Nandakumar Menon vs Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. And Anr.
- Court
- Bombay High Court
CNR No : HCBM020296632016
2026:BHC-OS:22767-DB
sr.1-wp-263-2017.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
MANSI
DHANANJAY
SHELKE
WRIT PETITION NO. 263 OF 2017
Digitally signed by
MANSI
DHANANJAY
SHELKE
Date: 2026.10.21
14:59:56 +0530
Nandakumar Menon .. Petitioner
Versus
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Anr. .. Respondents
Mr. Mihir Desai, Senior Advocate a/w Adv. Rishika Agarwal i/b Adv.
Moosa Izzat for the Petitioner.
Adv. Anand Pai a/w Adv. Rahul Sanghvi, Adv. Nimish Daswani, Adv.
Sahil Sayyed and Adv. Lavanya Panickar i/b M/s. Sanjay Udeshi and
Co. for Respondent No.1.
CORAM: R.I. CHAGLA &
FIRDOSH P. POONIWALLA, JJ.
Reserved on: OCTOBER 13, 2026
Pronounced on : OCTOBER 21, 2026
Judgement : (Per FIRDOSH P. POONIWALLA J)
1. The present Writ Petition has been filed seeking the following
final reliefs :
“a. That this Honourable Court be pleased to issue a writ of
mandamus or a writ, order or direction in the nature of
mandamus directing the Respondent No. 1 to grant
promotion/upgradation/progression to Petitioner from Job Group
B to C in 2002, from Job Group C to D in 2007, and from Job
Group D to E in 2012 alongwith the corresponding and
consequential high payscales, perks, allowances and benefits,
and any future promotions/upgradations/progressions that the
Petitioner may be eligible to receive.
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b. That this Honourable Court be pleased to issue a writ of
mandamus or a writ, order or direction in the nature of
mandamus directing the Respondent No. 1 to disclose the
promotion/upgradation/progression policy or policies in
operation at the Respondent No. 1 during the period from 1997
till the date of filing of this petition.”
2. Respondent No.1 has raised a preliminary objection as to the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the present Writ Petition.
This Judgement deals only with the said preliminary objection raised by
Respondent No.1
SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NO. 1
3. Mr. Anand Pai, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
Respondent No.1, submitted that the present Petition is filed in this Court in
2017, although the Petitioner was, at that time, posted in the Kochi Refinery
of Respondent No.1.
4. Mr. Pai drew attention to paragraph 70 of the Petition, which
states that the Petitioner resides in Mumbai, and submitted that the same
forms the basis of filing the present Petition, and that the same is incorrect.
Mr. Pai further submitted that the present Petition proceeds on the basis that
the whole cause of action arose in Mumbai.
5. In this context, Mr. Pai submitted that, after his transfer to Kochi
in 2014, until his retirement in 2021, the Petitioner continued to work at
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Kochi. His service-related emoluments were paid at Kochi, and he was in fact
subjected to disciplinary enquiry at Kochi. Mr. Pai submitted that paragraphs
56 to 62 of the Petition are in respect of happenings at the Kochi Refinery.
Further, Mr. Pai submitted that the aspect of promotion, from 2014, arose in
Kochi, and must be agitated at the Kerala High Court and not in this Court.
Mr. Pai further submitted that there was no demand in Kochi from 2014 to
2021 for the benefits, and the Petitioner retired and was paid all retiral dues.
Mr. Pai submitted that, thus, no part of the cause of action arose in Mumbai,
and the situs of employment is Kochi.
6. In support of his submissions, Mr. Pai relied upon the following
judgements:
(a) V.G. Jagdishan vs. Indofos Industries Limited, (2022) 6 SCC
167;
(b) J. Balaji vs. The Hindu, New Delhi, 2023 SCC OnLine Del
5352; and
PETITIONER’S SUBMISSIONS
7. Mr. Mihir Desai, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the Petitioner, submitted that the territorial jurisdiction of this Court is
expressly attracted by Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. Article
226(2) provides that the power of a High Court under Article 226 may be
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exercised where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Court, notwithstanding that the seat of the
authority or residence of the person against whom the writ is sought may be
outside such territory.
