ARTI SINGH vs CASHFREE PAYMENTS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 25 DAY OF AUGUST, 2026
R
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO. 4754 OF 2026 (CPC-)
BETWEEN:
1. ARTI SINGH
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
HAVING HER PLACE OF WORK AT A-30
TAKSHILA APARTMENT
PATPAR GANJ COMPLEX
DELHI 110 092.
2. HEAD AND TALE MEDIA PVT.LTD.
A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER
THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
A-30, TAKSHILA APARTMENT
PATPAR GANJ COMPLEX, DELHI 110 092.
…APPELLANTS
(BY DR.MALAVIKA PRASAD, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. A S
VISHWAJITH.,ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally signed
by
GAVRIBIDANUR
SUBRAMANYA
GUPTA
SREENATH
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
CASHFREE PAYMENTS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER
THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013,
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE
AT 10TH FLOOR, BUILDING NO. 7
ECO WORLD, SARJAPUR-MARATHAHALLI
OUTER RING ROAD
BENGALURU 560 103.
REP. BY ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY
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MR.JAMAL SAIT
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI.RAGHURAM CADAMBI., ADVOCATE FOR C/R)
THIS MFA IS FILED U/S.43 RULE 1(r) OF THE CPC,
PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DT. 03.06.2026. PASSED
ON IA NO.1 IN O.S.NO.3717/2026 BY THE i/c LXXV ADDL CITY
CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR
ORAL JUDGMENT
This appeal is preferred by the appellant/defendant
Nos.1 and 2 challenging the order dated 3.6.2026 passed
on I.A. No.1 in O.S. No.3717/2026 by the i/c LXXV Addl.
City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, granting an
exparte order of Temporary Injunction against the
appellant/defendant nos.1 and 2.
2. Parties shall be referred to as per their ranking
before the trial Court for the sake of easy understanding.
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(i) Brief facts of the case
3. Brief facts leading to filing of this appeal are as
under:
3.1 The plaintiff filed the suit against the defendants
for the relief of mandatory injunction directing the
defendants, their agents or any other person acting on
their behalf or under their instructions to remove the
defamatory article about the plaintiff, on the social media
platform of the 1st defendant and for Permanent
Injunction directing the defendants and their agents from
making statements which are defamatory, denigrating,
disparaging, false and misleading content in respect of the
plaintiff and its business and also for other consequential
reliefs.
3.2 Along with the plaint, the plaintiff filed an
application - I.A. No.1 for temporary injunction under
Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
for a direction to the defendants to immediately take down
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the defamatory article published on the platform of the 1st
defendant available at the URL mentioned therein, along
with any social media handles of the defendants, pending
disposal of the suit.
3.3 The trial Court took up the matter for
consideration. As an ad-interim order was sought prior to
issuance of notice, the application was heard and the
learned trial judge granted an ex parte order of Temporary
Injunction and ordered issuance of notice on I.A. No. 1
and also suit summons to the defendants. It is this order
of ad interim temporary injunction granted in favour of the
plaintiff that is questioned by the defendants in this
appeal.
3.4 The appellant no. 1/defendant No.2 is a
journalist for over 18 years and for the past 9 years, she
has been closely tracking India's fintech space and has
written some of the most defining pieces on the
ecosystem. Prior to that, the appellant no. 1 served as a
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Deputy Editor at India's leading business daily, Mint,
where she covered the intersection of finance and
technology. Prior to that, she worked at the Economic
Times Prime, a subscription-led platform by India's top
newspaper. She has done several various other activities
as a journalist. The appellant No.2/defendant no.1 is a
private limited company, incorporated in 2024 and it runs
a reader-funded news media and news platform engaged
in publishing reports, articles, analysis on business,
finance and fintech etc., Whereas, the respondent/plaintiff
is a company engaged in the business of providing
payment aggregation and related financial technology
services.
3.5 Being aggrieved by the impugned order passed
by the learned trial judge granting an ex parte order of
temporary injunction, the appellants/defendants are
before this Court in the present appeal.
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4. I have heard learned counsel - Dr. Malavika
Prasad for the appellants/defendants as well as learned
Counsel - Sri Raghuram Cadambi for the respondent/
plaintiff.
(ii) Contentions of learned counsel for
appellants/defendants
5. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants
contends that as an issue of maintainability was raised in
this appeal, she would address it first. It is contended that
the appeal is maintainable before this Court as
contemplated under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of CPC for the
reason that when an injunction is granted ex parte, it is
an order under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC and the
same would come within the purview of Order XLIII Rule 1
of CPC for a challenge in the appeal. It is not necessary
for the trial Court to have disposed of the application
exparte . It is also contended by learned counsel that when
there is a failure to provide reasoning as contemplated
under the proviso to Order XXXIX Rule 3 of CPC or a
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failure to provide reasoning that demonstrates the
application of mind, an appellate Court may be
approached by filing an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1 of
CPC and the same could be entertained. It is further
contended by learned counsel that the only superior Court
that may be seized of the matter is the appellate court
under Order XLIII Rule 1 of CPC.
5.1 Learned counsel for appellants/defendants
vehemently contends that the impugned order passed by
the learned trial judge is perverse, illegal, and arbitrary.
She contends that the impugned order is unreasoned and
the order merely asserts that if notice is ordered, it causes
the delay and defeats the very purpose of filing the suit.
