SANDEEP NIRANKARI vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
- Court
- Chhattisgarh High Court
1
2026:CGHC:26196
AFR
Digitally
signed by
YOGESH
TIWARI
Date:
2026.06.30
18:32:44
+0530
YOGESH
TIWARI
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order Reserved on : 13.05.2026
Order Delivered on : 29.06.2026
WPC No. 2479 of 2026
1 - Sandeep Nirankari S/o Late Bhajan Singh Aged About 57 Years R/o
B 37-38, Phase 2, Surya Vihar, Junwani, Ward No. 2, Bhilai, District -
Durg Chhattisgarh
2 - Aditya Singh S/o Akhilesh Singh Aged About 36 Years R/o 53/10,
Radhika Nagar, Supela, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
3 - Chandrashekhar Gavai S/o Sampatrao Gavai Aged About 60 Years
R/o House No. 294, Laxmi Nagar, Ward No. 10, Supela, Bhilai, District
Durg Chhattisgarh
4 - Girwar Banti Sahu S/o M.R. Sahu Aged About 40 Years R/o Ward
No. 12, Bajrang Para, Kohka, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
5 - Smt. Anju Sinha W/o Suman Sagar Sinha Aged About 33 Years R/o
Sirsa Road, Sinha Complex, Bhatapara, Kohka, Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
6 - Lalchand Verma S/o Late Jhumuk Lal Verma Aged About 59 Years
R/o Ramnagar, Supela, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
7 - Abhishek Mishra S/o Radhekant Mishra Aged About 32 Years R/o
House No. 1066, Road No. 20, Shanti Nagar, Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
8 - Keshav Chaubey S/o Late Bahoran Chaubey Aged About 54 Years
R/o Purani Basti, Subhash Chowk, Supela Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
9 - Smt. Neha Sahu W/o T.K. Sahu Aged About 31 Years R/o Plot No.
4, Kailash Nagar, Kurud Industrial Area, Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
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10 - Smt. Usha Sharma W/o Vinay Sharma Aged About 31 Years R/o
Ghasidas Nagar, Near Jamul Police Station, Ward No. 23, Bhilai,
District Durg Chhattisgarh
11 - Smt. Sharda Rai W/o S.P. Rai Aged About 66 Years R/o Block No.
14 C, Camp-1, Ward No. 28, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
12 - Abdul Mannan S/o Late Ghaffar Mohammad Aged About 27 Years
R/o Near Janta Vidyalaya, Camp-2, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
13 - Suresh Kumar Verma S/o Late Hemraj Verma Aged About 58
Years R/o House No. 10-D, Road No. 10, Sector-3, Khursipar Bhilai,
District Durg Chhattisgarh
14 - Smt. Nemin Sahu W/o Basant Kumar Sahu Aged About 52 Years
R/o House No. 31-F, Road No. 3, Sector-2, Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
15 - Smt. Sadhana Singh W/o Mukesh Kumar Sahu Aged About 39
Years R/o House No. 14-A, Road No. 5, Sector-2, Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
16 - Smt. Rita Singh Gera W/o Ramesh Chandra Singh Aged About 58
Years R/o L.I.G., Vaishali Nagar, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
17 - K. Jagdish Kumar S/o K. Koteshwar Rao Aged About 31 Years R/o
Near Ganesh Temple, Sector 11, Zone-3, Khursipar Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
18 - Bhupendra Kumar Yadav S/o Late Janak Lal Yadav Aged About 42
Years R/o Bihari Colony, Near Oba Durga Temple, New Khursipar
Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
19 - Shubham Kumar Jha S/o Gunanand Jha Aged About 30 Years R/o
House No. 6/b, Road No. 5, Zone 3, Sector 11, Khursipar Bhilai, District
Durg Chhattisgarh
20 - Smt. M. Lakshmi W/o M. Apparao Aged About 48 Years R/o House
No. 196, Ekta Nagar, Zone 2, Sector 11, Ward No. 34, Khursipar Bhilai,
District Durg Chhattisgarh
21 - Smt. D. Sujata W/o D. Kamraju Aged About 50 Years R/o House
No. 1G, Street 37, Zone 2, Sector 11, Khursipar Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
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22 - Rajesh Chaudhary S/o Late Prahlad Chaudhary Aged About 51
Years R/o House No. 16b, Road No. 14, Sector 4, Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
23 - Akansh Banchhor S/o Omprakash Banchhor Aged About 38 Years
R/o Above Shop No. 04, Sector 04-A Market, Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
24 - Neeraj Pal Verma S/o Late Satpal Verma Aged About 58 Years R/o
Shop No. 55, Sector-5 Market, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
25 - Sevan Kumar S/o Late Harichandra Thakur Aged About 34 Years
R/o House No. 4/a, Street 11, Sector - 6, Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
26 - Smt. Malti Thakur W/o Rakesh Singh Thakur Aged About 44 Years
R/o Quarter No. 4 A, Road No. 65, Sector 6, Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
27 - Saket Chandrakar S/o Onkar Singh Chandrakar Aged About 46
Years R/o Quarter No. 5a, Road No. 70, Sector 6, Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
28 - Abhay Kumar Soni S/o Late H.P. Soni Aged About 67 Years R/o
Quarter No. 7B, Road No. 17, Sector 10, Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
29 - Laxmipati Raju S/o Y. Ramlu Aged About 55 Years R/o Quarter No.
10b, Road No. 18, Sector 7, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
30 - Umesh Kumar Sahu S/o Late Laxman Sahu Aged About 38 Years
R/o Quarter No. 12 A, Road No. 21 A, Sector 7, Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
31 - Komaldas Tandon S/o Late Bisahat Tandon Aged About 47 Years
R/o Quarter No. 3/4, Road No. 9, Ward No. 69, Hospital Sector 9,
Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
32 - Shiju Anthony S/o B.C. Anthony Aged About 57 Years R/o M I G-
1/368, Amadi Nagar, H.U.D.C.O., Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
... Petitioners
versus
4
1 - State of Chhattisgarh through Secretary Urban Administration And
Development Department Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya, Atal Nagar
Nava Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh
2 - The Secretary General Administration Department Mahanadi
Bhawan Mantralaya, Atal Nagar Nava Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh
3 - Collector Durg District Durg Chhattisgarh
4 - Municipal Corporation Bhilai through Secretary (petition is against
the actions of the Commissioner hence through Secretory party is
made) District Durg Chhattisgarh
5 - Rajiv Pandey holding the post of Commissioner Municipal
Corporation Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh.
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioners : Mr. Satish Chandra Verma, Senior
Advocate assisted by Mr. Manharan Lal
Sahu and Mohammad Naqeeb,
Advocates
For State : Mr. Anand Dadariya, Deputy Advocate
General
Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
C A V Order
1. Heard Mr. Satish Chandra Verma, learned Senior Advocate
assisted by Mr. Manharan Lal Sahu and Mohammad Naqeeb,
learned counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as Mr. Anand
Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the
State.
2. By filing the present writ petition, the Petitioners have assailed the
inaction and failure of the Respondent Authorities in giving effect
5
to the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 passed by the General Body
of the Municipal Corporation under Section 54 of the Municipal
Corporation Act, 1956 (for short, ‘the Act, 1956’) whereby more
than two-third of the elected Councillors expressed their lack of
confidence in the functioning of the Commissioner and resolved
that he be removed from his official position. The grievance of the
Petitioners is that despite the Resolution having been passed in
accordance with the statutory provisions and democratic mandate
of the elected body, the State Authorities have neither taken any
decision thereon nor passed any consequential order, thereby
permitting the Commissioner to continue in office contrary to law.