8. Mr. Desai submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kusum
Ingots & Alloys Limited vs. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254 , has
authoritatively held that the expression "cause of action" in Article 226(2) has
the same essential meaning as ordinarily understood in law, namely, the
bundle of material facts which the Petitioner is required to establish in order
to obtain the relief sought. Mr. Desai submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held in the said Judgement that even if a small fraction of the cause
of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, the same is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction, provided such fraction constitutes an integral
or material part of the cause of action.
9. Mr. Desai submitted that the Petition specifically concerns
decisions pertaining to the Petitioner's promotion and service career, which
were taken by the Human Resource Department of Respondent No. 1 at
Mumbai. Mr. Desai submitted that the said facts are directly and
substantially connected with the lis between the parties, and therefore,
constitute an integral part of the cause of action.
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10. Further, Mr. Desai submitted that, in this Petition, the Petitioner
has sought a Writ of Mandamus directing Respondent No. 1 to grant
promotion/upgradation/ progression to the Petitioner from Job Group B to C
in 2002, from Job Group C to D in 2007 and from Job Group D to E in 2012,
alongwith the corresponding and consequential high payscales, perks,
allowances and benefits. Mr. Desai submitted that it is the case of the
Petitioner that the Petitioner was entitled to all these promotions when the
Petitioner was serving in Mumbai. Therefore, definitely a part of the cause of
action, if not the entire cause of action, arises in Mumbai. In support of his
submissions, apart from the aforesaid Judgement in Kusum Ingots (supra) ,
Mr. Desai relied upon the Judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in:
(a) Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu,
(1994) 4 SCC 711;
(b) Alchemist Limited vs. State Bank of Sikkim, (2007) 11 SCC
335; and
(c) State of Goa vs. Summit Online Trade Solutions Private
Limited, (2023) 7 SCC 791.
11. In conclusion, Mr. Desai submitted that this Court has territorial
jurisdiction to entertain, try, and dispose of this Petition, and therefore, the
preliminary objection raised by Respondent No. 1 ought to be rejected.
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
12. In order to consider the preliminary objection raised by
Respondent No. 1, it is important to consider the provisions of Article 226(2)
of the Constitution of India. Articles 226(1) and (2) of the Constitution of
India read as under:
“226. (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High
Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government,
within those territories directions, orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement
of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other
purpose.
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders
or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be
exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation
to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in
part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that
the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of
such person is not within those territories.”
13. By virtue of the provisions of Article 226(2) of the Constitution
of India, a High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories
within which the cause of action wholly or in part arises, would have
jurisdiction to entertain a Writ Petition.
14. In Kusum Ingots (supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that,
keeping in view the expressions used in clause (2) of Article 226 of the
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Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of the cause of
action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have
jurisdiction in the matter. Paragraphs 6, 7, 10, and 29 of the Judgement of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots (supra) are relevant and are set
out hereunder:
“6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts
which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute
the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute.
It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean
that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to
prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment
of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything
which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to
judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is
beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of
action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be,
shall be rejected summarily.
7. Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads
thus: "226. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue
directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or
person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause
of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such
power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or
authority or the residence of such person is not within those
territories."
10. Keeping in view the expressions used in clause (2) of Article
226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small
fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the
Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter.
29. In view of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, now if a part of cause of action arises outside the
jurisdiction of the High Court, it would have jurisdiction to issue
a writ. The decision in Khajoor Singh has, thus, no application.”
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15. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission (supra) , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the question whether a High Court has territorial
jurisdiction to entertain a Writ Petition must be answered on the basis of the
averments made in the Petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being
immaterial. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the question of territorial
jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the Petition. Paragraph 6
of the Judgement in Oil and Natural Gas Commission (supra) is relevant and
is set out hereunder:
“6. It is well settled that the expression "cause of action" means
that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed,
to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand
Kour v. Partab Singh' Lord Watson said:
“...the cause of action has no relation whatever to the
defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it
depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the
plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the
plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the
media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a
conclusion in his favour.”
Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial
jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support
of the cause of action into consideration albeit without
embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of
the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court
has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be
answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the
truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it
differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be
decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the
question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had
jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question
even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the
averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are
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sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action
had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.”
16. In Alchemist (supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
legislative history of Article 226 makes it clear that after 1963 (when Article
226 was amended to include Article 226(1A), which was later renumbered as
Article 226(2)), the cause of action is relevant and germane, and a Writ
Petition may be instituted in a Court within the territorial jurisdiction of
which the cause of action, in whole or in part, arises. Paragraphs 15 to 18 and
37 of the Judgement in Alchemist (supra) are relevant and are set out
hereunder:
“15. The effect of the above decisions was that no High Court
other than the High Court of Punjab (before the establishment of
the High Court of Delhi) had jurisdiction to issue any direction,
order or writ to the Union of India, because the seat of the
Government of India was located in New Delhi. Cause of action
was a concept totally irrelevant and alien for conferring
jurisdiction on the High Courts under Article 226 of the
Constitution. An attempt to import such concept was repelled by
this Court. In the circumstances, Article 226 was amended by
the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and after
Clause (1), new Clause (1-A) was inserted which read as under:
"226. (1-A) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue
directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or
person may also be exercised by any High Court
exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within
which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the
exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of
such Government or authority or the residence of such
person is not within those territories."
16. It may be stated that by the Constitution (Forty-second
Amendment) Act, 1976, Clause (1-A) was renumbered as
Clause (2). The underlying object of amendment was expressed
in the following words:
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"Under the existing Article 226 of the Constitution, the
only High Court which has jurisdiction with respect to the
Central Government is the Punjab High Court. This
involves considerable hardship to litigants from distant
places. It is, therefore, proposed to amend Article 226 so
that when any relief is sought against any Government,
authority or person for any action taken, the High Court
within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises may
also have jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions,
orders or writ."
(emphasis supplied)
The effect of the amendment was that the accrual of cause of
action was made an additional ground to confer jurisdiction on a
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
17. As Joint Committee observed:
"This clause would enable the High Court within
whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises to issue
directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or
person, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government
or authority or the residence of such person is outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The Committee
feels that the High Court within whose jurisdiction the
cause of action arises in part only should also be vested
with such jurisdiction."
18. The legislative history of the constitutional
provisions, therefore, makes it clear that after 1963, cause of
action is relevant and germane and a writ petition can be
instituted in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of
which cause of action in whole or in part arises.
37. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio
laid down in a catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that
for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the
appellant-petitioner would or would not constitute a part of
cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact
constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of
action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the
cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the court, the
court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the
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suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a "part of cause of action",
nothing less than that.”
17. In State of Goa (supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
constitutional mandate of Article 226(2) is that the cause of action referred to
therein must at least arise in part within the territories in relation to which
the High Court exercises jurisdiction when writ powers conferred by Article
226(1) are proposed to be exercised, notwithstanding that the seat of the
Government or authority or the residence of the person is not within those
territories. Paragraphs 14, 15 and 17 of the Judgement in State of Goa (supra)
are relevant and read as under :
“14. While dealing with an objection as to lack of territorial
jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition on the ground that the
cause of action has not arisen within its jurisdiction, a High
Court essentially has to arrive at a conclusion on the basis of the
averments made in the petition memo treating the contents as
true and correct. That is the fundamental principle. Bearing this
in mind, we have looked into the petition memo of WP (C) No.
38 of 2017 and searched in vain to trace how at least part of the
cause of action has been pleaded by the petitioning company, to
have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.
15. This is a case where clause (2) of Article 226 has been
invoked by the High Court to clothe it with the jurisdiction to
entertain and try the writ petitions. The constitutional mandate
of clause (2) is that the "cause of action", referred to therein,
must at least arise in part within the territories in relation to
which the High Court exercises jurisdiction when writ powers
conferred by clause (1) are proposed to be exercised,
notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or
the residence of the person is not within those territories.
