THE JANHIT THRIFT AND CREDIT CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LIMITED vs PRABH DYAL

Court
High Court of Himachal Pradesh

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 640 of 2026
Reserved on: 2.11.2026
Date of Decision: 19.11.2026.
Janhit Thrift & Credit Co-operative Society ...Petitioner
Versus
Prabh Dyal ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge.
1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
For the Petitioner : Mr Lokesh Thakur, Advocate,
vice Mr G.R. Palsra, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Nemo.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present revision against
the judgment dated 16.7.2026, passed by the learned Sessions
Judge, Mandi, District Mandi (learned Appellate Court), vide
which the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mandi (learned Trial Court), was
upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for
convenience) .
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act (in short, ‘NI Act’). It was asserted that the
accused availed a personal loan facility of ₹1,25,000/- from the
complainant society. The accused defaulted in the repayment of
the loan, and he was liable to pay ₹2,06,624/- to the
complainant. The accused issued a cheque of ₹2,06,624/- to the
complainant to discharge his liability. The complainant
presented the cheque before the bank, but it was dishonoured
with the endorsement "insufficient funds". The complainant
issued a notice to the accused on 30.4.2019 through registered
post. The notice was duly served upon the accused, but the
accused failed to repay the money; hence, the complaint was
filed before the learned Trial Court against the accused for
taking action against him as per the law.
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3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of
accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded
not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The complainant examined Manoj Kumar, Branch
Manager (CW-1), to prove the complaint.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), stated that he had
paid ₹50,000/- earlier and was liable to pay ₹15,000/- to
₹20,000/-. He did not produce any evidence despite repeated
opportunities, and his evidence was closed by the order of the
Court.
6. The learned Trial Court held that the loan was
advanced on 29.9.2014 as per the complaint, and the cheque was
issued on 11.4.2019. The period of limitation for recovery of the
debt is three years. The accused had not executed any document
acknowledging his liability regarding the repayment of the loan.
The cheque was issued after the expiry of three years from the
date of taking the loan. The debt was time-barred on the date of
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issuance of the cheque. The cheque was not issued towards the
legally enforceable debt/liability; hence, the complaint was
dismissed.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court, the complainant filed an appeal, which was
decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, District Mandi
(learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court
concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court
that the loan was taken in the year 2014 and the cheque was
issued in the year 2019. The cheque was issued towards the
repayment of a time-barred debt. The learned Trial Court had
rightly held that the cheque was not towards a legally
enforceable debt/liability; there was no infirmity in the
judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal
was dismissed.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgments passed by the
learned Courts below, the complainant has filed the present
revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in
dismissing the complaint. Section 49 of the H.P. Cooperative
Societies Act overrides the general provisions contained in the
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Limitation Act, and the learned Courts below erred in applying
the provisions of the Limitation Act to the present case. The
accused admitted the part-payment of ₹50,000/-, which
constituted an acknowledgement reviving the period of
limitation. This fact was ignored by the learned Courts below.
The cheque carried with it a presumption that it was issued for
consideration, and this presumption was ignored by the learned
Courts below. The statement of account shows that the
respondent had paid ₹500/- to the complainant on 7.10.2016,
which had the effect of reviving the period of limitation. This
was ignored by the learned Courts below. Therefore, it was
prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments
passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
9. An application for leading additional evidence has
also been filed by the applicant/complainant, asserting that the
applicant/complainant had filed the statement of account along
with the complaint, which could not be exhibited. The applicant
wants to exhibit the material document, which demonstrates
that the non-applicant/respondent had made a payment of
₹500/- in his loan account on 7.10.2016. The complaint was filed
on 13.6.2019, within limitation. The exhibition of the document
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is necessary to decide the present case. Hence, it was prayed that
the present application be allowed.
