SMT. GEETA RAMAPPA TERDAL vs COMMISSIONER,

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Reserved on : 07.10.2026
Pronounced on : 16.10.2026



R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD


DATED THIS THE 16th DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA


AND

THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

WRIT APPEAL NO.100680 OF 2025 (S-REG)



BETWEEN:

SMT. GEETA RAMAPPA TERDAL
AGE MAJOR, OCCU. SERVICE
R/O. OPPOSITE TO TELEPHONE
EXCHAANGE OFFICE
DANDELI, DIST. KARWAR
…APPELLANT

(BY SRI.R.S.SHETTAR, ADVOCATE)


AND:


1.








Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench

COMMISSIONER,
CITY MUNICIPALITY
DANDELI, KARWAR DISTRICT
2. PROJECT DIRECTOR
DISTRICT URBAN DEVELOPMENT CELL,

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D.C.OFFICE, KARWAR
3. DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION
9TH FLOOR, VISHVESHWARAYYA TOWER,
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDI,
BENGALURU-1.

4. COMMISSIONER
DIRECTORATE OF MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION
9TH FLOOR VISHVESHWARAYYA TOWER
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDI,
BENGALURU-1

5. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
KARNATAKA SECRETARIAT
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT
VIKAS SOUDHA, BENGALURU 1
6. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
D.C. OFFICE. KARWAR DISTRICT,
KARWAR.
…RESPONDENTS

(BY SMT.GIRIJA S.HIREMATH, HCGP)


THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S.4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING THIS HON BLE COURT TO ALLOWING
THIS APPEAL AND TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 29.08.2025
IN WRIT PETITION NO.105093/2022 AND ETC.

THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
07.10.2026 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

CAV JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )



The appellant is before us calling in question the order
dated 29-08-2025, rendered by the learned Single Judge in
W.P.No.105093 of 2022, whereby the writ petition comes to
be rejected on the solitary premise that the appellant,
having attained the age of superannuation, could no longer
seek regularization of her services. The learned Single Judge
thus holds that the claim for regularization would not
survive the appellant's retirement. It is this order, which
places superannuation as an insurmountable impediment to
the consideration of a claim that had its genesis during the
appellant's subsisting service that is called in question in the
present appeal. The issue, therefore, is whether the mere
efflux of time culminating in superannuation could render an

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otherwise subsisting claim for regularization otiose,
particularly when the appellant had served the State for 34
long years and seeks consequential benefits flowing from
such regularization.

2. Facts, adumbrated, are as follows:
2.1. The appellant, now aged 64 years, presents before this
Court a rather disquieting tale of a public servant who entered the
portals of Government service in the year 1988, served the State
for an astonishing span of 34 years, and yet was made to depart
from its service without ever being accorded the status of a regular
employee. The appellant belongs to the Scheduled Caste
community. Her entry into service was neither clandestine nor
through the backdoor. It was pursuant to a selection process
initiated by the respondent-State, through the Employment
Exchange, for appointment to the post of Typist against a duly
sanctioned and vacant post earmarked for the reserved category.
On being selected, the appellant reported to duty on 08-06-1988
and continued to discharge the functions of a Typist under the

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establishment of the 3rd respondent – Directorate of Municipal
Administration.
2.2. After rendering nearly 24 years of uninterrupted service,
the appellant staked her claim for regularization. Her claim was not
one resting merely upon her own representation. It received the
recommendation of the very establishment under which she had
been serving, along with the claims of several other daily-wage
employees similarly placed. What followed, however, was a curious
and disturbing disparity. While 12 daily-wage employees, who had
entered service subsequent to the appointment of the appellant,
were extended the benefit of regularization, the appellant's claim
remained unattended, notwithstanding the recommendations made
in her favour by the respective departments.
2.3. Years rolled by; representations remained
representations; recommendations remained recommendations;
and the appellant continued to discharge the duties of a Typist,
without the dignity and security of regular employment. Ultimately,
in June 2022, the appellant attained the age of superannuation and
was made to retire after rendering 34 long years of service, all of

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which stood branded as daily-wage service. Thus, an appointment
made against a sanctioned vacant post, pursuant to a selection
process conducted through the Employment Exchange, was
permitted to remain an engagement on daily wages for more than
three decades. The appellant entered service in the hope of
securing a livelihood with dignity, continued in service with the
expectation of being treated on par with those similarly situated,
and eventually retired with that expectation remaining unfulfilled.
2.4. The irony is difficult to overlook. Those who entered
service after the appellant were regularized, while the appellant,
who had preceded them in appointment and continued to serve the
establishment for 34 years, was left to superannuate as a daily-
wage employee. The State enjoyed the fruits of her labour for over
three decades, but the question of according her the status of a
regular employee remained unanswered throughout her service
career. It is this peculiar, and indeed poignant, factual circumstance
that forms the fulcrum of the present proceedings.
2.5. The appellant's claim for regularization, though
repeatedly projected before the competent authorities, had

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remained in a state of suspended consideration. The doors of the
administration having yielded no relief, the appellant was
constrained to knock at the doors of this Court by instituting
W.P.No.105093 of 2022, seeking issuance of a writ in the nature of
mandamus directing the respondents to regularize her services with
all consequential benefits, as had been done in the case of other
similarly situated employees.
2.6. The learned Single Judge, however, declined to entertain
the claim, principally on the ground that the appellant had already
attained the age of superannuation in June 2022 and, therefore, the
question of regularization of a person who had retired from service
would not arise. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed by the
following order:
“1. The petitioner is before this Court seeking for the
following reliefs:
a. The Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue any appropriate
order or direction or a writ, more particularly, in the
nature of mandamus directing the respondents herein
due to regularize the services of petitioner along with a
consequential benefits in the interest of justice and
equity.
b. To pass such other orders that this Hon’ble Court deems
fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
c. Costs of this writ petition may kindly be awarded.

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2. The essential claim of the petitioner is for the
regularization of the services of the petitioner. However,
the petitioner has superannuated in the mother of June
2022. Hence, the question of now regularising the
services of a person who has superannuated would not
arise.
3. As such, the petition stands dismissed .”

3. Heard Sri R S Shettar, learned counsel appearing for
appellant and Smt Girija S Hiremath, learned High Court
Government Pleader appearing for respondents.
SUBMISSIONS:
APPELLANTS:
4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant taking this
Court through the documents appended to the appeal, which were
all appended to the writ petition as well, would seek to demonstrate
that the appellant did not retire on attaining the age of
superannuation without registering her claim. She has been
agitating that she should be regularized right from the date she
completed 10 years of service. He would submit that the appellant
completed 34 years of service and had all recommendations from
the powers that be for regularization of services. He would contend

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that merely because an employee has retired on attaining the age
of superannuation, the law is not that the claim of such employees
would vanish in thin air. He would submit that the order of the
learned Single Judge, on the face of it, is erroneous. He would seek
the relief that had been sought before the learned Single Judge and
regularization of services of the appellant.
STATE:
5. Contrariwise , the learned High Court Government Pleader
would seek to defend the action of the learned single Judge, not on
the reason so rendered by the learned Single Judge, but on the
score that the appellant has retired on attaining the age of
superannuation and judgment in the case of SECRETARY, STATE
1
OF KARNATAKA v. UMADEVI(3) would come in the way of
regularization of services of the appellant, as the appellant was
appointed as a daily wage employee, albeit , pursuant to the calling
of names from the Employment Exchange, conduct of an interview
and a sanctioned vacant post. Learned High Court Government

1
(2006) 4 SCC 1

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Pleader would nevertheless submit that the matter be remitted back
to the learned Single Judge for appropriate adjudication.
6. We have given our anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have
perused the material on record.
CONSIDERATION:
7. The dates and the sequence of events forming the links in
the chain that has culminated in the claim of the appellant are not
in dispute. They nevertheless warrant a brief recapitulation, for it is
upon this factual foundation that the edifice of the appellant's claim
rests. The appellant's entry into service was neither fortuitous nor
through any backdoor arrangement. It was pursuant to a process of
selection undertaken by the respondent-State, by calling for names
from the Employment Exchange, against a duly sanctioned and
vacant post. The appellant was accordingly appointed on 11-03-
1998. Thus, the genesis of the appellant's appointment lay in a
selection process initiated by the State itself, against an existing
sanctioned vacancy, and not in any surreptitious entry into public

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employment. This distinction assumes significance in the
consideration of the appellant's claim for regularization.
7.1. The order of appointment in the Dandeli Municipality is as
follows:
“£ÀA: ¥ÀÅgÀ¸À¨sÉ/²§âA¢/PÀæªÀiÁAPÀ 2094/87-88 £ÀUÀgÀ ¸À¨sÁ PÁAiÀiÁð®AiÀÄ,
zÁAqÉð, ¢£ÁAPÀ:11.03.1998.

jUÉ,
²æêÀÄw VÃvÁ gÁ. vÉÃgÀzÁ¼À
ªÁ¸À: ºÀÄ©ÔzÀ ¦±À ªÀiÁPÉðmï ºÀwÛgÀ PÁgÀªÁgÀ

ªÀiÁ£ÀågÉÃ,
«µÀAiÀÄ: £ÀUÀgÀ¸À¨sÉ zÁAqÉîå°è ¢£ÀUÀÆ°AiÀÄ ªÉÄÃ¯É ¨ÉgÀ¼ÀZÀÄÑUÁgÀ
ºÀÄzÉÝUÉ
¸ÀAzÀ±Àð£ÀPÉÌ PÀgÉAiÀÄĪÀ §UÉÎ.

00000

ªÉÄîÌAqÀ «µÀAiÀĪÀ£ÀÄß UÀ䤹 f¯Áè GzÉÆåÃUÀ C«¤ªÀÄAiÀÄ PÉÃAzÀæ PÁgÀªÁgÀ¢AzÀ
¢£ÀUÀÆ° ¨ÉgÀ¼ÀZÀÄÑUÁgÀgÀ ºÀÄzÉÝUÉ ¤ªÀÄä ºÉ¸ÀgÀ£ÀÄß ¸ÀÆa¸À¯ÁVzÉ. DzÀÄzÀjAzÀ ¤ªÀÄUÉ FªÀÄÆ®PÀ
w½AiÀÄ¥Àr¸ÀĪÀÅzÉãÉAzÀgÉ, ¤ÃªÀÅ ¢£ÁAPÀ 24.03.88 gÀAzÀÄ ªÀÄÄAeÁ£É 11.00UÀAmÉUÉ £ÀgÀ¸À¨sÉ
zÁAqÉðAiÀÄ°è ¸ÀAzÀ±Àð£ÀPÉÌ ºÁdjgÀ¨ÉÃPÀÄ. ¸À¢æ ¢£ÀUÀÆ° ¨ÉgÀ¼ÀZÀÄÑUÁgÀ ºÀÄzÉÝUÉ
¯ÉÆÃPÉÆÃ¥ÀAiÉÆÃV ¥Àj²µÀÖ zÀgÀzÀAvÉ ¢£ÀUÀÆ°£ÀÄß PÉÆqÀ¯ÁUÀĪÀÅzÀÄ.

¤ÃªÀÅ ¸ÀAzÀ±Àð£ÀPÉÌ §gÀĪÀUÀ F PɼÀUÉ £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹zÀ C¸À° zÁR¯É ¥ÀvÀæUÀ¼À£ÀÄß
eÉÆvÉAiÀÄ°è vÀgÀvÀPÀÌzÀÄÝ.

1. eÁw ¥ÀæªÀiÁt ¥ÀvÀæ

2. ±Á¯É ¥ÀæªÀiÁt ¥ÀvÀæ d£À£ÀzÀ §UÉÎ.

3. «zÁåºÀðvÉ ¥ÀæªÀiÁt ¥ÀvÀæ

4. PÉ®¸ÀzÀ §UÉÎ C£ÀĨsÀªÀ EzÀÝ°è D §UÉÎ ¥ÀæªÀiÁt ¥ÀvÀæ.

5. JgÀqÀÄ ¥ÀvÁæA«ÄÌvÀ C¢üPÁjUÀ½AzÀ £ÀqÀvÉAiÀÄ §UÉÎ ¥ÀæªÀiÁt ¥ÀvÀæ.

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6. E¤ßvÀgÀ zÁR¯É ¥ÀæªÀiÁt¥ÀvÀæUÀ¼À£ÀÄß vÀgÀvÀPÀÌzÀÄÝ.