3. The Petitioners further challenge the continued functioning of the
Commissioner after the aforesaid Resolution as being wholly
arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the object and scheme of Section
54 of the Act, 1956. According to the Petitioners, the failure of the
Respondent Authorities to act upon the Resolution has rendered
the democratic will of the elected representatives nugatory and
has adversely affected the administration of the Municipal
Corporation. It is, therefore, prayed that this Court may issue
appropriate writs, orders and directions commanding the
Respondent Authorities to take a decision on and implement the
Resolution dated 25.03.2026 within a time-bound manner and to
restrain the Commissioner from exercising powers inconsistent
with the mandate of the elected body of the Municipal
Corporation. The petitioners have prayed for following relief(s) :-
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“a. That this Hon'ble court may be kind enough
to issue the writ in nature of Mandamus,
certiorari or any other likewise writ commanding
and directing the Respondent's to forthwith
remove the present commissioner of the
Municipal Commissioner of Bhilai and appoint
any appropriate Honest and dignified officer.
b. That this Hon'ble court may be kind enough
to issue the writ in nature of Mandamus,
certiorari or any other likewise writ commanding
and directing Respondent's to forthwith act
upon and implement the Resolution dated
25.03.2026 passed by the Mayor-in-Council
under Section 54 of the Municipal Corporation
Act whereby the Commissioner stood removed
from office;
c. That this Hon'ble court may be kind enough
to issue the writ in nature of Mandamus,
certiorari or any other likewise writ commanding
and directing Respondent's that the continued
functioning and discharge of executive and
administrative duties by the Commissioner after
the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 is illegal,
arbitrary, without authority of law and contrary
to the provisions of the Municipal Corporation
Act;
d. That this Hon'ble court may be kind enough
to issue the writ in nature of Mandamus,
certiorari or any other likewise writ commanding
and directing the Respondent's restraining the
Commissioner from exercising any executive,
administrative or financial powers/functions of
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the Municipal Corporation during the pendency
of the present petition;
e. That this Hon'ble court may be kind enough
to issue the writ in nature of Mandamus,
certiorari or any other likewise writ commanding
and directing the Respondent's declaring all
actions, decisions, financial transactions and
administrative acts undertaken by the
Commissioner after the Resolution dated
25.03.2026 as illegal, unauthorized and void ab
initio;
f. That this Hon'ble court may be kind enough
to issue the writ in nature of Mandamus,
certiorari or any other likewise writ commanding
and directing the Respondent's to make
appropriate interim administrative
arrangements for the smooth functioning and
administration of the Municipal Corporation in
accordance with law;
g. That this Hon'ble court may be kind enough
to issue the writ in nature of Mandamus,
certiorari or any other likewise writ commanding
and directing the Respondent's to conduct an
independent inquiry/investigation into the
unauthorized financial transactions, illegal
payments and administrative irregularities
committed by the Commissioner;
h. Award costs of the present petition in favour
of the Petitioners; and
i. Pass any other order/orders,
direction/directions or relief/reliefs which this
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Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
facts and circumstances of the case and in the
interest of justice.”
4. Brief facts of the case, in nutshell, are that the petitioners are
elected Councillors of the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai, who have
approached this Court being aggrieved by the alleged inaction of
the respondent authorities in giving effect to a Resolution dated
25.03.2026 passed under Section 54 of the Act, 1956, seeking
removal of the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation. The
case of the petitioners is that serious disputes had arisen between
the elected representatives of the Municipal Corporation and the
Commissioner with regard to the manner in which the affairs of
the Corporation were being administered. According to the
petitioners, the Commissioner had been taking several
administrative and financial decisions without obtaining requisite
approval from the Mayor-in-Council and the General Body of the
Corporation and had allegedly failed to implement various
resolutions passed by the elected body, resulting in growing
dissatisfaction amongst the Councillors.
5. The petitioners contend that in view of the alleged administrative
irregularities, financial improprieties and procedural violations
attributed to the Commissioner, the Mayor of the Municipal
Corporation submitted a detailed representation dated 12.03.2026
before the Chief Secretary, Government of Chhattisgarh, seeking
appropriate action against him. In the said representation,
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allegations were made regarding sanction and execution of
developmental works without obtaining prior technical sanction
and without placing the proposals before the competent elected
bodies of the Corporation. It was also alleged that substantial
financial approvals had been granted in violation of the prescribed
procedure and that certain actions of the Commissioner were
contrary to governmental instructions and statutory requirements.
The said representation was reportedly supported by several
elected Councillors of the Municipal Corporation.
6. Thereafter, during the Special Budget Session of the Municipal
Corporation held on 25.03.2026, a Resolution under Section 54 of
the Act, 1956 was placed before the General Body concerning the
removal of the Commissioner from his office. According to the
petitioners, after deliberations on the issues relating to the
functioning of the Commissioner, the Resolution was passed with
the requisite statutory majority contemplated under Section 54 of
the Act, 1956. The petitioners assert that upon passage of the
said Resolution, the State Government became under a statutory
obligation to take consequential action in accordance with law.
7. The record further reveals that subsequent to the Resolution
dated 25.03.2026, various representations and reminder
communications were submitted by elected Councillors and the
Mayor before the Collector, Durg, the Chief Secretary, the
Secretary, Urban Administration and Development Department,
10
and other competent authorities requesting implementation of the
Resolution and seeking necessary administrative action. The
petitioners contend that notwithstanding such repeated
representations, no effective decision was taken by the authorities
concerned. It is their grievance that the Resolution passed by the
elected body remained unattended and no consequential order
was issued by the State Government.
8. It is further the case of the petitioners that despite the aforesaid
Resolution, the Commissioner continued to function as the
Executive Head of the Municipal Corporation and continued to
exercise administrative, executive and financial powers. The
petitioners allege that during this period various financial
transactions, approvals and administrative decisions were
undertaken without approval of the elected body and that such
actions were detrimental to the interests of the Municipal
Corporation. According to them, the continued functioning of the
Commissioner after the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 is contrary
to the mandate of Section 54 of the Act, 1956 and amounts to an
encroachment upon the democratic functioning and autonomy of
the local self-government institution.
9. Contending that the inaction of the respondent authorities in
acting upon the Resolution passed by the elected body is
arbitrary, illegal and violative of the constitutional principles
governing local self-government institutions under Part IX-A of the
11
Constitution of India, the petitioners have preferred the present
writ petition.
10. Mr. Satish Chandra Verma, learned Senior counsel assisted by
Mr. Manharan Lal Sahu and Mohammad Naqeeb, would submit
that the present petition raises an issue of considerable
importance touching upon the democratic functioning and
autonomy of local self-government institutions under Part IX-A of
the Constitution of India. Learned counsel would submit that the
petitioners are elected Councillors of the Municipal Corporation,
Bhilai, and the present proceedings have been necessitated on
account of the complete failure of the respondent authorities to
give effect to the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 passed under
Section 54 of the Act, 1956. It is contended that the said
Resolution was passed by the elected body with the requisite
statutory majority after serious concerns were raised regarding
the functioning of the Commissioner, including allegations relating
to financial irregularities, unauthorized approvals, administrative
arbitrariness and repeated disregard of the resolutions passed by
the elected representatives. According to learned counsel, once
the Resolution was validly passed by the Corporation in exercise
of powers conferred under Section 54 of the Act, 1956, the
statutory consequence contemplated under the provision became
automatic and mandatory, leaving no discretion with the State
Government to defer, withhold or refuse implementation thereof.