17. Determination of the question as to whether the facts
pleaded constitute a part of the cause of action, sufficient to
attract clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, would
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necessarily involve an exercise by the High Court to ascertain
that the facts, as pleaded, constitute a material, essential or
integral part of the cause of action. In so determining, it is the
substance of the matter that is relevant. It, therefore, follows that
the party invoking the writ jurisdiction has to disclose that the
integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do
constitute a cause empowering the High Court to decide the
dispute and that, at least, a part of the cause of action to move
the High Court arose within its jurisdiction. Such pleaded facts
must have a nexus with the subject-matter of challenge based on
which the prayer can be granted. Those facts which are not
relevant or germane for grant of the prayer would not give rise
to a cause of action conferring jurisdiction on the court. These
are the guiding tests.”
18. Applying the law laid down by the aforesaid Judgements of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court to the facts of the present case, it is clear from the
averments in the Petition and the relief sought in prayer (a) of the Petition
that the Petitioner is seeking grant of promotion/upgradation/ progression to
the Petitioner in 2002, 2007 and 2012 when the Petitioner was situated in
Mumbai. Since the reliefs are sought by the Petitioner in respect of the period
during which he was employed in Mumbai, the cause of action, or at least a
part thereof, would definitely arise in Mumbai.
19. Further, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Desai, the Petition
specifically concerns decisions pertaining to the Petitioner's promotion,
which would be taken by the Human Resource Department of Respondent
No. 1 at Mumbai. For this reason also, the cause of action would arise in
Mumbai. Further, it is also pertinent to note that Respondent No. 1 has its
registered office at Mumbai.
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20. For all the aforesaid reasons, a material, essential, and integral
part of the cause of action in the present Petition has arisen in Mumbai. In
these circumstances, by virtue of the provisions of Article 226(2) of the
Constitution of India, this Court would have jurisdiction to entertain, try, and
dispose of this Petition.
21. The fact that the Petitioner was transferred to Kochi in 2014, and
retired in Kochi, does not change the position, and does not deprive this
Court of its jurisdiction to entertain the present Petition as the cause of action
has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
22. This leaves us to deal with the Judgements relied upon by Mr.
Pai in support of his submissions.
23. The first Judgement relied upon by Mr. Pai is the Judgement of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in V.G. Jagdishan (supra) . Paragraphs 4, 7 , 10
and 11 of the said Judgement are relevant and are set out hereunder :
“4. It was the case on behalf of the workman that as the demand
notice was served at Head Office at Delhi, it can be said that the
dispute has arisen giving rise to substantial cause of action at
Delhi. Therefore, it was the case on behalf of the workman that
the Labour Court at Delhi has territorial jurisdiction to try the
case.
7. Ms V. Mohana, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the appellant herein --workman has vehemently submitted that
in the present case it cannot be said that there is a total lack of
jurisdiction in the Labour Court, Delhi. It is submitted that as the
Head Office, where the demand notice was sent was at Delhi and
the demand notice was served from Delhi where the workman
was staying after the termination, it can be said that a part cause
of action has arisen in Delhi. It is submitted that when a part of
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the cause of action has arisen in Delhi, the court at Delhi would
have territorial jurisdiction. Reliance is placed on the decisions
of this Court in Nandram v. Garware Polyster Ltd., Bikash
Bhushan Ghosh v. Novartis India Ltd. and Singareni Collieries
Co. Ltd. v. Ande Lingaiah.
7.1. It is further submitted by Ms V. Mohana, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that in the present
case, the Labour Court had decided the preliminary issue and
held that the Labour Court, Delhi has no territorial jurisdiction to
decide the case. It is submitted that the Labour Court ought to
have given its decision on all issues. Reliance is placed upon the
decision of this Court in D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Admn. It is
submitted that as held by this Hon'ble Court, tribunals should
dispose of all the issues, whether preliminary or otherwise, at the
same time.
