Swayam Realtors And Traders Llp vs State Of Maharashtra Through Its Government Pleader And 8 Ors
- Court
- Bombay High Court
2026:BHC-OS:11643-DB
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 3274 OF 2025
ALONGWITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 7585 OF 2026
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 3274 OF 2025
PURTI
PRASAD
PARAB
Digitally signed
by PURTI
PRASAD PARAB
Date: 2026.05.06
17:08:28 +0530
Swayam Realtors & Traders LLP
a limited liability partnership firm
registered under the Limited
Liability Partnership Act, 2008,
formerly known as Swayam
Realtors & Traders Ltd., having
its registered office at
th
801, 8 Floor, Shikhar Complex,
Shrimali Society, Near Mithakhali
Six Road, Navrangpura, Ahmedabad,
Gujarat, India – 380 009. … Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Maharashtra
Through its Government Pleader
Original Side, Mumbai – 400 001.
2. Inspector General of Registration
& Controller of Stamps,
Maharashtra State, Near New
Administrative Building,
Opp. Old Vidhan Bhavan,
Firoj Gandhi Chowk,
Pune – 411 001.
3. Deputy Inspector General of
Registration and Controller of
Stamps, Maharashtra State
having its office at Ground Floor,
Old Customs House, Fort,
Mumbai – 400 001.
4. Joint Sub-Registrar, Mumbai
City – I, having its office at
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Ground Floor, Old Customs House,
Fort, Mumbai – 400 001.
5. Jt. Sub-Registrar, Borivali – II
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MTNL Building. 1 Floor,
Behind Technical Hakoba Compound,
Borivali (East), Mumbai – 400 066.
6. Settlement Commissioner and
Director of Land Records
through its City Survey Officer,
Borivali, D.N.R. Karode Marg,
Natakwala Lane, S.V. Road,
Borivali (West), Mumbai – 400 093.
7. City Survey Officer, Borivali
D.N.R. Karode Marg,
Natakwala Lane, S.V. Road,
Borivali (West), Mumbai – 400 093.
8. Talathi, Borivali
D.N.R. Karode Marg,
Natakwala Lane, S.V. Road,
Borivali (West), Mumbai – 400 093.
9. Khatau Makanji Spinning &
Weaving Mills Limited,
a company registered under the
provisions of the Companies Act, 1956
having its registered office at
Laxmi Building, 6 Shoorji Vallabhdas
Marg, Ballard Estate,
Mumbai – 400 038. … Respondents
Mr. Fredun DeVitre, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. Ajay Khattawala,
Mr.Karan Rukhana, Mr.Nirav Shah, Mr. Anuj Jaiswal and Ms. Niharika
Singh i/b Little and Co. for the Petitioner.
Mr. Jay Sanklecha, B - Panel Counsel a/w Mr. Prashant Kamble, AGP
for Respondent Nos. 1 to 8 – State of Maharashtra.
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CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE AND
HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, JJ.
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RESERVED ON : 17 APRIL, 2026
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PRONOUNCED ON : 6 MAY, 2026
JUDGMENT (PER HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, J.) :
1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. By consent of
learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the Petition is taken up for
final disposal.
2. At the outset, we take on record the statement made on
behalf of the Petitioner that the relief concerning mutation is not pressed
at this stage, with liberty reserved. We also record that the correct date
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of the BIFR sanction order is 26 February, 2007 as mentioned by the
Petitioner in separate note of statement and verified from the records.
3. The present Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India seeks, inter alia, a Writ of Mandamus directing the Respondent
authorities to register, under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908,
th rd
the orders dated 26 February, 2007 and 3 January, 2013 passed by the
Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) in Case No.
135 of 1989, whereby, pursuant to a sanctioned scheme of revival-cum-
demerger under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act,
1985, ( “the SICA Act” ) the immovable properties of Respondent No. 9
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stood transferred to and vested in the Petitioner with effect from 1
April, 2006. Consequential directions were also sought for registration
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of the declaration-cum-indemnity dated 28 November, 2024 and for
mutation of revenue records reflecting the Petitioner’s title. Of which
now on the basis of the statement made before us as recorded above by
the Petitioner, this prayer pertaining to mutation of the Petitioner’s name
in the Revenue Records does not survive.
