SURU ANURADHA vs BIDIKI DINABANDHU

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

W.P.(C). No.8612 of 2003
ODHC010020932003
(An application under Articles 226 and 227 of
Constitution of India)



Suru Anuradha ....... Petitioner

-Versus-

Bidika Dinabandhu & anr ....... Opposite Parties

Advocates appeared in the case through hybrid mode:
___________________________________________________________
For Petitioners : Mr. S.S.Rao, Senior Advocate with
Mr. B.K.Mohanty, Advocate


For Opp. Parties : Ms. J.Sahoo,
Addl. Standing counsel,
Mr. T.K.Mishra, Advocate
(For Private Opp. Party)
_______________________________________________________
CORAM:
JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA
JUDGMENT
03.09.2026

SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J. The petitioner has filed this writ
petition questioning the correctness of order dated 06.06.2003
passed by the Collector, Rayagada in OSATIP Review Petition
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No. 279 of 2001, whereby the permission granted to the
petitioner’s vendors for sale of the property under Regulation
2 of 1956 was set aside.


2. Be it noted that this Court originally disposed of the
writ application by order passed on 15.09.2022. However, the
legal heirs of Opposite Party Nos. 2 and 3 having preferred writ
appeal being W.A. No. 1683 of 2022, the order of the learned
Single Judge was set aside by judgment dated 23.03.2026 with
a direction to hear the writ application afresh. The writ
application was thus heard again in presence of the parties.


3. The facts of the case, briefly stated are that the land
in question belonged to one Bidika Jaguli measuring Ac. 16.07
decimals in Mouza-Seriguda of Boudh district. Upon his death,
his sons, namely, Bidika Dinabandhu, Bidika Jagili and Bidika
Sriramulu inherited and succeeded to the property. The
property was thereafter recorded in a joint khata. The recorded
owners belong to Scheduled Tribes. With the intention of
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selling the property to meet their legal necessities, the vendors
applied for permission under Section 3(1) of Regulation 2 of
1956 on 18.07.1995 before the competent authority which was
registered as OSATIP Case No. 46 of 1995. The competent
authority, after hearing the parties and considering the
evidence adduced, granted permission by order dated
14.09.1995 to sell their land by 30.11.1995. On 06.10.1995,
the vendors sold the land to the petitioner by executing a
registered sale deed upon receipt of consideration at the rate
fixed by the competent authority i.e. Rs. 45,000/- per acre.
4. Regulation 2 of 1956 was subsequently amended by
Amending Regulation No. 1/1997 to insert Regulation 3-a (i)
empowering the Collector to revise any order passed under
Regulation-3(1) or 3(2) of Regulation-2 of 1956 granting
permission to such land by scheduled tribe to non-schedule
tribe person within a period of 5 years suo motu or otherwise.
The Collector initiated a suo motu review petition bearing No.
279 of 2001 on 14.12.2001 under the amended regulation. By
order dated 06.06.2003, the Collector allowed the review
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petition and set aside the permission granted earlier. Said
order is impugned in the present writ application, which has
been filed seeking the following relief:
“The petitioner therefore prays that this Hon'ble Court be
graciously pleased to issue notice to the opposite parties
and upon hearing parties quash the order as per annexure-
4 passed by the Collector in OSATIP Case No.188/2001,
declaring the permission granted to the petitioner as per
annexure 3 to be void and directing restoration of land

And pass such other orders as this Hon'ble Court deems fit
and proper in the circumstances of the case.”

