STATE OF GUJARAT vs RAMBHABEN BHIKHABHAI RAVALIA
- Court
- Gujarat High Court
R/CR.A/1798/2008 (GJHC240269642008) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1798 of 2008
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK Sd/-
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
୰
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STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
RAMBHABEN BHIKHABHAI RAVALIA & ORS.
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Appearance:
MS JIRGA JHAVERI ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Appellant(s) No.
1
BAILABLE WARRANT SERVED for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No.
1,2,3,4,5
HCLS COMMITTEE(4998) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 5
MR DV CHAUHAN FOR MR VH KANARA(1881) for the
Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3,4
MS URMILA N DESAI(5609) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 5
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
Date : 31/08/2026
JUDGMENT
1. The appellant-State has preferred this appeal under
Section 378 (1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
against the judgment and order dated 29.01.2008 passed by
rd
the learned Presiding Officer, 3 Fast Track Court, Gondal
camp at Upleta (hereinafter be referred to as “the Trial
Court”) in Sessions Case No. 188 of 2007 whereby the trial
Court has acquitted the respondents accused from the offence
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punishable under Sections 323, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the
Indian Penal Code (hereinafter be referred to as the “IPC”)
r/w Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribes(Prevention of Atrocity) Act, 1989 (hereinafter be
referred to as the “Atrocity Act”).
2. The facts giving rise to present appeal are that the
complainant, Gauriben, wife of Laljibhai Makwana, residing at
Swaminarayan Society, Upleta, lodged a complaint before the
Upleta Police Station on 18.09.1999 stating that on the same
day, at about 4:30 p.m., she was present at her house along
with her son Vishal, aged about 13 years, and her younger son
Mayur, aged about 10 years. At that time, respondent-accused
No.1, Rambhaben, came to the falia of her house and threw
some insects known as “Dhanera” therein. When the
complainant questioned her about the same, the accused
started abusing her in filthy language. Thereafter, the
accused, who was carrying a stick, assaulted the complainant
by giving a stick blow on her left elbow.
2.1 Upon hearing the shouts, Rekhaben, Nimiben and
Poonamben, daughter of accused No.1, came there carrying
sticks and assaulted the complainant on her right wrist and
back. When the complainant’s son Mayur intervened, he also
sustained an injury on the right side of his forehead.
Thereafter, upon the intervention of the neighbour,
Sureshbhai Mochi, and other persons, the quarrel was
pacified and the parties were separated.
2.2 Accordingly, the complaint was lodged. The investigation
was thereafter carried out, during which the panchnama of
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the place of incident was drawn and statements of the
witnesses were recorded. Upon completion of the
investigation, as sufficient material was found connecting the
accused with the alleged offence, a charge-sheet was filed
against the accused persons for the aforesaid offences. The
accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be
tried. The prosecution, therefore, adduced oral as well as
documentary evidence in support of its case. Upon conclusion
of the trial, the Trial Court acquitted accused vide judgment
and order dated 29.01.2008 passed Sessions Case No. 188 of
2007.
2.3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and
order of acquittal the appellant has preferred present appeal.
Heard Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned AP for the appellant, Ms.
Urmila Desai, learned counsel for respondent No.5 and Mr.
D.V. Chauhan for Mr. V.H. Kanara, learned counsel for
respondent Nos. 1 to 4.
3. Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court has
erroneously come to the conclusion that the prosecution has
failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, and
therefore, the said finding deserves to be quashed and set
aside.
3.1 Learned APP has submitted that the trial Court has passed
the order of acquittal without assigning any cogent or
substantial reasons and has failed to properly appreciate the
most important evidence of the Medical Officer. Therefore,
the impugned order of acquittal is bad in law, illegal,
erroneous and contrary to the provisions of law.