¸ÀAzÀ±Àð£ÀPÉÌ §gÀĪÀ ºÉÆÃUÀĪÀ RZÀð£ÀÄß PÉÆqÀ¯ÁUÀĪÀÅ¢®è.

vÀªÀÄä «±Áé¹PÀ,
¸À»/-
DAiÀÄÄPÀÛgÀÄ, £ÀUÀgÀ¸À¨sÉ zÁAqÉð”

The appellant thereafter continued to serve the said Municipality for
nearly 18 years, discharging the duties entrusted to her with an
expectation that the long years of service would eventually receive
recognition in the form of regularization. In the interregnum, having
regard to the qualifications possessed by the appellant, she was
appointed to discharge the functions of a Computer Operator
against a duly sanctioned and vacant post. The change in the
nature of duties, however, brought about no corresponding change
in the nature of her employment, as she continued to be retained
on daily wages. Thus, while the Municipality found the appellant
qualified and competent to discharge the duties attached to a
sanctioned post, it continued to deny her the status of a regular
employee. The appellant's services were evidently found necessary
for the functioning of the establishment, but the question of
regularizing those very services remained in abeyance.

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7.2. It is in this backdrop that a communication emanates
from the Municipal Council, Dandeli, on 04-10-2006, recommending
the case of the appellant for regularization. The communication
assumes significance, for the recommendation came not from the
appellant herself, but from the very establishment which had
engaged her services and had the benefit of her labour over the
years. The recommendation, therefore, was not merely an assertion
of entitlement by the appellant, but an acknowledgment by the
employer of the circumstances warranting consideration of her
claim for regularization. The communication dated 04-10-2006
reads as follows:
PÀæ ¸ÀASÉå:£À¸ÀzÁA/PÀA D /«ªÀ/125:2006.07:365/425 ¢£ÁAPÀ 4/10/2006

jUÉ,
ªÀiÁ£Àå ¤zÉÃð±ÀPÀgÀÄ
¥ËgÁqÀ½vÀ ¤zÉÃð±À£Á®AiÀÄ
9 £Éà ªÀĺÀr, qÁ © Dgï CA¨ÉÃqÀÌgï «¢ü
«±ÉéñÀégÀAiÀÄå PÉÃAzÀæ,
¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ 01

ªÀiÁ£ÀågÉÃ,

(ªÀiÁ£Àå f¯Áè¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ, GvÀÛgÀ PÀ£ÀßqÀ PÁgÀªÁgÀ gÀªÀgÀ GavÀ ªÀiÁUÀðzÁégÁ)

«µÀAiÀÄ:- zÁAqÉð £ÀUÀgÀ¸À¨sÉAiÀÄ°è SÁ° EgÀĪÀ PÀA¥ÀÇålgï C¥ÀgÉÃlgï
ºÀÄzÉÝAiÀÄ°è SÁAiÀÄA UÉƽ¸ÀĪÀ PÀÄjvÀÄ.

- 14 -


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zÁAqÉð £ÀUÀgÀ¸À¨sÉAiÀÄ°è SÁ° EzÀÝ ¨ÉgÀ¼ÀZÀÄÑUÁgÀgÀ ºÀÄzÉÝUÉ GzÉÆåÃUÀ «¤ªÀÄAiÀÄ
PÀZÉÃj¬ÄAzÀ §AzÀ -AiÀiÁ¢AiÀÄ°è ¥Àj²ÃµÀ× eÁwAiÀĪÀjUÁV «ÄøÀ°lÖ eÁUÉAiÀÄ°è ²æêÀÄw
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C£ÀÄPÀÆ®ªÁUÀ§ºÀÄzÁVzÉ. ¸À¢æAiÀĪÀgÀÄ vÀªÀÄä £ÉêÀÄPÁw ¢£ÁAPÀ¢AzÀ E°èAiÀĪÀgÉUÉ SÁAiÀÄA
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4. ¸À¢æAiÀĪÀgÀ «£ÀAw Cfð

vÀªÀÄä «±Áé¹PÀ

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¥ËgÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛgÀÄ £ÀUÀgÀ¸À¨sÉ zÁAqÉð

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ªÀiÁ»wUÁV UËgÀªÀ ¥ÀǪÀðPÀ M¦à¹zÉ .

¸À»/-
¥ËgÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛgÀÄ
£ÀUÀgÀ¸À¨sÉ zÁAqÉð

- 15 -


¦¦J¥ï

7.3. The recommendations then continued by another
communication on 23-07-2009, which reads as follows:
“£ÀUÀgÀ¸À¨sÁ PÁAiÀiÁð®AiÀÄ zÁAqÉð

¢£ÁAPÀ: 23/07/2009 gÀAzÀÄ ¸ÁAiÀÄAPÁ® 4.00 UÀAmÉUÉ £ÀUÀgÀ¸À¨sÁAUÀtzÀ°è dgÀÄVzÀ
¸ÀªÀð ¸ÁzsÁgÀt ¸À¨sÉAiÀÄ°è ¥Á¸ÁªÀ £ÀqÀªÀ½PÉUÀ¼À oÀgÁªÀ £ÀA 178 gÀ AiÀÄxÁ £ÀPÀ®Ä

«µÀAiÀÄ £ÀA.6:- ²æêÀÄw VÃvÁ vÉgÀzÁ¼À, ¨ÉgÀ¼ÀZÀÄÑUÁgÀw EªÀgÀ ¸ÉÃªÉ ¸ÀPÀæªÀÄzÀ PÀÄjvÀÄ

oÀgÁªÀ £ÀA 178 ¢£ÁAPÀ 23/7/2009:-

«µÀAiÀÄ ªÀÄAqÀ£ÉAiÀÄ £ÀAvÀgÀ PÀZÉÃj n¥ÀàtÂAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¸À¨sÉAiÀÄ°è NzÀ¯Á¬ÄvÀÄ. ¸À£ï
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- 16 -


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7.4. On 25-01-2016, pursuant to the recommendations made
by the Municipal Council seeking regularization of the services of
employees engaged on daily wages, a list comprising 26 names was
forwarded to the competent authority for consideration . Of the 26
employees so recommended, 12 came to be regularized. The
appellant, however, was conspicuously left out,
notwithstanding her long years of service, the
recommendation made by the very establishment under
which she was working, and the claim for regularization
founded upon documents whose authenticity is not in
dispute. The benefit of regularization thus reached several
employees, but eluded the appellant, who had continued to
serve the establishment for decades. The State, which had
found it appropriate to regularize the services of 12 employees from
the very same list, left the claim of the appellant unanswered. The

- 17 -


appellant's case was thus not one of seeking an isolated indulgence,
but of seeking consideration on parity with those whose services
had been regularized pursuant to the very same exercise.
7.5. The passage of time did not bring the appellant any
closer to regularization. Representations were made,
recommendations were forwarded, and years passed by, but the
appellant continued to remain a daily-wage employee. What ought
to have received consideration during the currency of her service
was permitted to linger until the very service itself came to an end.
The appellant, having spent the greater part of her working life in
the service of the Municipality, ultimately attained the age of
superannuation without the benefit of regularization. The
culmination of her service, however, did not mark the culmination
of her pursuit of the claim. Having approached this Court at the
time of her retirement, the appellant instituted the subject writ
petition seeking regularization of her services with all consequential
benefits. The prayers sought in the writ petition read as follows:
“a. The Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue any appropriate
order or direction or a writ, more particularly, in the
nature of mandamus directing the respondents herein due

- 18 -


to regularize the services of petitioner along with a
consequential benefits in the interest of justice and
equity.
b. To pass such other orders that this Hon’ble Court deems
fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
c. Costs of this writ petition may kindly be awarded.”

The grievance projected by the appellant, therefore, is not merely
that she was denied regularization, but that she was denied
consideration for regularization while similarly situated employees
were extended that benefit, and the passage of time was ultimately
permitted to operate against her. Whether the State could allow
a claim of this nature to remain undecided throughout the
employee's service and thereafter invoke superannuation as
a ground to deny its consideration is the issue that lies at
the heart of the present appeal. The prayer was for a direction
to regularize the services and grant of consequential benefits.
8. The issue now is, whether the appellant is entitled to
seek regularization of services, notwithstanding the fact that
the appellant was appointed on daily wages and retires on
attaining the age of superannuation being a daily wage
employee for 34 years?

- 19 -


8.1. The sheet anchor of the defence projected by the
respondents-State is the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the
Apex Court in the case of UMADEVI supra , wherein, according to
the State, regularization of employees engaged on daily wages,
dehors the regular process of recruitment, is impermissible, more
so when such employees have already attained the age of
superannuation while continuing as daily-wage employees. The
State would thus seek to place the judgment in the case of
UMADEVI as an insurmountable legal impediment to the claim of
the appellant. The submission, though seemingly formidable,
requires examination in the light of the law declared in the
case of UMADEVI, the exception carved out therein, and the
subsequent exposition of its principles by the Apex Court.
8.2. The judgment in the case of UMADEVI cannot be read
as though it were a charter for perpetuating irregular employment,
nor can its declaration of law be divorced from the constitutional
philosophy that animated it. The Constitution Bench sought to
prevent the backdoor entry into public employment; it did not
intend to confer upon the State an unbridled licence to extract

- 20 -


labour against sanctioned posts for decades together and thereafter
disown the legitimate claims of those very employees by invoking
the doctrine against regularization. Equally, the exception
recognized in the judgment cannot be employed to defeat the
constitutional mandate of equality in public employment. The
distinction between an illegal appointment and an irregular
appointment, the existence of a duly sanctioned post, the manner
of initial engagement, the qualifications possessed by the
employee, and the length and continuity of service are all facets
that assume significance in the consideration of a claim of this
nature.
8.3. The issue, therefore, is not whether every daily-wage
employee acquires an indefeasible right to regularization by the
mere passage of time. The issue is whether an employee who
entered service through the Employment Exchange against a
sanctioned vacancy, continued to serve the State for decades,
received recommendations for regularization, and witnessed
similarly situated employees being regularized, could be denied
even consideration of her claim solely because she had, in the

- 21 -


meantime, attained the age of superannuation . To answer this
question, it becomes necessary to traverse the trajectory of
the law from UMADEVI to the judgments that followed, for
the law must be understood not merely by its declaration at
one point in time, but by the manner in which its principles
have subsequently been explained, distinguished and
applied.
9. It is, therefore, germane to notice the evolution of the law
on regularization, beginning with the judgment of the Constitution
Bench in UMADEVI and proceeding to its judicial aftermath.
UMADEVI AND ITS AFTERMATH
9.1. The Apex Court, in its judgment in the case of UMADEVI
supra , considers appointments that are illegal, irregular and
persons who have been working for the last 10 years as on the date
of the judgment i.e., on 10-04-2006, all can be considered for
regularization. However, it was noticed that an appropriate scheme
could be framed even otherwise. The Apex Court in the case of
UMADEVI has held as follows:

- 22 -


“…. …. ….
53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be
cases where irregular appointments (not illegal
appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa [(1967)
1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967 SC 1071] , R.N.
Nanjundappa [(1972) 1 SCC 409 : (1972) 2 SCR 799]
and B.N. Nagarajan [(1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S)
4 : (1979) 3 SCR 937] and referred to in para 15 above,
of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts
might have been made and the employees have continued
to work for ten years or more but without the
intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The
question of regularisation of the services of such
employees may have to be considered on merits in the
light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases
abovereferred to and in the light of this judgment. In that
context, the Union of India, the State Governments and
their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as
a one-time measure, the services of
such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten
years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under
cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should
further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken
to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be
filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily
wagers are being now employed. The process must be set
in motion within six months from this date. We also
clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not
sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment,
but there should be no further bypassing of the
constitutional requirement and regularising or making
permanent, those not duly appointed as per the
constitutional scheme.

54. It is also clarified that those decisions which run
counter to the principle settled in this decision, or in which
directions running counter to what we have held herein, will
stand denuded of their status as precedents.

