R.SOKKU vs THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

2026:MHC:4435
WP No. 38941 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 30-10-2026
CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE C.KUMARAPPAN
WP No. 38941 of 2024
CNR:{HCMA012383652024}
and
WMP No.42179 of 2024
1. R.Sokku
2. E. Munusamy
3. V. Vadivelu
4. M. Manickam
5. P. Velayutham
6. M. Subramanian
7. M.Mathias
8. K.Chitrambalam
9. T.Kanniyammal
10.J. Ranjitham
11.R.Amutha
..Petitioner(s)
Vs
1. The Additional Chief Secretary to Government,
Water Resource Department,
Secretariat, Fort St.George,
Chennai 600 009.
2. The Principal Secretary to Government,
Finance Department, Secretariat,
Fort St.George, Chennai 600 009.
3. Engineer In Chief (WRD) /Chief Engineer General,
Water Resource Department,
Chepauk, Chennai 600 005.
..Respondent(s)
Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying
to issue a Writ of Certiorarifed Mandamus, to call for the records relating to the
impugned order passed by the 1st respondent in Letter No. 4085/C2/2023 dated
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21.11.2024 and quash the same and consequently directing the respondents to
implement the Revised Pay Scales of Pay, 2009 as per the recommendations of
One Man Commission and sanctioned by the Govt. in G.O. Ms. No. 338
Finance (Pay Cell) Department dated 26.08.2010 and Govt. in G.O.Ms. No.325
Finance (Pay Cell) Department dated 22.07.2013 and as per the guidelines and
recommendations issued subsequently in the various Government Notifications
in favour of the petitioners considering their services rendered by them without
any promotional avenues and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law
within a reasonable time as fixed by this Court.
For Petitioner(s): Mr.L.P.Shanmugasundaram
For Respondent(s): Mr.S.Kumaresan,
Additional Advocate General
assisted by
Mr.V.Sivalingam,
Government Advocate
ORDER
This Writ Petition has been filed challenging the impugned order dated
21.11.2024 passed by the first respondent.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the
petitioners retired from service as Time Keepers in the Public Works
Department/Water Resources Department, after serving for more than 25 years,
without any promotional avenues or additional benefits. It is also his contention
that the petitioners were not extended the revised pay scales as per the
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recommendations of the One Man Commission, sanctioned under
G.O.Ms.No.338, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 26.08.2010, and
G.O.Ms.No.325, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 22.07.2013. The learned
counsel would contend that, in accordance with G.O.Ms.No.338, the
Government recommended the revision of pay scales and redesignation of
technical categories under the category of Skilled Assistant Grade-II. Since the
petitioners belong to the category of Skilled Assistant Grade-II, they are entitled
to the Selection Grade and Special Grade pay scales of Rs.9,300–34,800 +
Grade Pay of Rs.4,200.
2.1. He would further submit that, though such revision of pay was
extended through Government Letter (Ms).No.4 dated 06.01.2021, the
designation of Time Keeper was omitted from the tabular column due to a
typographical error, which resulted in administrative confusion. In this regard,
the Chief Engineer and Assistant Executive Engineer had issued a letter dated
05.05.2014; however, the authorities had not revised the pay scale. The learned
counsel for the petitioners would submit that they had submitted various
representations and had also filed W.P.No.21315 of 2023 seeking consideration
of their representations. However, the respondents, after considering the
representations submitted by the petitioners, rejected the same by way of the
impugned order dated 21.11.2024. It is the contention of the learned counsel for
the petitioners that, whenever a pay scale is fixed, the normal rule is that
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identically situated persons should be treated alike by extending similar
benefits. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar
Srivastava , reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 .
3. Per contra, the aforesaid contentions were stoutly opposed by the
learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents and would
contend that the prescribed qualification for the post of Time Keeper is a pass in
SSLC. Out of the 21 posts referred to in Government Letter (Ms).No.4 dated
06.01.2021, only 13 categories of trade posts requiring ITI qualification
satisfied the criteria prescribed for trade posts. It is the further contention of the
learned Additional Advocate General that, since the petitioners had failed in
SSLC, their services were regularised by relaxing the relevant rules. He would
also contend that, by Government Letter dated 11.05.2023, the Government had
explicitly clarified that the post of Time Keeper is not a trade post. Therefore,
the petitioners cannot be categorised as Skilled Assistants.
3.1. He would further submit that, pursuant to the directions issued by this
Court, after hearing the petitioners, the impugned order was passed and,
therefore, there are no grounds to interfere with the same. It is also the
contention of the learned Additional Advocate General that the petitioners
retired from service between 2008 and 2019 and that there was an inordinate
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delay in approaching this Court. Therefore, notwithstanding the merits of the
claim, the present Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed even on the ground of
delay and laches.
4. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made on
either side.
5. The short point that arises for consideration in the present case is
whether the petitioners can be categorised as a cadre belonging to a trade post
and as Skilled Assistants.
6. Though the petitioners seek revision of their pay scales, it is an
admitted fact that, under Government Letter (Ms).No.4 dated 06.01.2021, the
Government had directed the respective departments to extend the revision of
pay scales only to 13 categories of posts, wherein the post of Time Keeper was
not included. Though the learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that
the omission was only due to a typographical error, unless the said Government
Letter is brought under challenge, the question of treating the omission as a
typographical error, particularly in the exercise of judicial review, does not
arise.
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7. In the present case, the specific stand of the petitioners is that the
revision of pay scales ought to be applicable to Skilled Assistants, and that the
petitioners belong to the said category. However, the petitioners have not
established that they are Skilled Assistants. When the Government has taken
such a specific stand and has clarified its position through Government Letter
(Ms).No.4 dated 06.01.2021, and when there are no materials to establish a
contrary position, this Court is of the firm view that there are no grounds to
interfere with the impugned order.
8. Though the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arvind Kumar Srivastava (cited
supra), this Court is of the firm view that the said judgment is not applicable to
the facts of the present case, as the Government has clarified that the Time
Keepers are not entitled to the revision of pay scales sought for, and the said
Government Letter has not been challenged. Furthermore, as rightly contended
by the learned Additional Advocate General, the present Writ Petition is also
liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The petitioners retired
from service long ago. Though they had been submitting representations, this
Court is of the firm view that the inordinate delay in approaching this Court
would, in any event, render their claim liable to be rejected on the ground of
delay and laches.
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9. In this regard, it would be useful to refer to the following judgments.
For ready reference, the same are extracted one after another:-
(a) In M.Samuel Satyendranath Vs. State Bank of India (W.P.No.39494
of 2015 dated 17.08.2023), the relevant portion is extracted hereunder:-
“12. In this regard, the learned counsel for the respondents
relied upon the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India
reported in 2014 4 SCC 108 in the case of Chennai Metropolitan
Water Supply and Sewarage Board and others Vs T.T.Murali Babu,
wherein held as follows:-
“In the case at hand, though there has been four years’
delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to
address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether
such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification.
That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains
more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely
careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the
responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext
of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that
remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the
cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is
likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’
ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation
which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated
to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give
indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with
‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our
considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence
and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown
the petition overboard at the very threshold.”
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(b) In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs.
T.T.Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 , which reads as follows:-
“15. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR
1987 SC 251] the Court observed that: (SCC p. 594, para 24)
“24. … it is well settled that the power of the High
Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the
exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy
and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic.”
It has been further stated therein that: (Nandlal Jaiswal case
[(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] , SCC p. 594, para 24)
“24. … If there is inordinate delay on the part of the
petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ
jurisdiction.”
Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating
that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction
at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring in injustice.”
(c) In C.Jacob Vs. Director of Geology & Mining reported in (2008) 10
SCC 115, which reads as follows:-
“13. Where an employee unauthorisedly absents himself
and suddenly appears after 20 years and demands that he should
be taken back and approaches the court, the department naturally
will not or may not have any record relating to the employee at
that distance of time. In such cases, when the employer fails to
produce the records of the enquiry and the order of
dismissal/removal, court cannot draw an adverse inference
against the employer for not producing records, nor direct
reinstatement with back wages for 20 years, ignoring the
cessation of service or the lucrative alternative employment of the
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employee. Misplaced sympathy in such matters will encourage
indiscipline, lead to unjust enrichment of the employee at fault
and result in drain of public exchequer. Many a time there is also
no application of mind as to the extent of financial burden, as a
result of a routine order for back wages.”
(d) In State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar reported in (1995) 4 SCC
683, the relevant portion is extracted hereunder:-
“25. In our view, the above allegation is in no way sufficient to
hold that the writ petitioner (respondent here) has explained
properly and satisfactorily the undue delay of 20 years which had
occurred between the alleged taking of possession of his land and
the date of filing of writ petition in the High Court. We cannot
overlook the fact that it is easy to make such kind of allegations
against anybody that too against the State. When such general
allegation is made against a State in relation to an event said to
have occurred 20 years earlier, and the State's non-compliance with
petitioner's demands, the State may not at all be in a position to
dispute such allegation, having regard to the manner in which it is
required to carry on its governmental functions. Undue delay of 20
years on the part of the writ petitioner, in invoking the High Court's
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for
grant of compensation to his land alleged to have been taken by the
governmental agencies, would suggest that his land was not taken
at all, or if it had been taken it could not have been taken without
his consent or if it was taken against his consent he had acquiesced
in such taking and waived his right to take compensation for it.