10. Mr Lokesh Thakur, learned vice counsel appearing
for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Courts below erred
in dismissing the complaint after holding that it is barred by
limitation. The accused had acknowledged the liability by
making payment of ₹500/- on 7.10.2016, and the complaint was
within limitation. Therefore, he prayed that the application for
additional evidence be allowed and the judgments passed by the
learned Courts below be set aside.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ganesha v. Sharanappa , (2014) 1 SCC 87: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 1014
that interference with the acquittal is required when there is
manifest error of law or fact or the order suffers from glaring
illegality resulting in miscarriage of justice. It was observed at
page 91:
11. However, in a case where the finding of acquittal is
recorded on account of misreading of evidence or non-
consideration of evidence or perverse appreciation of
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evidence, nothing prevents the High Court from setting
aside the order of acquittal at the instance of the
informant in revision and directing fresh disposal on
merit by the trial court. In the event of such direction, the
trial court shall be obliged to reappraise the evidence in
light of the observation of the Revisional Court and take
an independent view uninfluenced by any of the
observations of the Revisional Court on the merits of the
case. By way of abundant caution, we may herein observe
that interference with the order of acquittal in revision is
called for only in cases where there is manifest error of
law or procedure and in those exceptional cases in which
it is found that the order of acquittal suffers from glaring
illegality, resulting in miscarriage of justice. The High
Court may also interfere in those cases of acquittal caused
by shutting out the evidence which otherwise ought to
have been considered or where the material evidence
which clinches the issue has been overlooked. In such an
exceptional case, the High Court in revision can set aside
an order of acquittal, but it cannot convert an order of
acquittal into that of an order of conviction. The only
course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is
to order retrial.
13. Before adverting to the merits of the revision, it is
necessary to dispose of an application for production of
additional evidence filed on behalf of the petitioner/applicant
under Section 432 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (BNSS) corresponding to Section 391 of the Cr.P.C.
14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of Rajasthan v. Asharam, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 423 , that
Sections 311 and 391 of Cr. P.C. deal with the power of the Court
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to take additional evidence. Section 311 deals with the trial, while
Section 391 deals with the appeal. The Appellate Court can
examine the evidence, but it does not possess the wide powers
conferred upon the Trial Court. It was observed:
“6. Both Sections 311 and 391 of the Cr. P.C. relate to the
power of the court to take additional evidence; the former
at the stage of trial and before the judgment is
pronounced; and the latter at the appellate stage after
judgment by the trial court has been pronounced. It may
not be entirely correct to state that the same
considerations would apply to both situations, as there is
a difference in the stages. Section 311 of the Cr. P.C.
consists of two parts; the first gives power to the court to
summon any witness at any stage of inquiry, trial or other
proceedings, whether the person is listed as a witness or
is in attendance though not summoned as a witness.
Secondly, the trial court has the power to recall and re-
examine any person already examined if his evidence
appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. On
the other hand, the discretion under Section 391 of the Cr.
P.C. should be read as somewhat more restricted in
comparison to Section 311 of the Cr. P.C., as the appellate
court is dealing with an appeal, after the trial court has
come to a conclusion with regard to the guilt or otherwise
of the person being prosecuted. The appellate court can
examine the evidence in depth and detail, yet it does not
possess all the powers of the trial court, as it deals with
cases wherein the decision has already been
pronounced.”
15. It was laid down in Sukhjeet Singh v. State of U.P. ,
(2019) 16 SCC 712: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 434: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 72 ,
that the additional evidence can be taken by the Appellate Court
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if the evidence is necessary for just determination of the case;
however, Section 391 cannot be used for retrial. The order should
not be made if the party had sufficient opportunities and had not
availed those opportunities. It was observed at page 722:
“24. Power to take additional evidence under Section 391
is, thus, with an object to appropriately decide the appeal
by the appellate court to secure ends of justice. The scope
and ambit of Section 391 CrPC has come up for
consideration before this Court in Rajeswar Prasad Misra
v. State of W.B. [Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B., AIR
1965 SC 1887: (1965) 2 Cri LJ 817]. Hidayatullah, J.,
speaking for the Bench, held that a wide discretion is
conferred on the appellate courts and the additional
evidence may be necessary for a variety of reasons. He
held that additional evidence must be necessary not
because it would be impossible to pronounce judgment
but because there would be a failure of justice without it .