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11. Mr. Verma would further submit that despite the Resolution having
been passed on 25.03.2026, the Commissioner has continued to
function as the Executive Head of the Municipal Corporation and
has continued to exercise administrative, executive and financial
powers. It is argued that such continuation is wholly without
jurisdiction and contrary to the mandate of the statute. Drawing
attention to the language employed in Section 54 of the Act, 1956,
learned counsel would contend that the Legislature has
consciously used mandatory expressions requiring the State
Government to act upon the democratic decision of the elected
body. It is submitted that once the statutory requirement regarding
the requisite majority stood fulfilled, the State Government was
left with no adjudicatory or discretionary role and was under a
legal obligation to act in accordance with the Resolution. Learned
counsel would argue that the respondent authorities cannot sit in
appeal over the collective wisdom of the elected Councillors nor
can they substitute their own satisfaction for the mandate
expressed by the Corporation in a duly convened meeting.
12. It is further submitted by Mr. Verma that the inaction of the
respondents has resulted in a situation where a Commissioner,
who has lost the confidence of the elected body and against
whom a Resolution under Section 54 of the Act, 1956 has been
passed, continues to administer the affairs of the Corporation.
According to learned counsel, such a situation is directly opposed
to the constitutional philosophy underlying Part IX-A of the
13
Constitution, which seeks to strengthen democratic
decentralization and empower local self-government institutions.
Learned counsel would submit that Articles 243Q and 243W
recognize Municipal Corporations as institutions of self-
government and envisage administration of municipal affairs
through elected representatives accountable to the public. It is
contended that permitting the Commissioner to continue in office
despite the democratic decision of the elected body amounts to
executive overreach and undermines the constitutional autonomy
guaranteed to Municipal Corporations.
13. Mr. Verma would further submit that repeated representations and
reminder communications were submitted by elected Councillors,
the Mayor and other office bearers before the Collector, the Chief
Secretary, the Secretary of the Urban Administration and
Development Department and other competent authorities
requesting implementation of the Resolution. However, despite
being fully aware of the Resolution and the statutory
consequences flowing therefrom, the respondent authorities failed
to take any effective action. It is argued that during the
interregnum, the Commissioner allegedly continued to undertake
administrative and financial decisions, including release of
payments and approvals of transactions, thereby causing serious
prejudice to the Municipal Corporation. According to learned
counsel, the continued exercise of power by the Commissioner
after the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 is void ab initio and all
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consequential actions undertaken by him thereafter are rendered
vulnerable in law.
14. Placing strong reliance upon the judgment of the Gujarat High
Court in Karsanbhai R. Patel v. Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation, 1988 SCC OnLine Guj 219 , learned counsel would
submit that the issue involved in the present case is no longer res
integra. Referring extensively to paragraphs 16, 33, 34, 36 and 38
of the said judgment, it is argued that where the statute provides
for removal of the Municipal Commissioner upon a Resolution
being passed by the requisite majority of the elected body, the
State Government is bound to act upon such Resolution forthwith
and has no authority to examine the correctness of the allegations
contained therein or to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the
elected representatives. Learned counsel would particularly
emphasize the observations of the Gujarat High Court that the
Legislature has consciously reposed confidence in the elected
body and that any interpretation permitting the Government to
delay or refuse implementation of such Resolution would defeat
the very purpose of the statutory provision and jeopardize the
independence and functioning of local self-government
institutions.
15. Reliance has also been placed upon the decision of the Bombay
High Court in Ramkrushna Gangaram Rathi v. Kisan Zingraji
Madke, 1970 SCC OnLine Bom 129 , to contend that where the
15
Legislature has consciously omitted any requirement of assigning
reasons or granting an opportunity of hearing before removal
pursuant to a democratic vote of no-confidence, the Court cannot
read such requirements into the statute. Learned counsel would
submit that the principle emerging from the said judgment is that
the continuance of a person holding an office dependent upon the
confidence of an elected body cannot be protected once such
confidence is lost.
16. Further reliance has been placed on the decisions in Shammi
Sharma & Another v. Municipal Corporation & Others, I.L.R.
(2013) M.P. 2569, Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore
Development Authority, (2010) 7 SCC 129 and Manohar Joshi
v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 3 SCC 619 in support of the
proposition that statutory authorities are bound to act strictly in
accordance with the legislative mandate and that democratic
institutions created under the Constitution must be permitted to
function free from arbitrary executive interference.
17. On the strength of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel
would pray that appropriate directions be issued commanding the
respondents to give effect to the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 and
to ensure compliance with the mandate of Section 54 of the Act,
1956.
18. On the other hand, Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate
General appearing for the State, vehemently opposes the
16
submissions advanced by learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the petitioners, and would submit that the present writ petition is
wholly misconceived, premature and not maintainable either in
law or on facts. Learned State counsel would contend that the
petitioners, being individual Councillors of the Municipal
Corporation, have no locus standi to maintain the present petition
seeking implementation of a Resolution allegedly passed by the
Corporation. According to him, if at all any right is claimed to have
accrued pursuant to the Resolution dated 25.03.2026, the same is
a right of the Municipal Corporation as a statutory body and not of
individual Councillors. It is argued that the petitioners cannot seek
enforcement of a Resolution on behalf of the Corporation,
particularly when the Corporation itself has neither authorized nor
instituted any proceedings seeking such relief. On this ground
alone, learned State counsel would submit that the writ petition
deserves to be dismissed.
19. Mr. Dadariya would further submit that the entire edifice of the
petition rests upon an erroneous interpretation of Section 54(2) of
the Act, 1956. Referring to the language employed in the
provision, he would argue that although a Resolution may be
passed by the elected Councillors recommending removal of the
Commissioner, the actual removal is not automatic and cannot be
treated as self-operative. It is contended that Section 54(2) of the
Act, 1956 contemplates a further decision by the State
Government, which alone is the appointing authority of the
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Commissioner. According to learned counsel, the statutory
scheme clearly indicates that an order is required to be passed by
the Government pursuant to such Resolution and until an
appropriate decision is taken by the Government, no vested right
accrues in favour of the petitioners. It is submitted that admittedly
no decision has yet been taken by the Government on the
Resolution dated 25.03.2026 and, therefore, the petitioners
cannot presume removal of the Commissioner merely on the
basis of the Resolution. The present petition, according to learned
counsel, is therefore premature and liable to be rejected on this
ground alone.
20. Mr. Dadariya would next submit that even otherwise the
Resolution dated 25.03.2026 itself suffers from serious procedural
infirmities and cannot be treated as a valid Resolution under
Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. Inviting attention to Annexure P/1
and the minutes of the meeting, it is submitted that the meeting
convened on 25.03.2026 was admittedly a Special Budget
Meeting convened for consideration of budgetary matters.
According to learned counsel, the agenda concerning removal of
the Commissioner was never included in the notice convening the
meeting and was allegedly introduced at the last moment during
the course of deliberations. It is argued that the proposal seeking
removal of the Commissioner was neither part of the notified
agenda nor was any separate notice issued for consideration of
such a proposal. In such circumstances, the very foundation of
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the Resolution relied upon by the petitioners is rendered legally
unsustainable.