- 23 -


55. In cases relating to service in the Commercial Taxes
Department, the High Court has directed that those engaged on
daily wages, be paid wages equal to the salary and allowances
that are being paid to the regular employees of their cadre in
government service, with effect from the dates from which they
were respectively appointed. The objection taken was to the
direction for payment from the dates of engagement. We find
that the High Court had clearly gone wrong in directing that
these employees be paid salary equal to the salary and
allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of their
cadre in government service, with effect from the dates from
which they were respectively engaged or appointed. It was not
open to the High Court to impose such an obligation on the
State when the very question before the High Court in the case
was whether these employees were entitled to have equal pay
for equal work so called and were entitled to any other benefit.
They had also been engaged in the teeth of directions not to do
so. We are, therefore, of the view that, at best, the Division
Bench of the High Court should have directed that wages equal
to the salary that is being paid to regular employees be paid to
these daily-wage employees with effect from the date of its
judgment. Hence, that part of the direction of the Division
Bench is modified and it is directed that these daily-wage
earners be paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of
employees of their cadre in the Commercial Taxes Department
in government service, from the date of the judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court. Since, they are only daily-
wage earners, there would be no question of other allowances
being paid to them. In view of our conclusion, that the courts
are not expected to issue directions for making such persons
permanent in service, we set aside that part of the direction of
the High Court directing the Government to consider their cases
for regularisation. We also notice that the High Court has not
adverted to the aspect as to whether it was regularisation or it
was giving permanency that was being directed by the High
Court. In such a situation, the direction in that regard will stand
deleted and the appeals filed by the State would stand allowed
to that extent. If sanctioned posts are vacant (they are said to
be vacant) the State will take immediate steps for filling those
posts by a regular process of selection. But when regular
recruitment is undertaken, the respondents in CAs Nos. 3595-
612 and those in the Commercial Taxes Department similarly
situated, will be allowed to compete, waiving the age restriction

- 24 -


imposed for the recruitment and giving some weightage for their
having been engaged for work in the Department for a
significant period of time. That would be the extent of the
exercise of power by this Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution to do justice to them.”

After the said judgment of the Apex Court in UMADEVI , the judicial
thought process has undergone a change owing to the fact of
exploitation of human labour at the hands of the State projecting
the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of UMADEVI .

9.2. The Apex Court in the case of AMARENDRA KUMAR
2
MOHAPATRA v. STATE OF ORISSA , had held as follows:
“…. …. ….
42. The decision in Umadevi (3) case [State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S)
753], as noticed earlier, permitted regularisation of regular
appointments and not illegal appointments. Question,
however, is whether the appointments in the instant case
could be described as illegal and if they were not, whether the
State could be directed to regularise the services of the
degree-holder Junior Engineers who have worked as ad hoc
Assistant Engineers for such a long period, not only on the
analogy of the legislative enactment for regularisation but also
on the principle underlying para 53 of the decision in Umadevi
(3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC
1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753].

43. As to what would constitute an irregular
appointment is no longer res integra. The decision of
this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari [(2010) 9 SCC

2
(2014) 4 SCC 583

- 25 -


247 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 826], has examined that
question and explained the principle regarding
regularisation as enunciated in Umadevi (3) case [State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S)
753]. The decision in that case summed up the following
three essentials for regularisation : (1) the employees
have worked for ten years or more, (2) that they have
so worked in a duly sanctioned post without the benefit
or protection of the interim order of any court or
tribunal, and (3) they should have possessed the
minimum qualification stipulated for the appointment.
Subject to these three requirements being satisfied,
even if the appointment process did not involve open
competitive selection, the appointment would be
treated irregular and not illegal and thereby qualify for
regularisation. Para 7 in this regard is apposite and may
be extracted at this stage: (M.L. Kesari case [(2010) 9
SCC 247 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 826], SCC p. 250)

“7. It is evident from the above that there is an
exception to the general principles against
‘regularisation’ enunciated in Umadevi (3) [State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 753], if the following conditions are fulfilled:


(i) The employee concerned should
have worked for 10 years or more in a duly
sanctioned post without the benefit or
protection of the interim order of any court or
tribunal. In other words, the State
Government or its instrumentality should
have employed the employee and continued
him in service voluntarily and continuously for
more than ten years.

(ii) The appointment of such
employee should not be illegal, even if
irregular. Where the appointments are not
made or continued against sanctioned posts
or where the persons appointed do not
possess the prescribed minimum
qualifications, the appointments will be
considered to be illegal. But where the person
employed possessed the prescribed
qualifications and was working against

- 26 -


sanctioned posts, but had been selected
without undergoing the process of open
competitive selection, such appointments are
considered to be irregular.”

44. It is nobody's case that the degree-holder
Junior Engineers were not qualified for appointment as
Assistant Engineers as even they possess degrees from
recognised institutions. It is also nobody's case that they
were not appointed against the sanctioned post. There
was some debate as to the actual number of vacancies
available from time to time but we have no hesitation in
holding that the appointments made were at all relevant
points of time against sanctioned posts. The information
provided by Mr. Nageswara Rao, learned Additional
Solicitor General, appearing for the State of Orissa, in
fact, suggests that the number of vacancies was at all
points of time more than the number of appointments
made on ad hoc basis. It is also clear that each one of
the degree-holders has worked for more than 10 years
ever since his appointment as ad hoc Assistant
Engineer. It is in that view difficult to describe these
appointments of the Stipendiary Engineers on ad hoc
basis to be illegal so as to fall beyond the purview of the
scheme envisaged in Umadevi (3) case [State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S)
753].

45. The upshot of the above discussion is that not
only because in Umadevi (3) case [State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 753] this Court did not disturb the appointments
already made or regularisation granted, but also
because the decision itself permitted regularisation in
case of irregular appointments, the legislative
enactment granting such regularisation does not call for
interference at this late stage when those appointed or
regularised have already started retiring having served
their respective departments, in some cases for as long
as 22 years .”

- 27 -


9.3. The Apex Court in the case of SHEO NARAIN
3
NAGAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH , holds as follows:
“…. …. ….

6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent has relied upon para 44 of the decision in Umadevi
(3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006
SCC (L&S) 753], so as to contend that it was not the case of
irregular appointment but of illegal appointment; there was no
post available on which the services of the appellants could have
been regularised and appointment were in contravention of the
reservation policy also; thus, termination order was rightly
issued and, in no case, the appellants were entitled for
regularisation of their services.

7. When we consider the prevailing scenario, it is
painful to note that the decision in Umadevi (3) [State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 753] has not been properly understood and rather
wrongly applied by various State Governments. We have
called for the data in the instant case to ensure as to how
many employees were working on contract basis or ad
hoc basis or daily-wage basis in different State
departments. We can take judicial notice that widely
aforesaid practice is being continued. Though this Court
has emphasised that incumbents should be appointed on
regular basis as per rules but new devise of making
appointment on contract basis has been adopted,
employment is offered on daily-wage basis, etc. in
exploitative forms. This situation was not envisaged
by Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi
(3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753]. The prime
intendment of the decision was that the employment
process should be by fair means and not by back door
entry and in the available pay scale. That spirit of
the Umadevi (3) [State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi(3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 753] has been ignored and conveniently

3
(2018) 13 SCC 432

- 28 -


overlooked by various State Governments/authorities.
We regretfully make the observation that Umadevi (3)
[State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC
1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] has not been implemented in its
true spirit and has not been followed in its pith and
substance. It is being used only as a tool for not
regularising the services of incumbents. They are being
continued in service without payment of due salary for
which they are entitled on the basis of Articles 14, 16
read with Article 34(1)(d) of the Constitution of India as
if they have no constitutional protection as envisaged
in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India [D.S. Nakara v. Union of
India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145 : AIR 1983 SC
130], from cradle to grave. In heydays of life they are
serving on exploitative terms with no guarantee of
livelihood to be continued and in old age they are going
to be destituted, there being no provision for pension,
retiral benefits, etc. There is clear contravention of
constitutional provisions and aspiration of downtrodden
class. They do have equal rights and to make them equals
they require protection and cannot be dealt with
arbitrarily. The kind of treatment meted out is not only
bad but equally unconstitutional and is denial of rights.
We have to strike a balance to really implement the
ideology of Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi
(3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753]. Thus, the time
has come to stop the situation where Umadevi (3) [State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S)
753] can be permitted to be flouted, whereas, this Court
has interdicted such employment way back in the year
2006. The employment cannot be on exploitative terms,
whereas Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi
(3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] laid down that there
should not be back door entry and every post should be filled by
regular employment, but a new device has been adopted for
making appointment on payment of paltry system on
contract/ad hoc basis or otherwise. This kind of action is not
permissible when we consider the pith and substance of true
spirit in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi
(3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753].

8. Coming to the facts of the instant case, there was a
direction issued way back in the year 1999, to consider the

- 29 -


regularisation of the appellants. However, regularisation was not
done. The respondents chose to give minimum of the pay scale,
which was available to the regular employees, way back in the
year 2000 and by passing an order, the appellants were also
conferred temporary status in the year 2006, with retrospective
effect on 2-10-2002. As the respondents have themselves
chosen to confer a temporary status to the employees, as such
there was requirement at work and posts were also available at
the particular point of time when order was passed. Thus, the
submission raised by the learned counsel for the respondent
that posts were not available, is belied by their own action.
Obviously, the order was passed considering the long period of
services rendered by the appellants, which were taken on
exploitative terms.

9. The High Court dismissed the writ application relying on
the decision in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi
(3), (2006) 4 SCC 1: 2006 SCC (L&S) 753]. But the
appellants were employed basically in the year 1993;
they had rendered service for three years, when they
were offered the service on contract basis; it was not the
case of back door entry; and there were no Rules in place
for offering such kind of appointment. Thus, the
appointment could not be said to be illegal and in
contravention of Rules, as there were no such Rules
available at the relevant point of time, when their
temporary status was conferred w.e.f. 2-10-2002. The
appellants were required to be appointed on regular basis
as a one-time measure, as laid down in para 53
of Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4
SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753]. Since the appellants had
completed 10 years of service and temporary status had
been given by the respondents with retrospective effect
from 2-10-2002, we direct that the services of the
appellants be regularised from the said date i.e.
2.10.2002, consequential benefits and the arrears of pay
also to be paid to the appellants within a period of three
months from today.”

- 30 -


9.4. The Apex Court in the case of NARENDRA KUMAR
4
TIWARI v. STATE OF JHARKHAND , holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
7. The purpose and intent of the decision
in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi
(3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] was therefore
twofold, namely, to prevent irregular or illegal
appointments in the future and secondly, to confer a
benefit on those who had been irregularly appointed in
the past. The fact that the State of Jharkhand continued
with the irregular appointments for almost a decade after
the decision in Umadevi (3) [State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 753] is a clear indication that it believes that it was
all right to continue with irregular appointments, and
whenever required, terminate the services of the
irregularly appointed employees on the ground that they
were irregularly appointed. This is nothing but a form of
exploitation of the employees by not giving them the
benefits of regularisation and by placing the sword of
Damocles over their head. This is precisely what Umadevi
(3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC
1: 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] and Kesari [State of
Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 : (2010) 2
SCC (L&S) 826] sought to avoid.

8. If a strict and literal interpretation, forgetting the spirit
of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (3) [State
of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S)
753], is to be taken into consideration then no irregularly
appointed employee of the State of Jharkhand could ever be
regularised since that State came into existence only on 15-11-
2000 and the cut-off date was fixed as 10-4-2006. In other
words, in this manner the pernicious practice of
indefinitely continuing irregularly appointed employees

4
(2018) 8 SCC 238

- 31 -


would be perpetuated contrary to the intent of the
Constitution Bench.

9. The High Court as well as the State of Jharkhand
ought to have considered the entire issue in a contextual
perspective and not only from the point of view of the
interest of the State, financial or otherwise - the interest
of the employees is also required to be kept in mind.
What has eventually been achieved by the State of
Jharkhand is to short circuit the process of regular
appointments and instead make appointments on an
irregular basis. This is hardly good governance.

10. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the
Regularisation Rules must be given a pragmatic interpretation
and the appellants, if they have completed 10 years of service
on the date of promulgation of the Regularisation Rules, ought
to be given the benefit of the service rendered by them. If they
have completed 10 years of service they should be
regularised unless there is some valid objection to their
regularisation like misconduct, etc. ”

9.5. A three Judges Bench of the Apex Court considering the
case of UMADEVI supra and subsequent judgments, in the case
5
of PREM SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH , holds as
follows:
“…. …. ….

36. There are some of the employees who have not been
regularised in spite of having rendered the services for 30-40 or
more years whereas they have been superannuated. As they
have worked in the work-charged establishment, not against
any particular project, their services ought to have been
regularised under the Government instructions and even as per
the decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3)

5
(2019) 10 SCC 516

- 32 -


[State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 753]. This Court in the said decision has laid down
that in case services have been rendered for more than
ten years without the cover of the Court's order, as one-
time measure, the services be regularised of such
employees. In the facts of the case, those employees who
have worked for ten years or more should have been
regularised. It would not be proper to regulate them for
consideration of regularisation as others have been
regularised, we direct that their services be treated as a
regular one. However, it is made clear that they shall not
be entitled to claiming any dues of difference in wages
had they been continued in service regularly before
attaining the age of superannuation. They shall be
entitled to receive the pension as if they have retired
from the regular establishment and the services rendered
by them right from the day they entered the work-
charged establishment shall be counted as qualifying
service for purpose of pension .”