The following was laid down in paras 8 and 9: (AIR p.
1892)
“ 8 . … Since a wide discretion is conferred on appellate
courts, the limits of that court's jurisdiction must
obviously be dictated by the exigency of the situation and
fair play, and good sense appear to be the only safe
guides. There is no doubt, some analogy between the
power to order a retrial and the power to take additional
evidence. The former is an extreme step appropriately
taken if additional evidence will not suffice. Both actions
subsume failure of justice as a condition precedent.
There, the resemblance ends, and it is hardly proper to
construe one section with the aid of observations made by
this Court in the interpretation of the other section.
9 . Additional evidence may be necessary for a variety of
reasons, which it is hardly necessary (even if it were
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possible) to list here. We do not propose to do what the
legislature has refrained from doing, namely, to control
the discretion of the appellate court under certain stated
circumstances. It may, however, be said that additional
evidence must be necessary not because it would be
impossible to pronounce judgment but because there
would be a failure of justice without it. The power must be
exercised sparingly and only in suitable cases. Once such
action is justified, there is no restriction on the kind of
evidence that may be received. It may be formal or
substantial. It must, of course, not be received in such a
way as to cause prejudice to the accused, as, for example,
it should not be received as a disguise for a retrial or to
change the nature of the case against him. The order must
not ordinarily be made if the prosecution has had a fair
opportunity and has not availed of it unless the
requirements of justice dictate otherwise.”
25. This Court, again, in Rambhau v. State of Maharashtra
[Rambhau v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 4 SCC 759: 2001
SCC (Cri) 812], had noted the power under Section 391
CrPC of the appellate court. The following was stated in
paras 1 and 2 : (SCC p. 761)
1 . There is a very wide discretion available in the
matter of obtaining additional evidence in terms of
Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A
plain look at the statutory provisions (Section 391)
would reveal the same…
2 . A word of caution, however, ought to be
introduced for guidance, to wit: that this additional
evidence cannot and ought not to be received in
such a way as to cause any prejudice to the accused.
It is not a disguise for a retrial or to change the
nature of the case against the accused. This Court in
Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B. [Rajeswar
Prasad Misra v. State of W.B., AIR 1965 SC 1887: (1965)
2 Cri LJ 817] in no uncertain terms observed that the
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order must not ordinarily be made if the prosecution
has had a fair opportunity and has not availed of it.
This Court was candid enough to record, however,
that it is the concept of justice which ought to
prevail, and in the event, the same dictates exercise
of power as conferred by the Code, there ought not
to be any hesitation in that regard.”
26. From the law laid down by this Court as noted
above, it is clear that there are no fetters on the
power under Section 391 CrPC of the appellate
court. All powers are conferred on the court to
secure the ends of justice. The ultimate object of
judicial administration is to secure the ends of
justice. The court exists for rendering justice to the
people.” (Emphasis supplied)
16. This position was reiterated in State (NCT of Delhi) v.
Pankaj Chaudhary , (2019) 11 SCC 575: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 264: 2018
SCC OnLine SC 2256 , and it was held that this power should not
be exercised to fill up the gaps by either side, especially to
reverse the judgment of the learned Trial Court. It was observed
at page 586:
“25. The High Court observed that the trial court erred in
saying that the accused failed to prove the making of
previous complaints against the prosecutrix. While saying
so, the High Court referred to certain complaints made
against the prosecutrix, including the one allegedly given
on 21-7-1997, which were produced by the Bar at the time
of arguments. The power conferred under Section 391
CrPC is to be exercised with great care and caution. In
dealing with any appeal, the appellate court can refer to
the additional evidence only if the same has been
recorded as provided under Section 391 CrPC. Any
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material produced before the appellate court to fill in the
gaps by either side cannot be considered by the appellate
court; more so, to reverse the judgment of the trial
court.”