She further contends that the impugned order has failed to
record any reasons in terms of proviso to Order XXXIX
Rule 3 of CPC as to why the notice to the appellants/
defendants is being dispensed and how the object of
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injunction would be defeated by the delay, if notice was
first issued.
5.2 Learned counsel also contends that no specific
reasoning or explanation in the light of the facts pleaded in
the plaint is forthcoming in the impugned order as to
urgency, imminent irreparable injury before notice, or any
factual basis showing that delay in issuing of notice would
render the interim prayer infructuous.
5.3 Learned counsel further contends that it is a
settled law that compliance with the proviso to Order
XXXIX Rule 3 is mandatory in case of ex parte injunction
orders. Where an injunction is granted without notice to
the defendant, trial Court requires to mandatorily record
reasons as to why notice is being dispensed and how it
would defeat the very object of injunction.
5.4 Learned counsel contends that there is a clear
absence of reasoned findings on prima facie case, balance
of convenience and irreparable injury, especially given the
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heightened standard for ex parte ad interim injunctions on
journalistic content.
5.5 Learned counsel also contends that the impugned
order is perverse and illegal for the reason that it merely
states in a generic manner that after perusing the
materials on record and plaint averments, documents,
citations and looking to the facts and circumstances of the
suit, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for grant
of ex parte temporary injunction in order to avoid
multiplicity of proceedings.
5.6 Learned counsel further contends that the
impugned order has failed to record proper reason for
existence of a prima facie case; record any findings on
irreparable injury to the respondent/plaintiff; and examine
the competing rights and positions of the
appellants/defendants as media/ journalistic appellants in
a defamation context in contrast with those of the
respondent/plaintiff.
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5.7 Learned counsel also contends that it is only in
exceptional circumstances, ex parte interim temporary
injunction is granted. While doing so, the Court must apply
the ordinary three-fold test of prima facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparable injury that would be caused
and upon being satisfied with these essential
requirements, Court could pass an ad interim order of
temporary injunction.
5.8 The learned counsel further contends that the
impugned order held the existence of a prima facie case
without reasons and has failed to articulate the remaining
two limbs on irreparable injury and balance of
convenience. She also contends that the impugned order
omitted to consider irreparable injury by not only failing to
record or recognize injury that is caused to the
respondent/plaintiff by a way of allegedly defamatory
article, but also failing to provide any reasoning as to how
injury is irreparable by way of damages. It is also
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contended that the balance of convenience is also not
clearly narrated and explained as to how it would tilt in
favour of the respondent/plaintiff.
5.9 It is further contended by learned counsel that
the appellant No.1 has a right to publish information being
a journalist and as a part of freedom of press, speech,
expression, profession and trade, which is a constitutional
right, she is entitled to put up article in the social media,
platform and other press and electronic media.
5.10 The learned counsel further contends that the
impugned order does not even record, much less
consider, the heightened standards for injunctions against
journalistic content, viz., that the alleged defamatory
article should be demonstrably and palpably false or
malicious, in such a manner that the defence of the
appellants would undoubtedly fail at trial. It is further
contended that no relevant documents are produced along
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with the plaint. Therefore, the impugned order is per se
illegal, perverse and arbitrary and requires to be set aside.
5.11 On these grounds, learned counsel for
appellants seeks to allow the appeal and consequently set
aside the impugned order passed by the trial judge.
5.12 Learned Counsel for the appellants relies upon
the following judgments in support of her case:
1. Wander Ltd. vs. Antox India (P) Ltd, reported in 1990
Supp SCC 727.
2. Shiv Kumar Chadha vs. Muncipal Corpn.of Delhi,
reported in (1993) 3 SCC 161.
3. Karnataka State Cricket Association vs. Mr.Shashidhara
A.V - Order of this Court dated 17th November 2025
in WP No.33725 of 2025.
4. Sri. Chethan A Vs. Smt.Rakshitha - Judgment of this
Court in MFA No.1910/2026 dated 16.03.2026.
5. Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private
Limited and Others Vs. Zee Entertainment Limited-
Order of High Court of Delhi in FAQ 79/2024, CM APPl.
14346/2024 dated 14th March 2024.
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(iii) Contentions of learned counsel for
respondent/plaintiff
6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/plaintiff vehemently contends that there is no
illegality or perversity in the impugned order passed by
the learned trial judge. It is further contended by learned
counsel for the respondent that the appeal is totally devoid
of merits and it is not maintainable either in law or facts.
On the ground of the appeal being not maintainable, he
seeks dismissal of the appeal.
6.1 Learned counsel further contends that the
appellate Court would not normally interfere with the
exercise of discretion by a Court of the first instance in
matters of interim injunction merely because, it would
arrive at a different opinion and therefore would come to a
different conclusion. Learned counsel further contends that
there is no material placed on record to show that the
impugned order is an exercise of arbitrariness and
capriciousness or perversity by ignoring the settled
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principles of law regulating the grant or refusal of
temporary injunction.
6.2 Learned counsel further contends that there is no
substance with regard to there being any violation or non-
compliance of the proviso to Order XXXIX Rule 3 of CPC.
The trial Court, in fact, has examined the plaint
averments, affidavit filed in support of the application,
documents produced by the respondent/plaintiff and also
the citations relied by the respondent/plaintiff before
recording that the object of injunction would be defeated
by delay.