4. It is submitted that the Petitioner, originally incorporated as
a company under the Companies Act, 1956 and subsequently converted
into a limited liability partnership under the Limited Liability Partnership
Act, 2008, has at all material times acted bonafide and diligently. It was
emphasized that the rights of the Petitioner in respect of the subject
properties do not emanate from any voluntary instrument but arise by
operation of law, pursuant to a statutory scheme sanctioned by BIFR,
which has attained finality. The transfer and vesting of the properties, it
was submitted, stood completed upon sanction of the scheme, and the
requirement of registration is merely consequential to reflect such
vesting in public records.
5. Tracing the chronology, the learned Senior Counsel on
behalf of the Petitioner submitted that Respondent No. 9, being a sick
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industrial company, had approached BIFR under the SICA Act, and by
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its order dated 26 February, 2007, a scheme of revival-cum-demerger
was sanctioned. Under the said scheme, the subject immovable
properties stood transferred to the Petitioner with retrospective effect
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from 1 April, 2006. Clause 11.1(d)(e) of the scheme specifically
obligated the State of Maharashtra to treat such demerger at par with
reconstruction under Section 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 for stamp
duty purposes and to give effect to the transfer. However, despite
binding directions, the State authorities failed to act in compliance,
compelling the Petitioner to initiate further proceedings before BIFR,
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resulting in the order dated 3 January, 2013 reiterating and enforcing
the obligation upon the State authorities to compute and recover stamp
duty in accordance with the scheme and to register the properties.
6. The Petitioner and its counsel further submitted that instead
of complying with the binding BIFR directions, the stamp authorities
acted contrary thereto by raising exorbitant and untenable demands of
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stamp duty and penalty, culminating in an adjudication order dated 18
December 2015. The Petitioner, it was urged, was constrained to
challenge such illegal demands through multiple proceedings, including
Writ Petitions before this Court and statutory appeals under the
Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. Ultimately, the Chief Controlling
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Revenue Authority, by its order dated 8 July, 2024, allowed the
Petitioner’s Appeal and set aside the earlier adjudication, and
conclusively determined that only nominal stamp duty of Rs. 100/- was
payable. The Petitioner promptly complied with the said order and paid
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the requisite Stamp duty on 17 July, 2024, whereupon the certificate
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under Section 32 of the Stamp Act was issued on 2 August, 2024.
7. On the strength of this adjudication, it was submitted that
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the Petitioner immediately approached the registering authorities on 22
August, 2024 with the duly stamped documents for registration.
However, the authorities refused to accept the same on the ground that
the presentation was beyond the time prescribed under Section 23 of the
Registration Act. The learned Senior Counsel characterised such refusal
as ex facie illegal, arbitrary, and contrary to settled legal principles. It
was argued that the Petitioner could not have presented the document for
registration prior to adjudication and payment of proper stamp duty, as
the statutory scheme under the Stamp Act mandates that an instrument
must be duly stamped before it can be acted upon or registered.
Therefore, according to the Petitioner, the period of limitation for
presentation could only commence upon completion of the adjudication
proceedings and certification of stamp duty.
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8. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that it is well
settled, through a consistent line of authorities of this Court, that the time
consumed in adjudication of stamp duty is liable to be excluded while
computing the period under Sections 23 and Section 25 of the
Registration Act. Reliance was placed upon decisions such as:-
1. Nestor Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra.
2. Snehanjali Electronics and Trading Pvt. Ltd. vs. Inspector of
General of Registration and Controller of Stamps and Ors.
3. Purnima Bhanuprasad Gohil vs. State of Maharashtra.
4. Vijay Laxmi Ravi Kumar vs. Revenue Control Authority of
Bombay High court.
