that, despite their long-standing
occupation and payment of dues, the respondents are now
10
seeking to evict them on the basis of the said orders after a
considerable lapse of time. It is further contended that the
petitioners are not encroachers but valid license holders and
that they are ready and willing to pay the rent and other dues
in accordance with the terms of the respective agreements.
The petitioners have, therefore, approached this Court
challenging the proposed action of eviction and seeking
protection against dispossession except in accordance with
law.
4. It is also relevant to mention that CONT No. 512 of 2022 has
been filed by the petitioner in WPC No. 1769 of 2022,
alleging wilful and deliberate disobedience of the interim
order dated 08.04.2022 passed by this Court in the said writ
petition, whereby the parties were directed to maintain status
quo. It is alleged in the contempt petition that, despite being
apprised of the aforesaid order, the authorities of Bhilai Steel
Plant proceeded to dispossess the petitioner from the subject
plot on 19.04.2022. The petitioner has, therefore, sought
initiation of contempt proceedings against the alleged
contemnor and has also prayed for restoration of possession
of the subject premises, besides other consequential reliefs.
5. Reliefs sought in WPC No. 3644/2022 is reproduced
hereinbelow:-
11
“10.1 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
restrain the respondents authorities from giving
effect to order dated 31.07.2004 passed in Case
No. 09/2004 as the same has become un-
executable by lapse of time.
10.2 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
direct the respondents from conversion of plots
allotted on license to lease basis.
10.3 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
set aside the order dated 31.07.2004 passed in
Case No. 09/2004 and also order dated
16.10.2021.
10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court
may deem fit and proper, may also be passed in
favour of the petitioner. An affidavit is filed
herewith in support of this petition.”
6. Reliefs sought in WPC No. 1769/2022 is reproduced
hereinbelow:-
“10.1 A writ and/ or an order in the nature of
appropriate writ do issue calling for records from
the respondents pertaining to petitioners' case for
its perusal, if deem fit in the facts and
circumstances of case.
10.2 A writ and/or an order in the nature of writ of
appropriate nature do issue restrain gin the
respondent authorities from giving effect to void
order dated 20.2.1981 passed in Case
No.75/1980 or the order who has lived his life and
has become un-executable by lapse of time and
also Notice 17.3.2022 and 29.3.2022 (Annexure
12
P-1 & P-2) being illegal, arbitrary and not
sustainable in law and in effect protect settled
possession of petitioner over the property in fact
in the facts and circumstances of case.
10.3 Cost of the proceedings.
10.4 Any other writs/directions that may be
deemed fit and just in the facts & circumstances
of case.”
7. Reliefs sought in WPC No. 3667/2022 is reproduced
hereinbelow:-
“10.1 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
restrain the respondents authorities from giving
effect to order dated 03.09.2004 passed in Case
No. 11/2004 as the same has become un-
executable by lapse of time.
10.2 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
direct the respondents from conversion of plots
allotted on license to lease basis.
10.3 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
set aside the order dated 03.09.2004 passed in
Case No. 11/2004.
10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court
may deem fit and proper, may also be passed in
favour of the petitioner.”
8. Reliefs sought in WPC No. 3673/2022 is reproduced
hereinbelow:-
“10.1 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
restrain the respondents authorities from giving
effect to order dated 14.08.2010 passed in Case
13
No. 13/2004 as the same has become un-
executable by lapse of time.
10.2 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
direct the respondents from conversion of plots
allotted on license to lease basis.
10.3 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
set aside the order dated 14.08.2010 passed in
Case No. 13/2004.
10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court
may deem fit and proper, may also be passed in
favour of the petitioner. An affidavit is filed
herewith in support of this petition.”
9. Reliefs sought in WPC No. 3676/2022 is reproduced
hereinbelow:-
“10.1 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
restrain the respondents authorities from giving
effect to order dated 03.09.2004 passed in Case
No. 10/2004 as the same has become un-
executable by lapse of time.
10.2 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
direct the respondents from conversion of plots
allotted on license to lease basis.
10.3 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
set aside the order dated 03.09.2004 passed in
Case No. 10/2004.
10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court
may deem fit and proper, may also be passed in
favour of the petitioner. An affidavit is filed
herewith in support of this petition.”
14
10. Reliefs sought in WPC No. 3681/2022 is reproduced
hereinbelow:-
“10.1 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
restrain the respondents authorities from giving
effect to order dated 23.10.2010 passed in Case
No. 67/2004 as the same has become un-
executable by lapse of time.