6.3 Learned counsel further contends that continuing
and repeated publication and circulation of defamatory
article across multiple social media platforms, constituted
precisely the species of continuing the harm that justifies
dispensation of prior notice and the trial Court has
precisely done the same by dispensing notice and granting
an ad interim order of temporary injunction.
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6.4 Learned counsel further contends that the
impugned order is not mechanical reproduction of the
citations relied by the respondent/plaintiff, whereas the
trial Court upon proper consideration of the principles
emerging from the decisions cited therein and on perusal
of the materials on record, plaint averments, documents
and the arguments that were put forward, prima facie
came to a conclusion that an ad interim order of
temporary injunction is warranted in the present case on
hand for the reason that the defamatory article would
cause more irreparable injury and hardship to the
respondent/plaintiff and accordingly on being satisfied has
granted the ad interim order of temporary injunction,
which does not suffer from any illegality or perversity.
6.5 Learned counsel further contends that the trial
Court has come to a conclusion that a prima facie case is
made out by the respondent/plaintiff, balance of
convenience tilts in his favour, so also irreparable injury
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and hardship would be caused more to the
respondent/plaintiff than to the appellants/defendants and
accordingly granted an ad interim order of temporary
injunction which does not call for interference.
6.6 Learned counsel vehemently contends that the
impugned order is not appealable under the provisions of
Order XLIII Rule 1 of CPC and therefore, the present appal
is not maintainable. He further contends that the
appellants/defendants have already entered appearance
before the trial Court and they have not chosen to either
file their statement of objections before the trial Court or
for that matter file an application for vacating or modifying
the impugned order, instead they have approached this
Court in a hurried manner by filing an appeal, without
exhausting the remedy available before the same Court
under Order XXXIX , Rule 4 of CPC.
6.7 Learned counsel further contends that the appeal
would not be maintainable as the application - I.A. No.1 is
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yet to be disposed of and it is pending adjudication.
Therefore, unless the application is decided, the
appellants/defendants could not have filed an appeal to fall
within the ambit of Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of CPC. The
appellants are at liberty to file an application under Order
XXXIX Rule 4 before the trial court to get the order
vacated. Therefore, the present appeal preferred by the
appellants/defendants is not maintainable on this ground.
6.8 On these grounds, learned counsel sustains the
impugned order passed by the learned trial judge and
seeks dismissal of the appeal.
6.9 Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff relies
upon the following judgments of this Court in support of
his case.
1. Parijatha v. Kamalaksha Nayak - (1981) SCC Online
Kar 319.
2. Procter And Gamble Home Products Private Limited vs.
Marico Limited and Others - MFA No. 8990/2017
dated 30th November 2017
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3. Gopal Ahuja Vs. Sanman Distributors - ILR 1993 KAR
3275.
4. R.Ravindranatha Manvi Vs. K.B. Ramesh and Others -
MFA No. 3837/2018 dated 21st December 2018
5. Shankargouda Vs. G.N.Khakhandaki and Others - WP
No. 201004/2021 and connected matter dated 1st
September 2023.
(iv) Consideration
7. Having heard learned counsel for the
appellants/defendants and the learned counsel for the
respondent/plaintiff, the points that would arise for
consideration in this appeal are:
1) Whether the appeal preferred by the
appellants/defendants is maintainable
under the provisions of Order XLIII
Rule 1 of CPC ?
2) Whether the impugned order is illegal
and perverse, calling for interference?
3) What order?
8. Firstly, on the question of maintainability of the
appeal, it is seen that any order that is passed under
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Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC is amenable to appeal
jurisdiction under Order XLIII Rule 1(r). Apparently in the
present case, by the impugned order, an ad interim order
of temporary injunction has been issued by the trial Court.
Therefore, the appeal filed by the appellant would be
squarely falling within the ambit of Order XLIII Rule 1(r),
as the trial Court has passed an order granting ad interim
order of temporary injunction and restrained the
appellants/defendants as prayed for in the application -
I.A. No.1. Therefore, the appeal would be maintainable
before this Court as an ex parte order of temporary
injunction is granted in favour of respondent/ plaintiff and
against the appellants/defendants. This aspect of the
matter has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of A. Venkat Subbaiah Naidu -vs- S.
1
Chellappan and others .
1
(2000)7 SCC 695
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9. It would be relevant to extract the provisions of
Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 and Order - XXXIX Rule-3 of
CPC:
" ORDER XXXIX
TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS AND INTERLOCUTORY
ORDERS
1. Cases in which temporary injunction may be
granted : Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit
or otherwise-
(a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger
of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party
to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a
decree, or
(b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to
remove or dispose of his property with a view to
defrauding] his creditors,
(c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess, the
plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in
relation to any property in dispute in the suit,
the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction
to restrain such act, or make such other order for
the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting,
damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of
the property for dispossession of the plaintiff, or
otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to
any property in dispute in the suit as the Court
thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until
further orders.
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2. Injunction to restrain repetition or
continuance of breach .-(1) In any suit for
restraining the defendant from committing a breach
of contract or other injury of any kind, whether
compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the
plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement
of the suit, and either before or after judgment,
apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to
restrain the defendant from committing the breach
of contract or injury complained, of, or any breach
of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the
same contract or relating to the same property or
right. (2) The Court may by order grant such
injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the
injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or
otherwise as the Court thinks fit.