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3.2 Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court has
erroneously come to the conclusion that the evidence
produced before it is not corroborative and, therefore, creates
doubt regarding the prosecution case. It is submitted that the
prosecution case is duly supported by the evidence of the
complainant, which gets corroboration from the evidence of
her son as well as the Medical Officer who had examined and
treated the injured. Thus, there was no lacuna on the part of
the prosecution in proving its case. However, the Trial Court
has failed to appreciate the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses in its true and proper perspective and, without
assigning any cogent and convincing reasons, has acquitted
the accused of the offences with which they were charged.
3.3 Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court has
erroneously held that, as there are contradictions in the
evidence of the complainant and other witnesses, the
prosecution has failed to prove its case. On the contrary, from
the evidence of the witnesses examined by the prosecution, it
is clearly established that accused No.1 came to the
complainant, started abusing her in filthy language and
thereafter assaulted her by giving a stick blow. Upon hearing
the shouts of the complainant, the daughter of accused No.1
came to the spot, and the complainant’s son was also
assaulted by them. Learned APP has submitted that the Trial
Court has disbelieved the prosecution case on the ground
that, from the evidence on record, it appears that the
complainant and other witnesses are close relatives and,
therefore, they are interested witnesses.
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3.4 Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court has
further erroneously come to the conclusion that the
prosecution has failed to prove its case and that the evidence
produced on record does not directly connect the accused
with the commission of the offence punishable under the
Atrocities Act. The said finding is contrary to the evidence
available on record. Therefore, the impugned judgment and
order passed by the Trial Court, being illegal, improper and
erroneous, deserves to be quashed and set aside by this
Court.
3.5 Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court ought to
have believed and appreciated the evidence regarding the
threats and filthy abuses administered by the accused persons
to the complainant. The prosecution witnesses have also
supported the said aspect of the prosecution case. However,
the Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate and believe
the said evidence, thereby committing a grave error in
appreciating the material evidence on record.
3.6 Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court ought to
have properly appreciated the evidence of the police
witnesses, which was cogent, reliable and trustworthy. There
was no valid reason to disbelieve their evidence. Their
versions remained consistent and there were no material
discrepancies or omissions brought out during cross-
examination so as to discredit their testimony. However, the
Trial Court, without assigning any cogent or substantial
reasons, has failed to appreciate the evidence of the said
witnesses and has thereby committed a grave error in
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acquitting the accused persons. The impugned judgment and
order is therefore bad in law and contrary to the evidence on
record and deserves to be quashed and set aside by this
Court.
3.7 Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court has
erroneously come to the conclusion that the prosecution has
failed to produce sufficient corroborative evidence connecting
the accused with the commission of the offence punishable
under the Atrocities Act and, therefore, the benefit of doubt
ought to be extended to the respondents-accused. The Trial
Court has itself believed that the caste certificate of the
complainant was issued by the competent authority and that
the said certificate was valid and genuine. However, merely
on the ground that the version of the complainant did not
receive sufficient corroboration, the Trial Court has held that
the offence was not proved. The said finding is erroneous and
contrary to the evidence on record and, therefore, deserves to
be rejected.
4. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent
accused has supported the judgment and order of acquittal.
4.1 Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the
impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the
learned Trial Court is legal, just, and proper and has been
passed after thorough appreciation of the oral as well as
documentary evidence available on record. The learned Trial
Court has assigned cogent, convincing, and well-reasoned
findings while acquitting the respondents–accused, and the
same does not warrant any interference by this Hon’ble Court.
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4.2 Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the
prosecution has failed to prove the charges levelled against
the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence led by
the prosecution suffers from material contradictions,
omissions, and inconsistencies, which create serious doubt
about the veracity of the prosecution case. The prosecution
has failed to establish the essential ingredients of the alleged
offences and has not produced reliable, trustworthy, and
corroborative evidence connecting the respondent with the
commission of the alleged offence.
4.3 It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the
presumption of innocence in favour of an accused is further
strengthened by an order of acquittal. Unless the findings
recorded by the Trial Court are shown to be perverse, illegal,
or contrary to the evidence on record, the Appellate Court
should be slow in interfering with an order of acquittal.