10.2 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
direct the respondents from conversion of plots
allotted on license to lease basis.
10.3 That this Hon'ble court kindly be pleased to
set aside the order dated 23.10.2010 passed in
Case No. 67/2004.
10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court
may deem fit and proper, may also be passed in
favour of the petitioner.”
11. Reliefs sought in WPC No. 4555/2022 is reproduced
hereinbelow:-
“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to allow the petition and call for the
record of the case, and set aside the order of
08.04.2022 of Nagar Nigam Rishali and removal
notice of Estate Officer Bhilai Steel Plant of
07.10.2022, in the interest of justice.
10.2 That any other relief, which this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper together with cost
of the petition.”
12. Reliefs sought in WPC No. 4587/2022 is reproduced
hereinbelow:-
15
“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to allow the petition and call for the record
of the case, and set aside the order of 08.04.2022
of Nagar Nigam Rishali and removal notice of
Estate Officer Bhilai Steel Plant of 07.10.2022, in
the interest of justice.
10.2 That any other relief, which this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper together with cost
of the petition.”
13. Reliefs sought in WPC No. 1882/2023 is reproduced
hereinbelow:-
“10.1 A writ and/ or an order in the nature of
appropriate writ do issue calling the records from
the respondent authorities concerned pertaining
to case of the petitioners for perusal of this
Hon'ble Court, if thinks fit in the facts &
circumstances of case.
10.2 A writ and/or an order in the nature of
appropriate writ do issue restraining the
respondent authorities from giving effect to void
order dated 11.08.2004 passed in Case No.
15/2002 or the order which has lived its life and
has become un-executable by lapse of time and
in effect to protect the settled possession of
petitioner over the property in the facts and
circumstances of the case.
10.3 Cost of the proceedings.
10.4 Any other writs and directions that may be
deemed fit and just in the facts & circumstances
of case.”
16
14. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the
petitioners are similarly situated occupants/license holders of
the subject premises and have been in possession thereof for
several decades pursuant to the respective agreements
executed with the Bhilai Steel Plant. It is submitted that there
is a strong apprehension that the respondents may proceed
to evict the petitioners without following the due process of
law, particularly when the premises of a similarly situated
concern, namely M/s Mahalaxmi Trading, situated in close
proximity to the petitioners' premises, have already been
sealed by the respondents. Learned counsel would further
submit that in the case of I.A. Dhas vs. Steel Authority of
India, this Court, vide order dated 08.04.2022 passed in WPC
No.1769 of 2022, had granted interim protection to a similarly
situated occupant and the said interim protection was
thereafter continued. It is contended that the petitioners are
also entitled to similar protection, particularly in view of the
fact that their cases arise from the same set of
circumstances. It is further submitted that the action
proposed by the respondents is otherwise not permissible in
law, as the orders of eviction relied upon by the respondents
had been passed several years ago and have not been acted
17
upon within a reasonable period. Learned counsel, therefore,
submits that the respondents cannot seek to revive and
execute such stale orders after an inordinate lapse of time,
particularly when the petitioners have remained in
possession and have continued to discharge their obligations
by making payment of rent/license fee and other charges.
15. Learned counsel would also submit that the subject land
was allotted by the Central Government to the Bhilai Steel
Plant for the purposes connected with its activities and,
therefore, eviction of the petitioners could be justified only if
the subject premises were actually required for expansion of
the plant or for any other legitimate purpose of the Bhilai
Steel Plant. It is submitted that the subject plots are not
presently required for such purpose and, therefore, there is
no justification for disturbing the long-standing possession of
the petitioners. It is further contended that the petitioners are
not encroachers, but are lawful occupants/licensees who
have remained in possession of the respective premises for
several decades and have regularly paid the applicable rent,
license fee, electricity charges and property tax. Therefore,
according to learned counsel, the respondents' attempt to
dispossess the petitioners, particularly after such a long
period, is arbitrary and illegal.
18
16. Learned counsel would lastly submit that the action of the
respondents, if permitted to continue, would cause serious
prejudice to the petitioners and would amount to
dispossession otherwise than in accordance with law. It is,
therefore, prayed that the respondents be restrained from
taking coercive steps against the petitioners and from giving
effect to the old orders of eviction, and that appropriate
protection be granted to the petitioners in the facts and
circumstances of the case.
17. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in CONT
No. 512/2022 submit that the present contempt petition
alleges wilful and deliberate disobedience of the interim order
dated 08.04.2022 passed by this Court in WPC No. 1769 of
2022, whereby the parties were directed to maintain status
quo in respect of the subject premises. Despite having
knowledge of the said order, the respondents allegedly
dispossessed the applicant from the subject plot on
19.04.2022. It is submitted that the petitioner was in settled
possession and that his dispossession during the
subsistence of the status quo order amounts to clear and
wilful disobedience thereof. Subsequent proceedings or
orders passed by the Estate Officer cannot justify an action
contrary to the order of this Court. Learned counsel would
19
further submit that the respondents were bound to maintain
the existing position until the order dated 08.04.2022 was
modified, vacated or otherwise ceased to operate. Their
conduct, therefore, warrants appropriate action under the
contempt jurisdiction of this Court.
18. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent–Steel
Authority of India Limited would submit that the present writ
petition is not maintainable, as the subject premises form part
of the public premises of Bhilai Steel Plant at Khursipar,
Bhilai, and the petitioner has no subsisting or legally
enforceable right to remain in occupation thereof. It is
submitted that the original allotment was made in favour of
an individual/proprietor and not in favour of the petitioner or
the partnership firm on whose behalf the present petition has
been instituted. In the case of M/s Mahalaxmi Trading, the
premises were temporarily allotted to Shri Jethanand
Sadhwani, Proprietor of M/s Mahalaxmi Trading, pursuant to
allotment order dated 20.07.1976, followed by an agreement
dated 23.07.1979. The said agreement specifically prohibited
subletting, creation of partnership or transfer of the right of
occupation. Similar restrictions governed the other allotments
relied upon by the occupants. Therefore, the petitioner
cannot claim an independent right of occupation on the
20
strength of an allotment made in favour of another person. It
is further submitted that the unauthorized occupation and
encroachment over the public premises were noticed by the
respondent and several notices were issued from time to
time requiring removal of the encroachment and vacation of
the premises. In respect of the premises concerning M/s
Mahalaxmi Trading, notices including the notice dated
22/24.02.2001 were issued and, upon failure to comply, the
allotment/licence was terminated and proceedings under the
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1971 (for short, ‘the PP Act’) were instituted. Likewise, in
Case No.10/2004 concerning M/s Bansal Brothers,
proceedings were initiated before the Estate Officer on
12.07.2004 for eviction from the unauthorized occupation of
public premises and for recovery of rent/damages. Notice
under Sections 4(1) and 7(3) of the PP Act was issued and
served. The proceedings thereafter continued; although the
matter proceeded ex parte at one stage, applications were
subsequently filed on behalf of the occupant, evidence was
adduced and the matter was duly considered by the Estate
Officer.
19. Learned counsel would submit that the Estate Officer,
upon consideration of the material and evidence available on
21
record, recorded a categorical finding that the land was the
public premises of SAIL/BSP and that the occupants were in
unauthorized occupation. The Estate Officer also recorded
findings regarding violation of the temporary licence,
additional encroachment, termination of the licence and
liability towards rent/damages, and thereafter passed orders
under Sections 5(1), 7(1) and 7(2) of the PP Act. In Case
No.10/2004, the order dated 26.08.2004 was followed by the
eviction order dated 03.09.2004. In another proceeding,
namely Case No.09/2004, the Estate Officer passed the
eviction order dated 31.07.2004 after issuance of notice
under Sections 4(1) and 7(3), granting opportunity to the
occupant and also determining damages and future damages
until vacation of the premises. In respect of the premises
allotted to Smt. Karuna Bansal, proceedings were also
initiated after issuance of notice under Sections 4(1) and
7(3), culminating in the eviction order dated 23.10.2010 and
consequential order under Sections 5(1) and 7(2) dated
20.01.2011. It is submitted that none of the aforesaid eviction
orders was challenged by the concerned occupants before
the competent appellate forum. The statutory remedy under
Section 9 of the PP Act was therefore not availed, and the
orders attained finality. The subsequent execution
22
proceedings were thus not based upon any fresh or unilateral
decision of the respondent to dispossess the petitioner, but
were merely steps taken to implement pre-existing orders
passed by the competent Estate Officer under the PP Act.