9. In support of the contention that where delay is occasioned
by pendency of adjudication before stamp authorities, such period must
be excluded, and the document, if presented within four months
thereafter, must be accepted for registration. Applying these principles,
the learned Senior Counsel submitted that in the present case, the
adjudication proceedings commenced as early as June 2007 and were
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concluded only on 8 July, 2024, with the issuance of the certificate on
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2 August, 2024. The entire period between 2007 and 2024, being
attributable to the inaction and unlawful conduct of the State authorities,
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is liable to be excluded. Once this principle is applied and limitation is
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computed thus, then the presentation of the document on 22 August,
2024 and thereafter within four months is squarely within limitation. It
was emphasized that the Petitioner has acted with due diligence
throughout, and the delay, if any, is wholly attributable to the
Respondent authorities, and they cannot be permitted to take advantage
of their own wrong.
10. The learned Senior Counsel while dealing with the
Respondents’ contention raised in the affidavit in reply, regarding the
2015 adjudication order and the delay in challenging the same, it is
submitted that the said order stood merged in the appellate order dated
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8 July, 2024 under the doctrine of merger, as recognised in Omprakash
1
Verma and Others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others , and
therefore ceased to have independent existence. It was further contended
that the Respondents themselves had prolonged the dispute by
challenging the BIFR directions before appellate forums, the proceedings
which culminated only in 2018, and even thereafter, they failed to act in
compliance, thereby contributing substantially to the delay.
11. It was then urged before us that the impugned action of the
1 (2010) 13 Supreme Court Cases 158
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registering authorities is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, being
arbitrary, unreasonable, and contrary to statutory mandate. The object of
the Registration Act, is mainly to ensure certainty and transparency in
transactions relating to immovable property and if the Respondent
authorities are permitted to act arbitrarily and deny the Registration of
the document of the Petitioner then the very object of the Registration
Act would be defeated inspite of the cases where the title is undisputed
and has vested by operation of law. It was submitted that the authorities
have failed to discharge their statutory duties and have acted in defiance
of binding orders passed by BIFR, which continue to operate and bind
the parties.
12. In conclusion, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the
petitioner has established a complete and satisfactory explanation for the
entire period in question, and there is neither negligence nor lack of bona
fides on its part. The delay, if any, stands fully accounted for and is
liable to be excluded in law. It was therefore prayed that this Court, in
exercise of its writ jurisdiction, be pleased to direct the Respondent
authorities to accept and register the BIFR orders along with the
declaration-cum-indemnity and to grant consequential reliefs, as sought
in the Petition.
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13. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the
Respondent authorities, advanced detailed submissions, both oral and
written, opposing the reliefs sought by the Petitioner. At the outset, it
was contended that Part IV of the Registration Act, 1908 specifically
governs the aspect of “time of presentation” of documents for
registration. Reliance was placed upon Sections 23 and Section 25 of the
said enactment to submit that the statutory scheme is clear and
mandatory in nature. It was urged that every document required to be
registered must ordinarily be presented before the competent registering
authority within a period of four months from the date of its execution.
The statute, in limited circumstances such as urgent necessity or
unavoidable accident, permits an extension of a further four months,
subject to payment of the prescribed fine. However, beyond this
aggregate outer limit of eight months, the statute does not contemplate or
confer any power upon the registering authority to accept a document for
registration. It was thus emphatically submitted that the legislative intent
makes no scope for discretion beyond the prescribed time limit
boundary.
14. In support of the above proposition, reliance was placed
2
upon the decision in Atul Projects Pvt Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra ,
2 Writ Petition (L) No.12995 of 2024.
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particularly Paragraph Nos. 19 to 24 thereof, wherein the Court has
reiterated the mandatory character of the limitation prescribed under the
Registration Act. It was further submitted that the limitation period
contemplated under the statute is with respect to the presentation of the
document and not the Act of Registration per se. Once a document is
validly presented within time, then its subsequent registration may occur
at a later stage. For this proposition, reliance was placed on the
3
judgment in Shama Charan Das vs. Joyenoolah , wherein it is held that,
upon proper presentation, the running of limitation ceases or stops.