9.6. The Apex Court in the case of CHANDER MOHAN
6
NEGI v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH , holds as follows:
“…. …. ….

13. It is true that in the initial schemes notified by
the Government, there was a condition that such
appointees should not seek regularisation/ absorption
but at the same time for no fault of them, they cannot be
denied regularisation/absorption. It is in view of the
requirement of the State, their services were extended
from time to time and now all the appointees have
completed more than 15 years of service. For majority of
the appointed Teachers under the various schemes,
benefit was already extended and some left over
candidates were denied on account of interim orders
passed by this Court. With regard to Primary Assistant
Teachers, it is stated that all the candidates have completed

6
(2020) 5 SCC 732

- 33 -


Special Teacher Training Qualifying Condensed Course and also
had obtained special JBT certificate after 5 years' continuous
service in terms of the Himachal Pradesh Education Code, 1985.
The judgments relied on by learned counsel Shri Prashant
Bhushan also would not render any assistance to the case of the
appellants herein for the reason that there was unexplained and
inordinate delay on the part of the appellants in approaching the
High Court and further having regard to explanation offered by
the State about the need of framing such policies to meet the
immediate requirement to fill up single teacher schools which
were vacant for a very long time, having regard to topographical
conditions, which is not even controverted by way of any
rejoinder before the High Court. In such view of the matter,
taking the totality of peculiar circumstances of these
cases, we are of the view that the view expressed by this
Court in the judgments relied on cannot be applied to the
facts of the case on hand. All the appointed candidates
are working for the meagre salaries pursuant to schemes
notified by the Government. Except the vague submission
that such schemes were framed only to make backdoor
entries, there is no material placed on record to buttress
such submission. Further it is also to be noted that
though such schemes were notified as early as in 2003,
nobody has questioned such policies and appointments
up to 2012 and 2013. The writ petition i.e. CWP No. 3303 of
2012-A was filed in the year 2012 without even impleading the
appointees as party respondents. In the writ petition, there was
no rejoinder filed by the writ petitioners disputing the averments
of the State as stated in the reply-affidavit. Having regard to the
nature of such appointments, appointments made as per policies
cannot be termed as illegal. Having regard to material placed
before this Court and having regard to reasons recorded in the
impugned order [Pankaj Kumar v. State of H.P., 2014 SCC
OnLine HP 5944] by the High Court, we are of the view that no
case is made out to interfere with the impugned
judgment [Pankaj Kumar v. State of H.P., 2014 SCC OnLine HP
5944] of the High Court.”

- 34 -


9.7. The Apex Court in the case of SUKHENDU
7
BHATTACHARJEE v. STATE OF ASSAM , while following the
earlier judgments in the cases of JAGGO v. UNION OF INDIA
reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826 ; SHRIPAL v. NAGAR
NIGAM, GHAZIABAD reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221 and
DHARAM SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH reported in
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735, has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
54. There is no dispute that the appellants had been
st
engaged as Work Charged/Muster Roll workers much prior to 1
April, 1993 and had continuously discharged their duties over a
prolonged period of time. Their position is, in no manner,
distinguishable from those Work Charged/Muster Roll workers
whose services were regularized pursuant to the Cabinet
nd
decision dated 22 July, 2005. The appellants were left out from
the exercise of regularization owing to inadvertent mistakes,
clerical errors and administrative discrepancies on the part of
the State. Hence, the appellants cannot be faulted for denial of
the benefits flowing from the aforesaid Cabinet decision under
which nearly 30,000 similarly situated workers were regularized.
The core question, therefore, which arises for
consideration is whether, in the aforesaid circumstances,
the appellants can be denied the benefit of regularization
solely on the ground that they were not appointed
against sanctioned posts and that the decision in
Umadevi (supra) prohibits such regularization.

55. The key reason assigned by the Division Bench
in overturning the judgment of the learned Single Judge
was that the employees were not appointed against duly
sanctioned vacant posts and, therefore, did not satisfy
the requirements of the exception carved out in

7

2026 SCC OnLine SC 909

- 35 -


paragraph 53 of Umadevi (supra). The Division Bench
held that regularization is permissible only in cases of
irregular (and not illegal) appointments of duly qualified
persons working against sanctioned vacant posts for ten
years or more without the protection of Court orders.
Since, according to the State, none of the respondents
therein were appointed against sanctioned posts, the
benefit of the one-time measure contemplated in
Umadevi (supra), and explained in M.L. Kesari (supra),
was held to be inapplicable to them.

56. Paragraph 53 of Umadevi (supra) would be relevant
for consideration of the lis and the same is reproduced
hereinbelow:—

“ 53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may
be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal
appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa
(supra), R.N. Nanjundappa (supra), and B.N. Nagarajan
(supra), and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly
qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might
have been made and the employees have continued to
work for ten years or more but without the intervention
of orders of Courts or of tribunals. The question of
regularization of the services of such employees may
have to be considered on merits in the light of the
principles settled by this Court in the cases above
referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that
context, the Union of India, the State
Governments, and their instrumentalities should
take steps to regularize as a one time measure,
the services of such irregularly appointed, who
have worked for ten years or more in duly
sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of
the Courts or of tribunals and should further
ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken
to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require
to be filled up, in cases where temporary
employees or daily wagers are being now
employed. The process must be set in motion within six
months from this date. We also clarify that
regularization, if any already made, but not subjudice,
need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there
should be no further bypassing of the constitutional
requirement and regularizing or making permanent,

- 36 -


those not duly appointed as per the constitutional
scheme.”
(Emphasis supplied)

57. The one-time exception as carved out in paragraph
53 of Umadevi (supra) was further elaborated and explained in
M.L. Kesari (supra) wherein this Court observed as follows:—

“9. The term ‘one-time measure’ has to be
understood in its proper perspective. This would
normally mean that after the decision in Umadevi,
each department or each instrumentality should
undertake a one-time exercise and prepare a list
of all casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees who
have been working for more than ten years
without the intervention of Courts and tribunals
and subject them to a process verification as to
whether they are working against vacant posts
and possess the requisite qualification for the post
and if so, regularize their services.

10. At the end of six months from the date of
decision in Umadevi , cases of several daily-wage/ad-
hoc/casual employees were still pending before Courts.
Consequently, several departments and
instrumentalities did not commence the one-time
regularization process. On the other hand, some
Government departments or instrumentalities
undertook the one-time exercise excluding several
employees from consideration either on the
ground that their cases were pending in Courts or
due to sheer oversight. In such circumstances, the
employees who were entitled to be considered in
terms of Para 53 of the decision in Umadevi, will
not lose their right to be considered for
regularization, merely because the one-time
exercise was completed without considering their
cases, or because the six month period mentioned
in para 53 of Umadevi has expired. The one-time
exercise should consider all daily-
wage/adhoc/those employees who had put in 10
years of continuous service as on 10.4.2006
without availing the protection of any interim
orders of Courts or tribunals. If any employer had
held the one-time exercise in terms of para 53 of
Umadevi, but did not consider the cases of some

- 37 -


employees who were entitled to the benefit of
para 53 of Umadevi, the employer concerned
should consider their cases also, as a continuation
of the one-time exercise. The one time exercise
will be concluded only when all the employees
who are entitled to be considered in terms of Para
53 of Umadevi, are so considered.

11. The object behind the said direction in para
53 of Umadevi is two-fold. First is to ensure that those
who have put in more than ten years of continuous
service without the protection of any interim orders of
Courts or tribunals, before the date of decision in
Umadevi was rendered, are considered for regularization
in view of their long service. Second is to ensure that
the departments/instrumentalities do not perpetuate the
practice of employing persons on daily-wage/ad-
hoc/casual for long periods and then periodically
regularize them on the ground that they have served for
more than ten years, thereby defeating the
constitutional or statutory provisions relating to
recruitment and appointment. The true effect of the
direction is that all persons who have worked for
more than ten years as on 10.4.2006 (the date of
decision in Umadevi) without the protection of any
interim order of any Court or tribunal, in vacant
posts, possessing the requisite qualification, are
entitled to be considered for regularization. The
fact that the employer has not undertaken such
exercise of regularization within six months of the
decision in Umadevi or that such exercise was
undertaken only in regard to a limited few, will not
disentitle such employees, the right to be
considered for regularization in terms of the above
directions in Umadevi as a one-time measure.”

(Emphasis supplied)

58. What can be deduced from paragraph 53 of
Umadevi (supra), as clarified in M.L. Kesari (supra), is
that the Union of India and the State Governments were
directed to undertake a one-time exercise to regularize
employees who had worked for ten years or more in duly
sanctioned posts, without the protection of Court or
tribunal orders. This direction was to be implemented
th
after the decision in Umadevi (supra), i.e. , after 10

- 38 -


April, 2006. The exception carved out in paragraph 53
was therefore intended to operate prospectively and
within the framework laid down therein.

59. In our considered view, the reliance placed by the
Division Bench on Umadevi (supra) and M.L. Kesari (supra) was
misplaced in the facts of the present case. Paragraph 53 of
Umadevi (supra) carved out a limited exception for those
employees who had worked for more than ten years in
duly sanctioned posts without the protection of Court
orders. However, the appellants were not seeking
regularization on the basis of that one-time exception.
nd
Their claim is rooted in the Cabinet decision dated 22
July, 2005, by which the State consciously decided to
regularize the services of Work Charged and Muster Roll
st
workers engaged prior to 1 April, 1993, and pursuant to
which nearly 30,000 similarly situated employees were in
fact regularized by creation of posts. The appellants
claimed parity with that very class and sought equal
treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution. The issue,
therefore, is not one of invoking the limited exception
carved out in Umadevi (supra), but of ensuring that
employees who stand on the same footing are treated
alike.

60. It is a settled principle that equals must be
treated equally, and if persons similarly placed are
treated differently without a rational basis, it would
11
amount to a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution . If
two sets of employees stand on the same footing in terms
of date of engagement, nature of duties, length of service
and eligibility under a declared policy, the State cannot
extend a benefit to one large group and deny it to the
smaller group without demonstrating a valid distinction.
Equality does not allow selective or partial
implementation of a policy. Once a policy decision is
taken to benefit a defined class, it must be applied
uniformly to all who satisfy the prescribed conditions.

61. In the present case, the State itself framed a
policy in 2005 to regularize Work Charged and Muster
st
Roll workers engaged prior to 1 April, 1993. Pursuant to
the aforesaid policy decision, approximately 30,000

- 39 -


workers were regularized. The appellants belong to that
very category. They were engaged prior to the cut-off
date and have rendered long and continuous service in
the same manner as those who were regularized. There is
no distinguishing feature shown which separates them
from the beneficiaries of the 2005 decision. Once the
State chose to regularize such a large body of workers
forming one identifiable class, it was under a
constitutional obligation to treat all eligible members of
that class alike. The remaining workers who were left
out, though otherwise eligible, cannot be excluded and
denied the same benefit. It is crucial to note that the
exclusion of the appellants from being granted the
benefit of the 2005 decision is not attributable to the
appellants but is rather predicated in the actions of the
State machinery which, on account of inadvertent errors
or clerical mistakes, did not include the appellants in the
list of beneficiary covered by the said government
decision.

12
62. Recently, in Pawan Kumar v. Union of India
this Court considered a similar situation wherein certain
employees had been regularized but others, though
similarly placed, were left out. This Court held that such
differential treatment was discriminatory and accordingly
granted the same relief to the excluded employees.

63. Once the State confers a benefit upon a
particular class, it cannot arbitrarily deny the same
benefit to others who are identically situated. Applying
the principle in the present case, the State, having
regularized nearly 30,000 workers under its own policy
decision, could not refuse to regularize the remaining
eligible workers who stood on the same footing. To do so
amounts to treating equals unequally, which is
impermissible under Article 14 of the Constitution.

64. The present appeals could have been allowed on the
basis of discussion made hereinabove, as the unequal and
arbitrary treatment meted out to the appellants is apparent on
the face of the record. However, the facts and circumstances of
the present case necessitate certain observations regarding the
manner in which the State has handled the issue of

- 40 -


regularization. The way in which assurances were extended,
policies were formulated and partially implemented, and
thereafter altered, warrants closer scrutiny so as to ensure
adherence to the standards of fairness and accountability
expected of the State and its instrumentalities.

