Sanjeev Bhayana vs Air India Ltd And Ors

$~23
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
% Date of Decision: October 27 , 2026
# CNR No. DLHC010077772022
+ W.P.(C) 3138/2022
SANJEEV BHAYANA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Karanpreet Singh, Ms.
Prachi & Ms. Vani Sharma,
Advs.
versus
AIR INDIA LTD AND ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Avishkar Singhvi (through
V.C.), Mr. Amit Mishra, Mr.
Azeem Sameul, Ms.
Malakshara Goyal, Mr.
Vaibhav Kharbanda, Mr.
Mujeeb & Ms. Srijeta Pratik,
Advs. for R-1.
Ms. Anjana Gosain, Ms.
Akansha Chaudhary, Advs. for
R-4.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
AMIT MAHAJAN, J. (Oral)
1. By way of the present petition, the petitioner seeks the
following reliefs:
“a) Pass a Writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other
appropriate Writ/Order/Direction against the Respondent No.1, 2
and 3 thereby directing the Respondent No.1, 2 and 3 to refund the
airfare of the above said four tickets (E-Ticket No. 098-
3757799787,098-3757799788,098- 3757799784 and 098-
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Signed By:SANJAY
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.10.2026
16:53:40

3757799785) into the account of the Petitioner.;
b) Pass a Writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate
Writ/Order/Directions against the Respondent No.4 thereby
directing the Respondent No.4 to ensure the proper compliance of
the Circular dated 07.10.2020 and to take necessary actions
against the Respondent No.] and 2 for failing to comply with the
directions contained in the said Circular dated 07.10.2020; or c)
Pass any other Order( s) deem fit and necessary 111 the facts and
circumstances of the case.”
2. It is the grievance of the petitioner that he had booked four
round-trip air tickets for travel from Delhi to Frankfurt, Germany,
scheduled for 07.03.2020 and 12.03.2020, respectively, on flights
operated by Respondent No. 1, through Respondent No. 3, for a total
consideration of ₹1,09,688/-. However, in view of the COVID-19
pandemic, the petitioner sought to reschedule the journey and
requested Respondent No. 1 to waive the applicable date-change
charges. It contended that despite repeated follow-ups, his request was
not accepted, whereafter the tickets were converted into open tickets
upon imposition of cancellation charges. Subsequently, in view of the
prevailing restrictions on international travel and the inability of the
petitioner to undertake the journey, the petitioner sought a refund of
the airfare from Respondent No. 3 on 30.12.2020. However,
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have failed to refund the amount.
3. At the outset, the respondents have opposed the maintainability
of the present writ petition on the ground that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3
are private entities and are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is contended
that, following the disinvestment of the Government of India’s entire
shareholding in Air India in favour of Respondent No.2 on
27.01.2022, Respondent No. 1 ceased to be a government entity.
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Signed By:SANJAY
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.10.2026
16:53:40

4. It is pertinent to note that the present petition has been filed
after the Government of India sold 100% of its shareholding to
Respondent No.2. The Hon’ble Apex Court has also considered
whether writ petitions against Air India would be maintainable
pursuant to the aforesaid sale in R.S. Madireddy v. Union of Inida :
2024 SCC OnLine SC 965 and held as under:
“31. In order to be declared as “State” or “other authority”
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, it
would have to fall within the well-recognised parameters laid
down in a number of judgments of this Court. In this regard, we
may refer to the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute
of Chemical Biology21 wherein this Court after taking into
consideration the previous judgments on this point, observed as
follows:
“27.Ramana [(1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628] was
noted and quoted with approval in extenso and the tests
propounded for determining as to when a corporation can
be said to be an instrumentality or agency of the
Government therein were culled out and summarised as
follows : (SCC p. 737, para 9)
“(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the
corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way
towards indicating that the corporation is an
instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p. 507,
para 14)
(2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as
to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it
would afford some indication of the corporation being
impregnated with governmental character. (SCC p. 508,
para 15)
(3) It may also be a relevant factor … whether the
corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State-
conferred or State-protected. (SCC p. 508, para 15)
(4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may
afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency
or instrumentality. (SCC p. 508, para 15)
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Signed By:SANJAY
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.10.2026
16:53:40

(5) If the functions of the corporation are of public
importance and closely related to governmental functions,
it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation
as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p.
509, para 16)
(6) ‘Specifically, if a department of Government is
transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor
supportive of this inference’ of the corporation being an
instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p. 510,
para 18)”
40. The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests
formulated in Ajay Hasia [Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib
Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 258] are
not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any
one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a
State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each
case would be — whether in the light of the cumulative
facts as established, the body is financially, functionally
and administratively dominated by or under the control of
the Government. Such control must be particular to the
body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then
the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand,
when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute
or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.”
(emphasis supplied)
32. There is no dispute that the Government of India having
transferred its 100% share to the company Talace India Pvt Ltd.,
ceased to have any administrative control or deep pervasive
control over the private entity and hence, the company after its
disinvestment could not have been treated to be a State anymore
after having taken over by the private company. Thus,
unquestionably, the respondent No. 3(AIL) after its disinvestment
ceased to be a State or its instrumentality within the meaning of
Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
33. Once the respondent No. 3(AIL) ceased to be covered by the
definition of State within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India, it could not have been subjected to writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
34. A plain reading of Article 226 of the Constitution of India
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Signed By:SANJAY
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.10.2026
16:53:40