17. Similarly, it was held in H.N. Jagadeesh v. R.
Rajeshwari , (2019) 16 SCC 730: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 450: (2020) 2
SCC (Civ) 758: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1813 , that where the
complainant had failed to produce the notice before the learned
Trial Court, he could not be permitted to lead the evidence
before the learned Appellate Court to prove it. It was observed at
page 731:
“6. We are unable to agree with this approach of the High
Court, in the facts of this case, which is inappropriate in
law. The service of the statutory notice calling upon the
drawer of the cheque (after it has been dishonoured) to
pay the amount of the cheque is a necessary precondition
for filing the complaint under Section 138 of the Act.
Therefore, it was incumbent upon the respondent to
produce the said statutory notice on record to prove the
same as well. In this case, this document was not even
filed by the respondent along with the complaint, and the
question of proving the same was, therefore, a far cry. In
a case like this, we fail to understand how the aforesaid
omission on the part of the respondent in not prosecuting
the complaint properly could be ignored, and another
chance could have been given to the respondent to prove
the case by producing further evidence. It clearly amounts
to giving an opportunity to the respondent to fill up the
lacuna.”
18. It was laid down in Rajvinder Singh v. State of
Haryana , (2016) 14 SCC 671: (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 421: 2015 SCC
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OnLine SC 971 that where it was possible to examine the Forensic
Expert at the trial stage, an application to examine him at the
appellate stage cannot be allowed. It was observed at page 677
“12. At the outset, we must deal with submissions as
regards the application for leading additional evidence at
the appellate stage. It has been the consistent defence of
the appellant that the dead body found in agricultural
fields in District Muzaffarnagar was that of Pushpa
Verma, and he went to the extent of producing a
photograph of the dead body in the present trial. He also
examined Brahm Pal Singh, Sub-Inspector and other
witnesses. It was certainly possible to examine a forensic
expert at the trial court stage itself, and the High Court
was right and justified in rejecting the prayer to lead
additional evidence at the appellate stage. Nonetheless,
we have gone through the report of the said forensic
expert engaged by the appellant. The exercise undertaken
by that expert is to start with the admitted photograph of
Pushpa Verma on a computer, then remove the “bindi” by
some process on the computer, then by the same process
remove her spectacles and by computer imaging change
the image as it would have looked if the lady was lying
down in an injured condition. The computer image so
changed was then compared with the photograph of the
dead body. We have seen both the images, and we are not
convinced at all about any element of similarity. We do
not, therefore, see any reason to differ from the view
taken by the High Court.”
19. It was held in Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of
Gujarat , (2024) 4 SCC 453: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 77 , that the power
under Section 391 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised when the party was
prevented from presenting the evidence despite the exercise of
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due diligence or the facts giving rise to such prayer came to light
during the pendency of the appeal. It was observed at page 455:
“8. At the outset, we may note that the law is well-settled
by a catena of judgments rendered by this Court that the
power to record additional evidence under Section 391
Cr.P.C. should only be exercised when the party making
such request was prevented from presenting the evidence
in the trial despite due diligence being exercised or that
the facts giving rise to such prayer came to light at a later
stage during pendency of the appeal and that non-
recording of such evidence may lead to failure of justice.”
20. In the present case, the complainant never asserted
in his complaint that the accused had acknowledged the liability
by making the payment on 7.10.2016. The complainant's
witness, Manoj Kumar (CW-1), had also not asserted this fact.
Therefore, there is no material on record in support of the
averment that the accused had made the payment on 7.10.2016.
21. In any case, the payment made by the debtor is not
sufficient. It was held by this Court in Kangra District Wholesale
Co-operative Supplies and Marketing Society Limited v. Buta Mal
Sohan Lal , 1996 SCC OnLine HP 58 that a person is required to
prove the acknowledgement by the debtor in writing to take the
benefit of Section 19 of the Limitation Act to extend the period of
limitation by proving the payment of debt. It was observed:
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“11. The bare reading of the above provision shows that in
order to attract the operation of this Section, two
essential conditions are:
(i) the payment must be made within the prescribed
period of limitation; and
(ii) such payment must be acknowledged by some
form of writing either in the handwriting of the
payer himself or signed by him.