21. Elaborating the aforesaid submission, Mr. Dadariya would place
reliance upon the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities
(Procedure for Conduct of Business) Rules, 2016 (for short,
‘Rules, 2016’). Referring particularly to Rule 3 of the Rules, 2016,
he would submit that the proviso thereto specifically mandates
that no business other than that specified in the notice shall be
transacted at a special meeting. It is contended that since the
meeting dated 25.03.2026 was convened exclusively for budget-
related business, no unrelated matter could legally have been
transacted therein. He would further draw attention to Rule 5 of
the Rules, 2016, which requires prior notice specifying the date,
time, place and agenda of the business proposed to be
transacted. According to him, admittedly no notice whatsoever
was issued proposing consideration of removal of the
Commissioner under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. He would
therefore submit that the alleged Resolution is in direct violation of
the mandatory statutory rules governing the conduct of meetings
and is consequently void ab initio.
22. Mr. Dadariya would further rely upon Rule 19 of the Rules, 2016
and submit that although the Rule permits consideration of a
proposal relating to or ancillary to a matter included in the agenda,
such provision has no application to the facts of the present case.
19
According to him, a proposal seeking removal of the
Commissioner under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 cannot by any
stretch of imagination be regarded as a matter ancillary or
incidental to a Special Budget Meeting. The subject-matter of
budget approval and the issue of removal of the Commissioner
operate in entirely distinct fields. Consequently, the Resolution
cannot derive legitimacy by invoking Rule 19 of the Rules, 2016. It
is therefore submitted that the proceedings culminating in the
alleged Resolution dated 25.03.2026 are wholly contrary to the
statutory framework and incapable of enforcement through a writ
of mandamus.
23. Mr. Dadariya would also submit that the mandatory requirement of
voting contemplated under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 has not
been demonstrated by the petitioners. Referring to the statutory
language, he would contend that the provision specifically
requires that not less than three-fourths of the total number of
elected Councillors must vote in favour of the proposition.
However, neither the minutes of the meeting nor the pleadings in
the writ petition disclose any voting process having been
undertaken in the manner contemplated by law. It is argued that
there is no material on record demonstrating the number of
Councillors who voted, the manner of voting or the fulfillment of
the statutory requirement prescribed under Section 54(2) of the
Act, 1956. In absence of such foundational facts, the petitioners
20
cannot claim that a legally enforceable Resolution came into
existence.
24. Lastly, Mr. Dadariya would submit that the judgments relied upon
by the petitioners are clearly distinguishable on facts and have no
application to the present case in view of the statutory scheme
governing the Act, 1956 as well as the Rules, 2016. According to
him, before any question regarding implementation of the
Resolution arises, the petitioners are first required to establish
that the Resolution itself was validly passed in accordance with
law. Since serious disputes exist regarding the legality of the
meeting, the agenda, the procedure adopted and the alleged
voting process, no writ can be issued directing implementation of
such a disputed Resolution. He would therefore submit that the
writ petition is devoid of merit, suffers from lack of maintainability
and deserves to be dismissed at the threshold.
25. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival
contentions and perused the material available with the writ
petition with utmost circumspection.
26. The controversy involved in the present writ petition lies in a
narrow compass. The petitioners, who are elected Councillors of
the Municipal Corporation, seek implementation of the Resolution
dated 25.03.2026 purportedly passed under Section 54 of the Act,
1956, whereby the elected body resolved to remove the
Commissioner from his office. According to the petitioners, once
21
the Resolution was passed with the requisite statutory majority,
the consequence contemplated under Section 54 of the Act, 1956
became mandatory and the State Government was left with no
discretion except to give effect to the same. The petitioners further
contend that the continued functioning of the Commissioner
despite the Resolution is contrary to the statutory mandate and
violative of the constitutional principles governing local self-
government institutions under Part IX-A of the Constitution of
India. In turn, the State has questioned the very maintainability of
the writ petition and has also challenged the validity of the
Resolution itself. The principal objections raised by the
respondents are that the petitioners lack locus standi to seek
enforcement of the Resolution; that no final decision has yet been
taken by the State Government in the matter and, therefore, the
writ petition is premature; and that the Resolution dated
25.03.2026 is itself legally unsustainable, having allegedly been
passed in a Special Budget Meeting without prior notice, without
inclusion of the subject in the agenda and without adherence to
the mandatory procedure prescribed under the Rules, 2016. The
State has also disputed compliance with the voting requirements
contemplated under Section 54 of the Act, 1956.
27. Thus, the questions which arise for consideration are whether the
petitioners possess the requisite locus to maintain the present
petition; whether the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 can be said to
have been validly passed in accordance with the provisions of the
22
Act and the Rules governing the conduct of meetings; whether the
State Government is under a mandatory obligation to act upon
such Resolution immediately upon its passage; and whether any
direction as prayed for by the petitioners can be issued in exercise
of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
28. Having bestowed anxious consideration to the submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the respective parties and upon
a careful examination of the statutory provisions, the documents
placed on record and the legal position governing the field, this
Court proceeds to examine the aforesaid issues.
29. Before adverting to the rival submissions advanced on behalf of
the parties and examining the legality and validity of the
Resolution dated 25.03.2026, this Court considers it appropriate
to first notice the statutory scheme governing the field. Since the
controversy in the present case revolves around the interpretation
of Section 54 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956
and the procedure prescribed for convening and conducting
meetings under the Chhattisgarh Municipalities (Procedure for
Conduct of Business) Rules, 2016, a proper appreciation of the
relevant statutory provisions becomes indispensable for
adjudication of the issues involved herein.
30. It is a settled principle of law that where the rights and obligations
of the parties flow from a statute, the Court is required to ascertain
the legislative intent from the language employed by the
23
Legislature itself. The scope, ambit and effect of the Resolution
dated 25.03.2026, the extent of the powers exercisable by the
elected body of the Municipal Corporation, the role of the State
Government in relation thereto, as well as the procedural
objections raised by the respondents concerning the validity of the
meeting and agenda, can be effectively examined only in the
backdrop of the relevant statutory provisions. Therefore, before
proceeding further to consider the rival contentions on merits, it
would be apposite and advantageous to reproduce the relevant
provisions of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956
and the Chhattisgarh Municipalities (Procedure for Conduct of
Business) Rules, 2016, which have a direct bearing on the
controversy involved in the present writ petition. The relevant
provisions read as under:-
Section 54 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal
Corporation Act, 1956
“54 - Appointment and removal of
Commissioner .(1) The Commissioner for the
Corporation shall be appointed by the
Government for a renewable period not
exceeding five years.
(2) He shall be forthwith removed from office if
at a meeting of the Corporation not less than
three-fourths of the total number of [elected
Councillors] vote in favour of a proposition in
this behalf; and he may be removed by the
Government at any time if it appears to the
24
Government that he is incapable of performing
the duties of his office or has been guilty of any
misconduct or neglect which renders his
removal expedient:
Provided that when the Commissioner holds a
lien on any post under Government, he may be
recalled at any time by the Government. [...] ”
Rules 3, 4, 5, 13, 16 & 19 of the Chhattisgarh
Municipalities (Procedure for Conduct of
Business) Rules, 2016
“ 3. Agenda. - The Agenda to be included in the
notice for meeting of the Municipality shall be
under,-
(a) confirmation of the minutes of previous
meeting, if the same was not confirmed in
that meeting;
(b) question asked by the Councillors and
their reply;
(c) information regarding important
correspondence;
(d) remaining agenda of business which
could not be transacted in the previous
meeting;
(e) suggestions and proposals submitted by
the committees or the Chief Executive
Officer;
25
(f) proposals submitted by the Councillors for
asking the statement on the matters of public
importance:
Provided that no business other than that
specified in the notice shall be transacted at
a special meeting:
Provided further that the proposal of asking
for the statement on the matters of public
importance shall be placed in the general
meeting only.