3.Before granting injunction, Court to direct
notice to opposite party : The Court shall in all
cases, except where it appears that the object of
granting the injunction would be defeated by the
delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of
the application for the same to be given to the
opposite party:
Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an
injunction without giving notice of the application to
the opposite party, the Court shall record the
reasons for its opinion that the object of granting
the injunction would be defeated by delay, and
require the applicant-
(a) to deliver to the opposite party, or to send to
him by registered post, immediately after the order
granting the injunction has been made, a copy of
the application for injunction together with-
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(i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the
application;
(ii) a copy of the plaint; and
(iii) copies of documents on which the applicant
relies, and
(b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is
granted or on the day immediately following that
day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid
have been so delivered or sent."
10. It would also be relevant to extract the provisions
of Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
" 104.Orders from which appeal lies. (1) An
appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save
as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this
Code or by any law for the time being in force, from
no other orders:-
(ff) an order under section 35A;
(ffa) and order under section 91 or section 92
refusing leave to institute a suit of the nature
referred to in section 91 or section 92, as the case
may be;
(g) an order under Section 95;
(h) an order under any of the provisions of this Code
imposing a fine or directing the arrest or detention
in the civil prison of any person excep where such
arrest or detention is in execution of a decree;
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(i) any order made under rules from which an
appeal is expressly allowed by rules:
Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order
specified in clause (ff) save on the ground that no
order, or an order for the payment of a less amount,
ought have been made
(2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in
appeal under this section."
11. It would also be relevant to extract the provisions
of Order XLIII Rule 1 of CPC which clearly demonstrates as
to how and when an appeal would be maintainable on the
order passed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC,
which reads as under:
"ORDER XLIII
APPEALS FROM ORDERS
1. Appeal from orders. An appeal shall lie from the
following orders under the provisions of section 104,
namely:-
(a) an order under rule 10 of Order VII returning a
plaint to be presented to the proper Court [except
where the [procedure specified in rule 10A of ORDER
VIII has been followed]:
(c) an order under rule 9 of Order IX rejecting an
application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to
set aside the dismissal of a suit;
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(d) an order under rule 13 of Order IX rejecting an
application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to
set aside a decree passed ex parte;
(f) an order under rule 21 of Order XI;
(i) an order under rule 34 of Order XXI on an objection
to the draft of a document or of an endorsement;
(j) an order under rule 72 or rule 92 of Order XXI
setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale;
(ja) an order rejecting an application made under sub-
rule (1) of rule 106 of Order XXI, provided that an
order on the original application, that is to say, the
application referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 105 of
that Order is appealable;
(k) an order under rule 9 of Order XXII refusing to set
aside the abatement or dismissal of a suit;
(1) an order under rule 10 of Order XXII giving or
refusing to give leave;
(n) an Order under rule 2 of Order XXV rejecting an
application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to
set aside the dismissal of a suit;
(na) an order under rule 5 or rule 7 of Order XXXIII
rejecting an application for permission to sue as an
indigent person;
(p) orders in interpleader-suits under rule 3, rule 4 or
rule 6 of Order XXXV;
(q) an order under rule 2, rule 3 or rule 6 of Order
XXXVIII;
(r) an order under rule 1, rule 28[rule 2A], rule 4
or rule 10 of Order XXXIX;
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(s) an order under rule 1 or rule 4 of Order XL;
(t) an order of refusal under rule 19 of Order XLI to
re-admit, or under rule 21 of Order XLI to re-hear, an
appeal;
(u) an order under rule 23 [or rule 23A] of Order XLI
remanding a case, where an appeal would lie from the
decree of the Appellate Court;
(w) an order under rule 4 of Order XLVII granting an
application for review."
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of A.
Venkatasubbiah Naidu -vs- S. Chellappan and
2
others held at paragraph Nos.13 and 21 as under:
" 13. It cannot be contended that the power to
pass interim ex parte orders of injunction does
not emanate from the said Rule. In fact, the
said Rule is the repository of the power to grant
orders of temporary injunction with or without
notice, interim or temporary, or till further
orders or till the disposal of the suit. Hence, any
order passed in exercise of the aforesaid powers
in Rule 1 would be appealable as indicated in
Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. The choice is for
the party affected by the order either to move
the appellate court or to approach the same
court which passed the ex parte order for any
relief.
2
(2000)7 SCC 695
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21. It is the acknowledged position of law that
no party can be forced to suffer for the inaction
of the court or its omissions to act according to
the procedure established by law. Under the
normal circumstances the aggrieved party can
prefer an appeal only against an order passed
under Rules 1, 2, 2-A, 4 or 10 of Order 39 of
the Code in terms of Order 43 Rule 1 of the
Code. He cannot approach the appellate or
revisional court during the pendency of the
application for grant or vacation of temporary
injunction. In such circumstances the party
which does not get justice due to the inaction of
the court in following the mandate of law must
have a remedy. So we are of the view that in a
case where the mandate of Order 39 Rule 3-A
of the Code is flouted, the aggrieved party, shall
be entitled to the right of appeal
notwithstanding the pendency of the application
for grant or vacation of a temporary injunction,
against the order remaining in force. In such
appeal, if preferred, the appellate court shall be
obliged to entertain the appeal and further to
take note of the omission of the subordinate
court in complying with the provisions of Rule
3-A. In appropriate cases the appellate court,
apart from granting or vacating or modifying
the order of such injunction, may suggest
suitable action against the erring judicial officer,
including recommendation to take steps for
making adverse entry in his ACRs. Failure to
decide the application or vacate the ex parte
temporary injunction shall, for the purposes of
the appeal, be deemed to be the final order
passed on the application for temporary
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injunction, on the date of expiry of thirty days
mentioned in the Rule."
13. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while
considering an ex parte order of Temporary Injunction,
held that an appeal would be maintainable under Order
XLIII Rule 1 of CPC. It also held that the choice is for the
party affected by the said order either to move the
appellate court or to approach the same court which
passed the ex parte order for any relief. Therefore there is
a two-pronged remedy available for the person who
suffers ex parte order of Temporary Injunction. One to
move the very same Court, which passed the exparte
order seeking for any relief. Second to move the appellate
court against the said order. The appellate Court would be
the High Court in the present case under Order XLIII Rule
1 of CPC. Therefore the appeal would be maintainable
before this Court.
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Bloomberg Television Production
14. In the case of
Services India Private Limited and Others Vs. Zee
3
Entertainment Enterprises Limited , the Hon'ble Apex
Court has once again come to the conclusion that on an ad
interim exparte order of injunction, the appeal would be
maintainable under Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. In the said case, the Hon'ble Apex Court held
at paragraph-11 as under:
" 11. Undoubtedly, the grant of an interim
injunction is an exercise of discretionary power and
the appellate court (in this case, the High Court) will
usually not interfere with the grant of interim relief.
However, in a line of precedent, this Court has held
that appellate courts must interfere with the grant of
interim relief if the discretion has been exercised
“arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or where the
court has ignored settled principles of law regulating
the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions”.
[Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. Arvindbhai
Rambhai Patel, (2006) 8 SCC 726, paras 126 & 128;
Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. v. Shyam Steel Industries
Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 634, para 37 : (2023) 1 SCC (Civ)
301.] The grant of an ex parte interim injunction by
way of an unreasoned order, definitely falls within the
above formulation, necessitating interference by the
3
(2025) 1 SCC 741
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High Court. This being a case of an injunction granted
in defamation proceedings against a media platform,
the impact of the injunction on the constitutionally
protected right of free speech further warranted
intervention."
15. In the judgment stated supra , the Hon'ble Apex
Court, while dealing with similar situation of a grant of an
ad interim order of injunction, did not agree with the
findings arrived at by the trial Court, where there was no
proper reasoning provided and it was an unreasoned order
and fell for consideration necessitating interference by the
High Court for not providing a valid and proper reason
including the appreciation of three essential requirements
of prima facie case, balance of convenience and hardship
that would be caused, and accordingly allowed the appeal
before it, remitted the matter to the trial judge to pass
fresh orders on the said application. Therefore, the facts
and circumstances in the case of Bloomberg Television
Production Services India Private Limited and Others
(supra) is squarely applicable to the present case. Under
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the circumstances, the question of maintainability is
answered in favour of the appellants and it is made clear
that against any order passed under Order XXXIX Rules 1
& 2 either granting or rejecting the relief of Temporary
Injunction by way of specific restrainment, an appeal
would be maintainable under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of CPC.
The 1st point raised in the present appeal is answered
accordingly.
16. The next question that would arise for
consideration is whether the impugned order is perverse,
illegal and arbitrary ?
17. It is not in dispute that the respondent/plaintiff
filed a suit against the appellants/defendants for the relief
of mandatory injunction directing the defendants, their
agents or any other person acting on their behalf or under
their instructions to remove the defamatory article about
the plaintiff, on the media platform of the 1st defendant
and also for other consequential reliefs. Along with the
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grant of ad interim order of temporary injunction, which
came to be allowed by the trial Court and same is the
subject matter of this appeal.
18. It would be relevant to extract the impugned
order passed by the learned trial Judge on I.A. No.1 filed
by the respondent/plaintiff, which reads as under:
"Heard the learned Counsel Sri.Raghuram
Cadambi, for the plaintiff on I.A.No.I.
Perused the application filed Under Order 39
rule 1 and 2 R/w/Sec.151 of CPC, to pass an ex-
parte ad-interim order of Temporary Injunction
directing the defendants to immediately take down
the defamatory article published on the platform
of the defendant No.1 available at the URL
https:// theheadandtale.com/ deepdives/cashfree-
in distressed - sale-pine-labs-leads-race-paytm-
also-in-fray exclusive-/, along with the social media
handles of the defendants, pending disposal of this
suit.
In support of the application I.A.No.I, the
authorized representative of the plaintiff company
by name Mohamad jamal Sait has sworn to an
affidavit. In support of the case he has produced
the documents.
The counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon
the following decisions:
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1. 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3675.
2. 2026 SCC OnLine Del 3647.
3. 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1079.
4. 2026 SCC OnLine Delhi 331.
I have bestowed my anxious considerations to
the principles emerges from these respected
decisions.