12. The scope of Section 20, Limitation Act, 1908, which
corresponds to Section 19, Limitation Act, 1963, came up
for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sant
Lal Mahton v. Kamla Prasad, 1951 SCC 1008: AIR 1951 SC
477 , wherein it was held in the following terms:
“It is the payment which really extends the period of
limitation under Section 20, Limitation Act; but the
payment has got to be proved in a particular way, and
for reasons of policy the Legislature insists on a
written or signed acknowledgement as the only proof
of payment and excludes oral testimony. Unless,
therefore, there is acknowledgement in the required
form, the payment by itself is of no avail. …. However,
while the section requires that payment should be
made within the period of limitation, it does not
require that the acknowledgement should also be
made within that period. To interpret the proviso in
that way would be to import into it certain words
which do not occur there.”
13. The Hon'ble Apex Court further held that while it is
not necessary that the written acknowledgement should
be made prior to expiry of the period of limitation, it is
essential that such acknowledgement, whether made
before or after the period of limitation, must be in
existence prior to the institution of the suit.
14. In the said case, before the Hon'ble Apex Court,
though there was evidence showing part payment
towards the debt, there was no written acknowledgement
in support of such part payment by the debtor. In the
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written statement filed by the debtor, he had admitted
and acknowledged the part payment having been made by
him. The Hon'ble Apex Court came to the conclusion that
such acknowledgement in the written statement, having
been made after the institution of the suit, was of no
consequence and would not extend the period of
limitation under Section 20, Limitation Act, 1908.
15. In Syed Jalaluddin Hasan Quadri v. Tarapharmacy
represented by its Managing Partner, Tarachand Agarwal,
AIR 1966 Andhra Pradesh 136 , it was held that in order to
save limitation under Section 19, Limitation Act, 1963 by
payment of some money towards the transaction, the
payment ought to have been made in writing or under the
signature of the debtor. Mere payment recorded by the
creditor in the account would not attract Section 19 of the
Limitation Act, 1963.
16. In A. Ramavel v. Pandyan Automobiles Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1973
Madras 359 , where part payment towards the debt was
shown to have been made by cheque drawn by the
brother-in-law of the debtor, while dealing with the
scope of Section 20 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it was
held:
“In order to give a fresh start of limitation under
Section 20, the payment should have been
acknowledged in writing by the person making the
payment. If the payment towards the debt was made
by the debtor himself, the writing required is the
writing of the debtor. But if the debtor chooses to pay
the amount towards the debt through his authorised
agent, then the acknowledgement in writing must be
by the agent who actually paid the amount towards the
debt. But, in this case, the payment was made by the
debtor himself, but the cheque was drawn by V.K.
Jagannathan, who is stated to be the brother-in-law of
the debtor. It is true that, if the cheque had been drawn
by the defendant himself in favour of the plaintiff and
that payment was accepted by the plaintiff, that
cheque would amount to an ‘acknowledgement’ in
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writing which would give a fresh period of limitation.
But, in this case, the cheque was not issued by the
defendant (debtor), but it was drawn by V.K.
Jagannathan. The payment was actually made by the
defendant. Therefore, Section 20 is not complied with
in order to get a fresh period of limitation. Section 20
is a special provision which enables the creditor to get
a fresh period of limitation when there is an
acknowledgement in writing by the debtor. In my
opinion, the conditions laid down in this section will
have to be strictly complied with, and there is no
question of an extension of that principle to any other
category of acknowledgement. The acknowledgement
in this case is not in conformity with the provisions of
Section 20 and, therefore, the plaintiff will not be
entitled to a fresh period of limitation from the date of
that payment.”
17. A similar view has been taken by the High Court of
Allahabad in Maqsoon Khan v. Lala Balwant Prasad, AIR
1982 Allahabad 41 .
22. A similar view was taken in Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd.
v. Assam SEB , (2020) 2 SCC 677: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1643, wherein
it was observed at page 684:
15. Order 7 Rule 6 uses the words “the plaint shall show
the ground upon which exemption from such law is
claimed”. The exemptions provided under Sections 4 to
20 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are based on certain facts
and events. Section 19, with which we are concerned,
provides for a fresh period of limitation, which is founded
on certain facts, i.e. ( i ) whether payment on account of
debt or of interest on legacy is made before the expiration
of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the
debt or legacy, ( ii ) an acknowledgement of the payment
appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by,
the person making the payment.
