STATE vs KUMUDA CHANDRA JENA

THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLLP No.36 of 2012

CNR No. ODHC010303302012
(In the matter of an application under Section 378 (1) & (3) of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 )

State of Orissa Petitioner
…….

-Versus-
Kumuda Chandra Jena Opposite Party
…….

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sangram Das, SC (Vigilance)

For the Opposite Party : None

CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 17.09.2026 : Date of Judgment: 31.10.2026

S.S. Mishra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment
of acquittal dated 04.03.2011 passed by the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Berhampur, Ganjam in T.R. No.33 of 2000, arising out of
Berhampur Vigilance P.S. Case No.2 of 1999, whereby the respondent
was acquitted of the charges under Section 13(2) read with Section

13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as well as Sections
468, 471 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code.

2. Heard Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel (Vigilance) for
the petitioner.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the respondent was
appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the U.G.M.E. School,
Khamankhola, within Balliguda Educational District of Kandhamal, on
01.02.1979. It was alleged that at the time of his appointment he
produced a forged High School Certificate (HSC) and a forged C.T. Pass
Certificate purportedly issued from S.T. School, Kuarmunda, in
Sundargarh district, on the strength of which he obtained the
appointment. During the vigilance enquiry, it was allegedly detected that
although the respondent had relied upon an HSC pass certificate for
securing employment, the Headmaster of Peoples School, Buguda, in
Ganjam district, informed the authorities that the respondent had
appeared in the HSC Examination of 1974 but had not passed the said
examination. On the basis of the materials collected during investigation,
the prosecution alleged that the respondent had dishonestly used forged

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educational certificates to obtain government service and thereby
committed offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the
Indian Penal Code.
4. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted
against the respondent for the offences under Section 13(2) read with
Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Sections
468, 471 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code. The learned trial court
framed charges accordingly, whereafter the case proceeded to trial. In
order to substantiate the allegations, the prosecution examined nine
witnesses and proved documents marked as Exts.1 to 8/3, while the
defence contested the prosecution case and sought acquittal.

5. Upon appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court held that
the prosecution had failed to establish the essential ingredients of forgery
and use of forged documents beyond reasonable doubt. The court
observed that the Investigating Officer had died before examination, that
the appointing authority had not been examined, that the service book
and pay records seized during investigation were not exhibited before the
court, and that no advertisement or notification prescribing the

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educational qualifications for appointment had been produced. Holding
that these deficiencies created substantial doubt regarding the
prosecution case, the learned Special Judge, Vigilance extended the
benefit of doubt to the accused. The relevant part of the aforesaid
judgment is reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“7. Learned counsel for the defence submitted that
the prosecution has not produced the advertisement
or notification to show that to be appointed as a
teacher in a primary school, the minimum
qualification by then was Matric C.T. In the absence
of xxx (not readable) it cannot be said that the
accused without being qualified for the post
appointed as teacher. Except the police officer, other
witnesses who have been examined in this case were
seizure witnesses who have proved the seizure list of
the service book of the accused and pay acquittance
roll. The service book, pay acquittance roll have not
been produced before this court for verification to
see as to what was the qualification of the accused
wherein his signature and hand writing would have
appeared and that he could have fastened into not,
but in this case such things have not been produced.
No explanation whatsoever has been offered by the
prosecution for not producing the same before this
court. In this case, a photo copy of Matric C.T.
certificate of the accused has been filed and it has
been marked as an exhibit. The question is, when a
person is given an appointment for the post of a
teacher, there must be on the basis of such
advertisement or subsequently by any notification or
against any post sanctioned. Those things have not

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been produced before the court. The appointing
authority, the D.I. of Schools of that point of time
must have verified the original certificate of the
accused before giving him appointment. Such person
has not been examined in this case. If at all this
court finds that false certificate has been utilized to
secure a job, the appointing authority, the D.I. of
Schools, must be in hand and glove with the accused
as otherwise service records, the attested copies of
the original certificates not provisional and
verifications of the same by the appointing authority
must be there. In this particular case though the
witnesses have stated that the service book, the
acquittance roll etc. have been seized by the
Vigilance Police, that alone has not proved the crime
as those documents are not produced. The most vital
thing is the I.O. who was also the informant, is to be
examined in this case has died in the meantime and
as such the light on the prosecution could not be
thrown or the prosecution case could not be unfolded
for proof. In this case, it cannot be said that there has
not been forgery or fabrication of documents by the
accused to secure a job but there is no legal evidence
or no proof has been made as the I.O. who was the
informant in this case has not been examined and he
has not taken pain to see the original advertisement,
the certificates, or interrogated the accused in a
through manner so also the appointing authority.
8. In view of this, the prosecution case has become
doubtful and as such the accused is given the benefit
of doubt and he is acquitted on the charges leveled
against him.
9. In the result, I hold the accused not guilty under
sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of

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Corruption Act, 1988/468/474/477(A) of IPC and
acquit him under the provisions of Section 248(1)
Cr.P.C.”