Consequently, the petitioner cannot, by invoking the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, indirectly seek
restoration of possession or reopening of an eviction order
which was never challenged in the manner provided by law.
20. Learned counsel would further submit that the mere
lapse of time between the passing of the eviction orders and
their physical execution does not establish abandonment of
the statutory proceedings. The record demonstrates
continuous efforts by the respondent to secure possession.
Various execution authorizations were issued from time to
time, including those dated 24.08.2004, 03.04.2006,
25.04.2007, 11.08.2010, 05.06.2014, 12.11.2020 and
16.10.2021, and the proceedings before the Estate Officer
continued as the premises had not been vacated. The
change of enforcement officers on account of transfers or
administrative reasons cannot be construed as abandonment
of the eviction order. Ultimately, on 24.08.2022, Shri K.K.
Yadav, Deputy General Manager (Enforcement), was
authorized as the execution officer, and on 06.09.2022 he
23
reported that the eviction action had been scheduled for
09.09.2022 at 7:00 a.m., with requisition for the Executive
Magistrate and police assistance.
21. It is submitted that pursuant to the aforesaid statutory
orders and execution proceedings, actual possession of the
public premises was taken on 09.09.2022 in the presence of
the Executive Magistrate/Tahsildar and police authorities and
the premises were duly sealed. The execution report and
Panchnama dated 09.09.2022, along with the keys and other
execution material, were submitted by the authorized officer.
In some of the connected proceedings, physical execution
was recorded on 17.08.2022 and the premises were similarly
sealed. Thus, the respondent's case is that, in all such
matters, the physical taking over of possession was the
culmination of the statutory eviction proceedings and not a
fresh or forcible dispossession undertaken independently of
the PP Act. Learned counsel would submit that this factual
aspect assumes significance in view of the interim order
dated 16.09.2022 passed by this Court directing
maintenance of status quo and restraining the respondent
authorities from preventing the petitioner from entering the
premises without following due process of law. It is
contended that, by the date of the said interim order,
24
possession had already been taken and the premises had
been sealed pursuant to the Estate Officer's eviction order.
Therefore, the factual premise on which the interim order was
sought, namely that the petitioner continued to be in
possession, was incorrect. The contemporaneous execution
report and Panchnama demonstrate that possession had
already been taken before the interim order. The respondent
therefore submits that the material fact regarding prior
execution and sealing ought to have been brought to the
notice of this Court.
22. It is further submitted that the subsequent conduct of
the petitioner also demonstrates that the premises had
already been sealed. After the execution, the Estate Officer,
on 12.09.2022, requested the police and district
administration to provide security and patrolling at the sealed
premises. Thereafter, by Letter No.500 dated 16.09.2022, the
Estate Officer specifically warned the concerned authorities
regarding the possibility of the seal being broken and
unauthorized re-entry into the premises. The said
communication was also sent to the petitioner by registered
post and affixed at the premises. On 17.09.2022, an
application was submitted before the Estate Officer seeking
removal of the seal on the strength of the interim order. The
25
respondent's case is that thereafter the sealed premises
were broken open and unauthorized re-entry was made,
resulting in the Estate Officer submitting a complaint dated
19.09.2022 seeking registration of an offence under Section
11 of the PP Act. Learned counsel submits that the said
subsequent conduct cannot confer any right of possession
upon the petitioner. Any criminal liability arising from such
conduct would, however, be governed by the appropriate
criminal/statutory proceedings. Learned counsel would
further submit that the petitioner cannot derive any lawful
right from the alleged payment of rent, electricity charges,
municipal dues or other charges. Such payments, even if
made, do not constitute an allotment, lease or statutory
authority to remain in possession of public premises,
particularly when the competent Estate Officer has already
adjudicated the occupation to be unauthorized and has
passed an eviction order. Likewise, any alleged attempt to
convert the licence into a lease in the year 1989 or reliance
upon correspondence issued by the Town Services
Department cannot override the concluded statutory
adjudication or revive a right of occupation which stood
terminated.
