STATE vs DILIP BHATNAGAR

[2026:RJ-JD:19128]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Judgment
Reportable-
DATE OF CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENTS 05/03/2026
DATE ON WHICH JUDGMENT IS RESERVED 05/03/2026
FULL JUDGMENT OR OPERATIVE PART Full Order
DATE Of PRONOUNCEMENT 24/04/2026
BY THE COURT:-
1. The State of Rajasthan initially instituted the present matter as
an application seeking leave to appeal under Section 378(iii) read
with Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the
judgment dated 26.03.2012 passed by the learned Special Judge
(Prevention of Corruption Act Cases), Jodhpur in Criminal Regular
Case No.33/2007, whereby the accused-respondent came to be
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acquitted of the charges under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with
Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Leave
having already been granted by this Court, the matter now stands
converted into and is being considered as a regular criminal
appeal against acquittal.
2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case was that on 23.04.2006,
the complainant alleged before the Anti Corruption Bureau, Pali
that his family fell within the Below Poverty Line category and that
his daughter-in-law, Sumitra, had applied for allotment of a
dwelling unit under the Indira Awaas Yojana. It was alleged that
though the first installment had been released, the accused-
respondent, serving as Gram Sevak-cum-Secretary, demanded
illegal gratification for release of the second installment. Acting
upon the complaint, a trap was allegedly organized, currency
notes were recovered, FIR was registered, and after investigation
a charge-sheet was filed upon receipt of sanction for prosecution.
3. The learned trial Court framed charges under Sections 7 and
13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. The accused denied
the allegations and claimed trial. The prosecution examined
fourteen witnesses and exhibited several documents. The accused,
in defence, offered explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and
placed reliance on documentary material marked as Exhibits D/1
to D/19. Upon appreciation of the entire record, the learned trial
Court acquitted the accused-respondent. Aggrieved thereby, the
State has approached this Court.
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4. Learned Public Prosecutor would contend that the learned trial
Court erred in discarding cogent trap evidence and in granting
undue benefit of doubt despite recovery of tainted currency from
the possession of the accused. It is urged that once demand and
acceptance stood established, the statutory presumption under
Section 20 of the Act ought to have been invoked. It is further
contended that the sanction order was validly granted and the
acquittal rests upon hyper-technical appreciation of evidence.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent supports the
judgment impugned and submits that the learned trial Court has
passed a well-reasoned acquittal after meticulous scrutiny of the
evidence. It is argued that the prosecution failed to establish
foundational facts of demand and conscious acceptance beyond
reasonable doubt. More importantly, it is contended that the
sanction for prosecution was a mere ritualistic exercise, devoid of
independent application of mind, and thus strikes at the root of
jurisdiction in view of Section 19 of the Act, thus, no interference
is called for in the said order and the appeal deserves to be
dismissed.
6. I have heard the submissions advanced by the counsel for
the parties and minutely perused the impugned judgment as well
as record of the case.
6.1. It is trite law that where two views are reasonably possible on
the evidence available, an appellate Court would be slow in
disturbing an order of acquittal. Unless the findings recorded by
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the trial Court are perverse, manifestly illegal, or wholly
unsustainable, interference is not warranted. The presumption of
innocence stands fortified by acquittal.
6.2. Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
mandates prior sanction before a competent public servant can be
prosecuted for offences under the Act. Such sanction is not an idle
incantation nor a ceremonial signature. It is intended as a solemn
safeguard ensuring that a public servant is not exposed to criminal
prosecution without the competent authority independently
examining whether the material collected during investigation
justifies such prosecution.
6.2.1 At this juncture, it becomes apposite to delineate the true
doctrinal import and statutory architecture of Section 19 of the
Act. The requirement of “previous sanction” operates as a
jurisdictional precondition to the very assumption of
cognizance by the criminal Court. In its absence, or where such
sanction is vitiated by patent illegality, the Court is rendered
incompetent to take cognizance of offences punishable under
Sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act. The legislative command is
couched in negative phraseology—“no Court shall take
cognizance”—thereby unequivocally prohibiting judicial action in
the absence of a valid sanction from the competent authority, i.e.,
the authority competent to remove the public servant from office.
The statutory scheme further clarifies that sanction must emanate
from the appropriate Government or competent authority
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depending upon the service conditions of the public servant, and
any ambiguity in this regard is resolved by reference to the
authority competent to effect removal at the time of commission
of the alleged offence. The provision, thus, ensures that
prosecution is not launched lightly or vexatiously against a public
servant without institutional scrutiny at the highest administrative
level.
Indeed, sanction functions as the legal gateway to the Court’s
jurisdiction; it is the foundational trigger upon which the criminal
Court assumes authority to entertain and proceed with the
prosecution. In the absence of such sanction, the Court is
denuded of jurisdiction and cannot entertain the charge-sheet or
proceed against the accused. It bears emphasis that “sanction” in
the eyes of law connotes a valid, legally sustainable sanction, one
reflecting due application of mind by the competent authority and
not a mere formal or mechanical approval.
Indeed, such a foundational safeguard is deeply embedded in
criminal jurisprudence itself, which does not countenance the
initiation or continuation of criminal proceedings in derogation of a
mandatory jurisdictional precondition. The law does not permit the
prosecution to bypass or dilute this statutory mandate and
proceed as if the requirement were merely procedural or curable.
On the contrary, compliance with Section 19 stands as a condition
precedent, the non-fulfilment whereof strikes at the very root of
the Court’s jurisdiction.