4. Orders of items in the Agenda .- The order
of items in the agenda shall be as per Rule 3.
However, the order may be changed with the
special permission of the Municipality.
5. Intimation of the meeting. - The Secretary
shall send the notice of the meeting to every
Councillor specifying the date, time and place
thereof and the agenda of business to be
transacted before seven working days of an
ordinary meeting and three working days of a
special meeting. A copy of such notice shall
also be displayed at the notice board of the
office. The notice of meeting shall be sent in
Form 'A' appended to these rules.
*
13. Business in the Meeting .- Every
Councillor, while discussing any proposals of
any amendment or any question shall address
to Presiding Officer by rising from his seat. He
will restrict his speech to the immediate
26
question put for discussion in the meeting and
will not make irrelevant talk and if the Presiding
Officer desires so, shall conclude his speech. If
any councillor disobeys instructions of
Presiding Officer and causes hindrance in the
conduct of business then, such councilor shall
be liable for action under Section 19 of the
Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956
(No. 23 of 1956) or Section 41 of the
Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961 (No. 37 of
1961), as the case may be.
*
16. Decision on question by majority of
votes. -All question brought before any meeting
of the Municipality shall be decided by a
majority of votes of the Councillors present, in
accordance with the provisions of the Act and
all such issues, for which there is no provision
in these rules or in the Act or in any other rules
made under the Act, shall be decided by
majority of votes of the Councillors present.
General Assembly does not have any right to
delete any question included in the agenda.
*
19. Other business in the Meeting. - Any
proposal which relates to or is ancillary to any
matter included in the agenda may be
submitted. However, the same shall only be
considered, if the consent of two third
Councillors present has been obtained. ”
27
31. From a careful perusal of the aforesaid provisions of the Act,
1956, particularly Section 54(2), it clearly emerges that the
Legislature has envisaged a two-fold mechanism concerning the
tenure and removal of the Commissioner of a Municipal
Corporation. While the Commissioner is appointed by the State
Government under Section 54(1) of the Act, 1956, sub-section (2)
thereof provides for his removal upon the happening of certain
contingencies. The provision stipulates that the Commissioner
"shall be forthwith removed from office" if, at a meeting of the
Corporation, not less than three-fourths of the total number of
elected Councillors vote in favour of a proposition seeking his
removal. The provision further confers an independent power
upon the State Government to remove the Commissioner if it
appears to the Government that he is incapable of performing the
duties of his office or has been guilty of misconduct or neglect
rendering his removal expedient. Thus, the statute recognizes two
distinct modes of removal of the Commissioner, one founded
upon the democratic will of the elected body and the other upon
the subjective satisfaction of the State Government on the
grounds specifically enumerated therein.
32. A further reading of Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 would
demonstrate that the Legislature has attached considerable
significance to the decision of the elected body of the Corporation
by prescribing a special majority of not less than three-fourths of
the total number of elected Councillors for passing a proposition
28
seeking removal of the Commissioner. Equally significant is the
requirement that such removal must be preceded by a vote in a
duly convened meeting of the Corporation. Therefore, for
attracting the consequences contemplated under Section 54(2) of
the Act, 1956, the existence of a valid meeting, consideration of a
proposition in accordance with law and voting by the requisite
statutory majority constitute foundational requirements which
cannot be ignored.
33. Likewise, from a conjoint reading of Rules 3, 4, 5, 13, 16 and 19 of
the Rules, 2016, it transpires that the procedure governing the
conduct of business in meetings of the Municipal Corporation is
not merely directory in nature but is intended to ensure
transparency, orderly deliberation and informed participation of
the elected representatives. Rule 3 mandates that the agenda to
be transacted in a meeting must be specified in the notice
convening the meeting and the first proviso thereto specifically
provides that no business other than that specified in the notice
shall be transacted at a special meeting. Rule 5 further requires
prior notice to every Councillor specifying the date, time, place
and agenda of the business proposed to be transacted. The
object behind these provisions is evidently to ensure that every
Councillor receives adequate notice of the matters proposed to be
considered and is afforded a reasonable opportunity to participate
in the deliberative process.
29
34. The Rules, 2016 further reveal that deliberations in a meeting are
required to remain confined to the business legitimately brought
before the House. Rule 13 obliges the Councillors to restrict their
discussions to the immediate question under consideration,
whereas Rule 16 contemplates that questions brought before a
meeting shall ordinarily be decided by majority of votes in
accordance with the provisions of the Act. Rule 19 carves out a
limited exception by permitting consideration of a proposal relating
to or ancillary to a matter included in the agenda, subject to
obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the Councillors present. The
expression "relates to or is ancillary to any matter included in the
agenda" assumes significance, for it indicates that matters wholly
foreign to the notified agenda cannot ordinarily be introduced and
transacted under the guise of ancillary business.
35. Thus, the statutory framework emerging from the Act, 1956 and
the Rules, 2016 makes it abundantly clear that while the elected
body has been vested with an important role under Section 54(2)
of the Act, 1956 in relation to removal of the Commissioner, the
exercise of such power is required to conform to the procedural
safeguards and requirements prescribed under the Rules, 2016.
36. From a perusal of Annexure P/2 dated 08.05.2026, which is a
communication addressed by the Mayor, Municipal Corporation,
Bhilai to the Collector, Durg, it is apparent that reference has been
made therein to the Resolution passed by the General Body of the
30
Municipal Corporation on 25.03.2026 under Section 54(2) of the
Act, 1956 as well as the decision taken in the emergent meeting
of the Mayor-in-Council held on 08.05.2026. The said
communication records that serious objections had been raised
by the elected representatives regarding the functioning of the
Commissioner, alleged financial irregularities, change of items in
sanctioned works and continuous violation of statutory
procedures. It has further been stated therein that after
deliberations in the General Body meeting dated 25.03.2026, a
Resolution seeking removal of the Commissioner was passed
under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. It would reveal that the
Mayor-in-Council, in its emergent meeting held on 08.05.2026,
expressed concern regarding the continued discharge of
administrative and financial functions by the Commissioner
notwithstanding the Resolution passed by the General Body. The
communication also indicates that the Mayor-in-Council
considered the forwarding of the budget booklet to the
Government without forwarding the proceedings of the General
Body meeting as an administrative irregularity. Consequently, a
decision appears to have been taken by the Mayor-in-Council to
apprise the Collector and the State Government of the Resolution
passed by the General Body and to seek appropriate directions
from the Government in the matter. Thus, Annexure P/2 primarily
reflects that even as on 08.05.2026, the elected body and the
Mayor-in-Council were insisting upon implementation of the
31
Resolution dated 25.03.2026 and were requesting the competent
authorities to take consequential action in accordance with law.
37. Likewise, Annexure P/8 dated 25.04.2026, which is a
communication addressed by the Mayor, Municipal Corporation,
Bhilai to the Collector, Durg, would indicate that the elected body
of the Municipal Corporation was proceeding on the premise that
the Resolution passed in the General Council Meeting dated
25.03.2026 had the effect of removing the Commissioner from
office under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. The said
communication records that the General Council had unanimously
passed a proposal expressing lack of confidence in the
functioning of the Commissioner and seeking his removal from
office. Reference has also been made therein to the provisions of
Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956, with an assertion that upon
passage of the Resolution by the requisite majority, the
Commissioner ceased to possess authority to exercise powers
under the Act.
