Kamal K Singh vs Pinpoint Multi Strategy Master Fund

CNR No : HCBM020182272026

sns 8-osapp-18227-2026.doc12 pt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
APPEAL (L) NO.18227 OF 2026
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO.20351 OF 2026
Kamal Singh, ]
Occupation: Business, ]
residing at 141 & 151, ]
Maker Tower A, Cuffe Parade, ]
Mumbai – 400 005. ] … Appellant/Applicant
V/s.
1. Pinpoint Multi Strategy Master Fund ]
(formerly known as Pinpoint Multi ]
Strategy Fund) having its registered ]
office at: C/o. Campbells Corporate ]
Services Ltd., Floor 4, Willow House ]
Cricket Square, George Town, ]
Grand Cayman KY1-9010, Cayman ]
Islands. ]
Also at: C/o. Pinpoint Asset ]
Management (Singapore) Pte. Ltd., ]
1 Wallich Street, #24-05 Guoco ]
Tower, Singapore, Central Singapore ]
(SG-01) 078881, Singapore. ]
2. Value Partners Greater China High ]
Yield Income Fund, ]
having its registered office at: ]
c/o. Maples Corporate Services ]
Limited, P. O. Box 309, Ugland ]
House, Grand Cayman KY1-1104, ]
Cayman Islands. ]
3. Value Partners Fixed Income SPC - ]
Value Partners Credit ]
1/17
Digitally
signed by
SUMEDH
NAMDEO
SONAWANE
Date:
2026.07.30
15:13:29
+0530
SUMEDH
NAMDEO
SONAWANE
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Opportunities Fund, ]
having its registered office at: ]
c/o. Maples Corporate Services ]
Limited, P.O. Box 309, ]
Ugland House, Grand Cayman ]
KY1-1104, Cayman Islands. ] … Respondent
______________________________________
Mr. J. P. Sen, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Shyam Kapadia, Ms. Simiti Tewari,
Mr. Nutash Kotwal, Ms. Riya Kamdar, Mr. Aditya Nair and Mr. Ojasi Nagar
i/by Khaitan Legal Associates for the Appellant/Applicant.
Mr. Venkatesh Dhond a/w. Mr. Rohaan Cama, Mr. Anuj Berry, Ms. Shalaka
Patil, Ms. Shilpa Singh Sengar, Mr. Kartikey Bhalotia, Ms. Jasleen Virk i/by
Trilegal for the Respondent No.1.
_____________________________________________
CORAM : A. S. GADKARI AND
KAMAL KHATA, JJ.
th
RESERVED ON : 8 July, 2026.
th
PRONOUNCED ON : 30 July, 2026.
Judgment (Per : Kamal Khata, J) :-
th
1) By this Appeal, the Appellant challenges the Order dated 5
May 2026, passed in an Interim Application filed in the Suit (‘impugned
Order’). The impugned Order directs the Appellant to disclose, on oath,
details of all assets, bank accounts, bank statements, income tax returns and
any alleged alienation thereof from the commencement of the New York
proceedings. The order further restrains the Appellant from dealing with or
creating third party rights in respect of any asset allegedly owned or
controlled by him, whether directly or indirectly.
2) Mr. J. P. Sen, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
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Appellant submits that, the direction contained in the impugned Order for
disclosure is vague, as neither the Suit nor the Interim Application identifies
the date from which the N. Y. litigation commenced. He submitted that, the
disclosures ought to apply prospectively and not retrospectively.
3) He relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of L. K. Prabhu vs. K. T. Mathew reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2577, to
submit that the property sought to be attached must belong to the
Defendant on the date of institution of the Suit; property already
transferred prior thereto cannot be attached. Compelling disclosure of
property transferred before the suit’s institution, he argued, serves no legal
purpose where attachment itself would be unavailable.
th
4) According to him, the captioned Suit was filed in India on 24
April 2026, and therefore the institution of the captioned suit furnishes the
only lawful baseline for disclosure. To treat the commencement of foreign
proceedings as a starting point would accord legal recognition to foreign
proceedings in a manner contrary to Section 13 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’).
5) He contended that the Respondents are not decree holders.