65. It is not in dispute that nearly 30,000 workers were
nd
regularized pursuant to the Cabinet decision dated 22 July,
2005. However, as noted above, due to administrative lapses
and clerical omissions on the part of the State, several eligible
workers, including the appellants, were left out of the exercise.
This led to the filing of multiple writ petitions before the High
Court. In those proceedings, particularly in Ramani Deka
(supra) and connected matters, the State, through affidavits
sworn by the Chief Secretary and other senior officers, expressly
acknowledged that a substantial number of workers engaged
st
prior to 1 April, 1993 had been left out in the exercise of
regularization. The Court was informed that the Government
was actively considering their cases and that an appropriate
policy would be framed within a stipulated period, with the
outcome likely to be in favour of such workers. Acting upon
these categorical representations, the High Court passed an
order requiring the State to take consequential steps.

66. In this backdrop, the subsequent filing of a
Miscellaneous Application seeking nod from the High Court to
implement the very policy under consideration, on the ground
that the law laid down in Umadevi (supra) created a legal
embargo on such regularization, appears wholly unwarranted. It
is not as though the State was unaware of the decision in
Umadevi (supra) at the time it furnished undertakings
before the High Court. The judgment in Umadevi (supra)
had already been delivered in April 2006. The
undertakings given by the State before the High Court,
acknowledging the existence of a large number of left-out
workers and committing to frame a policy for their
regularization, were furnished much thereafter. This
clearly indicates that the State was fully conscious of the
decision in Umadevi (supra) and its implications at the
time it made those representations. If the State
genuinely apprehended any legal impediment arising
from Umadevi (supra), it ought to have raised such
concerns at the first instance. Instead, it continued to

- 41 -


assure the Court that a policy for regularization of left-
out workers was under active consideration. It was only
in 2012 that the State sought leave of the Court, citing
Umadevi (supra) as a hurdle. The 2012 O.M. appears to
have been designed in a manner that effectively defeats
and dilutes the very object and purpose of the Cabinet
nd
decision dated 22 July, 2005. Once the Cabinet had
taken a considered decision and acted upon it for a large
number of employees, it was incumbent upon the State to
act in furtherance thereof fully, and not to introduce
measures that undermine or circumvent it. The State
which is expected to act as a model employer cannot be
permitted to resile from, or seek shelter against its own
decisions through subsequent executive decisions. To
allow such a course would be contrary to principles of
administrative fairness, consistency, and good
governance.

67. The conduct of the State must also be examined
in light of its status as a model employer. The State is
under a higher constitutional obligation to ensure that its
actions are just, reasonable and non-arbitrary. Recently,
13
this Court in Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand reiterated
that the State, as a model employer, bears a heightened
constitutional obligation in the discharge of its functions.
It must act with probity, fairness and candour, and
cannot cloud the disputes involving its employees under
narrow technical grounds divorced from their broader
constitutional context. A model employer is expected to
uphold the dignity of its employees more so who are at
the lowest pedestal of the hierarchy and to avoid
exploiting their vulnerability or precarious position. This
obligation flows directly from the Constitution and is not
discretionary. Constantly giving undertakings before a
constitutional Court and thereafter resiling from them
does not comport with the standards expected of a model
employer. An undertaking recorded by a Court is not a
casual statement, but is a solemn representation on the
basis of which judicial orders are passed. The State
cannot approbate and reprobate. It cannot, on the one
hand, secure time and indulgence from the Court on the
assurance that a policy will be implemented and, on the
other, avoid implementation by citing precedents that

- 42 -


were already in existence at the time the undertakings
were furnished.

68. The repeated undertakings given by the State
before the High Court, coupled with the earlier
implementation of the Cabinet decision in favour of
nearly 30,000 similarly situated workers, clearly gave
rise to a legitimate expectation in the minds of the
appellants who were deprived of the benefits of the
policy. In the maze of administrative deficiencies, they
were entitled to expect that the policy decision would be
implemented in a fair, complete and non-discriminatory
manner, and that their cases would also be considered as
part of the same exercise. Though legitimate expectation
does not create a vested right, it is firmly rooted in the
principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness that flows
from Article 14 of the Constitution.

69. A three-judge bench of this Court in National
14
Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan
explained the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the following
terms:—

“The doctrine of “legitimate expectation” has its
genesis in the field of administrative law. The
Government and its departments, in administering
the affairs of the country, are expected to honour
their statements of policy or intention and treat
the citizens with full personal consideration
without any iota of abuse of discretion. The policy
statements cannot be disregarded unfairly or
applied selectively. Unfairness in the form of
unreasonableness is akin to violation of natural
justice. It was in this context that the doctrine of
“legitimate expectation” was evolved which has
today become a source of substantive as well as
procedural rights. But claims based on “legitimate
expectation” have been held to require reliance on
representations and resulting detriment to the claimant
in the same way as claims based on promissory
estoppel.”
(Emphasis supplied)

- 43 -


70. The principle laid down in the aforesaid decision
applies to the present case as well. The State’s own
policy decision and subsequent undertakings before the
High Court constituted clear representations that the
cases of the left-out workers would be duly considered.
The State could not thereafter retract from its earlier
position in a selective or inconsistent manner.

71. Even otherwise, as correctly observed by the
learned Single Judge, there was no requirement for the
State to seek permission of the Court to implement its
own policy decision. The Full Bench in Jitendra Kalita
(supra) had itself observed that any solution to the issue
of regularization must be undertaken by the State as a
policy measure. Regularization, where permissible in law,
is an executive function. It falls within the domain of
policy and administration. Courts do not grant prior
approval to executive decisions. The role of the Court is
confined to judicial review, that is, to examine whether a
policy or action is constitutionally valid, fair and
reasonable. It is not for the Court to authorise the
executive to exercise powers which already vest in it.

72. We find merit in the observation of the learned
Single Judge that seeking permission in the manner done
by the State amounted, in effect, to a surrender of its
executive authority. The executive cannot abdicate its
responsibility by placing the burden upon the Court to
approve or disapprove the implementation of its own
policy. Once a Cabinet decision had been taken and
implemented in major proportions, and once
undertakings had been given before a constitutional
Court, the State was expected to act in furtherance of its
intent expressly declared in the policy, subject of course
to constitutional confines. The course adopted by the
State, in the facts of the present case, was neither
necessary nor justified.

73. As regards the contention of Shri Gupta that
after the decision in Umadevi (supra) no regularization
can be effected in respect of employees who were not
appointed against duly sanctioned posts, we are unable
to accept such a sweeping proposition in the facts of the

- 44 -


present case. The submission proceeds on the premise
that Umadevi (supra) lays down an absolute and
inflexible embargo against all forms of regularization
irrespective of the surrounding circumstances. Such an
interpretation, in our considered view, does not reflect
the true scope and ratio of the decision.

74. This Court in Jaggo (supra), deprecated the
tendency of the State to take mechanical shelter under
Umadevi (supra) to deny relief to employees who had
been performing work of a permanent and essential
nature for long years. This Court observed as follows:—

“12. Despite being labelled as “part-time
workers,” the appellants performed these essential tasks
on a daily and continuous basis over extensive periods,
ranging from over a decade to nearly two decades.
Their engagement was not sporadic or temporary
in nature; instead, it was recurrent, regular, and
akin to the responsibilities typically associated
with sanctioned posts. Moreover, the respondents
did not engage any other personnel for these tasks
during the appellants' tenure, underscoring the
indispensable nature of their work.

13. The claim by the respondents that these were
not regular posts lacks merit, as the nature of the
work performed by the appellants was perennial
and fundamental to the functioning of the offices.
The recurring nature of these duties necessitates
their classification as regular posts, irrespective of
how their initial engagements were labelled. It is
also noteworthy that subsequent outsourcing of these
same tasks to private agencies after the appellants’
termination demonstrates the inherent need for these
services. This act of outsourcing, which effectively
replaced one set of workers with another, further
underscores that the work in question was neither
temporary nor occasional.

19. It is evident from the foregoing that the
appellants' roles were not only essential but also
indistinguishable from those of regular employees.
Their sustained contributions over extended
periods, coupled with absence of any adverse
record, warrant equitable treatment and

- 45 -


regularization of their services. Denial of this
benefit, followed by their arbitrary termination, amounts
to manifest injustice and must be rectified.

20. It is well established that the decision in
Uma Devi (supra) does not intend to penalize
employees who have rendered long years of
service fulfilling ongoing and necessary functions
of the State or its instrumentalities. The said
judgment sought to prevent backdoor entries and
illegal appointments that circumvent
constitutional requirements. However, where
appointments were not illegal but possibly
“irregular,” and where employees had served
continuously against the backdrop of sanctioned
functions for a considerable period, the need for a
fair and humane resolution becomes paramount.
Prolonged, continuous, and unblemished service
performing tasks inherently required on a regular
basis can, over the time, transform what was
initially ad-hoc or temporary into a scenario
demanding fair regularization . In a recent judgment
of this Court in Vinod Kumar v. Union of India , it was
held that held that procedural formalities cannot be used
to deny regularization of service to an employee whose
appointment was termed “temporary” but has performed
the same duties as performed by the regular employee
over a considerable period in the capacity of the regular
employee.

22. The pervasive misuse of temporary
employment contracts, as exemplified in this case,
reflects a broader systemic issue that adversely
affects workers' rights and job security. In the
private sector, the rise of the gig economy has led to an
increase in precarious employment arrangements, often
characterized by lack of benefits, job security, and fair
treatment. Such practices have been criticized for
exploiting workers and undermining labour standards.
Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the
principles of fairness and justice, bear an even greater
responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment
practices. When public sector entities engage in
misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors
the detrimental trends observed in the gig
economy but also sets a concerning precedent that
can erode public trust in governmental operations.

- 46 -



25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary
employees, particularly in government institutions, often
face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the
foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have
been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they
have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long-
term obligations owed to employees. These practices
manifest in several ways:

• Misuse of “Temporary” Labels : Employees
engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and
integral to the functioning of an institution are often
labeled as “temporary” or “contractual,” even when their
roles mirror those of regular employees. Such
misclassification deprives workers of the dignity,
security, and benefits that regular employees are
entitled to, despite performing identical tasks.

• Arbitrary Termination: Temporary
employees are frequently dismissed without cause or
notice, as seen in the present case. This practice
undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects
workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of
the quality or duration of their service.

• Lack of Career Progression : Temporary
employees often find themselves excluded from
opportunities for skill development, promotions, or
incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their
roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and
their regular counterparts, despite their contributions
being equally significant.

• Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions
increasingly resort to outsourcing roles performed by
temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of
exploited workers with another. This practice not only
perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a
deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular
employment.

• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits :
Temporary employees are often denied fundamental
benefits such as pension, provident fund, health
insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans
decades. This lack of social security subjects them and

- 47 -


their families to undue hardship, especially in cases of
illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.

26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra)
sought to curtail the practice of backdoor entries
and ensure appointments adhered to
constitutional principles, it is regrettable that its
principles are often misinterpreted or misapplied
to deny legitimate claims of long- serving
employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish
between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments. It
categorically held that employees in irregular
appointments, who were engaged in duly
sanctioned posts and had served continuously for
more than ten years, should be considered for
regularization as a one-time measure. However,
the laudable intent of the judgment is being
subverted when institutions rely on its dicta to
indiscriminately reject the claims of employees,
even in cases where their appointments are not
illegal, but merely lack adherence to procedural
formalities. Government departments often cite
the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) to argue that no
vested right to regularization exists for temporary
employees, overlooking the judgment's explicit
acknowledgment of cases where regularization is
appropriate. This selective application distorts the
judgment's spirit and purpose, effectively
weaponizing it against employees who have
rendered indispensable services over decades.

27. In light of these considerations, in our
opinion, it is imperative for government departments to
lead by example in providing fair and stable
employment. Engaging workers on a temporary
basis for extended periods, especially when their
roles are integral to the organization's functioning,
not only contravenes international labour
standards but also exposes the organization to
legal challenges and undermines employee
morale. By ensuring fair employment practices,
government institutions can reduce the burden of
unnecessary litigation, promote job security, and
uphold the principles of justice and fairness that
they are meant to embody. This approach aligns
with international standards and sets a positive
precedent for the private sector to follow, thereby

- 48 -


contributing to the overall betterment of labour
practices in the country. ”
(Emphasis supplied)

75. Recently, this Court in Bhola Nath (supra) while
relying on the judgment of Jaggo (supra), Shripal (supra), and
Dharam Singh (supra) observed as follows:—

“13.6. This Court has, on several occasions,
deprecated the practice adopted by States of engaging
employees under the nominal labels of “part-time”,
“contractual” or “temporary” in perpetuity and thereby
exploiting them by not regularizing their positions. In
Jaggo v. Union of India , this Court underscored that
government departments must lead by example in
ensuring fair and stable employment, and evolved
the test of examining whether the duties
performed by such temporary employees are
integral to the day-to-day functioning of the
organization.