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16. We may notice the judgment of this Court dealing with
Section 20 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which was akin to
the present Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In Sant
Lal Mahton v. Kamla Prasad [Sant Lal Mahton v. Kamla
Prasad, 1951 SCC 1008: AIR 1951 SC 477] , this Court held
that for the applicability of Section 20 of the Limitation
Act, 1908, two conditions were essential: that the
payment must be made within the prescribed period of
limitation, and it must be acknowledged by some form of
writing either in the handwriting of the payer himself or
signed by him. This Court further held that for claiming
benefit of exemption under Section 20, there has to be
pleading and proof. In paras 9 and 10, the following has
been laid down : (AIR p. 479)
“ 9 . It would be clear, we think, from the language of
Section 20, Limitation Act, that to attract its
operations two conditions are essential: first, the
payment must be made within the prescribed period of
limitation and secondly, it must be acknowledged by
some form of writing either in the handwriting of the
payer himself or signed by him. We agree with the
Subordinate Judge that it is the payment which really
extends the period of limitation under Section 20,
Limitation Act; but the payment has got to be proved
in a particular way, and for reasons of policy the
legislature insists on a written or signed
acknowledgement as the only proof of payment and
excludes oral testimony. Unless, therefore, there is
acknowledgement in the required form, the payment
by itself is of no avail. The Subordinate Judge,
however, is right in holding that while the section
requires that the payment should be made within the
period of limitation, it does not require that the
acknowledgement should also be made within that
period. To interpret the proviso in that way would be
to import into it certain words which do not occur
there. This is the view taken by almost all the High
Courts in India, and to us it seems to be a proper view
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to take. (See Mohd. Moizuddin Mia v. Nalini Bala Devi
[Mohd. Moizuddin Mia v. Nalini Bala Devi, 1937 SCC
OnLine Cal 20 : AIR 1937 Cal 284 : ILR (1937) 2 Cal 137] ;
Lal Singh v. Gulab Rai [Lal Singh v. Gulab Rai, 1932 SCC
OnLine All 265 : ILR (1933) 55 All 280] , Venkata Subbhu
v. Appu Sundaram [Venkata Subbhu v. Appu Sundaram,
ILR (1894) 17 Mad 92] , Ram Prasad Babu v. Mohan Lal
Babu [Ram Prasad Babu v. Mohan Lal Babu, 1922 SCC
OnLine MP 10 : AIR 1923 Nag 117] and Vishwanath
Raghunath Kale v. Mahadeo Rajaram Saraf [Vishwanath
Raghunath Kale v. Mahadeo Rajaram Saraf, 1933 SCC
OnLine Bom 3 : ILR (1933) 57 Bom 453] .)
10 . … If the plaintiff's right of action is apparently
barred under the statute of limitation, Order 7 Rule 6,
Civil Procedure Code makes it his duty to state
specifically in the plaint the grounds of exemption
allowed by the Limitation Act, upon which he relies to
exclude its operation; and if the plaintiff has got to
allege in his plaint the facts which entitle him to
exemption, obviously these facts must be in existence
at or before the time when the plaint is filed; facts
which come into existence after the filing of the plaint
cannot be called in aid to revive a right of action which
was dead at the date of the suit. To claim exemption
under Section 20, Limitation Act, the plaintiff must be
in a position to allege and prove not only that there
was payment of interest on a debt or part-payment of
the principal, but that such payment had been
acknowledged in writing in the manner contemplated
by that section.”
23. In the present case, no written acknowledgement
was produced, and the mere production of a statement of
account containing payment is not sufficient.