4.4 It is submitted that the appellant has failed to point out
any infirmity, illegality, perversity, or misreading of evidence
in the impugned judgment and order. The findings recorded
by the learned Trial Court are based upon proper appreciation
of the evidence and settled legal principles. The learned Trial
Court has rightly extended the benefit of doubt to the
respondents–accused, which is a substantive right flowing
from the fundamental principles of criminal law.
4.5 In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is
submitted that the present appeal is devoid of merits and
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deserves to be dismissed. The impugned judgment and order
of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court therefore
deserves to be confirmed.
5. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order, as well
as the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for
both sides, the issues that arises for consideration before this
Court are as under:-
Whether the Trial Court committed any error in passing
the impugned judgment and order of acquittal?
Whether the Trial Court, while appreciating the evidence
of the prosecution witnesses, has committed any error of
law or fact?
Whether the impugned judgment and order of acquittal
suffers from any illegality or perversity?
6. In view of the above-stated submissions and upon perusal of
the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, as well as the
evidence recorded by the Trial Court, it is appropriate to first
examine the facts of the case. The complainant, Gauriben,
wife of Laljibhai Makwana, residing at Swaminarayan Society,
Upleta, lodged a complaint at Upleta Police Station on
18.09.1999, stating that at about 4:30 p.m., while she was at
home with her sons Vishal and Mayur, respondent-accused
No.1, Rambhaben, came to her falia and threw insects known
as “Weevil”. When questioned, she abused the complainant in
filthy language and assaulted her with a stick on her left
elbow. Thereafter, Rekhaben, Nimiben and Poonamben,
daughter of accused No.1, also assaulted the complainant
with sticks on her wrist and back. When her son Mayur
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intervened, he sustained an injury on his forehead. The
quarrel was thereafter pacified upon the intervention of
neighbours and other persons, and the complaint was lodged
accordingly.
7. The cause and genesis of the incident, as stated by the
complainant is that respondent No. 1 had spread the wheat
for drying it and for removing dampness, insects and weevil.
After the wheat had dried, she was winnowing the wheat for
removing the insects and weevil. At that time, the complainant
objected to the same on the ground that, due to the
winnowing of the wheat, the insects and weevil were being
blown into her house. Upon receiving such objection,
respondent No. 1 allegedly became excited and collected the
insects and weevil in a bowl and threw them into the house of
the complainant. As a result, the complainant also became
agitated and entered into an altercation with respondent No.
1. In the meantime, the other three respondents, who are the
daughters of respondent No. 1, reached the place of the
incident and allegedly started assaulting the complainant.
During the course of the incident, her son also sustained
injuries, allegedly after being assaulted with sticks by one of
the accused.
8. Upon perusal of the depositions of the witnesses and the
findings recorded by the Trial Court, more particularly the
evidence of PW-1, the complainant, and PW-3, her son, serious
contradictions are found with regard to the fundamental facts,
particularly as to the cause and genesis of the incident. So far
as prosecution witnesses Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are concerned,
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they have not supported the case of the prosecution.
9. Even upon considering the evidence of PW-10, the
Doctor, it emerges that the injuries found on the bodies of the
complainant PW-1 and her son PW-3 were likely to have been
caused by a fall on the ground. No injury was found which
could be attributed to an assault with a stick, as alleged by
the complainant. In the aforesaid circumstances, and upon
appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the
Trial Court, from paragraph No. 9 onwards, recorded a
finding that the prosecution had failed to establish the
fundamental facts constituting the alleged occurrence against
the respondents-accused. Even the alleged recovery of the
weapons was not proved by the prosecution. Furthermore,
upon perusal of the evidence of PW-11, the Investigating
Officer, it appears that he had not collected any documentary
evidence to establish that the complainant belonged to a
particular community. No such document was produced
before the Court to establish the caste or community of the
complainant.
10. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the Trial Court
was right and justified in passing the impugned judgment and
order of acquittal. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment
and order as well as the depositions of the prosecution
witnesses, I am in complete agreement with the findings
recorded by the Trial Court. I do not find any infirmity,
perversity or illegality in the impugned judgment and order of
acquittal warranting interference by this Court.