26
23. It is also submitted that the petitioner has no locus to
claim the benefit of an allotment made in favour of another
person. In particular, where the temporary licence/allotment
stood in the name of a particular proprietor, the petitioner
cannot assert an independent right of occupation contrary to
the express conditions of the licence prohibiting transfer,
subletting or creation of partnership. The subsequent
application for removal of the seal made by a person other
than the original allottee also does not create any lawful right
in his favour. Learned counsel would further submit that the
respondent's claim for rent/damages has also been
determined in the statutory proceedings. The Estate Officer
had directed payment of damages and future damages until
vacation of the premises. As on August, 2022, substantial
amounts, including approximately Rs.18,45,806.45/- /
Rs.18,89,797/-, as applicable to the respective premises and
as reflected in the departmental record, remained
recoverable towards unauthorized occupation. The petitioner
cannot, therefore, rely upon alleged payments of rent or
electricity charges while simultaneously disputing the liability
determined under the PP Act.
24. It is lastly submitted that the relief sought in the writ
petition, if granted, would effectively result in restoration of
27
possession of public premises to an occupant whose
occupation has already been adjudicated to be unauthorized
and from whom possession has been taken pursuant to a
statutory eviction order. Such a course would amount to
indirectly nullifying or reversing the final order of the Estate
Officer without the petitioner having successfully challenged
that order in the statutory appellate proceedings. The
petitioner has neither established any subsisting lawful right
to possession nor demonstrated any exceptional ground
warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. In these circumstances, learned counsel submits
that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. It is further
prayed that the petitioner be directed to hand over/continue
to remain out of possession of the public premises and to pay
the damages and other dues determined in accordance with
law, and that no equitable relief be granted in favour of a
person whose unauthorized occupation has already been
adjudicated by the competent authority.
25. Learned counsels appearing for the respondent–
Municipal Corporation would submit that the Corporation is
only a formal party to the present proceedings, as the
impugned action and order relate to the Bhilai Steel Plant
and the Estate Officer. No relief has been claimed against the
28
answering respondent. It is submitted that the petitioner’s
assertion regarding payment of electricity charges to the
Municipal Corporation is incorrect, as the documents filed by
the petitioner themselves show payment to the Chhattisgarh
State Power Distribution Company Limited. In any event,
payment of municipal dues or taxes, even if made, would not
confer any title or legal right over the premises. Learned
counsel would further submit that the issues raised in the
petition primarily concern the action of the respondent
authorities under the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, and the answering
respondent has no role in the same. Therefore, the petition
deserves to be dismissed against the Municipal Corporation.
26. Learned State counsel would submit that the dispute
raised in the present writ petitions primarily concerns the
petitioners and the Steel Authority of India Limited/Bhilai
Steel Plant and its Estate Officer. The respondent-State has
no direct role in the allotment of the subject premises or in
the proceedings initiated under the Public Premises (Eviction
of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. Learned State
counsel would further submit that the action complained of is
required to be considered in the light of the statutory
proceedings and orders passed by the competent authority
29
under the aforesaid Act. The respondent-State would abide
by any order that may be passed by this Court in the present
batch of petitions.
27. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents/non-
applicants in Contempt petition would submit that the
contempt petition is devoid of merit, as no wilful or deliberate
disobedience of the interim order dated 08.04.2022 is made
out. The premises in question are public premises of the
Steel Authority of India Limited and the eviction was being
executed pursuant to the subsisting order of the Estate
Officer dated 20.02.1981, in respect of which repeated steps
for execution had been taken. It is submitted that the eviction
and sealing of the premises were carried out on 19.04.2022
in the presence of the police and Tahsildar, Durg. The
respondents specifically deny having any prior knowledge or
communication of the interim order dated 08.04.2022 at the
time of execution. The petitioner's application was submitted
before the Estate Officer only at about 5:00 p.m. on
19.04.2022, after the premises had already been sealed, and
the respondents received the same only on 20.04.2022.
Learned counsel would further submit that immediately upon
the order being brought to their notice, the Estate Officer
stayed further proceedings by order dated 25.04.2022. The
30
subsequent breaking of the seal and re-entry into the
premises by the petitioner resulted in lodging of an FIR dated
06.05.2022 under Section 11 of the Public Premises (Eviction
of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. It is, therefore,
submitted that the execution was undertaken bona fide
pursuant to a pre-existing statutory order and not with any
intention to disobey the order of this Court. In the absence of
knowledge and conscious or deliberate violation, the
essential ingredients of contempt are not satisfied. The
contempt petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.
28. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the
respective parties and have perused the material available
on record with the bunch of petitions.