Under Section 13 of the CPC, a foreign Judgment from a non-reciprocating
territory must be tried and adjudicated in the captioned Suit before any
decree issues. The power to seek disclosure under Order XXI Rule 41 of the
CPC is accordingly unavailable, as it is reserved exclusively for decree
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holders. Ordinarily, such a power is invoked only in the aid of execution
where a domestic money decree has remained unsatisfied despite decree
holder’s efforts. He relied upon the decision in the case of Delhi Chemical
and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. vs. Himgiri Realtors Pvt. Ltd. reported in
EFA(OS) (COMM) No.4/2021, and United Phosphorous Ltd. vs. A. K.
Kanoria reported in 2002 (4) Mh.L.J. 358 , in support.
6) Order XXI Rule 41(2), read with Form 16A of Appendix E to
the CPC, contemplates disclosure of assets only as on the date of institution
of the Suit. Though Order XLVIII Rule 3 permits variation of prescribed
forms where "the circumstances of each case may require," this power is
circumscribed. The disclosure order's purpose is limited to securing a decree
in the captioned Suit; it cannot justify the roving, expansive inquiry into the
Appellant's financial affairs undertaken by the impugned Order.
7) Furthermore, Counsel argued that the impugned Order should
not have been granted on account of delay. The foreign judgments date to
11th May 2023 and 22nd November 2024, yet the Suit was instituted only
on 24th April 2026—nearly three years after the first judgment. The
underlying NYSC Summary Judgments and Turnover Orders against the
Rolta entities, which ground the contempt proceedings, date back to 2020.
Had the Respondents genuinely feared asset dissipation, they could have
approached the Indian Courts immediately. They failed to do so even after
obtaining judgments in contempt proceedings in 2023 and 2024. To permit
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a sweeping, retrospective financial audit at the first hearing, after willfully
delaying for three years, is unjust.
8) Counsel further submitted that mere possession of a money
decree does not, in law, justify a roving inquiry into an individual's personal
and financial affairs. A judgment debtor may be compelled to disclose only
to the extent necessary for execution—which, in this case, the Respondents
have yet to obtain from the Indian Court. The impugned Order is thus
wholly disproportionate and invasive, particularly because: (i) no prima
facie finding exists against the Appellant; (ii) there is no finding of
apprehension that the Appellant will dissipate assets; (iii) the Appellant was
denied an opportunity to reply; and (iv) the foreign judgments remain
untested against Section 13 of the CPC.
9) Mr. Sen further contended that the Respondents created
artificial urgency after nearly three years of inaction, now seeking a
sweeping retrospective audit. He relied on Raman Tech. & Process Engg.
Co. v. Solanki Traders (2008 2 SCC 302) to argue that Order XXXVIII Rule 5
of the CPC is not intended to convert unsecured debt into secured debt;
invoking the provision as leverage to coerce settlement ought to be
discouraged.
10)
Counsel reiterated that a judgment debtor under a money
decree cannot routinely be directed to disclose information affecting
substantive rights. He relied on Delhi Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works
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Pvt. Ltd. (supra) to support this proposition. The disclosure sought by the
impugned Order is proportionate and invasive, lacking the foundational
requirements for such an intrusive order. Accordingly, the Appellant sought
to set aside the stay effect of the impugned Order.
11) Mr. Dhond, learned senior Counsel for Respondent No. 1,
submits that the Appellant has a central role in the Rolta Group. As
Chairman, Managing Director, and founder of Rolta India, the ultimate
parent company, the Appellant is the ultimate decision-maker exercising
control over the Group. Through private companies, Rolta Pvt. Ltd. and
Rolta Overseas Pvt. Ltd. he personally directs the movement of funds on
Rolta India's behalf.
12) The Respondents obtained two judgments from the New York
State Supreme Court (11th May 2023 and 22nd November 2024) against
the Rolta entities. The principal sum owing is USD 187,863,538.77
₹
(approximately 1,800 crores), with total claims including interest
amounting to USD 235,71,913.71 (approximately ₹ 2,300 crores). Pursuant
to these judgments, the Respondents initiated enforcement proceedings.
13) Mr. Dhond further submitted that, owing to the Turnover
Order breach, the New York Supreme Court appointed a Receiver over all
Rolta Group shares (Orders of 5th March 2021 and 16th April 2021). On
19th January 2023, the NCLT admitted a petition filed by Union Bank of
India against Rolta India. In these circumstances, the Appeal merits
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dismissal.