13.7 In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam , and Vinod Kumar
v. Union of India , this Court cautioned against a
mechanical and blind reliance on Umadevi (supra) to
deny regularization to temporary employees in the
absence of statutory rules. It was held that Umadevi
(supra) cannot be employed as a shield to
legitimise exploitative engagements continued for
years without undertaking regular recruitment .
The Court further clarified that Umadevi itself draws a
distinction between appointments that are “illegal” and
those that are merely “irregular”, the latter being
amenable to regularization upon fulfilment of the
prescribed conditions.

13.8. In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P. , this
Court strongly deprecated the culture of “ad-hocism”
adopted by States in their capacity as employers. The
Court criticised the practice of outsourcing or
informalizing recruitment as a means to evade
regular employment obligations, observing that
such measures perpetuate precarious working
conditions while circumventing fair and lawful
engagement practices.

- 49 -


13.9. The State must remain conscious that
part-time employees, such as the appellants,
constitute an integral part of the edifice upon
which the machinery of the State continues to
function. They are not merely ancillary to the
system, but form essential components thereof.
The equality mandate of our Constitution,
therefore, requires that their service be
reciprocated in a manner free from arbitrariness,
ensuring that decisions of the State affecting the
careers and livelihood of such part-time and
contractual employees are guided by fairness and
reason .”

(Emphasis supplied)

76. What emerges from the principles enunciated in
the aforesaid decisions is that the State cannot rely upon
the mere form of engagement to deny fair and equitable
treatment to employees who have served it for long
years. The consistent thread running through these
judgments is that Umadevi (supra) cannot be invoked as
a blanket barrier to justify prolonged and continued
engagements of a temporary or ad hoc nature, especially
where the employees have been discharging essential
and recurring functions of the State. The Court has
repeatedly emphasised that the distinction between
“illegal” and “irregular” appointments must be kept in
view, that long and continuous service is a relevant
consideration, and that the State, as a model employer, is
under a constitutional obligation to act with fairness,
consistency and reasonableness. The practice of retaining
employees for decades under deceptively titled
designations, while simultaneously extracting regular
work integral to the administration, has been
disapproved consistently.

77. Applying these principles to the present case, it
is evident that engaging workers on muster rolls was a
consistently employed policy of the State which
continued for prolonged period of time. The appellants
were not engaged for sporadic or seasonal purposes but
were taken on muster rolls and have rendered continuous
service for decades in departments performing regular

- 50 -


governmental functions. The State itself acknowledged
the magnitude of the issue and framed a Cabinet policy to
regularize similarly situated workers, acting upon it in
respect of nearly 30,000 employees. In such
circumstances, to deny consideration to the fraction of
remaining eligible workers including the appellants, by
taking shelter under a rigid reading of Umadevi (supra)
would defeat the very principles of fairness and non-
arbitrariness that this Court has consistently upheld.

78. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to
accept the contention of the State that the appellants
cannot be granted regularization on the ground that they
were not initially appointed against duly sanctioned
posts. The State, having engaged the appellants prior to
st
1 April, 1993, utilised their services continuously for
decades, and having itself framed and implemented a
Cabinet policy regularizing nearly 30,000 similarly
situated workers, cannot now exclude the appellants by
taking shelter behind a rigid or technical reading of
Umadevi (supra). In absence of any cogent distinction or
reasoned decision justifying such exclusion, the action of
the State is manifestly arbitrary. It is inconsistent with its
obligation to function as a model employer and does not
withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution.”

The said judgment was rendered on 21-05-2026.
9.8. Subsequent to the said judgment, the Apex Court, again,
8
in the case of BHIKHANI DEVI v. UNION OF INDIA , while
considering whether a temporary status casual labourer would be
entitled to pensionary benefits on superannuation in the absence of
a formal order of regularization, observes as follows:

8

2026 SCC OnLine SC 1055

- 51 -


“…. …. ….
32. Having heard the counsel for both the parties and on
perusal of pleadings and material on record, the issue that
arises for consideration can be carved out as follows:

‘Whether temporary status casual labourer, in the
absence of a formal order of regularisation, would be
entitled to pensionary benefits on superannuation or
not?’

33. Before adverting to the above question and
interpreting the Scheme involved in the present factual matrix,
we find it apposite to delineate the legal framework governing
the rights of casual and temporary employees. This Court has
over the years developed jurisprudence concerning rights of
casual labourers and temporary employees which needs to be
adverted to.

34. In Jagrit Mazdoor Union (supra), this Court held
that upon conferment of temporary status and
completion of three years of continuous service, casual
labourers are to be treated at par with Group ‘D’
employees and would thereby be entitled to such benefits
admissible to regular employees. The Court observed that
there could be no justification in withholding benefits
from such employees and emphasised the obligation of
the State, as a model employer, to act in consonance with
the Directive Principles of State Policy as provided in the
Constitution of India.

35. Further, in Vinod Kumar (supra), this Court
recognised that where employees have rendered
continuous service, performing duties indistinguishable
from those discharged by regular employees, the
distinction between temporary and permanent
employment becomes substantively illusory and the
failure to recognise the true nature of such service would
be contrary to the principles of equity and fairness.

36. In Jaggo (supra), this Court reiterated that
employees labelled as temporary or part-time, but who
have in fact rendered continuous and essential service

- 52 -


over long periods, cannot be denied benefits available to
regular employees merely on account of nomenclature.
The Court held that such engagement is neither sporadic
nor casual, but is in the nature of regular employment,
thereby necessitating extension of all corresponding
service benefits.

37. In this context, the principle laid down by this
Court in Yashwant Hari Katakkar v. Union of India 6 also
assumes significance, wherein this Court held that where
an employee has rendered long years of service and there
is no justifiable reason for not conferring permanent
status, it would be a travesty of justice to deny
pensionary benefits merely on the ground of absence of
formal regularisation, and such an employee is liable to
be treated as having attained permanent status.

38. Perusal of the above decisions of this Court
establish a consistent judicial approach that long-serving
employees, whether casual or temporary, particularly
those who have been conferred a recognised status and
extended benefits akin to regular employees, cannot be
denied corresponding benefits including social security
and pensionary benefits. The emphasis must be on
ensuring that the State does not retain such employees in
a precarious condition while extracting services identical
to those performed by regular employees.

39. This approach is firmly rooted in the
constitutional mandate of equality enshrined under
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Any classification,
resulting in denial of any benefits to a class of employees
who are otherwise similarly situated in terms of duties
and responsibilities would fall foul of constitutional
ethos. Further, the Directive Principles of State Policy,
particularly Articles 38, 39 and 43, cast a positive
obligation upon the State to ensure social and economic
justice, fair conditions of work, and a decent standard of
life for labourers. Pension, in this context, is not a
gratuitous benefit but a facet of social welfare and
economic justice.

- 53 -


40. The concept of the State as a model employer,
read in conjunction with the aforesaid constitutional
mandate, reinforces the obligation upon the State to
extend fair and equitable treatment to employees who
have rendered long and continuous service and that the
State cannot extract services of a permanent nature
while denying corresponding benefits.

41. At this stage, it is also necessary to note that
pension is not a bounty but a vested and enforceable
constitutional right. This Court in State of Jharkhand v.
Jitendra Kumar Srivastava 7 has categorically held that
pension is a hard-earned benefit amassed by an
employee by virtue of long and continuous service and is
in the nature of “property” within the meaning of Article
300A of the Constitution of India.

42. Once pension is recognised as a constitutional
right in the nature of property, it cannot be taken away
except by authority of law. A statutory right cannot be
rendered illusory on account of inaction of the employer,
and such inaction cannot defeat or deny a constitutional
right. It is in the light of this above discussed judicial
approach of this Court over a period of time, the
provisions of the Scheme and the subsequent applicable
circulars must be read, understood and interpreted.

43. Let us, now, turn to the Scheme that is applicable to
the facts of the present case. The principles emanating from
Jagrit Mazdoor Union (supra), as discussed hereinabove,
are directly incorporated in formation of the said Scheme.
The relevant portion of the decision is reproduced herein:

“… After rendering three years of continuous
service with temporary status, the casual
labourers shall be treated at par with temporary
Grade ‘D’ employees of the Department of Posts
and would thereby be entitled to such benefits as
are admissible to Group ‘D’ employees on regular
basis. ”
( emphasis supplied )

…. …. ….

- 54 -



55. It may be noted here that the Respondents contend
that temporary status casual labourers are extended only the
benefits that are specified in the Scheme and Circular dated
30.11.1992 and are not entitled for pensionary benefits. The
said submission, in our considered opinion, is misconceived.
The expression “ benefits admissible to temporary Group
‘D’ employees such as ”, made use of in the circular is of
considerable importance. The utilisation of the words
“such as” clearly indicates that the benefits enumerated
therein are illustrative and neither restrictive nor
exhaustive. This is also evident from the observations in
Jagrit Mazdoor Union (supra), which form basis of the
Scheme and Circular dated 30.11.1992, and provides to
extend all benefits as admissible to temporary Group ‘D’
employees without any restrictions. Therefore, the
circular, as earlier observed, being a beneficial
legislation, cannot be read and understood in a restrictive
manner rather the correct approach of interpretation
would be to analyse it in the letter and spirit of the
legislative and administrative intent i.e. to extend all
benefits as are available to temporary Group ‘D’
employees, to temporary status casual labourers
including pensionary benefits.

56. Before proceeding further, it becomes necessary to
deal with another contention advanced on behalf of the
Respondents that Clause 6 of the Scheme contemplates
counting of 50% service rendered under temporary status
towards retirement benefits only after formal regularisation as
Group ‘D’ employee and, therefore, in the absence of
regularisation, no pensionary benefits can be granted. The said
submission cannot be accepted in the manner sought to be
canvassed. Clause 6 cannot be read in isolation divorced from
the principles and purpose underlying the Scheme and the
circular dated 30.11.1992. The judgment of this Court in
Jagrit Mazdoor Union (supra), which forms the basis of
the Scheme itself, categorically directed that upon
completion of three years of continuous service under
temporary status, casual labourers ‘would thereby be
entitled to benefits as are admissible to Group ‘D’
employees on regular basis’. The circular dated
30.11.1992 further clarifies that such employees would

- 55 -


be entitled to counting of service for pension and
terminal benefits as admissible to temporary Group ‘D’
employees.

57. The expression “after regularisation” occurring
in Clause 6 cannot be construed in a narrow or restrictive
manner so as to defeat the beneficial object underlying
the Scheme and must be construed in its proper context.
Clause 6 does not create the pensionary entitlement itself,
rather, it provides an additional benefit by directing that half of
the service rendered under temporary status to be counted
towards grant of retirement benefits upon regularisation. The
pensionary entitlement of temporary status employees who
have completed the prescribed period of service flows
independently from the Scheme and the circular dated
30.11.1992. Clause 6 has to be interpreted harmoniously and
would construe to mean that in cases where formal orders of
regularisation are passed, 50% of the service rendered under
temporary status would be liable to be counted towards
retirement and pensionary benefits as additional benefit apart
from the benefits as available under the rules which become
applicable to a regular government employee. Consequently,
while Clause 6 may operate to confer an additional advantage in
cases where regularisation takes place, the absence of formal
regularisation cannot be construed as extinguishing or defeating
the underlying entitlement to pensionary benefits.

58. At this stage, it also becomes necessary to appreciate
the distinction between different categories of employees
engaged within the service framework in the Department of
Posts. Broadly, four categories of employees emerge from the
statutory and administrative work structure involved in the
matter at hand, namely: (i) casual labourers; (ii) temporary
status casual labourers; (iii) temporary Government employees;
and (iv) regular Government employees.

59. A casual labourer is merely a daily-rated worker
engaged on need basis and is entitled only to daily wages for
the period during which work is performed. Such employee does
not possess any structured service status nor entitled to any
service benefits ordinarily available to Government employees.

- 56 -


60. The second category is that of a temporary status
casual labourer. The conferment of temporary status not only
initiates the process of integration of such employee within a
structured service framework but extends certain service
protections and benefits under the Scheme. Nevertheless, such
employee remains a temporary status casual labourer and does
not become a temporary Government servant.

61. The third category is that of temporary Government
employees which are governed by the CCS (Temporary Service)
Rules, 1965, while the fourth category comprises of regular
Government employees governed by the regular service rules
applicable to permanent Government servants.