29. The principal question which arises for consideration in
these writ petitions is whether the petitioners, who claim to
have acquired possession of the subject premises from the
original lessee/licensee, can claim a lawful right to continue
in occupation of the public premises belonging to the Bhilai
Steel Plant, notwithstanding the conditions contained in the
original lease/agreement prohibiting transfer, subletting or
creation of partnership in respect of the allotted premises.
30. From the material available on record, it appears that
the subject premises were originally allotted/leased by the
31
Bhilai Steel Plant in favour of the original allottee, namely,
Shri Ved Prakash Chopra. The petitioners claim to have
subsequently obtained possession from the said original
allottee upon payment of consideration and have raised
permanent constructions over the subject premises.
However, the petitioners have not been able to demonstrate
that any independent right or title in their favour was created
by the Bhilai Steel Plant. On the contrary, the very basis of
their possession is the alleged transaction entered into with
the original allottee.
31. The contention of the petitioners that the Estate Officer
had no jurisdiction or authority to initiate proceedings for their
eviction under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized
Occupants) Act, 1971, cannot be accepted. Section 2(e) of
the Act defines “public premises”, while Section 2(g) defines
“unauthorised occupation”. In the facts of the present case,
the petitioners cannot claim lawful authority to remain in
possession merely on the basis of the transaction entered
into with the original lessee, particularly when the original
lease/agreement itself prohibited transfer, subletting or
creation of partnership in respect of the premises.
32
32. In Liife Insurance Corporation of India and Another
v. VITA, (2026) 3 SCC 427 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held as under:-
“78.1. Both categories of statutes, namely, the
PP Act, 1971 on one hand, and the Bombay
Rent Control Act, 1947, the Maharashtra Rent
Control Act, 1999, the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 and similar Rent Control legislations, on
the other hand, are special laws. Therefore, in
order to determine as to which Act will apply in
case of conflict, reference has to be made to the
purpose and policy underlying the two
enactments and the clear intendment conveyed
by the language of the relevant provisions
therein. Keeping in view the object and purpose
underlying both the enactments, that is, the PP
Act, 1971 and the Rent Control Acts, the
provisions of the PP Act, 1971 shall override the
provisions in the Rent Control legislations.
78.2. The PP Act, 1971 and the State Rent
Control Acts are special enactments in
themselves. Rule generalia specialibus non
derogant will not apply. Having regard to the
purpose, policy and legislative intent of the PP
Act, 1971, the same would prevail over the
State Rent Control Acts in respect of eviction of
“unauthorised occupants” of “public premises”
as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act.
33
78.3. The provisions of the PP Act, 1971, to the
extent they cover the premises falling within the
ambit of the Rent Control Act, override the
provisions of the Rent Control Act.
78.4. A person in unauthorised occupation of
“Public Premises” under Section 2(e) of the Act
cannot invoke the protection of the Rent Control
Act.
78.5. In cases where the tenanted premises are
claimed to be governed by the State Rent
Control Act and the same have also become
“Public Premises” within the meaning in Section
2(e) of the PP Act, 1971, for their unauthorised
occupation, the PP Act, 1971 will have
application.
78.6. The statutory machinery envisaged under
the PP Act, 1971, could be activated for
recovery of possession of public premises by
any government or public entity mentioned in
the definition.
78.7. The PP Act, 1971 will apply to the
tenancies which may have been created and in
existence either before coming into force of the
Act or which may have been created
subsequent to coming into the force of the Act.
78.8. Two conditions must be satisfied for the
applicability as above. Firstly, the tenanted
premises must fall within the purview of
definition under Section 2(e) of the PP Act,
34
1971. Secondly, the premises should have been
in unauthorised occupation.
78.9. Termination of tenancy of “Public
Premises” by issuing notice under Section 106
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is one of
the modes which would render the occupation of
the tenant unauthorised, post the date specified
in such notice. This would hold true in respect of
tenancies created before or after coming into
force of the PP Act, 1971.
78.10. Invocation and applicability of the
provisions of the PP Act, 1971 is not dependent
upon the aspect of possession. What is material
is the occupation of the premises which has
become unauthorised occupation. The
occupation is a continuous concept.
78.11. The propositions enunciated in Suhas H.
Pophale [Suhas H. Pophale v. Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd., (2014) 4 SCC 657 : (2014) 2
SCC (Civ) 685] , as noticed in para 19 of this
judgment, do not, in our considered view, state
the correct position of law. The observations
made therein, with great respect, are not in
consonance with the settled legal principles and
runs contrary to the principle of stare decisis
and stand overruled to that extent.”