15. The learned Counsel for the Respondents then addressed the
Petitioner’s contention that the document could not have been presented
for registration in the absence of proper stamping. This submission was
strongly refuted as being contrary to the statutory framework,
particularly placing reliance on Rule 46 of the Maharashtra Stamp Rules,
1961. It was argued that the said rule explicitly provides the procedure to
be followed where an insufficiently stamped document is presented for
registration. In such a case, the registering officer is obliged to impound
the document under the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 or the
Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, and thereafter follow the prescribed
procedure, including making necessary endorsements under Rules 39
3 (1885) ILR 11 Cal 750
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and 43 read with Section 58 of the Registration Act, before forwarding
the document to the Collector for adjudication. It was emphasized that
the statute does not prohibit presentation of an inadequately stamped
document; rather, it provides a complete mechanism for its
regularisation. Therefore, according to the Respondents, there was no
legal impediment preventing the Petitioner from presenting the
document within the prescribed period, and had such presentation been
made, the limitation would have stood arrested.
16. The Respondents’ Counsel further submitted that our Court,
in catena of decisions, has carved out a limited exception to the rigid
timelines prescribed under the Registration Act by excluding periods
during which the delay is attributable to impossibility or to acts of the
Court or statutory authorities. According to him this principle is founded
upon well-settled maxims, namely actus curiae neminem gravabit and
lex non cogit ad impossibilia . In Support of this contention, reliance was
placed upon the following decisions :-
1. Nestor Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra,
2. Kirti Mulani vs. State of Maharashtra,
3. Purnima Bhanuprasad Gohil vs. State of Maharashtra, and
4. Grand Centrum Realty LLP vs. State of Maharashtra.
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17. Accordingly, the learned Counsel argued that such
exclusion is permissible only to the extent of the actual period during
which the matter remained pending before the competent authority for
adjudication, and not beyond. Applying the above principles to the facts
of the present case, the learned Counsel submitted that the BIFR order
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dated 11 January, 2007 was required to be presented for registration
within the statutory period. Though an application for adjudication of
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stamp duty was filed on or about 13 June, 2007, the adjudication
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culminated in an order dated 18 December, 2015. He Further
emphasized that the Petitioner admittedly did not challenge the said
adjudication order for nearly nine years. The period between 2015 and
2024, during which no proceedings were pending before the stamp
authorities, cannot be excluded for the purpose of computing limitation.
The Petitioner’s subsequent challenge to the adjudication order, initiated
only in 2024, was characterised as belated, misconceived, and lacking in
bonafides. It was further pointed out that even earlier proceedings
initiated in 2019 did not assail the adjudication order, thereby
demonstrating a clear lack of diligence on the part of the Petitioner. It
was then contended that although the appellate authority ultimately set
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aside the adjudication order on 8 July, 2024, such condonation of delay
in filing the Appeal does not create any legal fiction whereby the Appeal
is deemed to have been filed within the original limitation period. The
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effect of condonation, it was submitted, is merely to revive the remedy;
it does not obliterate the intervening period of inaction nor render it non
est in law. Consequently, there was, in fact, no adjudication proceeding
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pending between 18 December, 2015 and May 2024, and this entire
period must be counted against the Petitioner.
18. The Respondents further disputed the Petitioner’s assertion
regarding the date of presentation of the document. It was submitted that
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the claim of the Petitioner about presentation on 22 August, 2024 is not
borne out by any contemporaneous record. On the contrary, the official
inward register and token records maintained by the registering authority
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indicate that the document was presented only on 25 October, 2024. In
the absence of cogent evidence to the contrary, the latter date must be
accepted. Reliance in this regard was placed upon Snehanjali
Electronics and Trading Pvt. Ltd. vs. Inspector of General of
4
Registration and Controller of Stamps and Ors. wherein the Court
recognised the written application date as determinative of presentation.
19. In conclusion, the learned Advocate for the Respondents
submitted that the Petitioner has been grossly negligent and has failed to
pursue available remedies within the prescribed time. The delay in the
4 (2017) SCC Online Bom 6755 (DB)
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present case is neither bonafide nor beyond the control of the Petitioner.
