THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER vs THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER KBJNL

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA


KALABURAGI BENCH

RD
DATED THIS THE 3 DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026


BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K V ARAVIND


MISCL. FIRST APPEAL NO. 201103 OF 2025 (LAC-)

BETWEEN:

1.
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
UKP, INDI-586209.

2. THE COMMISSIONER,
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT
SECRETARY FOR LAND ACQUISITION DIVISION,
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
NAVANAGAR, BAGALKOT-587103.

3. THE GENERAL MANAGER,
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT,
LAND ACQUISITION DIVISION,
NAVANAGAR, BAGALKOT-587103.

…APPELLANTS









(BY SRI.NARENDRA M. REDDY, ADVOCATE)
AND:

1. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
KBJNL, ALBC DIVISION, CHIMMALAGI LIFT
Digitally Signed by KV
ARAVIND

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IRRIGATION PROJECT ALMATTI,
TQ. BAGEWADI-586203.

2. GHALIB S/O RAJAKSAB NALABAND
AGE:MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. JALAWAD, TQ. SINDAGI,
DIST. VIJAYAPURA-586101

…RESPONDENTS

THIS APPEAL IS FILED U/S 74(1) OF RIGHT TO FAIR
COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION,
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013 PRAYING TO
CALL FOR THE RECORDS IN L.A.C. NO.1610/2019 PASSED BY
THE LEARNED I ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE AND LAND
ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT
AUTHORITY, VIJAYAPURA DATED 15.07.2023 AND ALLOW THE
ABOVE APPEAL AND TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND
AWARD DATED 15.07.2023 IN LAC NO.1610/2019 PASSED BY
THE LEARNED I ADDITIONAL DISTRCT JUDGE AND THE LAND
ACQUISTION, REHABILITATION ADN RESTTLEMENT
AUTHORITY, VIJAYAPURA, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND
EQUITY.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K V ARAVIND


Digitally Signed by KV
ARAVIND

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ORAL JUDGMENT
This appeal has been filed by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer, UKP, Vijayapur on 10.12.2024.
2. This appeal is filed with delay of 454 days. I.A.
No.01/2026 is filed on 03.09.2026 for condoning the said delay
in filing the appeal. The affidavit accompanying the application,
filed by Special Land Acquisition Officer, Vijayapura, seeks to
explain the delay. The reasons assigned are more or less
identical to those furnished in hundreds of matters filed by the
appellants, attributing the delay to administrative reasons and
movement of files.
3. This Court finds that the affidavit is bald and do not
explain the delay.
4. This appeal appears to have been filed only with a
view to frustrate the execution proceedings.
5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has, time and again,
held that public authorities entrusted with public duties and
public revenue are expected to exercise due diligence and
responsibility in dealing with public issues, public funds, and
Digitally Signed by KV
ARAVIND

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public property. The observations and directions issued by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court from time to time have, however, not
resulted in any discernible progress or improvement in the
conduct of the authorities or in the quality of litigation pursued
by them.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the
principles governing condonation of delay, has held that it is
not merely the number of days of delay that is relevant, but
whether sufficient and reasonable cause has been made out for
condoning the delay. In appropriate cases, however, the length
of the delay may also assume significance. It has further been
held that the applicant seeking condonation of delay must
furnish a reasonable and satisfactory explanation for the delay.
It has also been held that Government authorities do not enjoy
any special privilege/treatment in matters relating to delay and
stand on the same footing as any other litigant before the
Court.
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the
comprehensive principles on condonation of delay in filing
appeals. The relevant paragraph in the case of Shivamma v.
Digitally Signed by KV
ARAVIND

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Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969
reads as under:
“ v. Public Policy vis-à-vis Public Interest
in matters of delay on part of the State or any
of its instrumentalities.
228 . Limitation laws are themselves grounded
in public policy, as already discussed in the preceding
paragraphs of this judgment, it is based on the
maxim ‘interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium’ i.e., “it
is for the general welfare that a period be put to
litigation”. Therefore, public interest is better served
by timely governmental action than by condoning
repeated lapses. State cannot simultaneously seek to
represent the interest of the public and yet
consistently fail to protect that very interest by
allowing limitation periods to lapse.
229. Public interest is best served by ensuring
efficiency and diligence in governmental functioning,
rather than by condoning its lapses as a matter of
course. Thus, a liberal inclination towards the State
or any of its instrumentalities, in matters of
condonation of delay, cannot be adopted, merely on
the presumption that, if the delay is not condoned,
public interest runs the risk of suffering, by a
meritorious matter being thrown out. Public interest
lies not in condoning governmental indifference, but
in compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely
action.
230. To permit condonation of delay to become
a matter of course for the Government would have
the deleterious effect of institutionalising inefficiency.
It would, in substance, incentivise indolence and
foster a culture where accountability for delay is
eroded. If the State is assured that its lapses will
invariably be excused under the rubric of “public
Digitally Signed by KV
ARAVIND