(e) In State of M.P. Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal reported in (1986) 4 SCC 566,
which reads as follows:-
“24. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court
to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise
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of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the
indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ
petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High
Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of
its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay
is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not
ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion
and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices.
The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ
jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after
unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only
hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties.
When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights
in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs
with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such
jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this
judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where
it has been emphasised time and again that where there is
inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are
created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline
to interfere, even if the State action complained of is
unconstitutional or illegal. We may only mention in the passing
two decisions of this Court one in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v.
International Airport Authority of India [(1979) 3 SCC 489 :
AIR 1979 SC 1628 : (1979) 3 SCR 1014] and the other in Ashok
Kumar Mishra v. Collector [(1980) 1 SCC 180 : AIR 1980 SC
112 : (1980) 1 SCR 491] . We may point out that in R.D. Shetty
case, even though the State action was held to be
unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution, this Court refused to grant relief to the petitioner
on the ground that the writ petition had been filed by the
petitioner more than five months after the acceptance of the
tender of the fourth respondent and during that period, the
fourth respondent had incurred considerable expenditure,
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aggregating to about Rs 1.25 lakhs, in making arrangements for
putting up the restaurant and the snack bar. Of course, this rule
of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a strait
jacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and
creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the
exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the
petitioner. But, such cases where the demand of justice is so
compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in
spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their
very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a
matter within the discretion of the court; ex hypothesi every
discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote
justice and not to defeat it.
(f) In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Shri Balwant
Regular Motor Service reported in 1968 SCC OnLine SC 54, which reads as
follows:-
“11. In any event, we are satisfied that it is not open to the
private operators including Respondent 1 to apply for a writ in the
nature of certiorari for quashing the order of the RTA dated September
10/11, 1965 in view of their conduct. It is not disputed that the private
operators including Respondent 1 were present in the meeting of the
RTA held on September 10/11, 1965 either personally or through duly
appointed Counsel. Respondent 1 and the other private operators
assured the RTA at the hearing that they would withdraw the writ
petitions pending in the High Court. On such assurances, and subject to
the actual withdrawal of the writ petitions in terms of the assurance, the
RTA considered the matter in the said meeting and after hearing the
parties, made an order giving effect to the compromise. It is obvious
that the private operators including Respondent 1 were parties to the
order dated September 10/11, 1965, had accepted that order, acted
upon it and derived benefits and advantages from it for nearly one year
and 9 months. But for the said order which suspended the operation of
the permit of the appellant till July 1, 1967 the private operators
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including Respondent 1 could not have got temporary permits to
operate on the same routes as no stage carriage permits could be issued
under Section 62 of the Act during the subsistence of substantive
permits. In these circumstances we consider that there was such
acquiescence in the RTA's order dated September 10/11, 1965 on the
part of Respondent 1 and other private operators as to disentitle them to
a grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is well-
established that the writ of certiorari will not be granted in a case
where there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant
to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and
other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party. The
principle is to a great extent, similar to though not identical with the
exercise of discretion in the Court of Chancery. The principle has been
clearly stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v.
Prosper Armstrong Hurd. Abram Farewall, and John Kemp4 as
follows:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to
a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded
upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by
any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried
upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and
the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking
the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
This passage was cited with approval by this Court in a recent case —
Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial court, Bombay5.
In our opinion, the principle of this decision applies to the present case
and since Respondent 1 and the other private operators had not even
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pleaded any circumstances justifying the delay or their conduct, the
High Court was in error in granting a writ of certiorari in their
favour.”
10. In view of the aforesaid position, this Court does not find any merit in
the present Writ Petition. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. Consequently, the
connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No costs.
30-10-2026
2/2
Index: Yes
Speaking order
Neutral Citation: Yes
KV
To
1. The Additional Chief Secretary to Government,
Water Resource Department,
Secretariat, Fort St.George,
Chennai 600 009.
2. The Principal Secretary to Government,
Finance Department, Secretariat,
Fort St.George, Chennai 600 009.
3. Engineer In Chief (WRD) /Chief Engineer General,
Water Resource Department,
Chepauk, Chennai 600 005.
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2026:MHC:4435
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C.KUMARAPPAN J.
KV
WP No. 38941 of 2024
30-10-2026
2/2
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