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Thus, where the foundational requirement of a valid sanction
collapses, the entire edifice of prosecution, commencing from
cognizance, extending to framing of charge, conduct of trial,
recording of evidence, and culminating in adjudication, stands
irreparably vitiated. In such a scenario, the proceedings cannot be
sustained in the eye of law, as they are erected upon a
jurisdictional infirmity, rendering the superstructure legally
unsound.
6.3. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v.
Ameerjan MANU/SC/7922/2007 and in Mohd. Iqbal Ahmad
v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1979 SC 677 has
authoritatively held that grant of sanction requires conscious
scrutiny of the material placed before the authority and genuine
satisfaction founded upon application of mind. Mechanical
approval, granted without due consideration, vitiates the sanction.
The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohd.
Iqbal Ahmad (Supra) are reproduced as under :-
.... It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove
that a valid sanction has been granted by the
Sanctioning Authority after it was satisfied that a case
for sanction has been made out constituting the
offence. This should be done in two ways; either (1) by
producing the original sanction which itself contains the
facts constituting the offence and the grounds of
satisfaction and (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to
show that the facts placed before the Sanctioning
Authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it.
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It is well settled that any case instituted without a
proper sanction must fail because this being a manifest
difficult (sic-defect) in the prosecution, the entire
proceedings are rendered void ab initio."
6.4. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of
Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No.1162/2011 decided on
12.02.2024) has reiterated that interference with an order of
acquittal is warranted only in cases of manifest illegality or
perversity. The principles enunciated therein emphasize that
where two views are possible, the one favouring the accused must
prevail, and a plausible view taken by the Trial Court ought not to
be supplanted. Paragraph 36 of the said judgment encapsulates
the doctrine in the following terms:
“36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on
the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as
guilty…
(i) Appreciation of evidence must be holistic and
comprehensive;
(ii) Selective or truncated evaluation may itself occasion
miscarriage of justice;
(iii) If two views are possible, the one favourable to the
accused must ordinarily prevail;
(iv) A legally plausible view of the Trial Court cannot be
supplanted merely because another view is possible;
(v) In reversing an acquittal, the appellate Court must
deal with all reasons assigned by the Trial Court;
(vi) Conversion of acquittal into conviction requires
demonstration of manifest illegality, perversity, or
patent error in the Trial Court’s approach.”
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Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid settled principles and
upon a thorough scrutiny of the record, this Court finds no
compelling reason to take a view different from that taken by the
learned Trial Court. The appreciation of evidence appears to be
judicious, comprehensive, and in accordance with law.
6.5. The record of the present case assumes decisive significance.
Exhibit D/1 is the communication by which the investigating
agency forwarded papers to the sanctioning authority. Exhibit D/2
is the document described as “Prarup”, i.e., a draft format or
template. A perusal thereof reveals that it was nothing but a
ready-made proforma prepared in advance. The said draft appears
to have been sent by the investigator to the sanctioning authority.
6.6. What is of grave consequence is that the final sanction order,
Exhibit P/9 is substantially identical to the draft proforma. Save
and except the signature appended by the sanctioning authority,
no meaningful alteration, no independent reasoning, no insertion
suggestive of personal satisfaction, and no discernible
reconsideration of facts appear on the face of the record. Even
punctuation, language, phraseology, and textual composition
remain materially unchanged.
6.7. The learned trial Court has, therefore, rightly concluded that
the sanctioning authority did not undertake an autonomous
evaluation of the evidence, but merely affixed signature upon a
prepared format transmitted by the investigator. Such an exercise
cannot be dignified as lawful sanction in the eye of law. It is
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nothing beyond an empty formality performed to complete
procedural ritual.
7. The expression “application of mind” in the context of
prosecution sanction connotes that the authority must:
(i) independently peruse the statements of witnesses and
documentary record;
(ii) examine whether ingredients of the alleged offences are prima
facie disclosed;
(iii) satisfy itself that prosecution is warranted in public interest;
(iv) exclude extraneous influence of the investigating agency; and
(v) record approval as a conscious administrative determination,
not as clerical concurrence.
Where the authority merely signs upon a ready draft
supplied by the investigator, the statutory safeguard collapses into
illusion.
7.1. In prosecutions under the Act, valid sanction is not a trivial
irregularity but a jurisdictional precondition. Where sanction itself
is demonstrably mechanical and non est in law, continuation of
prosecution becomes legally infirm. The learned trial Court was,
therefore, justified in extending benefit of doubt to the accused.
7.2. This Court finds that the learned trial Judge has examined the
documentary exhibits with commendable care and has correctly
appreciated the evidentiary value of Exhibits D/1, D/2 and P/9.
The finding that the sanction order was merely a reproduced draft
carrying only the signature of the authority is borne out from the
record. No perversity, misreading, or manifest illegality is shown.
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7.2. Once the very substratum of valid sanction stood shaken, the
prosecution case suffered a serious legal impediment. In such
circumstances, the acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court
cannot be said to be either unreasonable or contrary to law.
Rather, it appears to be a judicious and legally sustainable
determination.
7.3. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the findings recorded by the learned trial
Court are sound, cogent, and founded upon proper appreciation of
law as well as evidence. The sanction for prosecution being a
mechanical exercise lacking independent application of mind, no
case for interference against acquittal is made out.
8. Consequently, the appeal stands dismissed. The judgment
dated 26.03.2012 passed by the learned Special Judge
(Prevention of Corruption Act Cases), Jodhpur is affirmed.
9. Record be returned forthwith.
(FARJAND ALI),J
77-Mamta/-
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