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interest,” there would remain little incentive for its
officers to act with vigilance or for its
instrumentalities to streamline procedures for timely
action. The consequence would not be the
advancement of public interest but rather its
betrayal.
231. Public interest, therefore, does not lie in
condoning governmental negligence, but in
compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely
decision-making. This Court has time and again
emphasised that liberal condonation of delay on
behalf of the State, merely on the ground that refusal
might cause the dismissal of a potentially meritorious
matter, is a misplaced proposition. Public interest is
not synonymous with the cause of the Government;
it is, instead, synonymous with the enforcement of
rule of law, certainty in legal rights, and an
administrative machinery that functions with
diligence and accountability.
232. It must, therefore, be underscored that
the guiding principle is not the protection of
governmental indifference but the promotion of
responsible governance. The State is under a higher
duty to act in time, for in every matter it litigates, it
does so not in its private capacity, but as the trustee
of the people’s interest. Hence, repeated indulgence
in condoning delays on grounds of bureaucratic
inefficiency would amount to eroding the very object
of limitation statutes, which are enacted in every
civilised jurisdiction for the sake of finality, certainty,
and public order.
233. Any other view, would invariably defeat
the sound public policy embodied in the Limitation
Act and fail in enthusing efficiency in administration,
and bring a balance between accountability and
autonomy of action, It would result in giving
immunity or carte blanche power to act as it pleases
with the public at whim or vagary and inevitably spell
doom all over the collective responsibility that the
State and its instrumentalities are entrusted with.
Thus, we are of the considered opinion, that delay
Digitally Signed by KV
ARAVIND

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cannot be condoned, merely because not doing so
would result in non-suiting the State and thereby run
the ostensible risk of public interest suffering. Such
by no stretch can be the sole consideration for the
purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as to do so
would be to ignore the provision of Section 3 and the
overarching public policy of giving quietus to lis, that
forms the bedrock of the Limitation Act.
234. Even otherwise, it is no more res-integra,
that law of limitation has to be applied all but the
same and with all its rigour, even if it may harshly
affect a particular party. In Basawaraj (supra) this
Court observed that a result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation. Even if the
statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party the court has no
choice but to give full effect to the same. It is based
on the legal maxim dura lex sed lex i.e., “the law is
hard but it is the law”. The relevant observations
read as under: -
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that
law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied with
all its rigour when the statute so prescribes.
The court has no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds. ‘A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an
evil. A court has no power to ignore that
provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.’ The
statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the
court has no choice but to enforce it giving
full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura
lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but
it is the law”, stands attracted in such a
situation. It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
Digitally Signed by KV
ARAVIND

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13. The statute of limitation is founded on
public policy, its aim being to secure peace in
the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent
oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the
past which have not been agitated
unexplainably and have from lapse of time
become stale. [...]” (Emphasis supplied)
235. An application seeking condonation of
delay is to be decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court. In case there was no sufficient
cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on
time condoning the delay without any justification, on
lofty ideals amounts to passing an order in violation
of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the statute.”
xxx
249 . Once the State chooses to litigate, it must
shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the
same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit
the State to evade the consequences of delay on the
ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual
officers would amount to diluting the rigour of
limitation statutes and undermining their very object.
Such an approach would not only privilege the State
unjustly over private parties but would also
perpetuate a culture of indifference and
irresponsibility within the administration.
xxx
254 . We say so because if such observations
by the High Court, to condone delay in the interest of
a State-machinery, were allowed to be sustained by
us, it would allow the State-machineries a leeway to
systematically orchestrate delays in the guise of
laxity exhibited by their authorities. Given the
majesty and colossality a State-machinery would
hold against a private litigant, it would be grossly
Digitally Signed by KV
ARAVIND

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unfair to a litigant, who would be perpetually
entangled in the clutches of litigation, if enormous
delays, like that of almost 11 years in the present
case, are permitted to be condoned. This Court has
never turned a blind eye to the gradients of
substantive justice.
xxx
258 . The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into consideration
while considering whether the delay should be
condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of
the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their
own period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of
limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his
right to have the matter considered on merits
because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be
presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to
plead that the substantial justice deserves to be
preferred as against the technical considerations.
While considering the plea for condonation of delay,
the court must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain
the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the
other side is equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.