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11. Now, So far as basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of
Atrocity Act is concerned, it is relevant to refer the decision of
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shajan Skaria Versus
State Of Kerala reported in 2024-AIR(SC)-0-4557 more
particularly head notes (d) to (h) which reads as under:-
“(d) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 - Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)
(r), 3(1)(u) - decline to grant anticipatory bail - when can it be said
that a prima facie case is made out in a given FIR/complaint - held,
'prima facie' is a Latin term that translates to "at first sight" or
"based on first impression" - expression "where no prima facie
materials exist warranting arrest in a complaint or FIR" should be
understood as "when based on first impression, no offence is made
out as shown in FIR or complaint" - this means that when
necessary ingredients to constitute offence under the Act, 1989 are
not made out upon reading of complaint, no case can be said to
exist prima facie.
(e) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 - Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)
(r), 3(1)(u), 18 - Constitution of India - Art. 226 - rejection of
application for anticipatory bail - legal bar - duty of Court - in
present case, an accused may argue that although allegations
levelled in FIR or complaint do disclose commission of an offence
under the Act, 1989, yet FIR or complaint being palpably false on
account of political or private vendetta, Court should consider plea
for grant of anticipatory bail despite specific bar of S. 18 of the Act,
1989 - however, if accused puts forward case of malicious
prosecution on account of political or private vendetta then the
same can be considered only by High Court in exercise of its
inherent powers u/S. 482 of CrPC or in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution - however, powers
u/S. 438 of CrPC cannot be exercised once contents of
complaint/FIR disclose a prima facie case - thus, if all ingredients
necessary for constituting offence are borne out from complaint,
then remedy of anticipatory bail becomes unavailable to accused -
duty to determine prima facie existence of case is cast upon courts
with a view to ensure that no unnecessary humiliation is caused to
the accused - Courts should not shy away from conducting a
preliminary inquiry to determine if narration of facts in
complaint/FIR in fact discloses essential ingredients required to
constitute an offence under the Act, 1989 - it is expected of courts
to apply their judicial mind to determine whether allegations
levelled in complaint, on a plain reading, satisfy ingredients
constituting alleged offence application of judicial mind should be
independent and without being influenced by the provisions
figuring in complaint/FIR - words "having committed an offence
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under this Act" denote that it is only when accusation in complaint
clearly points towards commission of an offence under the Act,
1989 that bar of S. 18 would apply - minimum threshold for
determining whether an offence under the Act has been committed
or not is to ascertain whether all ingredients which are necessary
to constitute offence are prima facie disclosed in complaint or not -
accusation which does not disclose necessary ingredients of
offence on a prima facie reading cannot be said to be sufficient to
bring into operation bar envisaged by S. 18 of the Act, 1989 - in
cases like the one in hand, Courts should have the discretion to
look into materials based upon which complaint has been
registered, in addition to verifying the averments made in the
complaint - if on a prima facie reading of materials referred to in
complaint and complaint itself, ingredients necessary for
constituting offence are not made out, then bar of S. 18 would not
be applicable - hence, it would be open to Courts to consider plea
for grant pre-arrest bail on its own merits.
(f) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(u) - whether averments in
FIR/complaint in question disclose commission of any offence u/S.
3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 held, no - in present case appellant is
alleged to have published a video on YouTube, containing a slew of
reckless statements in the form of allegations levelled against
complainant - there is nothing in transcript of uploaded video to
indicate even prime facie that those allegations were made by
appellant only on account of fact that complainant belongs to a SC
- from nature of allegations made by appellant, it appears that he is
at inimical terms with complainant - his intention may be to malign
or defame him but not on ground or for reason that complainant
belongs to a Scheduled Caste - offence u/S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989
is not established merely on fact that complainant is a member of a
SC or ST, unless there is an intention to humiliate such a member
for reason that he belongs to such community - S. 3(1)(r) of the
Act, 1989 is attracted where reason for intentional insult or
intimidation is that person who is subjected to it belongs to a SC or
ST - object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide
stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are targeted
towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the
reason of their caste status.
