Ananda Kishore Kanu vs Jyoti Prasad Barua And 3 Ors.

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GAHC010187252014

2026:GAU-AS:12736
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : MACApp./268/2014
ANANDA KISHORE KANU
S/O LATE R.B. KANU BARUAPARA, WARD NO. 4, MANGALDAI TOWN,
DIST. DARRANG, ASSAM.
VERSUS
JYOTI PRASAD BARUA and 3 ORS.
S/O SRI MADAN BARUA, VILL. BHUKTABARI, P.O. and PL.S. SIPAJHAR,
DIST. DARRANG, ASSAM.
3:UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD.
GUWAHATI REGIONAL OFFICE
G.S. ROAD
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-6
KAMRUP ASSAM
4:NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD
MANGALDAI BRANCH
P.O. MANGALDAI
DIST. DARRANG
ASSAM
PIN 78412
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR.C GOSWAMI,
Advocate for the Respondent : MS.B BORAHR-4, MR.T BARUA,MR.S S SHARMA,MR.M
GOSWAMI,MR.B HALDAR,MR.B J MUKHERJEE,MS.L SHARMA,MRA SHARMA,MS.R D
MOZUMDAR(R-4)

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:: BEFORE ::
(HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PARTHIVJYOTI SAIKIA)

Advocate(s) for the Appellants : Mr. C. Goswami.

Advocate(s) for the Respondent(s) : Ms. R.D. Mazumdar.

Date on which judgment is reserved : 31.08.2026.
Date of pronouncement of judgment : 03.09.2026.
Whether the pronouncement is of the
operative part of the judgment? : YES.
Whether the full judgment has been
pronounced? : YES.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER (CAV)
Heard Mr. C. Goswami, learned counsel representing the appellant. Also heard Ms. R.D.
Mazumdar, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.4 i.e. the National Insurance Co. Ltd.

2. This is an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 challenging the judgment
and order dated 06.05.2014 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge (FTC), Darrang, Mangaldai in
MAC Case No.189/2011.
3. The factual matrix leading to filing of this appeal lies within a short compass. On 14.02.2010 at
about 12.40 P.M., the appellant was driving a Maruti Car bearing Registration No.AS-01-AB-9837.
When he reached Aulachowka on the National Highway No.52, the incoming Indica Car bearing
Registration No.AS-01-AJ-7741 had dashed against the car of the appellant. It was a head-on-collision
between the two vehicles and the appellant sustained injuries.
4. After hearing both sides and after going through the evidence adduced by the parties, the Tribunal
held that it was a head-on-collision between two vehicles and therefore, the Insurance Company shall
have to pay 50% of the total awarded amount of ₹4,60,000/-. In fact, the Insurance Company was
directed to pay half of the said amount, which stood at ₹2,30,000/-.
5. Mr. Goswami has submitted that every head-on-collision between two vehicles, does not mean
that both of them are equally responsible for the accident.
6. Mr. Goswami has relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that was delivered in
Municipal Corpn., Greater Bombay v. Laxman Iyer , (2003) 8 SCC 731 . Paragraph 6 of the said
judgment is quoted as under:

“ 6. The plea which was stressed strenuously related to alleged contributory negligence. Though there is

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no statutory definition, in common parlance “negligence” is categorised as either composite or
contributory. It is first necessary to find out what is a negligent act. Negligence is omission of duty
caused either by an omission to do something which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations,
who ordinarily by reason of conduct of human affairs would do or be obligated to, or by doing
something which a prudent or reasonable man would not do. Negligence does not always mean absolute
carelessness, but want of such a degree of care as is required in particular circumstances. Negligence is
failure to observe, for the protection of the interests of another person, the degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The idea of
negligence and duty are strictly correlative. Negligence means either subjectively a careless state of
mind, or objectively careless conduct. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one; it is
rather a comparative term. No absolute standard can be fixed and no mathematically exact formula can
be laid down by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. What
constitutes negligence varies under different conditions and in determining whether negligence exists in
a particular case, or whether a mere act or course of conduct amounts to negligence, all the attending and
surrounding facts and circumstances have to be taken into account. It is absence of care according to
circumstances. To determine whether an act would be or would not be negligent, it is relevant to
determine if any reasonable man would foresee that the act would cause damage or not. The omission to
do what the law obligates or even the failure to do anything in a manner, mode or method envisaged by
law would equally and per se constitute negligence on the part of such person. If the answer is in the
affirmative, it is a negligent act. Where an accident is due to negligence of both parties, substantially
there would be contributory negligence and both would be blamed. In a case of contributory negligence,
the crucial question on which liability depends would be whether either party could, by exercise of
reasonable care, have avoided the consequence of the other's negligence. Whichever party could have
avoided the consequence of the other's negligence would be liable for the accident. If a person's
negligent act or omission was the proximate and immediate cause of death, the fact that the person
suffering injury was himself negligent and also contributed to the accident or other circumstances by
which the injury was caused would not afford a defence to the other. Contributory negligence is
applicable solely to the conduct of a plaintiff. It means that there has been an act or omission on the part
of the plaintiff which has materially contributed to the damage, the act or omission being of such a
nature that it may properly be described as negligence, although negligence is not given its usual
meaning. (See Charlesworth on Negligence , 3rd Edn., para 328.) It is now well settled that in the case of
contributory negligence, courts have the power to apportion the loss between the parties as seems just
and equitable. Apportionment in that context means that damage is reduced to such an extent as the court
thinks just and equitable having regard to the claim shared in the responsibility for the damage. But in a
case where there has been no contributory negligence on the part of the victim, the question of

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apportionment does not arise. Where a person is injured without any negligence on his part but as a
result of the combined effect of the negligence of two other persons, it is not a case of contributory
negligence in that sense. It is a case of what has been styled by Pollock as injury by composite
negligence. (See Pollock on Torts , 15th Edn., p. 361.).”

7. Per contra, Ms. Mazumdar has relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that was
delivered in Bijay Kumar Dugar v. Bidyadhar Dutta & Ors ., reported in (2006) 3 SCC 242 . In
paragraph 12 of the said judgment, it is held that when the vehicles had a head-on-collision, the drivers
of both the vehicles should be held responsible to have contributed equally to the accident.
8. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels of both sides.
9. This Court is of the opinion that the learned Tribunal had correctly held that both the vehicles
were equally responsible for the accident and correctly directed the Insurance Company to pay 50% of
the total awarded amount.
10. Under the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that this appeal has no merit at all
and stands dismissed accordingly.
Send back the T.C.R.

JUDGE
Comparing Assistant