14) We have heard both learned senior Counsel and carefully
reviewed the entire record.
15) Undisputedly, the Appellant has a central role in the Rolta
Group. As Chairman, Managing Director, and12 pt founder of Rolta India,
the Appellant is the ultimate decision-maker and exercises control over the
Group including private companies, Rolta Pvt. Ltd. and Rolta Overseas Pvt.
Ltd. Importantly, the Appellant controls the movement of funds on behalf of
Rolta India.
16) The record indicates that the Respondents obtained two
judgments from the New York State Supreme Court (11th May 2023 and
22nd November 2024) against the Rolta entities. The principal sum owing
is USD 187,863,538.77 (approximately ₹ 1,800 crores), with total claims
including interest amounting to USD 235,71,913.71 (approximately ₹ 2,300
crores). Pursuant to these judgments, the Respondents initiated
enforcement proceedings.
17) In response to enforcement, Rolta India filed an Affidavit (30th
September 2020) citing FEMA restrictions requiring RBI approval for
transferring shareholding in overseas subsidiaries. On 20th October 2020,
the New York Supreme Court passed a Turnover Order directing: (a) Rolta
India to transfer its subsidiary shares; (b) Rolta Global BV and Rolta Middle
East FZ-LLC to do likewise; and (c) all Rolta Group entities to remit cash on
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hand (approximately USD 2 million) for enforcement. Notably, neither
Rolta India nor its subsidiaries appealed these orders.
18) Within nine days, on 29th October 2020, six Rolta subsidiaries
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Respondents promptly moved to
dismiss, alleging bad faith and circumvention of the Turnover Order. The US
Bankruptcy Court (11th January and 9th February 2021) dismissed the
proceedings, holding that: (i) the action was designed to delay and frustrate
the decree; (ii) proposed reorganization plans with Streamcast and AdviseX
failed; (iii) the filing divided the dispute artificially among three courts; and
(iv) the subsidiaries sought to defeat the decree.
19) On 6th May 2021, the Bankruptcy Court rejected a
reconsideration request. Notably, on 19th November 2020—the same date
Rolta India filed Suit No. 6612/2020 (with Interim Application No.
6618/2020) seeking to restrain enforcement of the New York judgment and
Turnover Order—the Respondents filed their reply affidavit (4th January
2021) in opposition. The Appellant did not pursue the ad-interim reliefs
sought; the application has since languished.
20) On 25th November 2020, decree holders initiated civil
contempt proceedings against Rolta India Limited, Preetha Pulusani (former
President of Rolta International), and the Appellant for non-compliance
with the decree and Turnover Order. That same day, the New York Court
issued a Show Cause Notice, which the Appellant acknowledged through
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his US Attorneys in an affidavit filed in the anti-enforcement proceedings
before this Court. On 21st December 2021, the New York Court held Ms.
Pulusani in contempt, making a specific finding that the Appellant, despite
advice, refused compliance. The Rolta Group had earnings of ₹ 294 crores,
yet none were paid to decree holders. Though liability initially attached to
the Appellant, he was not served in the first round; proceedings resumed in
the second round after the Show Cause Notice. Following the Appellant's
appearance and full testimony, the New York Court's Judgment of 11th May
2023 held the Appellant in civil contempt. The Court observed that:
(i) The Appellant initiated litigation before the Bombay High
Court;
(ii) He instructed Pulusani to file bogus bankruptcy
proceedings;
(iii) He personally oversaw the rerouting of Rolta India's cash
flow through Rolta Pvt. Ltd. and Rolta Overseas Pvt. Ltd.;
(iv) He exercises primary control over these private entities and
reroutes funds on Rolta India's behalf;
(v) He failed to obtain RBI permission to transfer shares or
comply with the Turnover Order;
(vi) He orchestrated a Settlement Agreement routing
approximately USD 188 million in US-based assets to India,
obstructing the receiver's claims; and
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(vii) He was primarily responsible for transferring USD 187
million from Rolta's US subsidiary after the judgment.
21) In our judgement, the Appellant's conduct transcends simple
breach of the foreign judgment; it constitutes aggravated and willful
disobedience compounded by subsequent evasion. Under the Indian Laws
the Appellant falls under the definition of “officer” under Section 2(59) of
the Companies Act, 2013, which is reproduced hereinbelow for ready
reference:
“Section 2(59): “officer” includes any director, manager or key
managerial personnel or any person in accordance with whose
directions or instructions the Board of Directors or any one or more
of the directors is or are accustomed to act.”