It was urged that equitable considerations cannot override explicit
statutory mandates. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj & Anr. vs. Special Land
5
Acquisition Officer , particularly Paragraph No.12, to submit that
limitation provisions must be applied with full rigour, irrespective of
hardship or inconvenience. It was thus contended that this Court lacks
the jurisdiction to extend limitation on equitable grounds, and
accordingly, the Writ Petition deserves to be dismissed.
20. Having considered the rival submissions and upon taking
into consideration the factual aspect it is clear that the controversy must
be resolved not merely on a literal application of statutory timelines, but
on a principled synthesis of constitutional discipline, statutory hierarchy,
and the jurisprudence governing period of limitation in such cases.
21. At the outset, we are of the opinion that the impugned
action must firstly, withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. The discipline of non-arbitrariness is not a formal
requirement but it is a substantive constitutional command. In Kumari
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Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others ,
5 (2013) 14 SCC 81
6 (1991) 1 SCC 212
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the Hon’ble Supreme Court authoritatively held that every State action
must be informed by reason and must eschew arbitrariness, the ratio
being that arbitrariness is the very antithesis of equality. This principle
was constitutionally deepened in the case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union
7
of India and Another , where it was held that procedure established by
law must be just, fair, and reasonable, and not arbitrary, fanciful or
oppressive. Again the emerging principle is that statutory interpretation
cannot be divorced from its consequences, particularly where those
consequences are shaped by the conduct of the State itself. Viewed in
this light of Constitution Principles, the refusal of registration in the
present case cannot be assessed in isolation. The State, having failed to
comply with binding statutory directions and having compelled the
Petitioner to undergo prolonged adjudicatory processes, cannot
subsequently permitted to invoke period of limitation as a bar for getting
the document of the Petitioner registered in accordance with the
Registration Act. To countenance such a position would be to legitimize
State-induced prejudice which constitutional doctrine does not permit.
22. The principle that a party cannot take advantage of its own
wrong is a foundational equitable doctrine which is equally applicable in
public law along with Administrative Law. In Union of India and
7 (1978) 1 SCC 248
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Others vs. Major General Madan Lal Yadav (Retd.) , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court thus has held that a party responsible for delay cannot
rely upon that delay to defeat the rights of the opposite party. Thus, in
clear terms the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that equity does not permit
a litigant, particularly the State, to derive advantage from its own default.
In the present case, the delay is not merely incidental but it is structurally
attributable to the conduct of the State authorities themselves. The
invocation of limitation in such circumstances is therefore legally
untenable.
23. The second limb of analysis concerns the statutory
framework under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions)
Act, 1985. The Record admittedly indicates that the document in
question is not ordinary instrument which is executed between two
parties but an order passed by the competent tribunal BIFR under the
Central Legislation thereby sanctioning the revival cum demerger
scheme by which, the subject immovable properties stood transferred to
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the Petitioner with retrospective effect from 1 April, 2006. Once this is
the factual position then Section 32 of SICA Act come in operation,
which confers overriding effect upon a sanctioned scheme,
notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law. In
8 (1996) 4 SCC 127
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Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others vs. Corromandal
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Pharmaceuticals and Others , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a
sanctioned scheme prevails over all other enactments to the extent of
inconsistency. This judgment clearly holds that the legislative intent
underlying SICA is to ensure that revival mechanisms are not defeated
by procedural or fiscal impediments. This principle was reaffirmed in
10
Raheja Universal Limited vs. NRC Limited and Others , wherein the
Court held that a sanctioned scheme is binding on all stakeholders,
including State authorities, and must be implemented in its entirety. The
series of Dictums thus underscores the supremacy and binding force of
such schemes. The consequence in the present case is therefore evident
that once the scheme mandated vesting and directed the State to act in a
particular manner, the authorities were under a statutory obligation to
give effect to it. Their prolonged inaction of not registering the document
for one or the other reason cannot dilute the legal efficacy of the scheme.