38. A further perusal of Annexure P/8 reveals that the Mayor
expressed reservations regarding the continuance of official and
administrative functions by the Commissioner after the Resolution
dated 25.03.2026. It has been stated therein that a note-sheet
was placed before the Mayor by the Commissioner for convening
a meeting of the Mayor-in-Council and that any decision taken on
such note-sheet would, according to the Mayor, run contrary to
32
the Resolution passed by the General Council. The
communication further reflects a request made to the Collector for
appointment of a competent authority to discharge the functions of
the Commissioner till appropriate orders were passed by the State
Government so as to ensure smooth administration of the
Municipal Corporation.
39. From a conjoint perusal of Annexure P/9 dated 06.05.2026 and
Annexure P/10 dated 07.05.2026, it reflects that subsequent to
the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 passed by the General Council
under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956, the Mayor and members of
the Mayor-in-Council were actively deliberating upon the
administrative consequences arising therefrom. Annexure P/9 is a
communication issued by the Mayor directing the
Commissioner/Secretary of the Municipal Corporation to convene
an emergent meeting of the Mayor-in-Council on 08.05.2026. The
said communication specifically refers to the Resolution passed
by the General Council regarding removal of the Commissioner
under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 and records that serious
concerns had been expressed by the members of the Mayor-in-
Council regarding the administrative situation prevailing thereafter
as well as certain alleged irregularities in financial matters. The
Mayor, therefore, considered it necessary to convene an
emergent meeting in view of the sensitivity and importance of the
issues involved.
33
40. Annexure P/10, which is the consequential notice issued by the
Secretary of the Municipal Corporation on 07.05.2026, reveals
that acting upon the directions of the Mayor, a meeting of the
Mayor-in-Council was formally scheduled to be held on
08.05.2026 at 12:00 noon in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 15(3), (4) and (5) of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation
(President-in-Council Functions and Duties) Rules, 1998. The
notice was circulated to the Mayor, Commissioner, Additional
Commissioner and other concerned officers and departmental
heads for information and participation in the meeting.
41. Thus, the aforesaid documents indicate that even after the
Resolution dated 25.03.2026, the elected functionaries of the
Municipal Corporation were proceeding on the premise that
issues concerning the status of the Commissioner and the
consequential administrative arrangements required immediate
consideration by the Mayor-in-Council. The documents further
demonstrate that the emergent meeting dated 08.05.2026 was
convened specifically to deliberate upon the administrative and
financial concerns which, according to the elected
representatives, had arisen in the aftermath of the Resolution
passed under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956.
42. From a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, it is quite vivid
that the meeting convened on 25.03.2026 was admittedly a
Special Budget Meeting of the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai. The
34
notice convening the said meeting as well as the proceedings
placed on record unmistakably demonstrate that the purpose for
which the meeting was called was consideration and approval of
the budget and other allied financial matters of the Municipal
Corporation. It is not the case of the petitioners that any separate
meeting was convened specifically for consideration of a proposal
under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 seeking removal of the
Commissioner. Equally, it is not in dispute that no agenda
proposing removal of the Commissioner was included in the
notice convening the meeting. However, during the course of the
budget meeting, a proposal came to be moved and a Resolution
was purportedly passed seeking removal of the Commissioner
under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956. It is on the strength of the
said Resolution that the petitioners seek a direction to the State
Government to remove the Commissioner from office.
43. The issue, therefore, is not whether the elected Councillors
possess the power to initiate a proposal under Section 54(2) of
the Act, 1956. The real question is whether the Resolution relied
upon by the petitioners can be regarded as a valid Resolution in
the eyes of law having been passed in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by the statute and the rules framed
thereunder. It is trite law that where a statute prescribes a
particular manner for doing a thing, the same has to be done in
that manner alone or not at all. Any departure from the prescribed
procedure ordinarily renders the action vulnerable to challenge.
35
44. At this stage, it would be profitable to notice the scheme of the
Rules, 2016. Rule 3 specifically provides that no business other
than that specified in the notice shall be transacted at a special
meeting. The legislative intent behind the said provision is
evident. Every elected Councillor is entitled to know in advance
the business proposed to be transacted in a meeting so that he
may effectively participate in the deliberations. Rule 5 further
mandates issuance of notice to every Councillor specifying the
date, time and place of the meeting together with the agenda
proposed to be transacted. The requirement of prior notice is not
an empty formality but a substantive safeguard intended to ensure
transparency, fairness and informed decision-making within
democratic institutions.
45. A conjoint reading of Rules 3 and 5 leaves no room for ambiguity
that where a special meeting is convened, only such business as
is specified in the agenda can be transacted therein. In the
present case, neither the notice convening the meeting nor any
material placed on record indicates that removal of the
Commissioner under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 formed part of
the notified agenda. No document has been brought on record to
demonstrate that the Secretary of the Municipal Corporation
issued any notice to the Councillors informing them that a
proposal regarding removal of the Commissioner would be
considered in the meeting scheduled on 25.03.2026. There is also
no material to establish that such agenda was circulated within
36
the period prescribed under the Rules. Consequently, the
foundational procedural requirements contemplated under the
Rules, 2016 stand conspicuously absent.
46. The contention of the petitioners that the proposal could
nevertheless be considered in the meeting is equally untenable.
Rule 19 of the Rules, 2016 permits consideration of a proposal
only if the same relates to or is ancillary to a matter included in the
agenda. The expression "relates to or is ancillary to" cannot be
interpreted in a manner so expansive as to permit introduction of
an altogether independent and substantive item of business
having no nexus with the notified agenda. Consideration of the
annual budget of the Municipal Corporation and removal of the
Commissioner under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 operate in
entirely distinct fields. By no stretch of imagination can a proposal
for removal of the Commissioner be regarded as ancillary to
consideration of the budget. Accepting such a proposition would
render the safeguards contained in Rules 3 and 5 wholly otiose
and would defeat the very object behind prescribing prior notice
and agenda for meetings of democratic bodies.
47. What further assumes significance is that Section 54(2) itself
contemplates a proposition being considered and voted upon in a
meeting of the Corporation. The expression employed by the
Legislature necessarily postulates a meeting validly convened in
accordance with law. A proposition which itself is introduced
37
contrary to the mandatory provisions governing the conduct of
business cannot be elevated to the status of a valid statutory
Resolution merely because a majority of Councillors supported it.
Democratic decision-making, howsoever important, must operate
within the framework of law. Procedural safeguards are not
obstacles to democracy; rather, they are indispensable
components of democratic governance.
48. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that statutory
procedures governing democratic and statutory institutions cannot
be diluted on considerations of expediency or convenience. In the
celebrated decision of Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936
PC 253 (2) , the Privy Council laid down the principle, which has
since been consistently approved and followed by the Supreme
Court, that where a statute requires a thing to be done in a
particular manner, it must be done in that manner alone and all
other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden.
49. The said principle was expressly reiterated in Commissioner of
Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and Others,
(2002) 1 SCC 633 , wherein the Supreme Court held that statutory
requirements couched in mandatory language are required to be
strictly adhered to and cannot be circumvented by invoking
considerations of equity or substantial compliance, by observing
as follows :-
38
“29. Nextly, the Commission has elaborately
discussed the object of introduction of Chapter
XIX-A in the Act, the history behind the
introduction and schematic rationalisation of
the provisions of Chapter XIX-A brought about
through the Finance Act, 1987 to hold that in
exercising its power under Chapter XIX-A it has
almost an unbridled power to arrive at a
settlement. This exercise of purposive
interpretation by looking into the object and
scheme of the Act and legislative intendment
would arise, in our opinion, if the language of
the statute is either ambiguous or conflicting or
gives a meaning leading to absurdity. We do
not find any such problem in the provisions of
the Act to which we have already referred to.