22) Consequently, the Appellant also falls under the definition of
“officer in default” under Section 2(60) of the Companies Act, 2013, which
is reproduced hereinbelow:
“Section 2(60): “officer who is in default”, for the purpose of
any provision in this Act which enacts that an officer of the company
who is in default shall be liable to any penalty or punishment by
way of imprisonment, fine or otherwise, means any of the following
officers of a company, namely:-
(i) whole-time director;
(ii) key managerial personnel;
(iii) where there is no key managerial personnel, such director or
directors as specified by the Board in this behalf and who has or
have given his or their consent in writing to the Board to such
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specification, or all the directors, if no director is so specified;
(iv) any person who, under the immediate authority of the Board
or any key managerial personnel, is charged with any responsibility
including maintenance, filing or distribution of accounts or records,
authorises, actively participates in, knowingly permits, or knowingly
fails to take active steps to prevent, any default;
(v) any person in accordance with whose advice, directions or
instructions the Board of Directors of the company is accustomed to
act, other than a person who gives advice to the Board in a
professional capacity;
(vi) every director, in respect of a contravention of any of the
provisions of this Act, who is aware of such contravention by virtue
of the receipt by him of any proceedings of the Board or
participation in such proceedings without objecting to the same, or
where such contravention had taken place with his consent or
connivance;
(vii) in respect of the issue or transfer of any shares of a company,
the share transfer agents, registrars and merchant bankers to the
issue or transfer;”
23) In our view therefore the Appellant would also be liable for the
offence under the Act. The Appellant's pattern of conduct abundantly
justifies the disclosure order.
24) The 11th May 2023 Judgment directed: (i) payment of USD
187 million by the Appellant within 30 days (by 11th June 2023); and (ii)
an injunction against asset disposal pending appeal resolution.
25) On 9th June 2023, the Appellant filed an Appeal before the
New York Appellate Division without securing a stay; the appeal was not
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pursued and faced automatic dismissal after six months under New York
law. Despite the 11th June 2023 deadline, the Appellant refused payment.
Consequently, on 22nd November 2024, a final Money Judgment issued for
USD 187 million.
26) Owing to the Turnover Order breach, the New York Supreme
Court appointed a Receiver over all Rolta Group shares (Orders of 5th
March 2021 and 16th April 2021).
27) In this backdrop, the Appellant's contention that the disclosure
direction is vague lacks merit. The order clearly seeks disclosure from the
commencement of New York litigation which is undisputedly 6th June
2018.
28) The Appellant's argument that the foreign judgment's
compliance with Section 13 of the CPC requires determination in the
captioned Suit is also without substance. The Appellant cannot approbate
and reprobate, a principle long establised. The Appellant cannot feign
ignorance of Suit No. 6612/2020 filed on 19th November 2020 (with
Interim Application No. 6618/2020) seeking to restrain enforcement of the
New York judgment and Turnover Order. This very act acknowledged the
foreign judgment's existence and enforceability. The Appellant cannot now
feign ignorance of that judgment or demand its re-adjudication as a
prerequisite to disclosure. He stands estopped by his own conduct and
pleadings.
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29) A plain reading of Section 13 of CPC demonstrates that a
foreign judgment is conclusive as to directly adjudicated matters between
the same parties, subject only to specified exceptions. Section 13 is
reproduced for ready reference:
“13. When foreign judgment not conclusive.—A foreign judgment
shall be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated
upon between the same parties or between parties under whom they
or any of them claim litigating under the same title except—
(a) where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent
jurisdiction;
(b) where it has not been given on the merits of the case;
(c) where it appears on the face of the proceedings to be founded on
an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognise the
law of 2[India] in cases in which such law is applicable;
(d) where the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained are
opposed to natural justice;
(e) where it has been obtained by fraud;
(f) where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force
in 2[India].”
30) Additionally, Section 14 of CPC establishes that upon
production of a certified foreign judgment, the Court presumes it was
pronounced by a competent court unless the contrary appears or want of
jurisdiction is proven. Section 14 is reproduced hereinbelow for a ready
reference.