By perusing the materials on record and plaint
averments, documents, citations and looking to the
facts and circumstances of this suit, at this stage
the plaintiff has made out a prima-facie case for
grant of ex-parte temporary injunction and in order
to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. If the notice is
ordered to be issued, it causes the delay and
defects the very purpose of filing the suit. Hence, I
proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
Issue ex-parte Temporary Injunction order
against the defendant Nos.1 and 2 as prayed in
I.A.No.1, till next date of hearing.
Plaintiff shall comply Order 39 Rule 3 of
C.P.C. Issue emergent notice on I.A:No.I, order and
suit summons to the defendants, if P.F. is paid.
Call on: 17.06.2026."
19. Upon careful perusal of the impugned order, it is
seen that the trial Court observed that after bestowing
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anxious consideration to the principles emerging from the
decisions relied by the plaintiff and on perusing the
materials on record, plaint averments, documents and
looking to the facts and circumstances, the plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case for grant of exparte order of
temporary injunction. Apparently, it is seen that the trial
Court has not clearly said what is a prima facie case made,
why the exparte ad interim order of temporary injunction
is required to be granted prior to the issuance of notice
and that delay would cause irreparable injury or hardship
to the plaintiff. Thereby the trial Court has not spelt out in
its order with regard to the prima facie case being made
out for grant of an ad interim order of temporary
injunction. The trial Court while considering an application
under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of CPC is required to follow
the three essential requirements namely prima facie case,
balance of convenience and the hardship that would be
caused to the aggrieved party.
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20. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shiv
kumar Chadha -vs- Municipal Corporation of Delhi
4
and Others , held at paragraphs 32, 33, 34 and 35 as
under:
"32. Power to grant injunction is an extraordinary
power vested in the court to be exercised taking
into consideration the facts and circumstances of a
particular case. The courts have to be more
cautious when the said power is being exercised
without notice or hearing the party who is to be
affected by the order so passed. That is why Rule 3
of Order 39 of the Code requires that in all cases
the court shall, before grant of an injunction, direct
notice of the application to be given to the
opposite-party, except where it appears that object
of granting injunction itself would be defeated by
delay. By the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment)
Act, 1976, a proviso has been added to the said
rule saying that “where it is proposed to grant an
injunction without giving notice of the application to
the opposite-party, the court shall record the
reasons for its opinion that the object of granting
the injunction would be defeated by delay…”.
33. It has come to our notice that in spite of the
aforesaid statutory requirement, the courts have
been passing orders of injunction before issuance of
notices or hearing the parties against whom such
orders are to operate without recording the reasons
4
(1993) 3 SCC 161
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for passing such orders. It is said that if the
reasons for grant of injunction are mentioned, a
grievance can be made by the other side that court
has prejudged the issues involved in the suit.
According to us, this is a misconception about the
nature and the scope of interim orders. It need not
be pointed out that any opinion expressed in
connection with an interlocutory application has no
bearing and shall not affect any party, at the stage
of the final adjudication. Apart from that now in
view of the proviso to Rule 3 aforesaid, there is no
scope for any argument. When the statute itself
requires reasons to be recorded, the court cannot
ignore that requirement by saying that if reasons
are recorded, it may amount to expressing an
opinion in favour of the plaintiff before hearing the
defendant.
34. The imperative nature of the proviso has to be
judged in the context of Rule 3 of Order 39 of the
Code. Before the proviso aforesaid was introduced,
Rule 3 said “the court shall in all cases, except
where it appears that the object of granting the
injunction would be defeated by the delay, before
granting an injunction, direct notice of the
application for the same to be given to the
opposite-party”. The proviso was introduced to
provide a condition, where court proposes to grant
an injunction without giving notice of the
application to the opposite-party, being of the
opinion that the object of granting injunction itself
shall be defeated by delay. The condition so
introduced is that the court “shall record the
reasons” why an ex parte order of injunction was
being passed in the facts and circumstances of a
particular case. In this background, the
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requirement for recording the reasons for grant of
ex parte injunction, cannot be held to be a mere
formality. This requirement is consistent with the
principle, that a party to a suit, who is being
restrained from exercising a right which such party
claims to exercise either under a statute or under
the common law, must be informed why instead of
following the requirement of Rule 3, the procedure
prescribed under the proviso has been followed.
The party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court
for grant of an order of restraint against a party,
without affording an opportunity to him of being
heard, must satisfy the court about the gravity of
the situation and court has to consider briefly these
factors in the ex parte order. We are quite
conscious of the fact that there are other statutes
which contain similar provisions requiring the court
or the authority concerned to record reasons before
exercising power vested in them. In respect of
some of such provisions it has been held that they
are required to be complied with but non-
compliance therewith will not vitiate the order so
passed. But same cannot be said in respect of the
proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39. The Parliament has
prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an
order of injunction without notice to the other side,
under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte
orders have far-reaching effect, as such a condition
has been imposed that court must record reasons
before passing such order. If it is held that the
compliance with the proviso aforesaid is optional
and not obligatory, then the introduction of the
proviso by the Parliament shall be a futile exercise
and that part of Rule 3 will be a surplusage for all
practical purposes. Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of
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the Code, attracts the principle, that if a statute
requires a thing to be done in a particular manner,
it should be done in that manner or not all. This
principle was approved and accepted in well-known
cases of Taylor v. Taylor [(1875) 1 Ch D 426 : 45
LJ Ch 373] and Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor [AIR 1936
PC 253 (2) : 63 IA 372 : 37 Cri LJ 897] . This Court
has also expressed the same view in respect of
procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Ramchandra
Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare [(1975) 1 SCC
559 : AIR 1975 SC 915]
35. As such whenever a court considers it
necessary in the facts and circumstances of a
particular case to pass an order of injunction
without notice to other side, it must record the
reasons for doing so and should take into
consideration, while passing an order of injunction,
all relevant factors, including as to how the object
of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an
ex parte order is not passed. But any such ex parte
order should be in force up to a particular date
before which the plaintiff should be required to
serve the notice on the defendant concerned. In the
Supreme Court Practice 1993, Vol. 1, at page 514,
reference has been made to the views of the
English Courts saying:
“Ex parte injunctions are for cases of real urgency
where there has been a true impossibility of giving
notice of motion….