5. Though the Opposite Parties entered appearance
they did not filed any counter affidavit.
6. Heard Mr. S.S. Rao, learned Senior counsel with Mr.
B.K. Mohanty for the petitioners, Ms. J. Sahoo, learned ASC
for the State and Mr. T.K. Mishra, learned counsel appearing
for the private Opposite Parties.
7. Mr. Rao, learned Senior counsel would argue that
the impugned order has been passed in a proceeding which is
entirely without jurisdiction inasmuch as the order granting
permission to the vendors of the petitioner to sell the land was
passed on 14.09.1995 and as per the amended provision, the
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same could have been revised only within a period of five years.
The present review petition was initiated on 14.12.2001 which
is six years after the order granting permission and is
therefore, not sustainable. On merits, it is submitted by Mr.
Rao that the original order granting permission was passed on
proper appreciation of facts, evidence and materials on record.
The Collector, however held that the order was wrongly passed
on purely irrelevant and untenable grounds. The question of
fraud was neither raised nor proved by any person. In fact,
there was no complaint with regard to the completed sale
transaction for as long as six years. Mr. Rao further submits
that even otherwise, the Collector adopted a procedure
unknown to law inasmuch as the vendor was examined in the
absence of vendee and thereafter, notice was issued to the
vendee. As such, he never got a chance to cross-examine the
vendor. Mr. Rao concludes his argument by submitting that
the vendors never complained of any foul play having occurred
but some of the legal heirs have come forward to take undue
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advantage by reversing a validly concluded transaction long
back.
8. Mrs. J.Sahoo, learned State counsel submits that
the Collector has the power to initiate a suo motu revision
within five years from the date of grant of permission. However,
the amended Regulation-3-a, which was inserted by the
amending Regulation No. 1 of 1997 was published in official
gazette on 27.03.1997. The amended provision must therefore,
be deemed to have to come into force from the aforesaid date.
Such being the case, the suo motu review having been initiated
on 14.12.2001 is well within the prescribed period and
therefore, maintainable.
9. Mr. Mishra further submits that the power so
conferred is wide enough to include even an order passed prior
to coming into force of the amendment, though the amendment
itself is prospective in nature as per judgments passed by this
Court in several cases, particularly the case of Jami Ramesh
and another vrs. State of Odisha , 2019 (II) OLR 94 . Mr.
Mishra further submits that the original order granting
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permission was passed without proper notice to the applicant
and the general public and contains several flaws such as non-
signing of the order, failure to inform the Welfare Department
of Odisha. For such reason, the Collector rightly decided to
interfere with the order. It is further submitted that there is
discrepancy with regard to the person who was to get married
for which the sale of land was necessitated. It is further
submitted that after death of the recorded owners, their legal
heirs being the private Opposite Parties are in possession of
the suit property.
10. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties at
length and on consideration of the contentions raised, it is
evident that the first point that arises for determination is,
whether the amended Regulation of 1997 would apply to the
order of permission granted prior to such amendment.
To answer this, this Court again takes note of the
relevant dates. The order of permission was passed by the
competent authority on 14.09.1995. The Collector, purportedly
exercising power conferred by Regulation 3-a(i) initiated suo
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motu review on 14.12.2001. This Court is not inclined to enter
into the question of the date of coming into force of the above
amended Regulation as in its considered view, the same is not
relevant. It has been forcefully argued on behalf of the private
Opposite Parties, and not disputed by the counsel for the
petitioner, that the amendment is prospective in nature. The
judgment passed by a division Bench of this Court in the case
Jami Ramesh (supra) has been cited. It may be noted that in
Jami Ramesh (supra), the division Bench was considering the
applicability of Section 3-B of the amended Regulation
whereas the present case involves applicability of amending
Regulation of 1997. Reading of the judgment reveals that the
division Bench took note of several judgments passed by the
Supreme Court and held that any amendment made to the Act
(Regulation) shall have prospective effect unless it is expressly
provided or any necessary implications makes it retrospective .
It would be proper to refer to Paragraph-12 of the Judgment:
“12. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered
opinion that the amendment which is brought into as
Section 3(B) of the Amendment Regulation, 2000, cannot
have a retro-spective effect and as such, the same will have
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a prospective effect. It will be applied to the transactions
made on or after the date of publication i.e. 04.09.2002 and
the transaction which took place prior thereto, will not be
affected, in any manner by the provisions of Amendment
Regulation, 2000.”
(Emphasis added)

The same analogy can be drawn to the present case
inasmuch as the amended Regulation came into force from the
date of its publication in the official gazette on 27.03.1997. At
this stage, it would also be apposite to reproduce to the
amended provision below:
“ 3(a) (i) Any order passed by the competent authority under
sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2) may, within a period of
five years from the date of the order, be revised, either on own
motion otherwise. by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner if
the order was passed by Collector and by the Collector if it
was passed by any other competent authority, after or giving
the parties concerned a opportunity of being heard: reasonable

Provided that no order shall be revised under this sub-section
if an appeal against such order has been entertained under
sub-section (3).”

11. In view of the settled position of law as discussed
above, the expression ‘any order’ used in the provision can only
mean an order passed post the amendment and not the ones
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passed prior to it. Any contrary interpretation would lead to
absurd conclusions. To amplify, if the amendment as a whole
is held to be prospective w.e.f. 27.03.1997, the expression ‘any
order’ cannot obviously relate to orders passed prior to the said
date, but what the learned counsel for the private Opposite
Parties has argued essentially means that, while the amended
regulation is itself prospective, the expression ‘any order’
occurring therein is retrospective. This interpretation cannot
be countenanced in law.
12. Another aspect that needs mention is that even
otherwise, the amended Regulation confers on the concerned
authority the power of revision and not review. There is an
essential distinction between revision and review. The
regulation does not define the terms, revision and review.

Plainly understood, the essential distinction
between the two is that the review is a power vested in the same
Court which passed the order, whereas, the power of revision
is to be exercised by the higher forum. Reading of order dated
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14.12.2001 passed by the Collector in OSATIP Review Case No.
279 of 2001 reveals that the Officer in Special Duty (Land
Reforms) Rayagada granted the order of permission in case No.
46 of 1994. The Collector inter alia passed the following order:
“This is a case u/s (3-a) (i) of OSATIP amendment
Regulation 2 of 1996.According to the same,
permissions granted u/s 3(i) by the competent authority
can be reviewed by the Collector within five years from
the date of order of the permission.
It is seen that the Officer on Special duty (Land
Reforms), Rayagada in Case No. 46 of 1995 vide order
No. 230 dated 16.09.1995 has permitted the vendor to
sell land u/s 3(i) of Reg. 2 of 56. Xxx xxx xxxx
It is proposed to review the case suo-motu xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis added)

The Collector being the higher authority must therefore, be
deemed to have executed powers of revision though wrongly
described as review.
13. However, in view of the discussion made earlier, the
Collector had no jurisdiction whatsoever to reopen an order
granting permission prior to 27.03.1997 in the garb of
exercising power of review (or revision) under Regulation-3-a
(i). On such count alone, the impugned order is rendered
unsustainable in the eye of law and deserves interference.
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14. Having held so, it is not necessary to enter into the
correctness or otherwise of the said order, which, incidentally
has never been questioned by any party, much less the vendors
for all these years.
15. In the result, the writ application is allowed. The
impugned order is set aside.


……..…………………..
Sashikanta Mishra,
Judge


Orissa High Court, Cuttack
rd
Dt. 3 September, 2026/ Deepak

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: DEEPAK PARIDA
Reason: Authentication
Location: OHC,Cuttack
Date: 08-Sep-2026 11:37:25
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