“14. Presumption as to foreign judgments.—The Court shall
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presume upon the production of any document purporting to be a
certified copy of a foreign judgment, that such judgment was
pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction, unless the
contrary appears on the record; but such presumption may be
displaced by proving want of jurisdiction.’’
31) The presumption of jurisdiction established by Section 14 is
not rebuttable merely by assertion of disagreement with the foreign court's
reasoning or conclusions. In our view, the presumption under Section 14 is
mandatory and places the burden squarely on the party challenging the
foreign judgment to prove want of jurisdiction. Mere speculation that the
New York court's findings might be incorrect or reliance on Section 13's
exceptions does not displace this presumption. The Appellant has adduced
no credible evidence of want of jurisdiction by the New York State Supreme
Court. Accordingly, the Appellant's attempt to re-examine the merits of the
foreign judgment or its findings of fact is impermissible.
32) Therefore, the Appellant's own initiation of anti-enforcement
proceedings (Suit No. 6612/2020) undermines his contention that the
foreign judgment remains uncertain or requires substantive determination.
In our view it is yet another plea to delay and deprive the Respondents of
their lawful claims. The Court cannot be a mute spectator and ignore these
facts.
33) Following the principles articulated in Wander Ltd. v. Antox
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Pvt. Ltd. (1990 Supp SCC 727), we decline to interfere with the Single
Judge's exercise of discretion. The discretion was neither arbitrary,
capricious, nor perverse, nor did it ignore settled principles governing
interlocutory injunctions. The Supreme Court has clearly directed that
appellate courts will not reassess materials or reach contrary conclusions if
the trial court's conclusion was reasonably possible on the record. The trial
court's reasoned exercise of discretion should not be disturbed merely
because the appellate court would have decided differently. Relevant
paragraph reproduced for ready reference:
“14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the
exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the
appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of
the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except
where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised
arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had
ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant of refusal of
interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is
said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess
the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one
reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was
reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would
normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of
discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had
considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a
contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial
court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate
court would have taken different view may not justify interference
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with the trial court’s exercise of discretion…..”
34) The Appellant's reliance on L. K. Prabhu (supra) is misplaced
and distinguishable on its core reasoning. That case concerned the
substantive attachment rights of a judgment creditor: specifically, whether
property transferred prior to institution of suit (via a registered deed) could
be attached as a fraudulent transfer under Section 53 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882. The issue was whether attachment of such property was
permissible in law, a substantive question of judgment creditor remedies.
Here, by contrast, the issue is purely procedural; whether the Appellant
may be compelled to disclose the existence and location of assets during the
period from the commencement of New York proceedings. Disclosure does
not determine attachability; it merely locates assets in aid of prospective
attachment. The case thus addresses an entirely different legal question and
provides no precedent for the Appellant's position. Moreover, disclosure will
reveal whether properties in the Appellant's hands belonged to him on 6th
June 2018, information essential to determining their attachability. Since
the Appellant has been tried and a judgment rendered by the New York
Court finding him in civil contempt for asset diversion, the L. K. Prabhu
analogy rooted in technical property transfer rules is wholly inapplicable to
the factual setting of deliberate evasion here.
35)
Similarly, reliance on Bank of Baroda v. Dr. Bavaguthu
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Raghuram Shetty & Ors. (2021 SSC Online Kar) fails given the Appellant's
documented conduct in the New York judgment—conduct demonstrating a
debtor's intent to dispose of assets and defeat creditor claims, rendering
recovery uncertain.
36)
The Delhi Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works decision does
not assist, as it acknowledges the decree remained unsatisfied due to the
judgment debtor's obstruction, the transfer of USD 187 million during
proceedings. United Phosphorous Ltd. (supra) similarly operates against the
Appellant; as a foreign decree holder, the Respondent may invoke Order XXI
Rule 41 where information lies peculiarly within the debtor's knowledge.
The Appellant, having initiated anti-injunction proceedings on 19th
November 2020, cannot claim pre-decree debtor status. Lastly, Raman Tech.
& Process Engg. Co. does not apply, as this matter does not convert
unsecured debt into secured debt.
37) The Appeal is accordingly dismissed.
38) In view of disposal of Appeal, Interim Application does not
survive and is accordingly disposed off.

(KAMAL KHATA, J.) (A.S. GADKARI, J.)
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