An ex parte injunction should generally be until a
certain day, usually the next motion day….”
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21. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Morgan
5
Stanley Mutual Fund -vs- Kartick Das , held at
paragraph No.36 as under:
"36. As a principle, ex parte injunction could be
granted only under exceptional circumstances. The
factors which should weigh with the court in the
grant of ex parte injunction are—
(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will
ensue to the plaintiff;
(b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would
involve greater injustice than the grant of it would
involve;
(c) the court will also consider the time at which the
plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so
that the making of improper order against a party in
his absence is prevented;
(d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had
acquiesced for sometime and in such circumstances
it will not grant ex parte injunction;
(e) the court would expect a party applying for ex
parte injunction to show utmost good faith in
making the application.
(f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be
for a limited period of time.
(g) General principles like prima facie case, balance
of convenience and irreparable loss would also be
considered by the court."
5
(1994)4 SCC 225
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22. In the case of Time City Infrastructure and
Housing Limited, Lucknow -vs- State of UP and
6
others , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held at paragraph
No.5 as under:
" 5.Looking to the scheme of Order 39, CPC it is clear
that ordinarily an order of injunction may not be
granted ex parte. The opposite party must be issued
a notice and heard before an injunction may be
granted. Rule 3 carves out an exception in favour of
granting an injunction without notice to the opposite
party where it appears that the object of granting
injunction would be defeated by the delay.
Conferment of this privilege on the party seeking an
injunction is accompanied by an obligation cast on
the court to record reasons for its opinion and an
obligation cast on the applicant to comply with the
requirements of Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso.
Both the provisions are mandatory. The applicant
gets an injunction without notice but subject to the
condition of complying with Clauses (a) and (b)
above said."
23. The Principles governing grant of temporary
injunction has been explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi -vs- Harish
6
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1674
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7
Ambalal Chokshi , wherein at paragraph nos.32 and 33,
it is held as under:
"Principles governing grant of temporary
injunction
32. In Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad
[Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad, (2001)
5 SCC 568] , it was held by this Court that it would not
be appropriate for any court to hold a mini-trial at the
stage of grant of temporary injunction.
33. The burden is on the plaintiff, by evidence
aliunde by affidavit or otherwise, to prove that there is
“a prima facie case” in his favour which needs
adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima
facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his
property or the right is a condition precedent for the
grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not
to be confused with prima facie title which has to be
established on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie
case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which
needs investigation and a decision on merits.
Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is
not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has
to satisfy that non-interference by the court would
result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief
and that there is no other remedy available to the
party except one to grant injunction and he needs
protection from the consequences of apprehended
injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however,
does not mean that there must be no physical
possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that
the injury must be a material one, namely, one that
7
(2024)11 SCC 351
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cannot be adequately compensated by way of
damages. The third condition also is that “the balance
of convenience” must be in favour of granting
injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to
grant injunction should exercise sound judicial
discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or
injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the
injunction is refused and compare it with that which is
likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is
granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or
probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court
considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter
should be maintained in status quo, an injunction
would be issued. Thus, the Court has to exercise its
sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the
relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit. (See
Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh [Dalpat Kumar v.
Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719] .)"
24. Apparently, in the present case on hand, an ad
interim order of temporary injunction has been granted by
the trial Court. Hence, this Court will have to see whether
the trial Court has provided proper reasoning to come to
such a conclusion for grant of an ad interim order of
temporary injunction. Upon careful perusal of the
impugned order, it is seen that the trial Court has merely
stated that it has considered the principles emerging from
the decisions relied by the respondent/plaintiff, perused
the materials on record, so also the plaint averments and
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documents and came to a conclusion that plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case for grant of ex parte
temporary injunction and if the notice was ordered to be
issued, it would cause delay and defeat the very purpose
of filing the suit and therefore, in order to avoid
multiplicity of proceedings, granted an ex parte order of
temporary injunction.
25. In my opinion, the trial Court has not assigned
any reasons for grant of temporary injunction and not
stated what is the prima facie case that is made out and
why the delay would defeat the very purpose of filing of
the suit. When an application is filed under Order XXXIX
Rules 1 & 2 of CPC, the trial Court is obligated to consider
whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and
come to the conclusion by arriving at a proper reasoning
and not merely stating prima facie case is made out. The
trial Court is obligated to spelt out in its order as to what
is the prima facie case that is made out by way of
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application of mind through judicial reasoning and
thereafter whether the plaintiff has made out balance of
convenience to be tilting in his favour and so also the
irreparable injury would be caused by non grant of such an
order. It is only then the temporary injunction order could
be granted. If no such thing is decided or adjudicated by
the learned trial judge while passing the ad interim order
of temporary injunction, it would squarely come within the
meaning of non-application of mind and improper exercise
of judicial discretion while appreciating the materials on
record and granting an ad interim order of temporary
injunction amounting to perversity. In the present case on
hand, it is apparently clear that reasons are not spelt out
in the impugned order passed by the trial Court as to what
is the prima facie case made out and the two other
essential requirements of balance of convenience and
irreparable hardship that would be caused more to which
of the parties.