(g) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)(r) - expression "intent to humiliate" -
words "with intent to humiliate" as they appear in text of S. 3(1)(r)
of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to caste identity of person
who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation - not every
intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST
community will result into a feeling of caste-based humiliation - it
is only in those cases where intentional insult or intimidation takes
place either due to prevailing practice of untouchability or to
reinforce historically entrenched ideas like superiority of the
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"upper castes" over the "lower castes/untouchables", notions of
purity and pollution, etc. that it could be said to be an insult or
intimidation of type envisaged by the Act, 1989 - mere fact that
person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a SC or ST
would not attract offence u/S. 3(1)(r) unless it was intention of
accused to subject concerned person to caste-based humiliation -
humiliation is not so much a physical injury but is in the nature of a
psychological injury that leaves a permanent scar on the heart -
distinction between systemic and regimented humiliation -
resistance is internal to humiliation - thus, those who are
humiliated also inherently possess capacity to protest against it -
however, those who protest also run risk of inciting opposition
from those who want to push traditionally humiliated groups to
margins - this apprehension of opposition and push back from
dominant against marginalised is also evident from Statements of
Objects of the Act, 1989 - thus, term humiliation as it appears in S.
3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must be construed, that is, in a way that it
deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such humiliation
is intricately associated with the caste identity of such members.
(h) Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 - S. 7(1)(d) - Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 -
S. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(u), 18 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 -
grant of anticipatory bail - legal bar - it is clear from a plain
reading of provision of S. 7(1)(d) of Civil Rights Act that any insult
against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the
ground of "untouchability" was punishable with imprisonment for a
maximum term of six months under the Civil Rights Act - Civil
Rights Act was not adequately sufficient to tackle caste-based
offences and the practice of "untouchability", leading to enactment
of the Act, 1989 introducing more stringent provisions for
combating such practices - S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 should, thus,
be seen in the context of S. 7(1)(d) of Civil Rights Act - thus, words
"with an intent to humiliate a member of a SC or ST" become
inseparable from underlying idea of "untouchability" which is
sought to be remedied and punished by the Act, 1989 - having
regard to reprehensible conduct and nature of derogatory
statements made, appellant, at best could be said to have prima
facie committed offence of defamation punishable u/S. 500 of IPC -
if that be so, it is always open for complainant to prosecute
appellant accordingly - however, complainant could not have
invoked provisions of the Act, 1989 only on premise that he is
member of SC, more so, when a prima facie conjoint reading of
transcript of video and complaint fails to disclose that actions of
appellant were impelled by caste identity of complainant.
12. In the decision in the case of Sohanvir @ Sohanvir
Dhama Versus State Of U.P. reported in 2025 (4) Crimes
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375 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-
“9. In order to examine this contention, it is necessary to refer to
Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, which reads as under: 3.
Punishments for offences of atrocities. (1) Whoever, not being a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, (s) abuses any
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name
in any place within public view;
10. The expression any place within public view has been
interpreted by this Court in numerous decisions, most recently in
Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent
of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Others, 2025 0 INSC 132. Relying on
Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710 this
Court reaffirmed that:
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place within public
view, the place should be open where the members of the
public can witness or hear the utterance made by the
accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place
within the four corners of the wall where members of the
public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has
taken place at a place within public view.
11. A perusal of the Application filed by the complainant under
Section 156(3) of the CrPC reveals that the alleged casteist abuses
were stated to have been used by the Appellants inside the
premises of the complainant. This circumstance, on its face, does
not satisfy the statutory requirement that the abuses were made in
any place within public view, which is an essential component of
the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. The house of
the complainant cannot be considered to be within public view.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent no. 2 has not
been able to show that the complaint or the statement recorded
under Section 200 CrPC contained any specific averment that the
caste based abuses were hurled at a place within public view.
13. In our considered view, the High Court erred in concluding that
the incident occurred in public view. A careful reading of the
complaint makes it evident that the alleged castebased abuses
were uttered inside the premises, in the presence of the Appellants
and Respondent No. 2. Therefore, the essential requirement of the
offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not satisfied.