62. It is to be noted that these aforesaid four categories
are not to be conflated as stages required to be gone through to
become a regular employee. It may be pointed here that a
casual labourer can directly become a regular employee, if the
Scheme provides for such transition. A temporary Government
employee, however, definitely has two stages leading to
permanent employment i.e. initial appointment as temporary
Government employee and upon confirmation in service, his
status is changed to regular government employee.

63. For casual labourers, the Scheme provides for a
progression to regular employment. Initially the employee
enters service as a casual labourer. Thereafter, upon satisfying
the conditions prescribed under Clause 1 of the Scheme, he/she
is conferred temporary status and continues under such status.
Upon completion of the prescribed conditions and subject to the
applicable Recruitment Rules, the employee becomes eligible for
regularisation against Group ‘D’ posts and ultimately regularized
and appointed as regular employee on availability of vacancies.

64. The Scheme, in question, which provides for grant of
temporary status and regularisation for casual labourers
recognises four categories of employees operating within the
service structure, however, the progression contemplated
therein essentially unfolds in three stages i.e. engagement as a
casual labourer, conferment and continuance of temporary
status, and eventual regularisation against Group ‘D’ posts.

- 57 -


65. It is apposite to highlight and emphasize that
although under the Scheme the temporary status of
casual labourers continues till his regularization in
service, however, on completion of the period of three
years, the service conditions are materially changed as he
is treated at par with temporary Group ‘D’ employees and
extended all benefits that are admissible to such
employees.

66. The submission advanced on behalf of the
Respondents, that under the Scheme the employees continue
merely as temporary status casual labourers and are distinct
from the temporary Government servants, and so would be the
pensionary framework applicable. At first blush, this contention
appears to be correct to an extent. However, on due
consideration and deliberation of the Scheme and its various
clauses as a whole, the submission aforesaid is found to be
misplaced.

67. Although, it may be correct to say that
conferment of temporary status on a casual labourer
under the Scheme does not ipso facto transform such
employee into a temporary Government servant,
however, what falls short from the aforesaid submission
is that while the status of such employee continues
unchanged i.e., of a ‘temporary status casual labourers’,
the Scheme consciously and specifically extends to such
employees benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’
employees upon completion of three years of continuous
service under temporary status. The service conditions,
at this juncture, of the casual temporary status employee
under the Scheme gets substantially changed and carries
all the benefits that are available to temporary
government employees. Therefore, while the
nomenclature and category of their service status remain
unchanged, the nature and extent of benefits now
available to them stand significantly enlarged and aligned
with those admissible to temporary Government
employees, blurring the distinction between both
categories as far as benefits available to them are
concerned. The distinction that remains is one relating to
nomenclature, formal status and mode of regularisation
but not to the nature of extended benefits.

- 58 -



68. In other words, the Scheme nowhere provides
that upon completion of three years' service under
temporary status, the employee becomes a temporary
Government servant. What it specifically provides is that
such employee shall be treated at par with temporary
Group ‘D’ employees for purposes of extension of
admissible benefits. The parity contemplated under the
Scheme is thus parity in service benefits and not identity
of service status.

69. Once the Scheme and the circular dated
30.11.1992 consciously extend benefits admissible to
temporary Group ‘D’ employees, the Respondents cannot
rely solely upon the nomenclature of ‘temporary status
casual labourer’ to deny those very benefits. The entire
framework of the Scheme proceeds upon extension of
substantive service benefits despite continuance of the
original nomenclature as temporary status casual
labourer.

70. As already discussed hereinabove, the Scheme and
the circular dated 30.11.1992 extend to temporary status
employees all the benefits that are available to temporary Group
‘D’ employees. Now, it becomes necessary to examine the
nature of pensionary benefits available to such temporary
Government employees under the statutory framework.

71. The services of the temporary Government servants
are governed by the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. It is
not disputed that a temporary Government servant is entitled to
terminal benefits including pension and on his death family
pension. Rule 10(1-B) of the said Rules specifically provides that
where a temporary Government servant retires on attaining the
age of superannuation after rendering temporary service of not
less than ten years, such employee shall be entitled to
superannuation pension and retirement gratuity and on death
family pension in accordance with the provisions of the CCS
(Pension) Rules, 1972. Rule 10(1-B) is reproduced herein:

“ 10. Terminal gratuity payable to temporary
Government servants.

- 59 -


xxx xxx xxx

(1-B) In the case of a temporary Government
servant who retires from service on attaining the age of
superannuation or on his being declared to be
permanently incapacitated for further Government
service by the appropriate medical authority, after he
has rendered temporary service of not less than 10
years or who has sought voluntary retirement by giving
three months' notice in writing on completion of 20
years' service, provisions of sub-rule (1) shall not apply
and in accordance with the provisions of the Central Civil
Services (Pension) Rules, 1972-

(i) such a Government servant shall be eligible
for the grant of superannuation, invalid or retiring
pension, as the case may be, and retirement gratuity;
and

(ii) in the event of his death after retirement, the
members of his family shall be eligible for the grant of
family pension.

xxx xxx xxx”

72. As is apparent from the above, the statutory
framework governing temporary Government employees
itself accepts and acknowledges entitlement of
pensionary benefits and that the same are not confined
only to regular permanent employees but are also
available to temporary Government servants upon
completion of the prescribed qualifying service. The CCS
(Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 thus constitute the
statutory source recognising pensionary entitlement of
temporary employees who have rendered specified and
continuous service.

73. The contention of the Respondents that the
Appellants were paid out of contingencies and therefore
stood excluded from the purview of the CCS (Temporary
Service) Rules, 1965 also cannot be accepted in the
particular facts of the present case. Such exclusion may
have relevance at the stage of initial engagement as
casual labourers. However, the service conditions of the
Appellants underwent a substantial transformation upon

- 60 -


extension of benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’
employees. The continued reliance by the Respondents
upon the original mode of engagement, while
simultaneously extending pay parity, increments, GPF
facilities, leave benefits and other service entitlements
akin to temporary Group ‘D’ employees, would amount to
selectively accepting one part of the Scheme while
disregarding the other. Such an approach would defeat
the very object underlying the Scheme and the circular
dated 30.11.1992. Once parity in service benefits with
temporary Group ‘D’ employees is consciously extended
under the Scheme, pensionary benefits flowing under
Rule 10(1-B) of the Rules of 1965 cannot be selectively
denied by ignoring or overlooking the statutory right.

74. The argument founded upon financial burden is
equally untenable. Pension is not a matter of grace
dependent upon the financial convenience of the
employer, but a deferred wage earned through long years
of service. As already noticed hereinabove, this Court has
recognised pension as a constitutional right in the nature
of property protected under Article 300A of the
Constitution of India as held in Jitendra Kumar Srivastava
Case (supra) and it, therefore, cannot be denied on the
plea of financial burden.

75. From the above discussion what follows is that
when the statutory framework including CCS (Temporary
Service) Rules, 1965 is read in conjunction with the
Scheme and the circular dated 30.11.1992, the
inescapable conclusion which emerges is that a casual
labour, on being conferred the temporary status, upon
completion of three years of continuous service as
temporary status casual labourer becomes entitled to
benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’ employees,
which necessarily includes pensionary benefits available
under Rule 10(1-B) of the CCS (Temporary Service)
Rules, 1965 subject, of course, to fulfilling the eligibility
criteria provided therein. This right is not dependent on
regularisation. What is conceived is conferring of
additional benefit of previous service under the Scheme
as would be available to an employee on regularisation
apart from the benefits conferred under the rules

- 61 -


becoming applicable on this now acquired new status of a
regular employee.

76. The question as framed in para 32 above stands
answered as follows:

‘A temporary status casual labourer would be
entitled to pensionary benefits on superannuation even in
the absence of regularisation.’

77. What remains to be seen now is whether the
Appellants, in the cases before us, fulfil the eligibility criteria
under Rule 10 (1-B) of CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 so
as to be entitled for pensionary benefits.

78. The service trajectory of Late Suraj Sah as per the
material placed on record, thus falls into three distinct phases:
(i) service as a casual labourer from 1972 till 29.11.1989; (ii)
service as a temporary status casual labourer from 29.11.1989
till 30.11.1992; and (iii) continuance as a temporary status
casual labourer with entitlement to benefits admissible to
temporary Group ‘D’ employees from 30.11.1992 till his
superannuation on 31.12.2008.

79. From the above what emerges is that Late Suraj
Sah was initially engaged as a casual labourer in the year
1972 and continued as such till 29.11.1989. During this
period, he remained a daily-rated worker and was not
entitled to any service benefits. Upon introduction of the
Scheme, he was conferred temporary status with effect
from 29.11.1989. Thereafter, upon completion of three
years of continuous service under temporary status on
30.11.1992, though his formal status continued to remain
that of a temporary status casual labourer, he became
entitled to the benefits admissible to temporary Group ‘D’
employees. Thus, while his nomenclature remained
unchanged, his service benefits thereafter stood aligned
with those admissible to temporary Group ‘D’ employees
as per the Scheme and the circular dated 30.11.1992. He
ultimately superannuated on 31.12.2008 while continuing
as a temporary status casual labourer. So from
30.11.1992 till the date of superannuation i.e.
31.12.2008, the period being more than the minimum of

- 62 -


10 years, he became entitled for benefits under Rule
10(1-B) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 read
with the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. Thereby making him
entitled to grant of superannuation pension and other
retirement benefits as admissible under the above rules.

80. The service records of Bahuru Sahu and
Pitamber Jha would also reflect that they were, after
initial appointment as casual labourers, conferred
temporary status, w.e.f. 29.11.1989 till 30.11.1992 and
continued as temporary status casual labourers till their
date of superannuation 30.04.2008 and 31.10.2015
respectively. The period being in excess of minimum
qualifying service of ten years for entitlement of pension,
they would be entitled to grant of all retiral benefits as
available under the Rules.

81. Insofar as the contention of the Respondents
with regard to delay and laches is concerned, it is well
settled that pensionary benefits constitute a continuing
cause of action, and a claim for pension cannot be
defeated solely on the ground of delay. At the same time,
the claim for arrears is required to be balanced with
settled principles governing limitation. In the present
case, nothing has been brought on record to indicate that
the Appellants had raised any claim for pensionary
benefits prior to filing of the respective Original
Applications before the Tribunal. In such circumstances,
while the entitlement of the Appellants to pensionary and
consequential retiral benefits stands established, the
arrears thereof, wherever applicable, shall remain
confined to the period of three years and two months
preceding the date of filing of the respective Original
Applications before the Tribunal, consistent with settled
principles governing service jurisprudence. ”

(Emphasis supplied at each instance)

10. In AMARENDRA KUMAR MOHAPATRA supra, the
Apex Court undertook a detailed reconciliation of UMADEVI with

- 63 -


STATE OF KARNATAKA vs. M.L.KESARI reported in (2010) 9
SCC 247 , elucidating why regularization must necessarily follow
once an employee has completed 10 years of service while being
otherwise qualified.

11. The first discernable departure from the rigid
contours of UMADEVI was in the case of SHEO NARAIN
NAGAR, supra, where the Apex Court lamented that
UMADEVI was being wielded as a convenient instrument to
perpetuate injustice, by continuing employees in service
without regularization and in some cases, even without
payment of lawful wages. Noting that the appellants therein had
been in service since 1993 and had completed 10 years well prior to
UMADEVI , the Court held that denial of regularization would be
wholly unjustified. This exposition was further amplified in
NARENDRA KUMAR TIWARI supra , where the Apex Court
cautioned that the pernicious practice of indefinitely
continuing employees appointed through irregular means if
allowed to persist, would subvert the very intent of the
Constitution Bench in UMADEVI. The Court observed that

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where employees had rendered 10 years of continuous
service to the State of Jharkhand, they observed
regularization barring the existence of any valid impediment
such as misconduct or lack of eligibility. The reasoning finds
further affirmation in the case of PREM SINGH supra.

12. The Apex Court carried forward the jurisprudence in
CHANDER MOHAN NEGI supra , wherein the Apex Court was
dealing with the case of teachers, exhorted the State forthwith to
frame an appropriate policy for regularization.