259 . We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The
rules of limitation are based on the principles of
sound public policy and principles of equity. We
should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging
over the head of the respondent for indefinite period
of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of
the appellants.

xxx
Digitally Signed by KV
ARAVIND

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V. CONCLUSION
261 . Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the
impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set
aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we
deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that
administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as
a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we
want to convey an emphatic message to all the High
Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous
and superficial grounds, until a proper case of
sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-
machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona
fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure
is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But
courts, and more particularly the constitutional
courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a
litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the
bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its
own lackadaisical attitude.

262 . The High Courts ought not give a
legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State
authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain
extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of
delay is a State-authority. They should not become
surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The
constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants
cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations,
wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable
orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains
to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the
High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with
inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by
doing so the courts only add insult to the injury,
more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of
the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to
questions of law.

263 . Limitation periods are prescribed to
maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for
finality. More than the importance of judicial time,
Digitally Signed by KV
ARAVIND

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what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited
means, who is to contest against an enormous State,
and its elaborate and never-exhausting
paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be
disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a
party litigating against the State, for whatever
reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay
in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens
the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such
litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is
our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not
sent from pillar to post to seek justice.
.
264 No litigant should be permitted to be so
lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by
the courts to misuse the process of law.”

8. Identical view has been expressed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in State of Odisha v. Managing Committee
of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191 .
The same reads as under:–
“16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were
consistently followed by this Court until adoption of a
different and seemingly strict approach while dealing with
applications for condonation of delay during the last
decade and a half became discernible starting with the
decision in Postmaster General v. Living Media India
Limited11, where a delay of 427 days in filing the relevant
special leave petition was not condoned. University of
Delhi v. Union of India12 is another decision (of a three-
Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of 916 days was
not condoned. While upholding the decision of the relevant
high court under challenge refusing to condone the delay
of 5659 days in presentation of an appeal under
Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs
of a deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in Pathapati
Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA)13 very recently reiterated
that the law of limitation is founded on public policy, the
Digitally Signed by KV
ARAVIND

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object is that a legal remedy is put to an end so that no
litigation remains pending for an indefinite period. It was
also held, departing from the earlier view, that the merits
of the case cannot be considered at the stage of
considering the application for condonation of delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj
Singh v. Union of India14 authoring the judgment for a
coordinate Bench adopted the view taken
in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other
decisions following the same while not interfering with an
order of condonation of delay passed by the relevant high
court. However, it was observed that a distinction ought to
be drawn between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is
proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was also
emphasized that a different approach has to be adopted
while this Court is considering an application for
condonation of delay in presentation of an
appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a
discretionary order of the high court granting the prayer
for condonation of delay. In the case of the former,
whether to condone or not would be the only question
whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper
exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for
condonation has to be examined.
Xxxxxxx
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur
Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt
that it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope.
It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down
in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much
optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships,
however, found no visible support for such optimism and
the Court's patience having been tested to the extreme
limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the
courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring
under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the
Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly
lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High
Court but also before this Court. Notwithstanding that its
appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court,
this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha
four months after expiry of the period of limitation.
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ARAVIND

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21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a
matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court
whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude
that is shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion that
the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha
is not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for
exercise of discretion has been set up.”
9. If the affidavit explaining the reasons assigned for
seeking condonation of delay is examined in the light of the
law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments
referred to (supra), no relevant dates are forthcoming. Largely,
the explanation relates to the movement of files and
administrative approvals. The explanation can only be said to
be an excuse and not bona fide . Any bona fide effort to prefer
the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation is
completely absent. Administrative delay and inter-
departmental correspondence cannot be considered sufficient
cause. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Government
and its instrumentalities are required to act with a higher
degree of diligence, accountability, and promptitude. The
explanation furnished must be reasonable, satisfactory, bona
fide , and cover the entire period of delay. In the present case,
the explanation can neither be said to be reasonable,
Digitally Signed by KV
ARAVIND

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satisfactory, nor bona fide , nor does it cover the entire period
of delay.
10. There is no explanation or ground made out as to
what prevented the appellants from approaching this Court
within the prescribed period of limitation. The affidavit has not
even made an attempt to explain the delay. In the light of the
above findings, and in the absence of any satisfactory,
reasonable, and bona fide explanation for the delay, this Court
finds that the application does not merit consideration and is
liable to be rejected.
Accordingly I.A. No.01/2026 is dismissed. Consequently,
the appeal also stands dismissed.
Pending I.As., if any, stand disposed of.
Digitally Signed by KV
ARAVIND

(K V ARAVIND)
JUDGE


VBS
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