would make it clear that the High Court has the power to issue the
directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of Habeas
Corpus, Mandamus, Certiorari, Quo Warranto and Prohibition to
any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any
Government within its territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement
of rights conferred by Part-III of the Constitution of India and for
any other purpose.
35. This Court has interpreted the term ‘authority’ used in Article
226 in the case of Andi Mukta (supra), wherein it was held as
follows:
“17. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is
confined only to public authorities to compel performance
of public duty. The ‘public authority’ for them means
everybody which is created by statute—and whose powers
and duties are defined by statute. So government
departments, local authorities, police authorities, and
statutory undertakings and corporations, are all ‘public
authorities’. But there is no such limitation for our High
Courts to issue the writ ‘in the nature of mandamus’.
Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to
issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a
striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226,
writs can be issued to ‘any person or authority’. It can be
issued ‘for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights
and for any other purpose’.
*
20. The term ‘authority’ used in Article 226, in the context,
must receive a liberal meaning like the term in Article 12.
Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of
fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers
power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of
the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights.
The words ‘any person or authority’ used in Article 226
are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory
authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may
cover any other person or body performing public duty. The
form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What
is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body.
The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation
owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No
matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive
obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.”
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Signed By:SANJAY
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.10.2026
16:53:40

(emphasis supplied)
36. Further, in the case of Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas22,
this Court culled out the categories of body/persons who would be
amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court which are as
follows:
“18. From the decisions referred to above, the position that
emerges is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i) the
State (Government); (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body;
(iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v.) a
company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi) a
private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a
private body discharging public duty or positive obligation
of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under
liability to discharge any function under any statute, to
compel it to perform such a statutory function.”
37. The respondent No. 3(AIL), the erstwhile Government run
airline having been taken over by the private company Talace
India Pvt. Ltd., unquestionably, is not performing any public duty
inasmuch as it has taken over the Government company Air India
Limited for the purpose of commercial operations, plain and
simple, and thus no writ petition is maintainable against
respondent No. 3(AIL). The question No. 1 is decided in the above
manner.
38. The question of issuing a writ would only arise when the writ
petition is being decided. Thus, the issue about exercise of extra
ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India would arise only on the date when the writ petitions were
taken up for consideration and decision. The respondent No.
3(AIL)- employer was a government entity on the date of filing of
the writ petitions, which came to be decided after a significant
delay by which time, the company had been disinvested and taken
over by a private player. Since, respondent No. 3 employer had
been disinvested and had assumed the character of a private entity
not performing any public function, the High Court could not have
exercised the extra ordinary writ jurisdiction to issue a writ to such
private entity. The learned Division Bench has taken care to
protect the rights of the appellants to seek remedy and thus, it
cannot be said that the appellants have been non-suited in the case.
It is only that the appellants would have to approach another
forum for seeking their remedy. Thus, the question No. 2 is decided
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Signed By:SANJAY
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.10.2026
16:53:40

against the appellants.
39. By no stretch of imagination, the delay in disposal of the writ
petitions could have been a ground to continue with and maintain
the writ petitions because the forum that is the High Court where
the writ petitions were instituted could not have issued a writ to the
private respondent which had changed hands in the intervening
period. Hence, the question No. 3 is also decided against the
appellants.
40. Resultantly, the view taken by the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court in denying equitable relief to the appellants
herein and relegating them to approach the appropriate forum for
ventilating their grievances is the only just and permissible view.
41. We may also note that the appellants raised grievances by way
of filing the captioned writ petitions between 2011 and 2013
regarding various service-related issues which cropped up
between the appellants and the erstwhile employer between 2007
and 2010. Therefore, it is clear that the writ petitions came to be
instituted with substantial delay from the time when the cause of
action had accrued to the appellants.
42. It may further be noted that the Division Bench of Bombay
High Court, only denied equitable relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India to the appellants but at the same time, rights
of the appellants to claim relief in law before the appropriate
forum have been protected.
43. We may further observe that in case the appellants choose to
approach the appropriate forum for ventilating their grievances as
per law in light of the observations made by the Division Bench of
the Bombay High Court, Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963
shall come to the rescue insofar as the issue of limitation is
concerned.
44. In wake of the discussion made hereinabove, we do not find any
reason to take a different view from the one taken by the Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court in sustaining the preliminary
objection qua maintainability of the writ petitions preferred by the
appellants and rejecting the same as being not maintainable.”
5. In view of the aforesaid, it is evident that Respondent No. 1 is a
private entity and a writ petition would not be maintainable against it.
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Signed By:SANJAY
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.10.2026
16:53:40

Pursuant to the Government of India selling its entire shareholding to
Respondent No. 2 on 27.01.2022, Respondent No. 1 ceased to be a
government-owned entity and is no longer an instrumentality of the
State. The mere fact that Respondent No. 1 provides air transport
services, which are of public importance, would not, by itself, render
it amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are also private
entities and, therefore, a writ would not lie against them in the facts of
the present case.
6. The only direction sought against Respondent No. 4 is to ensure
compliance with its Circular dated 07.10.2020 and to take necessary
action against Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 for failing to comply with the
directions contained therein. However, the issuance of a writ of
mandamus requires a clear demonstration that the respondent against
whom such relief is sought has neglected to discharge a statutory duty.
Mandamus is an extraordinary judicial remedy exercised to compel a
public authority to perform a duty which it is legally obligated to
discharge but has failed to do so. In the present case, the petitioner has
failed to establish any such neglect or failure on the part of
Respondent No. 4 in the discharge of its statutory duties. In the
absence of any such demonstration, no case is made out for issuance
of a writ of mandamus against Respondent No. 4.
7. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds no grounds for
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
in the present case.
8. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed.
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Signed By:SANJAY
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.10.2026
16:53:40

9. The petitioner is at liberty to pursue alternate remedies
permissible in law, if any.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
OCTOBER 27, 2026
“SK”
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Signed By:SANJAY
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.10.2026
16:53:40