7.2. Making the above submissions and relying upon above
decisions of this Court, it is prayed to quash and set aside the
order(s) passed by the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court and direct the Labour
Court, Delhi to decide and dispose of the case at the earliest.
10. From the findings recorded by the Labour Court, Delhi and
the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High
Court, it is not much in dispute that the workman was employed
as a driver at Ghaziabad office. He was working at Ghaziabad.
His services were retrenched at Ghaziabad. All throughout
during the employment, the workman stayed and worked at
Ghaziabad. Only after the retrenchment/termination the
workman shifted to Delhi from where he served a demand notice
at Head Office of the Management situated at Delhi. Merely
because the workman after termination/retrenchment shifted to
Delhi and sent a demand notice from Delhi and the Head Office
of the Management was at Delhi, it cannot be said that a part
cause of action has arisen at Delhi. Considering the facts that the
workman was employed at Ghaziabad; was working at
Ghaziabad and his services were terminated at Ghaziabad, the
facts being undisputed, only the Ghaziabad Court would have
territorial jurisdiction to decide the case.
11. As such the issue involved in the present case is no longer res
integra in view of the decision of this Court in Eastern Coalfields
Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee. In Eastern Coalfields the workman was
employed in Mugma area in the district of Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
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His services were terminated at Mugma. However, the workman
filed a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court. On a
preliminary objection taken the Calcutta High Court helds that
since the workman was serving at Mugma area under the General
Manager of the area which is the State of Jharkhand, the Calcutta
High Court had no jurisdiction. Affirming the aforesaid decision,
this Court held that the entire cause of action arose in Mugma
area within the State of Jharkhand and only because the head
office of the company was situated in the State of West Bengal,
the same by itself will not confer any jurisdiction upon the
Calcutta High Court particularly when the head office had
nothing to do with the order of punishment passed against the
workman. In the present case also, the workman was employed
at Ghaziabad; he was working at Ghaziabad and his services
were also terminated at Ghaziabad by the office at Ghaziabad
where he was employed.”
24. On a reading of the Judgement in V.G. Jagdishan (supra)
considering the fact that the workman was employed at Ghaziabad, was
working at Ghaziabad and his service were terminated at Ghaziabad, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that only the Ghaziabad Court would have
territorial jurisdiction to decide the challenge to his termination. These facts
are very different from the present case where the Petitioner has claimed
promotion at the time when he was employed in Mumbai and therefore we
have held that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of this
Petition.
25. The next Judgement relied upon by Mr. Pai is the Judgement of
the Delhi High Court in J. Balaji (supra) . Paragraphs 4, 7, 9 and 12 of the said
Judgement were relied upon by Mr. Pai and are set out hereunder :
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“4. Appellant challenged the aforesaid termination order
by filing a claim petition under Section 24 of the Industrial
Disputes Act. 1947 (ID Act). By Award dated 27th August,
2019 passed in LCA No. 07/2016 (Old DID No. 53/15), the
learned Labour Court dismissed the claim petition of the
appellant herein holding that Delhi Courts had lost their
territorial jurisdiction since the situs of employment of the
appellant had shifted from Delhi to Chennai as the appellant
had joined the office at Chennal upon his transfer. Thus, learned
Labour Court held as follows:-
"Issue no. 2. Whether the claimant/petition was employed as
a Correspondent in respondent's organization at Chennai, if
so, whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain
and try the present petition?
It is an admitted case as emerged from the evidence on
record that workman started his job with the management at
Vishakhapatnam and lastly he was working at Chennai.
As had been held in catenea of judgments as relied upon by
Id. AR for management, it has become manifestly clear that
it is the situs of place of employment of workman which
determines the question of territorial jurisdiction of a Labour
Court for deciding a labour dispute raised by a workman and
the place of his initial appointment or the place of his
promotion would be of no help to him in conferring the
territorial jurisdiction upon a Court which otherwise does
not have the same.