14. Upon consideration of the submissions and scrutiny of the
material placed on record, we find merit in the contention raised
on behalf of the Appellants insofar as the applicability of the SC/ST
Act is concerned. On the allegations as they stand, a prima facie
case under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not made out against
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the Appellants.
15. It is beyond dispute that the appellate powers are to be invoked
with due caution, and only in exceptional circumstances. It is
equally well established that the Court cannot delve into the
truthfulness or credibility of the allegations contained in the FIR or
complaint. The Appellate Court has to examine the contents of the
complaint as they stand. In the facts of the present case, the High
Court ought to have exercised its appellate powers to quash the
summoning order with respect to offences under the provisions of
the SC/ST Act.
16. In view of the foregoing discussion and having found that the
essential ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the
SC/ST Act are not prima facie satisfied, we deem it appropriate to
interfere to that limited extent. Accordingly, the proceedings
initiated against the Appellants under the Section 3(1)(s) of the
SC/ST Act are hereby quashed. However, the trial insofar as it
pertains to the remaining offences under the IPC shall proceed in
accordance with law.”
13. Even in the decision in case of Karuppudayar Versus
State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent Of Police, Lalgudi
Trichy reported in 2025 (0) AIR(SC) 705, Gunjan @ Girija
Kumari Versus State (Nct Of Delhi) reported in 2026 (0)
AIJEL-SC 76984 and Talari Naresh Versus State Of Telangana
reported in 2026 (0) AIR(SC) 2499, the Hon’ble Apex Court
has taken a similar view. In the decision of this Court in the
case of State Of Gujarat Versus Laxmanji Sadaji Thakor
reported in 2025 (0) GUJHC 36421 also similar view has been
taken by this Court.
14. In view of the above, the Court has rightly observed that
unless the basic ingredients required to attract the provisions
of Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act are proved and
established by the prosecution, the accused cannot be held
liable under the said provision. In the absence of the
fulfilment of such basic ingredients, the Trial Court has rightly
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passed the impugned judgment and order in favour of the
present respondents.
15. Further, on perusal of the record of the appeal, it
transpires that the respondent-accused has established his
innocence before the Trial Court and that, after due
appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence and
other material placed on record, the Trial Court has rightly
passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The
findings recorded by the Trial Court are just, proper and in
accordance with the settled principles of law and, therefore,
no interference is warranted by this Court.
16. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the Appellate
Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider
the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of their
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the trial Court.
17. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the
trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal
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against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not
ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the
approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest
illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at
by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be
characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are
possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which
would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below.
However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the
evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by
the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a
manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on
record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such
circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a
just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find
out whether the accused are connected with the commission
of the crime with which he is charged.
18. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of
Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly
paragraph Nos. 42 and 43 , which was subsequently re-
affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State
of Bihar and another , reported in [ 2022] 3 SCC 471 ,
wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general
principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph
No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex
Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex
Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar
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Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 =
(2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to
40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings
recorded by the trial Court.
19. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of
Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169 , wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20
and 21 as under:-
“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general
principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs.
State of Karnataka , regarding the power of the appellate Court
while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The
principles read thus:
“42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an
appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc.
are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court
in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of
an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the
power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under
the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
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secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High
Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and
weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the
Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of
guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal
against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High
Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses
and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly
finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their
testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the
jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the
brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal,
resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing
the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial
Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.”
20. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly
appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the
present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on
record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused has committed the alleged crime. Therefore,
the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record.
21. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it
clearly transpires that the trial Court has not committed any
error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record
and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled
against them. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, it
clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to
prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and
order of the trial Court is sustainable and the present appeal
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is liable to be dismissed.
22. In view of the above, t h e present appeal is devoid of
merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is
dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the Trial Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond
stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the
concerned Trial Court forthwith.
Sd/-
(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
SURESH SOLANKI
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