24. The third and determinative issue pertains to period of
limitation under the Registration Act, 1908. Section 23 and Section 25
prescribe the period within which a document is required to be
presented. Section 23 and Section 25 are reproduced as below :-
9 (1997) 10 SCC 649
10 (2012) 4 SCC 148
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23. Time for presenting documents:- Subject to the
provisions contained in section 24, 25 and 26, no
document other than a will shall be accepted for
registration unless presented for that purpose to the
proper officer within four months from the date of its
execution:
Provided that a copy of a decree or order may be
presented within four months from the day on which the
decree or order was made, or, where it is applicable
within four months from the day on which it becomes
final.
23A. Re-registration of certain documents:-
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
this Act, if in any case a document requiring
registration has been accepted for registration by a
Registrar or Sub-Registrar from a person not duly
empowered to present the same, and has been
registered, any person claiming under such document
may, within four months from his first becoming aware
that the registration of such document is invalid,
present such document or cause the same to be
presented, in accordance with the provisions of Part VI
for re -registration in the office of the Registrar of the
District in which the document was originally
registered; and upon the Registrar being satisfied that
the document was so accepted for registration from a
person not duly empowered to present the same, he
shall proceed to the re - registration of the document as
if it had not been previously registered, and as if such
presentation for re-registration was a presentation for
registration made within the time allowed therefore
under Part IV, and all the provisions of this Act, as to
registration of documents, shall apply to such re-
registration; and such document, if duly re-registered
in accordance with the provisions of this section, shall
be deemed to have been duly registered for all purposes
from the date of its original registration:
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Provided that, within three months from the twelfth day
of September 1917, any person claiming under a
document to which this section applies may present the
same or cause the same to be presented for re -
registration in accordance with this section, whatever
may have been the time when he first became aware
that the registration of the document was invalid.
25. Provision where delay in presentation is
unavoidable:-
(1) If, owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable
accident, any document executed, or copy of a decree
or order made, in India is not presented for registration
till after the expiration of the time hereinbefore
prescribed in that behalf, the Registrar in cases where
the delay in presentation does not exceed four months,
may direct that, on payment of a fine not exceeding ten
times the amount of the proper registration – fee, such
document shall be accepted for registration.
(2) Any application for such direction may be lodged
with a Sub-Registrar, who shall forth-with forward it to
the Registrar to whom he is subordinate.
25. Before considering these two Sections it is necessary to
consider the jurisprudence on the subject of period of limitation, which
in our view has consistently evolved to recognise that limitation cannot
be computed in abstraction from legal capability.
26. In Nestor Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs.
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State of Maharashtra and Ors. , a Division Bench of this Court held
11 (2015) SCC Online Bom 3480 (DB)
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that the period spent in adjudication of stamp duty must be excluded
while computing limitation. Thus, this judgment clarifies that a
document which is not duly stamped is incapable of lawful registration,
and therefore limitation cannot run during a period when the law itself
prohibits registration.
27. This principle was reiterated in Snehanjali Electronics and
Trading Private Limited (supra), where it was held that delay attributable
to statutory adjudication processes cannot prejudice the party seeking
registration. This judgment emphasises that such time must necessarily
be excluded.
28. The position has been restated with clarity in Purnima
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Bhanuprasad Gohil vs. State of Maharashtra and Others , wherein it
was held that limitation begins only when the document becomes
capable of lawful registration, that is to say, upon completion of stamp
adjudication. These decisions, when read together, establish that
limitation under the Registration Act is not a rigid or mechanical
computation of time, but must yield to the legal impossibility of
registration. Therefore the legal maxim referred by the Respondent in
his written submission “ lex non cogit ad impossibilia” infact supports
12 (2024) SCC Online Bom 3185
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the case of the Petitioner. The above doctrine was considered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul
13
Khayumsab vs Mr. Kumar & Ors. , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme
Court recognised the applicability of this maxim by referring to the
earlier judgments and held that the law does not compel a person
performing an act which is impossible. Applying the said principle to
the present case, the Petitioner cannot be penalised for not presenting the
document through a period when, owing to pending stamp adjudication
and the conduct of the statutory authorities due to which lawful
registration was not practical or legal possible.