33. Clause 22 of the agreement specifically prohibits
subletting or the creation of a partnership in respect of the
allotted premises. Therefore, the original allottee could not
35
validly transfer the possessory rights in favour of the
petitioners in contravention of the terms of the agreement. A
person deriving possession through a transaction prohibited
by the original allotment agreement cannot claim a better
right against the owner merely on the basis of such
transaction. In Board of Trustees of the Port of Calcutta v.
Kalipada Bhakat and others, (2014) 10 SCC 573 , the
Supreme Court considered the rights of persons claiming
through an original occupant in proceedings under the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.
Accordingly, in the absence of any independent allotment or
authorisation by the Bhilai Steel Plant, the petitioners cannot
claim that their occupation has become authorised merely
because they paid consideration to the original allottee.
34. Once the occupation of the petitioners is found to be
unauthorised within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act of
1971, the initiation of proceedings under Section 5 of the Act
cannot be said to be without jurisdiction merely because the
petitioners claim to have entered into possession through the
original allottee. In Life Insurance Corporation of India Ltd.
(Supra), the Supreme Court considered the applicability of
the Public Premises Act and its overriding effect over
conflicting provisions of State rent-control legislation. The
36
statutory scheme of the Act provides a mechanism for
eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. The
competent authority is, therefore, entitled to proceed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, subject to
compliance with the applicable statutory requirements.
35. The contention that the petitioners have raised
permanent constructions over the subject premises, obtained
electricity connections and remained in occupation for
several decades does not, by itself, create any title or legally
enforceable right against the Bhilai Steel Plant. Such
circumstances may establish the fact or duration of
possession, but they cannot substitute for lawful authority to
occupy public premises. The principles governing
unauthorised occupation must be applied in light of the
statutory scheme of the Act of 1971, as explained in Board
of Trustees of the Port of Calcutta (Supra), and Life
Insurance Corporation of India Ltd.(Supra) . Consequently,
the petitioners cannot claim a right to continue in occupation
merely on the basis of long possession, expenditure incurred
on construction or payment of electricity charges.
36. The petitioners have also sought to contend that the
eviction orders passed by the Estate Officer several years
ago have become incapable of execution on account of lapse
37
of time. The said contention also cannot be accepted. An
unauthorised occupant cannot seek to acquire a right in
public premises merely by relying upon the passage of time.
Mere delay in execution of an order of eviction does not
create a vested right in favour of an unauthorised occupant,
nor can such occupant claim protection on the basis of
adverse possession against the true owner of the premises.
37. The contention that the proceedings under the Act of
1971 cannot be pursued on account of the lapse of time must
be examined in accordance with the applicable statutory
provisions and the nature of the orders passed by the
competent authority. The petitioners cannot claim that the
mere passage of time has conferred an independent right to
continue in occupation of the premises. In Anant Raj
Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority, 2012
SCC OnLine Del 6406 , the Delhi High Court held, in the
context of proceedings under the Act of 1971, that a noticee
must raise the available objections before the Estate Officer
rather than seek to restrain the statutory proceedings through
a civil suit. The said decision supports the proposition that
objections concerning the legality of the proceedings must be
pursued through the remedies available under the statutory
scheme. The petitioners have, therefore, to establish a
38
legally sustainable ground for interference; the mere passage
of time, without more, does not establish such a ground.
38. The contention of the petitioners that the orders passed
by the Estate Officer have attained finality and, therefore,
cannot be acted upon after such a long period also does not
persuade this Court. The mere lapse of time does not have
the effect of conferring legality upon an otherwise
unauthorised occupation. The petitioners have not
demonstrated the existence of any subsequent order of the
competent authority recognising their occupation or creating
an independent leasehold or ownership right in their favour.
39. The submission that the writ petitions are not
maintainable in view of the statutory remedy provided under
the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)
Act, 1971, also does not merit acceptance in the absolute
terms in which it has been advanced. The jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not completely
ousted merely because an alternative statutory remedy is
available. The power of judicial review under Article 226 can
be exercised in appropriate cases. However, the existence of
such jurisdiction does not mean that this Court would
interfere merely because another view is possible. In the
present case, no patent lack of jurisdiction or manifest
39
illegality has been demonstrated in the action taken by the
Estate Officer so as to warrant interference in exercise of writ
jurisdiction.