Sections 234-A, 234-B and 234-C in clear
terms impose a mandate to collect interest at
the rates stipulated therein. The expression
“shall” used in the said section cannot by any
stretch of imagination be construed as “may”.
There are sufficient indications in the scheme
of the Act to show that the expression “shall”
used in Sections 234-A, 234-B and 234-C is
used by the legislature deliberately and it has
not left any scope for interpreting the said
expression as “may”. This is clear from the fact
that prior to the amendment brought about by
the Finance Act, 1987, the legislature in the
corresponding section pertaining to imposition
of interest used the expression “may” thereby
giving a discretion to the authorities concerned
to either reduce or waive the interest. The
39
change brought about by the amending Act
(Finance Act, 1987) is a clear indication of the
fact that the intention of the legislature was to
make the collection of statutory interest
mandatory. In this connection, we may usefully
refer to the judgment of this Court in Jaywant
S. Kulkarni v. Minochar Dosabhai Shroff [(1988)
4 SCC 108 : AIR 1988 SC 1817] wherein this
Court held that when the legislature changes
the expression “may” to “shall” by amendment
of the statute, it is clear that it intended to make
the provision mandatory from the existing
directory provision. Therefore, the question of
the Commission relying upon external aids, for
the purpose of interpretation like Wanchoo
Committee Report, Discussions of Select
Committee of Parliament and introduction of
Chapter XIX-A in the Act, press release of the
Board dated 21-5-1996 etc. are purposeless
because of the clear and unambiguous
language used in Sections 234-A, 234-B and
234-C and Sections 245-D(4) and (6). We
notice that if only the Commission were to
follow the golden rule of interpretation by giving
the words of the statute their natural and
ordinary meaning without unnecessarily going
into a forensic exercise of trying to find out the
object of the introduction of Chapter XIX-A or
Part F of Chapter XVII, the Commission would
not have fallen in error. ”
50. The Supreme Court in Bhanumati v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(2010) 12 SCC 1, while dealing with statutory local self-
40
government institutions, held that such bodies are creatures of
statute and their powers, rights and functioning are regulated by
the statute under which they are constituted. Consequently, every
action of the elected body must conform to the statutory
procedure prescribed by the Legislature. Any resolution passed in
disregard of mandatory procedural requirements cannot derive
legitimacy merely because it enjoys numerical support of the
members present in the meeting.
51. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharmin Bai Kashyap v.
Babli Sahu and Others, (2023) 10 SCC 461 , while examining the
validity of actions taken under a statutory framework governing
local self-government institutions, reaffirmed the well-established
principle that where the Legislature has prescribed a specific
procedure for exercise of a statutory power, strict adherence to
such procedure is mandatory and any deviation therefrom renders
the resultant action legally vulnerable. The Supreme Court
observed as under:-
“13. It is well-settled principle of law that where
a right or a liability is Created by a statute,
which gives a special remedy for enforcing it,
the remedy provided by the statute must be
availed of. It is also well-settled salutary
principle that if a statute provides for doing a
thing to be done in a particular manner, then it
has to be done in that manner and in no other
manner. In Cherukuri Mani v. State of A.P.5, it is
observed that: (SCC p. 727, para 14)
41
"14. Where the law prescribes a thing to be
done in a particular manner following a
particular procedure, it shall be done in the
same manner following the provisions of
law, without deviating from the prescribed
procedure."”
52. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the
aforementioned judicial precedents, this Court finds that the
Resolution dated 25.03.2026 suffers from a patent and incurable
defect affecting its very legality and enforceability. The statutory
scheme governing the conduct of meetings of the Municipal
Council clearly contemplates that every item proposed to be
considered at a meeting must be specifically incorporated in the
agenda circulated to the members in advance. Such requirement
is not an empty formality but constitutes an essential safeguard
intended to ensure transparency, informed deliberation and
meaningful participation by all elected representatives. Admittedly,
the Special Meeting convened on 25.03.2026 was called
exclusively for consideration of the Budget of the Municipal
Council. The agenda circulated to the Councillors did not contain
any proposal relating to the removal of the Commissioner nor was
any notice issued indicating that such a matter would be taken up
for consideration.
53. The power contemplated under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956
carries serious civil and administrative consequences, both for the
Commissioner concerned and for the functioning of the Municipal
42
Council. A proposal seeking removal of a Commissioner cannot
be equated with an incidental or ancillary matter arising during the
course of budget deliberations. Such a proposal constitutes an
independent and substantive subject requiring prior notice, due
deliberation and strict adherence to the procedure prescribed
under the governing statutory framework. In the absence of
compliance with these mandatory procedural requirements, the
consideration of such a proposal in a Special Budget Meeting
stands vitiated from its inception.
54. The aforesaid conclusion also finds support from the recent
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharmin Bai Kashyap
(supra), wherein the Supreme Court reiterated the well-
established principle that where a statute creates a right and
simultaneously prescribes the manner and procedure for its
enforcement, such right can be exercised only in the manner
contemplated by the statute itself.
55. The Supreme Court further emphasized that when the law
requires an act to be performed following a particular procedure,
the same must be performed strictly in accordance with that
procedure and not otherwise. The principle assumes particular
significance in the context of statutory local self-government
institutions where the source of power as well as the manner of its
exercise are both regulated by the governing enactment.
Therefore, when the Act, 1956 read with the Rules, 2016
43
prescribes the procedure by which a proposition for removal of the
Commissioner is to be considered in a duly convened meeting,
any deviation from such mandatory procedure strikes at the root
of the exercise itself and renders the resultant Resolution
incapable of legal enforcement.
56. The principle laid down in Dharmin Bai Kashyap (supra) is not
merely procedural in character but is founded upon the larger
doctrine of rule of law. The requirement of adherence to the
prescribed statutory procedure ensures transparency, certainty
and fairness in institutional decision-making and prevents arbitrary
exercise of power. Consequently, once it is found that the
proposal seeking removal of the Commissioner was considered in
a meeting convened for an altogether different purpose and
without compliance with the mandatory requirements relating to
notice and agenda, the Resolution cannot be treated as a valid
exercise of power under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 merely
because it may have received support from a majority of the
members present.
57. The legal position in this regard is no longer res integra. As held in
Nazir Ahmad (supra) and consistently followed by the Supreme
Court in a catena of decisions including Anjum M.H. Ghaswala
(supra), where a statute prescribes a particular manner for doing
an act, the act must be performed in that manner alone and in no
other. The statutory procedure cannot be substituted by
44
considerations of convenience, expediency or perceived public
interest. Once the Rules, 2016 prescribe the manner in which
business is to be transacted in a meeting and the mode by which
matters are to be included in the agenda, any departure therefrom
strikes at the very root of the decision-making process. Therefore,
the Resolution dated 25.03.2026 cannot be validated by invoking
the doctrine of substantial compliance or by contending that the
ultimate object sought to be achieved was otherwise within the
powers of the Council.
58. Equally significant is the principle reiterated by the Supreme Court
in Bhanumati (supra) that statutory local self-government
institutions are creatures of statute and derive their authority
exclusively from the enactment under which they are constituted.