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24. It is undisputed that the statement of account was
filed before the learned Trial Court; however, it was not
exhibited. It has been asserted that the document could not be
exhibited inadvertently, which does not amount to sufficient
cause. It was held by this Court in Pohu Lal v. Kamla Devi, 2001
(2) Shim. LC 384, that inadvertence is a form of negligence.
Therefore, the application does not disclose any exercise of due
diligence.
25. Further, the statement of account shows that there is
an entry of "TFR from DDS-406", which shows that the amount
was not paid by the debtor/accused, but was transferred from
some other account. Section 19 of the Limitation Act provides
that the payment should have been made by the debtor before it
can extend the period of limitation. Therefore, the requirement
laid down under Section 19 of the Limitation Act is not satisfied.
Therefore, the document, even if taken on record, would not
assist the Court in determining the dispute pending before the
Court, and the application for additional evidence cannot be
allowed.
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26. The complainant specifically asserted in the
complaint that the accused had taken a loan of ₹1,25,000/- on
29.9.2014. Article 19 of the Limitation Act deals with the
limitation for money payable for money lent and prescribes the
period of three years from the date when the amount is paid.
Therefore, the period of limitation had expired on 28.9.2017, and
the cheque issued on 11.4.2019 was towards a time-barred debt.
Learned Courts below had rightly held that a cheque issued
towards the repayment of a time-barred debt was not towards a
legally enforceable debt. They had rightly relied upon the
judgment of this Court in Social Leasing (India) Ltd. v. Rajan
Kumar Kanthwal, 2025 SCC OnLine HP 3131 , and the conclusion of
the learned Courts below cannot be faulted.
27. It was submitted that Section 49 of the H.P.
Cooperative Societies Act excludes the provisions of the
Limitation Act and the learned Courts below erred in applying
the provisions of the Limitation Act to the present case. This
submission is only stated to be rejected. It was laid down by this
Court in Jogindera Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Addl. Registrar
(Mon.) Cooperative Societies and Ors. (19.05.2025-HPHC): MANU/
HP/ 0751/2025 that Section 49 of the Cooperative Societies Act
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excludes the provisions of limitation regarding Sections 69, 73,
and 88 of the Act, and the provisions of limitation would apply
to all other acts. It was observed:
11. A perusal of Section 49 of the Act of 1968 would make
it crystal clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act
have been excluded in its applicability only qua Sections
69, 73 and 88 of the Act of 1968. Meaning thereby that the
provisions of the Limitation Act, excluding the aforesaid
Sections, would be applicable to all the other provisions
of the Act of 1968, including the appeals and reviews filed
thereunder.
12. The legislature has taken a conscious decision by
excluding the provisions of the Limitation Act only to
three sections of the Act of 1968 and making other
provisions applicable as contained in the Act of 1968.
Meaning, thereby, that from the scheme of the Act of
1968, it can be found that the legislative intent was not to
exclude the applicability of the provisions of the
Limitation Act. There cannot be any dispute to the
proposition that if the legislative scheme of special or
local law indicates that enactment intended applicability
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, then Section 5 of the
Limitation Act shall be applicable independent with
operation of Section 29 thereof.
xxxxxx
18. In view of aforesaid discussions and for the reasons
stated hereinabove, findings regarding non-applicability
of the provisions of Limitation Act including Section 5
thereof to the proceedings conducted under the Act of
1968 more particularly Section 93 and Rules framed
thereunder are perverse and accordingly set aside and it is
specially held that the provisions of the Limitation Act in
terms of Section 49 of the Act of 1968 are excluded to its
applicability to proceedings taken under Sections 69, 73
and 88 of the Act of 1968 and are not applicable to all
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other provisions of the Act of 1968 including Sections 93,
94 etc. The questions of law are answered accordingly.
28. In the present case, the proceedings have not been
initiated under Sections 69, 73, or 88 of the H.P. Cooperative
Societies Act; hence, Section 49 does not apply to the present
proceedings.
29. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the judgments
passed by the learned Courts below, and the present revision
fails and is dismissed.
30. The present revision stands disposed of, so also the
pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.
31. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the
learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
th
19 November, 2026
(Chander)
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