40. The further objection regarding the impleadment of the
Estate Officer also deserves rejection. Merely arraying the
officer who passed the impugned order as a respondent
cannot, by itself, render the writ petition non-maintainable.
The Court is required to examine the substance of the
controversy and the relief claimed rather than adopt a hyper-
technical approach with regard to the array of parties. No
prejudice has been demonstrated to have been caused to the
concerned officer merely because he has been impleaded in
the proceedings.
41. On an overall consideration of the material on record,
the crux of the dispute is clear. The subject premises belong
to the Bhilai Steel Plant and were originally allotted/leased to
another person. The petitioners claim their possession
through the original allottee, despite the express prohibition
against transfer, subletting or creation of partnership. Such a
transaction, being contrary to the terms of the original
agreement, could not confer any independent right or title
upon the petitioners. Their long-standing possession,
construction over the premises, payment of electricity
40
charges or other dues cannot alter the legal character of their
occupation.
42. The petitioners, therefore, cannot claim protection of
their possession merely on the ground that they have
remained in occupation for a long period. The Bhilai Steel
Plant, being the owner of the public premises, is entitled to
recover possession from an unauthorised occupant in
accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971.
The action of the respondents in initiating/proceeding with the
eviction of the petitioners, therefore, cannot be said to be
without authority of law.
43. Consequently, this Court finds no ground to interfere
with the impugned proceedings/orders challenged in these
writ petitions. The petitioners have failed to establish any
lawful right to continue in occupation of the subject premises
or any jurisdictional error warranting interference under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
44. Coming to CONT No. 512 of 2022 , the same has been
preferred by the petitioner in WPC No. 1769 of 2022 alleging
wilful and deliberate disobedience of the interim order dated
08.04.2022 passed in the said writ petition, whereby the
parties were directed to maintain status quo in respect of the
41
subject premises. The allegation of the petitioner is that,
despite the subsistence of the said order and knowledge
thereof, the respondent proceeded to dispossess him from
the subject premises on 19.04.2022.
45. In order to constitute civil contempt, it is necessary to
establish a wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. The
material placed on record, however, does not persuade this
Court to hold that the alleged contemnor has deliberately and
wilfully violated the order dated 08.04.2022. As noticed
hereinabove, the occupation claimed by the petitioner was
not founded upon any independent or lawful title against the
Bhilai Steel Plant. The proceedings for eviction had already
been initiated and the rights of the parties were governed by
the orders passed by the competent authority under the
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act,
1971.
46. It is also relevant that the very basis of the petitioner's
claim of protection of possession has not been found
sustainable in the connected writ petition. The petitioner has
failed to establish any lawful right to continue in occupation of
the public premises. Mere fact of possession, therefore,
cannot be treated as sufficient to establish that the alleged
42
action of the respondent constituted a deliberate violation of
the order of this Court.
47. The contempt jurisdiction is not intended to be invoked
for adjudicating disputed questions of title or for conferring
upon a person a substantive right to remain in possession of
public premises. The question whether the petitioner was
entitled to continue in possession has already been
considered in the connected writ proceedings, and this Court
has found that the petitioner's occupation was unauthorised
and that the proceedings for eviction under the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971
were not without jurisdiction.
48. In the circumstances of the present case, the essential
ingredient of wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order
dated 08.04.2022 is not established. The allegation made in
the contempt petition, therefore, does not warrant initiation of
contempt action against the respondent. Consequently,
CONT No. 512 of 2022 also deserves to be dismissed .
49. For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds no ground to
interfere with the impugned proceedings/orders challenged in
the connected writ petitions. The petitioners have failed to
establish any lawful right to continue in occupation of the
43
subject premises or any jurisdictional error warranting
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.
50. Accordingly, WPC No. 3644 of 2022, WPC No. 3667 of
2022, WPC No. 3673 of 2022, WPC No. 3676 of 2022, WPC
No. 3681 of 2022, WPC No. 4555 of 2022, WPC No. 4587 of
2022, WPC No. 1882 of 2023 and WPC No. 1769 of 2022
are dismissed.
51. Consequently, CONT No. 512 of 2022 is also
dismissed.
52. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Vishakha
44
HEAD-NOTE
“Petitioners claiming possession through the original
allottee in violation of the express prohibition on transfer or
subletting acquire no lawful right to occupy public
premises. Long-standing possession, construction and
payment of dues do not confer any enforceable right.”