13. Thereafter, in JAGGO supra, the Apex Court after
an exhaustive consideration of rival submissions, holds that
the employees who had rendered uninterrupted service
extended far beyond a decade, could not be nonchalantly
discarded by the facile label of ‘part time’ or ‘contractual’.
The Apex Court underscored that the true essence of
employment lies in the sustained contribution rendered, the
integral nature of work performed and the absence of
allegation that the entry was tainted by illegality or

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subterfuge. The Apex Court requesting plight of employees
who had toiled for a decade or two, without career
progression or equal remuneration holding that such
treatment amounted to denial of basic human right and a
perpetuation of exploitation of human labour. The culmination
of this judicial evaluation is reflected in SHRIPAL supra, where the
Apex Court after surveying the entire spectrum of law,
unequivocally holds that the UMADEVI cannot be pressed
into service as a shield to justify exploitative engagements
continuing for years without the employer undertaking
lawful recruitment. Consequently, the regularization was directed
for employees who had completed 10 years of service.

14. The line of reasoning attained further
crystallization in DHARAM SINGH supra, rendered in August
2025 wherein, the Apex Court holds that the appellants who
had already retired were nevertheless entitled to
regularization with effect from the date on which they
completed 10 years of service. The Apex Court further
directed re-calculation and disbursement of pension,

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gratuity and other terminal benefits within three months
from the date of the said judgment. Significantly, even in
respect of the deceased appellants, the Apex Court held
where death occurred during the pendency of the claim of
regularization, the legal heirs would be entitled to arrears of
terminal benefits, in accordance with law.


15. What unmistakably emerges from the afore-
quoted pronouncements is that the employees regardless of
the nomenclature attached to their engagement, whether
temporary, contractual or daily wage or even on
consolidated pay, once they have completed 10 years of
service and were otherwise qualified to hold the post, are
entitled to consideration for regularization. Any denial
thereof would reduce the appointment to an exploitative
engagement. The Apex Court has further cautioned that
replacement of one set of temporary or contractual employees with
another similarly placed set, would offend even the ratio of
UMADEVI itself. As such, the conduct on the part of the State,
cannot be countenanced.

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16. In so far as the retired employees are concerned,
the Apex Court has authoritatively held that retirement
during the pendency of the claim for regularization does not
extinguish such claim. The submissions advanced by the learned
counsel for the appellant, merits acceptance as the petitioner in
the present case retired while her claim for regularization
subsisted and during the pendency of the writ petition, the
right to consideration does not evaporate on attainment of
age of superannuation. The Apex Court has gone a step further
to hold that even in cases of deceased employees who asserted
their claim for regularization during their lifetime and whose claim
remained pending either before the State or before this Court or
competent Judicial Fora , such claims must still be examined and
granted, if otherwise permissible.

17. In the case of SUKHENDU BHATTACHARJEE, the Apex
Court considers the interplay between the Constitution Bench
judgment in UMADEVI , the exception carved out in paragraph 53
thereof, and the constitutional guarantee of equality under Article
14. The controversy arose when nearly 30,000 work-charged and

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muster-roll employees were regularized pursuant to a policy
decision of the State, while several identically situated employees
were excluded owing to administrative lapses and clerical
omissions.
17.1. The Apex Court holds that UMADEVI cannot be
construed as imposing an absolute and inflexible embargo upon
regularization in every conceivable circumstance. The object of
UMADEVI was to prevent illegal appointments and backdoor
entries into public employment, and not to furnish the State with a
convenient shield to perpetuate arbitrary treatment of employees
who had rendered long and continuous service.
17.2 The Apex Court draws a distinction between a claim
founded upon the one-time exception under paragraph 53 of
UMADEVI and a claim founded upon equal treatment under an
existing policy of regularization. Where the State has consciously
regularized one class of employees, it cannot arbitrarily exclude
other employees who are identically situated in the matter of
appointment, nature of duties, length of service and eligibility. Such
selective regularization would fall foul of Article 14.

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17.3. The Apex Court further emphasizes that the State, as a
model employer, cannot extract labour for decades, hold out
assurances of regularization and thereafter invoke technicalities to
defeat the legitimate expectations of its employees.
18. In BHIKHANI DEVI, the Apex Court considers whether a
casual labourer who had been conferred temporary status and had
subsequently attained superannuation without formal regularization
could be denied pensionary and retiral benefits. Tracing the
development of service jurisprudence through JAGRIT MAZDOOR
UNION (REGD.) v. MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LTD.
reported in 1990 Supp SCC 113 ; VINOD KUMAR v. UNION OF
INDIA reported in (2024) 9 SCC 327; JAGGO supra and
YASHWANT HARI KATAKKAR v. UNION OF INDIA reported in
(1996) 7 SCC 113 , the Apex Court holds that the nomenclature
attached to an employee's engagement cannot, by itself, determine
the substantive benefits to which such employee is entitled. The
Apex Court observes that pension is neither a bounty nor an act of
governmental generosity. It is a hard-earned benefit flowing from

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qualifying service and, where legally accrued, constitutes property
protected under Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
19. On a conspectus of the law declared by the Apex
Court in the afore-quoted judgments, what would
unmistakably emerge is that the nomenclature attached to
an employee's engagement, be it temporary, contractual,
daily-wage or on consolidated pay, cannot, by itself, become
the determinative factor in considering the claim for
regularization. Where an employee, otherwise qualified to
hold the post, has rendered ten years or more of continuous
service against a duly sanctioned vacancy, without the
protective umbrella of orders of Courts or Tribunals, the
claim for regularization warrants consideration within the
parameters delineated in UMADEVI and its subsequent
exposition. The constitutional philosophy underlying these
judgments is that the State cannot, on the one hand, extract
the labour of an employee for decades together, discharging
duties which are perennial and integral to its functioning,
and, on the other, deny even consideration of regularization

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by taking refuge under the nomenclature of the engagement.
The State cannot have the benefit of permanent labour
under the guise of temporary employment, nor can it convert
the vulnerability of an employee into a perpetual instrument
of administrative convenience. To deny consideration of
regularization merely because the employee has, in the
meantime, attained the age of superannuation, would be to
permit the State to reap the fruits of decades of labour and
thereafter wash its hands of the obligations that may have
accrued during the subsistence of such employment. Such an
approach would lend judicial imprimatur to an exploitative
engagement of human labour, a course that would be wholly
antithetical to the constitutional ideals of fairness, dignity
and social justice.
20. The Apex Court, in the afore-quoted judgments, has
underscored that the mere attainment of the age of superannuation
cannot, by itself, become a reason to defeat accrued service-related
entitlements or to decline consideration of a claim that had arisen
during the currency of employment. The right to seek

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consideration of regularization, where otherwise available in
law, does not evaporate into thin air upon the employee
crossing the threshold of superannuation. Retirement may
bring the relationship of employment to an end; it does not
necessarily bring to an end the legal consequences of an
unlawful denial of benefits during that employment. An
employee who has devoted the prime of her youth and the
greater part of her working life to the service of the State
cannot be shown the door at the twilight of her career, with
nothing to show for decades of toil, merely because the
State chose to perpetuate her engagement on daily wages.
Such treatment, where the employee was otherwise entitled
to regularization, would be unfair in its conception, unjust in
its operation and unconscionable in its consequences. It
would reduce public employment to an arrangement under
which the State secures the labour of an employee during
the most productive years of her life, but denies the
attendant security and benefits when they are most needed.
The judgment in UMADEVI cannot be pressed into service as an
all-purpose shield to justify such prolonged precarious

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engagements. It was a judgment intended to preserve
constitutional discipline in public recruitment, not a licence to
perpetuate exploitation under the protective cloak of constitutional
legality. The State, which is expected to be a model employer,
cannot be permitted to transform a constitutional safeguard
against illegal appointments into a weapon against
employees whose services it has continuously utilized for
decades.
21. If the facts obtaining in the case at hand are considered
on the bedrock of the principles so enunciated by the Apex Court,
the arbitrariness in the treatment meted out to the appellant
becomes writ large. The appellant did not enter service through any
backdoor arrangement. Her name was drawn from the list
maintained by the Employment Exchange, pursuant to a process
initiated by the respondent-State. The appointment was against a
duly sanctioned and vacant post, with the policy of reservation
being given effect to, as the appellant belongs to the Scheduled
Caste community. The appellant thereafter continued to serve
the Municipality for 34 long years, discharging duties in

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different capacities, including those of a Typist and a
Computer Operator. The Municipality itself found her
services worthy of regularization and forwarded
recommendations to that effect .
22. The recommendations did not remain wholly unacted
upon, for, out of 26 employees whose names were forwarded, 12
were extended the benefit of regularization. The appellant,
however, was left behind, notwithstanding her long years of service
and the recommendation made in her favour. The State thus drew a
line between employees who stood on the same footing, extending
the benefit of regularization to some while leaving the appellant to
languish in the uncertainty of daily-wage employment. No
justifiable distinction warranting such differential treatment is
forthcoming from the material placed before this Court. The conduct
of the State, which ought to have been a model employer, falls
woefully short of the constitutional standards of fairness and non-
arbitrariness.
23. The learned Single Judge, in the considered view of this
Court, ought to have examined these circumstances rather than

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non-suiting the appellant on the solitary ground that she had
attained the age of superannuation. The appellant's retirement did
not erase the 34 years of service rendered by her; neither did it
obliterate the claim that had arisen long before her retirement. The
learned Single Judge, therefore, fell into error in declining to
examine the claim on its merits merely because the appellant had
superannuated.
24. The cumulative effect of the afore-narrated facts, viewed
through the prism of the law declared by the Apex Court, leaves
little room for doubt that the appellant has made out a case for
relief. The appellant's entry into service through the Employment
Exchange, her appointment against a sanctioned vacancy, the
uninterrupted service rendered for 34 years, the recommendations
made for regularization, and the extension of that very benefit to
similarly situated employees constitute circumstances which, taken
together, demonstrate the manifest arbitrariness of her exclusion.
This is not a case where an employee seeks to secure regularization
merely by invoking the length of service. It is a case where the
State, having initiated the process of appointment, utilized the

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services of the appellant for decades, recommended her
regularization and regularized others similarly situated, seeks to
deny her the same benefit by invoking the very passage of time
during which her claim remained unattended.
25. In the peculiar and compelling circumstances obtaining in
the case at hand, this Court is of the considered view that a mere
mandamus directing the respondents to reconsider the claim of the
appellant would be an inadequate remedy. Such a direction would
only consign the appellant, now a superannuated employee, to yet
another round of administrative consideration and, possibly,
another journey to the doors of this Court. The law does not
demand that a litigant, who has already spent decades pursuing a
legitimate claim, be condemned to an endless cycle of
representations, rejections and litigation. Justice, to be meaningful,
must not merely recognize a wrong; it must, where the facts and
law so warrant, furnish an effective remedy for that wrong. The
appellant is, therefore, entitled to a direction for regularization of
her services with consequential service and retiral benefits, to be
worked out in accordance with the applicable rules.

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26. Before parting, this Court deems it necessary to
remind the respondent-State of its solemn obligation as a
model employer. The State must not become an exemplar of
the very exploitation which the Constitution commands it to
prevent. It cannot retain employees on daily wages for the
greater part of their working lives, deny them the security of
regular employment, and thereafter compel them to spend
the evening of their lives in the corridors of Courts seeking
recognition of services rendered over decades. The
respondents would do well to ensure that such instances do
not recur, for constitutional governance demands not merely
obedience to judicial directions after litigation, but fairness
in administrative action before litigation becomes inevitable.
27. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER

(i) The Writ Appeal is allowed.

(ii) The order dated 29-08-2025, passed by the learned
Single Judge in W.P.No.105093 of 2022, stands set
aside.

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(iii) The appellant shall be entitled to regularization of
her services in the cadre in which she was
working at the time of attaining the age of
superannuation, with effect from the date on
which she completed ten years of service, i.e., 11-
02-1998, together with all consequential benefits
flowing therefrom.
(iv) It is made clear that the consequential benefits to
which the appellant shall be entitled would
include notional continuity of regular service from
the date of completion of ten years of service, for
the purposes of pay fixation and all other
admissible service benefits. The entire period of
34 years of service rendered by the appellant
shall be reckoned for the purpose of
determination and computation of pension,
gratuity and all other admissible terminal and
retiral benefits. The respondents shall accordingly
undertake the necessary exercise of refixation of
pay and determination of consequential benefits.
(v) The respondents shall pass appropriate orders
regularizing the services of the appellant and
giving effect to the directions issued hereinabove,
within an outer limit of eight weeks from the date
of receipt of a copy of this order.

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(vi) In the event of failure to comply with the
aforesaid direction within the stipulated period,
the appellant shall, in addition to the benefits
directed hereinabove, become entitled to arrears
of wages quantified at 50% of the salary
entitlement flowing from such regularization, as a
consequence of non-compliance with the
directions of this Court.
Ordered accordingly.


Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE




Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE


BKP
CT: VH