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26. As I have already stated, the judgments of the
Hon'ble Apex Court and several judgments of this Court
have clearly laid down the principles as to how an
application under Order - XXXIX Rules - 1 & 2 of CPC for
grant of an ad interim order of temporary injunction to be
decided. It is not merely by saying prima facie case is
made out or balance of convenience tilts and irreparable
injury would be caused. It is for the trial Court to
specifically spelt out the reasons for all three essential
requirements, which in the present case has not been
clearly opined.
27. As stated supra, whenever an application under
Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC is considered, the trial
Court is required to deliberate upon three essential
requirements of prima facie case, balance of convenience
and the hardship that would be caused more to which of
the parties. While doing so, the trial Court is required to
legally articulate the specific reasons of prima facie case
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and the balance of convenience would tilt in whose favour,
so also the hardship that would be caused more to which
of the parties. In the present case on hand, the trial Court
has not specified by way of a proper reasoning and not
applied its judicial mind to give brief details of prima facie
case, balance of convenience and hardship that would be
caused to the plaintiff. It is rather held that prima facie
case is made out based on the citations relied by the
plaintiff, but not adverted to what is the prima facie case
made out by the plaintiff for grant of an ex parte ad
interim order of temporary injunction prior to giving notice
to the defendants. Therefore the order that is passed by
the trial Court is clearly coming within the ambit of an
unreasoned order, so also it would amount to an order
which is perverse, arbitrary, capricious for having ignored
the settled principles of law regulating the grant of
temporary injunction.
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28. In view of the discussion made hereinabove and
having heard learned counsels for both parties and the
judgments relied by them, I am in agreement with learned
counsel for the appellants/defendants that the impugned
order passed by the learned trial Judge is illegal and
perverse for not having legally articulated the essential
requirements of the prima facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparable hardship in the proper
perspective. Therefore, the impugned order deserves to
be set aside. The 2nd point raised in the present appeal
is answered accordingly.
29. Now coming to the next question, whether this
Court should consider the application and pass necessary
orders or should it remand the matter back to the trial
Court for reconsideration of the application - I.A. No. 1
filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and Rule 2, it is seen that
whenever an application is filed under Order XXXIX Rules
1 and 2 of CPC, it is required to be filed in the Court of the
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first instance, so also in the present case such an
application is filed. But before issuance of notice, the trial
Court found it appropriate to grant an ad interim exparte
order of Temporary Injunction for the reason that the
delay would defeat the purpose of filing the suit. It is
always for the Court of the first instance to deal with the
application and decide the matter on merits. The
appellants/defendants have already filed their vakalath
and have come on record before the trial Court. If they
have not filed their objections to the application, they are
at liberty to file the objections so also the written
statement and contest the application on merits. It may
not be appropriate for this Court to pass an order on the
said application as it is for the trial Court to deal with the
application based on the pleadings and the materials
available on record, as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
8
the case of Wander Ltd. & Anr. vs. Antox India P. Ltd .
8
1990 Supp SCC 727
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30. The appellate Court should not interfere with the
order if it is passed by following the principles of three
essential requirements of prima facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparable hardship. Had it been the
case where both the parties were heard, this Court could
have considered the appeal on its merits on the
application. But in the present case on hand, the
impugned order is an unreasoned exparte order without
hearing the appellants/defendants. Therefore in my
opinion, an opportunity requires to be given to the
appellants/ defendants before the trial Court by remitting
this matter back to the trial Court for reconsideration of
the application once again in a time bound manner rather
than this Court deciding the application.
31. Under the circumstances, I am of the opinion
that the matter requires to be remanded to the trial Court
for reconsideration of I.A No. 1 by providing an
opportunity to the plaintiff as well as the defendants,
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keeping open all contentions with regard to the merits of
the application.
32. Accordingly, I pass the following:
O R D E R
i) The appeal is allowed .
ii) The impugned order dated 03.06.2026
passed on I.A No. 1 in O.S No. 3717/2026 by
the i/c LXXXV Additional City Civil & Sessions
Judge, Bengaluru, is hereby set aside.
iii) Matter is remitted back to the trial Court to
re-consider the application - I.A. No. 1 afresh
and pass reasoned order after providing
sufficient opportunity to both parties, within
fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of
copy of this order.
iv) The parties are at liberty to file further
pleadings and documents, if required.
v) It is open to the parties to urge all grounds
that are urged in the present appeal.
vi) It is made clear that this Court has not
expressed any opinion on the merits of the
matter, so also on the application.
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HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:45980
MFA No. 4754 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010443492026
vii) All contentions of parties are kept open.
Ordered accordingly.
Sd/-
(PRADEEP SINGH YERUR)
JUDGE
GSS
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 42