This view of mine is further fortified by the following
citations relied upon by the management:
1. Lohia Starlinger Limited v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2006
V AD (Delhi) 732;
2. Braham Prakash v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2007) 143
DLT 311;
3. Harsaran Singh v. Managing Director, Modern Food
Industries (India) Ltd., (2009) 163 DLT 794;
In the light of the aforesaid citations, I have no hesitation in
holding that once the workman was transferred to Chennai
and had also joined there, then the situs of his employment
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shifted from Delhi to Chennai and as such, the Delhi Courts
had lost their territorial jurisdiction which would now vest
in the Labour Courts at Tamil Nadu.
Therefore, Delhi Courts had no territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the present claim. As such, the issue is answered in
negative and decided in favour of management and against
the workman."
7. It is further contended that the ID Act has no provision
related to territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, claim filed under ID
Act cannot be fettered by the rules of territorial jurisdiction as
applicable to civil suits.
9. On the other hand learned counsel for respondents justified
the Award passed by the learned Labour Court as well as the
impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. Learned
counsel for respondents relied upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of V.G. Jagdishan v. Indofos
Industries Ltd., (2022) 6 SCC 167 in order to contend that Delhi
Courts did not have territorial jurisdiction in the present case.
rd
12. After his transfer from Delhi to Chennai vide order dated 3
th
February, 2014, appellant sent an email dated 12 February,
th
2014 seeking an extension of time till 6 March, 2014 to join
duty at Chennai, which was acceded to by respondents.
Thereafter, appellant made a second request for an extension of
th
time to join at Chennai till 9 June, 2014 vide his email dated
th rd
4 March, 2014. However, his leave was approved upto 23
March, 2014. Subsequently, pursuant to further requests by
appellant, respondents extended the time to join the transfer
th
posting at Chennai on or before 15 April, 2014. Appellant once
th
again wrote on 14 April, 2014 seeking further extension of
th
leave. By communication dated 19 April 2014, appellant was
informed that he had been relieved from Delhi Office and his
th
services stood transferred to Chennai from 15 April, 2014, and
that he ought to apply for leave to the Chief of Tamil Nadu
Bureau who was the competent authority. Thereafter, appellant
wrote to the Chief of Tamil Nadu Bureau seeking leave for six
st
weeks on 21 April, 2014. The Chief of Tamil Nadu Bureau
th
sent email communication to appellant on 26 April, 2014,
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granting him leave and giving him one final opportunity to join
nd
Chennai before 2 May, 2014. Ultimately, appellant joined duty
nd
at Chennai on 2 May, 2014.”
26. In the case of J. Balaji (supra) , the Petitioner was challenging his
termination. The Court held that the Petitioner had joined duty at Chennai,
his service was terminated from Chennai and the Order of termination was
issued from Chennai. The Court held that, in these circumstances, it is clear
that the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Courts at Chennai,
and merely because the Appellant was posted in Delhi, prior to his posting at
Chennai, would not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court when the
cause of action qua the proceedings did not arise in Delhi. Once again, the
facts in the case of J. Balaji (supra) are clearly distinguishable. In J. Balaji
(supra) the challenge was to the termination of the employee. The employee
was posted at Chennai, his service was terminated from Chennai and the
order of termination was issued from Chennai. In these circumstances, the
Court held that the Courts at Chennai had territorial jurisdiction. In the
present case, as stated hereinbefore, the Petitioner is seeking promotion
during the period of his employment when he was in Mumbai, therefore the
cause of action has arisen in Mumbai and this Court has jurisdiction to
entertain, try and dispose of this Petition.
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ORDER
27. In the aforesaid circumstances and for the aforesaid reasons,
the following Order is passed :
a) Respondent No’s.1 preliminary objection on jurisdiction is
rejected.
b) It is held that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain, try
and dispose of the present Writ Petition.
c) In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no
order as to costs.
th
d) Place the Writ Petition for directions on 25 November,
2026.
[FIRDOSH P. POONIWALLA, J.] [R. I. CHAGLA, J.]
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