6. The learned counsel for the petitioner-State submitted that the
learned trial Court gravely erred in acquitting the accused by ignoring
the cogent oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution.
He contended that although the Investigating Officer, Sri S.L. Rao, had
expired before the trial, the prosecution successfully proved the written
report submitted by him through P.W.9, Sri P.C. Mishra, Officer-in-
Charge of Vigilance Police Station, Berhampur. The written report was
exhibited as Ext.8 and the formal F.I.R. prepared by P.W.9 was marked
as Ext.8/3. He further argued that P.W.5, the Senior Clerk in the office
of the D.I. of Schools, Buguda, categorically proved Ext.6, the school
leaving certificate, and deposed that the xerox copy of the certificate
issued by the Headmaster of People's School, Buguda unmistakably
revealed that the accused had failed in the H.S.C. Examination of 1974.
P.W.7, the Headmaster of People's School, Buguda, deposed that on the
requisition of the Investigating Officer, the school admission register
and Transfer Certificate Book were verified and the xerox copy of

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Transfer Certificate No.71/74 relating to the accused was obtained
during investigation. P.W.7 also proved the seizure list marked as Ext.7.

7. He further submitted that the non-production of the service book
and pay acquaintance roll created a doubt regarding the prosecution
case. Such records were wholly unnecessary for proving the offences
alleged, particularly when the opposite party’s appointment and service
as Assistant Teacher in U.G.M.E. School, Kamanakhal, as well as his
receipt of salary, were admitted facts and were never in dispute. He
argued that admitted facts require no formal proof, and the seizure of
the service book and pay acquaintance register had already been proved
through the evidence of P.Ws.1, 5 and 7. Therefore, the trial court's
insistence upon production of those records amounted to
misappreciation of evidence and resulted in an erroneous acquittal
despite overwhelming evidence establishing that the respondent had
secured public employment by relying upon forged educational
certificates.
8. This Court has carefully examined the judgment passed by the
learned trial Court, the reasons assigned therein, and the evidence

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adduced by both the prosecution and the defence during trial. This
Court has also considered the grounds urged in the present appeal
and heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-State at
length.
9. Before interfering with an order of acquittal, this Court is also
required to bear in mind the well-settled principles governing an
appeal against acquittal. In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v.
State of Karnataka & Ors. , reported in 2026 INSC 67 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has reiterated that where two reasonable conclusions
are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial
Court. It has further been held that if the view taken by the trial
Court is a possible view based on the evidence available on record,
the appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal merely
because another view is also possible. Interference is warranted only
when the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is
based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where
compelling and substantial reasons exist showing that the acquittal is

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clearly unreasonable. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this
Court, it can be said that if two reasonable
conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the
Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible. The following principles have to be kept in
mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the
appeals against an order of acquittal:
(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission
to consider the material evidence on record;
(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when
there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing
so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a
compelling reason for interference.
(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a
possible view which could have been taken on the basis of
the evidence on record;
(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion
was possible.
”


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Equally, in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka , reported in
2024 INSC 104
, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
presumption of innocence, which every accused enjoys during trial, gets
strengthened and concretized once the trial culminates in an order of
acquittal. Consequently, while exercising appellate jurisdiction against
an acquittal, a higher threshold is required to rebut such reinforced
presumption. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are
manifestly unsustainable or perverse, the appellate Court ought to
exercise great restraint in upsetting the acquittal. It was held thus:-
We may firstly discuss the position of law
“24.
regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal
appeal. For, that is the foundation of this
challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven
guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of
the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the
case ends in acquittal. The presumption of
innocence gets concretized when the case ends in
acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on
appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that
the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets
strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to

rebut the same in appeal.”


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10. The appellate jurisdiction against an order of acquittal is,
therefore, not intended to facilitate a fresh substitution of the opinion of
the trial Court merely because a different view on the evidence is
conceivable. As reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulasareddi
@ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra) , the
appellate Court must first satisfy itself that the judgment of acquittal is
vitiated by patent perversity, misreading or non-consideration of material
evidence, or is so unreasonable that no prudent person could have
arrived at such a conclusion. Equally, as held in Mallappa & Ors. v.
State of Karnataka (supra) , the reinforced presumption of innocence
following an acquittal places a higher threshold upon the appellate Court
before upsetting the findings recorded by the trial Court. Thus, unless the
conclusions reached by the trial Court are wholly unsustainable on the
evidence available on record, judicial restraint rather than substitution of
views remains the governing principle in an appeal against acquittal.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this
Court finds that the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court
cannot be said to be either perverse or wholly unreasonable. Merely

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because another view may also be possible, the same cannot furnish a
ground to reverse the acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
11. At this distant point in time, the absence of compelling and
substantial reasons warranting interference, reversal of the acquittal
would itself occasion serious prejudice and would be a travesty of
justice. At this belated stage, presumption of innocence prevailed in
favour of the opposite party for more than 15 years, as he was acquitted
by the Court below. Reversing such presumption at this stage would not
only be harsh, but it would be against the cardinal principle of
reformatory criminal jurisprudence. This Court, therefore, finds no legal
or factual justification to unsettle the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal
passed by the learned trial Court. In view of the aforementioned, this
Court is not inclined to grant leave against the judgment of acquittal
impugned herein.
12. Accordingly, the CRLLP stands dismissed.
(S.S. Mishra)
Judge
The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
st
Dated the 31 October, 2026 /Ashok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB
MOHAPATRA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 05-Nov-2026 19:59:15

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