29. This principle when applied to the present case, where
registration was legally impermissible pending adjudication, the law
cannot penalise the Petitioner for not performing an act which could not
have been lawfully done. Therefore, the submission of the Respondents
that the Petitioner ought to have presented the document in an unstamped
form cannot be accepted. While such a course may be permissible in a
routine case, it cannot be elevated into a mandatory obligation in the
present case particularly when the very basis of stamp liability was under
contest and the State itself was asserting inconsistent positions. It has to
be endorsed that judicial reasoning cannot compel procedural formalism
13 2006 (1) SCC 46
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at the cost of substantive justice. The reliance therefore placed by the
learned Advocate for the Respondent on the judgment of Basawaraj and
Another (supra), is therefore completely misplaced. In the Case of
Basawaraj and Another (supra) it is held that delay attributable to
negligence or inaction cannot be condoned. The present case stands on a
fundamentally different footing, it is not a case of negligence or in-action
on the part of the Petitioner but here is the case where the delay is
institutional and State-induced. The doctrinal basis of Basawaraj and
Another (supra) is therefore inapplicable.
30. One more argument of the Petitioner that requires
consideration is the argument of Doctrine of merger, which further
fortifies the Petitioner’s case. While considering and applying this
Doctrine in Kunhayammed and Others vs. State of Kerala and
14
Another , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held, that once an appellate
authority passes an order, the original order merges into it and ceases to
have independent existence. The ratio of this judgment is that the
operative order is the appellate order. Consequently, the first
th
adjudication order in the present case dated 18 December, 2015 must
th
be regarded as having merged into the appellate order dated 8 July,
2024, and the document became legally capable of registration only
14 (2000) 6 SCC 359
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thereafter. The contention of the Respondents Advocate that original
th
adjudication order dated 18 July, 2015 was never challenged for almost
nine years and hence that period cannot be excluded is completely
misplaced for the reason that the order of final adjudication by the
appellate Authority was delivered in July 2024 thereby setting aside the
th
order dated 18 December, 2015 and hence the first adjudication order
gets merged in the final adjudication order of Appellate authority.
31. Thus, when viewed cumulatively on all the above referred
premises and legal positions, along with a factual chronology reveals a
consistent pattern of diligence on the part of the Petitioner and
corresponding inaction on the part of the State. The delay stands fully
explained and is legally excludable. The refusal of registration is
therefore not merely erroneous in law but also arbitrary in its effect.
32. Thus, in our considered view, the period under Section 23
and Section 25 of the Registration Act must be computed from the date
on which the document became capable of lawful registration, namely
th
upon final adjudication of stamp duty on 8 July, 2024 or, at the latest,
nd
upon issuance of the certificate on 2 August, 2024. The presentation
thereafter is clearly within limitation. Even otherwise, any marginal
delay stands sufficiently explained in the facts of the present case.
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33. Hence, we proceed to pass following Order :-
ORDER
(i) The Writ Petition is allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and
(b), subject to the clarification recorded above.
(ii) Respondent Nos. 4 and 5, or the competent Registering authority,
th
shall accept for registration the BIFR sanctioned scheme/order dated 26
rd
February, 2007, the order dated 3 January, 2013, and the declaration-
th
cum-indemnity dated 28 November, 2024, along with all annexures
required in law.
(iii) The Registering authority shall not refuse registration on the
ground that the document is beyond the period prescribed under Section
23 and Section 25 of the Registration Act, 1908.
(iv) The time consumed in adjudication of stamp duty, connected
proceedings before statutory authorities, and proceedings arising from
the dispute regarding proper stamp duty shall stand excluded for the
purpose of computing the period of presentation.
(v) The Registering authority shall complete the process of
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registration in accordance with law within four weeks from the date the
Petitioner presents the documents along with a copy of this order and
complies with all procedural requirements.
(vi) The petitioner is granted liberty to adopt appropriate proceedings
in accordance with law if the revenue authorities refuse mutation or
decline to act upon the registered document.
(vii) Rule is made absolute in the above terms .
(viii) No order as to costs.
34. In view of disposal of the Petition, pending Interim
Application would not survive and stands disposed off .
(HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, J.) (RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.)
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