Consequently, the exercise of powers by such bodies must
remain confined within the statutory limits and procedural
safeguards enacted by the Legislature. Any action taken in
disregard of those safeguards is rendered legally unsustainable
irrespective of the support it may command among the members
participating in the meeting. Thus, the mere fact that a majority of
Councillors present in the meeting voted in favour of the proposal
cannot confer legality upon a Resolution that was itself initiated
and considered contrary to the mandatory statutory procedure.
59. This Court is also unable to accept the submission advanced on
behalf of the petitioners that the State Government was under a
45
statutory obligation to act upon the Resolution solely because it
was passed by the Municipal Council. The obligation of the State
Government to consider or act upon a Resolution under Section
54(2) of the Act, 1956 necessarily presupposes the existence of a
Resolution validly adopted in accordance with law. A Resolution
which is tainted by non-compliance with mandatory procedural
requirements cannot acquire legal sanctity merely by reason of its
passage in a meeting of the Council. Acceptance of such a
contention would amount to permitting statutory requirements to
be circumvented and would render the procedural safeguards
incorporated in the Rules, 2016 wholly otiose.
60. The judgments relied upon by learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the petitioners are clearly distinguishable on facts and in law.
Those decisions proceed on the premise that the meetings in
question were validly convened and that the resolutions under
consideration had been passed in conformity with the applicable
statutory provisions. None of the authorities cited before this Court
lays down a proposition that a resolution passed in violation of
mandatory procedural requirements must nevertheless be
enforced. The ratio of those decisions, therefore, cannot be
extended to validate the impugned Resolution. Likewise,
authorities dealing with no-confidence motions against elected
office bearers arise under distinct statutory schemes containing
separate procedural safeguards and cannot be mechanically
46
imported into the framework governing Section 54(2) of the Act,
1956.
61. The Court is further of the view that adherence to procedure is not
a matter of technicality but a fundamental component of the rule
of law. Democratic decision-making within statutory institutions
derives its legitimacy not merely from numerical superiority but
from observance of the procedure established by law. Procedural
safeguards ensure fairness, accountability and informed
participation in the decision-making process. To hold otherwise
would permit statutory mandates to be overridden whenever a
majority chooses to do so, thereby undermining the very
foundation of lawful governance. Such an approach would be
wholly inconsistent with settled constitutional principles and the
jurisprudence governing statutory bodies.
62. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the Resolution dated 25.03.2026, which forms the
very foundation of the present writ petition, cannot be recognized
as a legally valid and enforceable Resolution under Section 54(2)
of the Act, 1956. The material placed on record unequivocally
demonstrates that the meeting in question was convened as a
Special Budget Meeting and that the proposal relating to removal
of the Commissioner neither formed part of the notified agenda
nor was any prior notice issued to the Councillors indicating that
such an important and substantive matter would be taken up for
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consideration. The mandatory requirements contained in Rules 3
and 5 of the Rules, 2016, which are intended to secure
transparency, informed participation and orderly conduct of
business in meetings of democratic institutions, were not complied
with. The proposal also cannot be brought within the ambit of Rule
19 of the Rules, 2016, as a motion seeking removal of the
Commissioner is an independent and substantive subject having
no nexus with the business of budget consideration.
Consequently, the proceedings culminating in the Resolution
dated 25.03.2026 stand vitiated by non-compliance with
mandatory statutory requirements.
63. This Court is also constrained to observe that the Act, 1956 and
the Rules, 2016 constitute a complete statutory code governing
the functioning of Municipal Corporations and the conduct of their
business. The powers conferred upon elected representatives, the
Mayor, the Mayor-in-Council and other statutory authorities are all
traceable to and regulated by the provisions of the statute. Once
the Legislature has prescribed a particular procedure for
convening meetings, specifying agenda items, conducting
deliberations and passing resolutions, every stakeholder is bound
to act strictly within that statutory framework. Neither the
perceived urgency of a matter nor the strength of the majority
supporting a proposal can justify departure from the procedure
established by law.
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64. It is a settled principle that statutory institutions derive legitimacy
not merely from the democratic character of their composition but
equally from their fidelity to the governing statute. The Act and the
Rules are required to be followed in their letter as well as spirit.
Any action taken in disregard thereof would not only expose the
decision to legal challenge but would also undermine the
institutional discipline and certainty which the statutory framework
seeks to preserve. Therefore, while the elected body undoubtedly
possesses important powers under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956,
the exercise of such powers must necessarily conform to the
requirements prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed
thereunder.
65. This Court is mindful of the fact that local self-government
institutions occupy an important position in the constitutional
framework envisaged under Part IX-A of the Constitution of India
and that the democratic will of elected representatives deserves
due respect and recognition. However, it is equally well settled
that democratic institutions created by statute must function within
the boundaries prescribed by law. The legitimacy of a democratic
decision does not flow merely from the number of persons
supporting it but from the fact that such decision has been arrived
at through a procedure sanctioned by law. Procedural safeguards
are not empty technicalities; they constitute essential checks
designed to preserve fairness, transparency, accountability and
institutional integrity. Once the Legislature has prescribed a
49
specific procedure for transacting business and passing
resolutions having serious administrative consequences, the
same cannot be dispensed with on the ground that a majority of
members were otherwise willing to support the proposal.
66. The Court is further of the view that no mandamus can be issued
directing the State Government to act upon or implement a
Resolution which itself lacks legal sanctity. The obligation
contemplated under Section 54(2) of the Act, 1956 to give effect
to the democratic decision of the elected body necessarily arises
only when such decision has been taken in accordance with the
statutory scheme governing the field. In the absence of a validly
adopted Resolution, no corresponding legal duty can be said to
have arisen in favour of the petitioners capable of being enforced
through issuance of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
67. It is, however, clarified that this Court has not expressed any
opinion on the merits of the allegations levelled against the
Commissioner, nor has it adjudicated upon the correctness,
truthfulness or otherwise of the grievances raised by the elected
representatives regarding the functioning of the Municipal
administration. The dismissal of the present petition rests solely
upon the legal infirmity affecting the Resolution dated 25.03.2026
and the non-compliance with the mandatory procedural
requirements governing its consideration and adoption. It shall
50
remain open to the competent authority or the elected body of the
Municipal Corporation to take recourse to such remedies and
procedures as may be available to them in accordance with law.
68. Before parting, this Court deems it appropriate to observe that
statutory powers carrying significant civil and administrative
consequences, such as those contemplated under Section 54(2)
of the Act, 1956, ought to be exercised with due deliberation and
in strict conformity with the statutory framework. Compliance with
procedural requirements not only safeguards the rights of all
stakeholders but also ensures that decisions taken by democratic
institutions withstand legal scrutiny and command public
confidence. Observance of procedure is the hallmark of the rule of
law, and any departure therefrom has the potential to erode the
institutional discipline upon which statutory governance is
founded.
69. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds no merit in the
present writ petition. The same deserves to be and is accordingly
dismissed .
70. There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/- /-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh
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The date when the
The date when the
The date when the judgment is
judgment is reserved
judgment is
uploaded on the website
pronounced
Operative Full
13.05.2026 29.06.2026 ------ 30.06.2026
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Head-Note
No writ of mandamus can be issued directing the State
Government to implement a Resolution lacking legal sanctity. The
obligation under Section 54(2) of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956
arises only in respect of a Resolution validly adopted in accordance
with the statutory scheme; in the absence of such a Resolution, no
enforceable legal duty exists under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.