Nakka Vamshi vs State of Telangana
- Court
- High Court for the State of Telangana
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT
HYDERABAD
*
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.683 of 2025
BETWEEN
Nakka Vamshi
… Appellant
And
The State of Telangana
… Respondent
Date of Judgment Pronounced: 22.09.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? (Yes/No)
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be (Yes/No)
marked to Law Reports/Journals?
3. Whether their Lordship/ Ladyship wish to (Yes/No)
see the fair copy of the Judgment?
_____________________
JUSTICE K. SUJANA
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* THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA
+CRIMINAL APPEAL No.683 OF 2025
% Dated 22.09.2026
BETWEEN
# Nakka Vamshi
… Appellant
And
$ The State of Telangana
… Respondent
! Counsel for Appellant: C. Raghu
^ Counsel for respondent: M. Ramachandra Reddy,
( Additional Public Prosecutor)
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1. (1998) 4 SCC 605
2. AIR 2002 SUPREME COURT 733
3. 2024 INSC 905
4. (1984) 4 SCC 116
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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN
AND
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA
CRIMINAL APPEAL.No.683 of 2025
CNR.No. HBHC010376392025
DATED: 22.09.2026
Reserved on: 20.08.2026 Pronounced on: 22.09.2026
Uploaded on:
Between:
Nakka Vamshi
… Appellant/Sole accused
AND
The State of Telangana
…Respondent
(as per Hon’ble Smt. Justice K. Sujana)
JUDGMENT:
This Criminal Appeal is filed challenging the judgment
dated 30.05.2025 passed by the learned Principal District and
Sessions Judge, Jagtial, in S.C.No.04 of 2021, whereby the
appellant/accused was convicted for the offences punishable
under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code and
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sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine
of Rs.2,000/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for
three months, for the offence under Section 302 IPC and to
undergo simple imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine
of Rs.1,000/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two
months, for the offence under Section 201 IPC.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the deceased,
Manda Swapna, was a divorcee having one son and was
acquainted with the appellant/accused, who was a student
and also used to attend coolie work for his livelihood.
According to the prosecution, the appellant went to Hyderabad
on 04.07.2018 for his livelihood and worked at Ratnadeep
Super Market, Medchal, Hyderabad. During that period, the
appellant and deceased used to meet at various places in
Hyderabad and developed a relationship with each other. It is
alleged that they had sexual intercourse and subsequently
decided to marry.
3. It is further the case of the prosecution that thereafter
the appellant left his job and returned to Laxmipur village.
The deceased allegedly used to call the appellant over phone
and insist that he should marry her. According to the
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prosecution, the appellant became irritated with her conduct
and decided to eliminate her. In furtherance of the said
intention, the appellant allegedly called the deceased on
19.10.2018 to come to his village.
4. It is alleged that on 20.10.2018, the deceased came to
Jagtial and boarded a private bus to proceed towards
Vengalapur village. The driver and conductor of the said bus,
who were examined during investigation as LWs.14 and 15,
allegedly recorded their statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
before the learned Magistrate. According to the said
statements, the deceased disclosed that her name was
Swapna and that she was going to meet Vamshi, with whom
she was in love. When the bus reached Peddamma Gudi of
Vengalapur village, she allegedly got down from the bus and
was received by a male person wearing a pink-coloured towel
around his neck.
5. According to the prosecution, the said person was the
appellant/accused, who took the deceased to a land situated
near Bandam Bore and cartway bushes, where there would
ordinarily be no public presence. It is alleged that both of
them talked for some time and thereafter quarrelled with each
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other. The prosecution further alleges that while the deceased
was taking rest, the appellant intentionally caused her death
by tying a towel around her neck and strangulating her and
thereafter attempted to cause disappearance of the evidence of
the offence.
6. On receiving information regarding the presence of an
unidentified female dead body in the shivar of Vengalapur
village, P.W.1, the VRO of Gollapalli village, lodged Ex.P1
report, based on which initially a case was registered under
Section 174 Cr.P.C. The police visited the scene of offence,
conducted scene observation and inquest proceedings,
photographed and videographed the dead body and recorded
the statements of the witnesses. As the dead body was in a
decomposed condition, post-mortem examination was
conducted at the scene.
7. P.W.10, the Medical Officer, conducted the post-mortem
examination and found a ligature mark around the neck
measuring approximately 20 inches in length and one inch in
width, which was horizontal and running through the middle
of the neck and was suggestive of strangulation or throttling.
The hyoid bone was preserved for forensic examination.
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Subsequently, on receipt of the FSL report, P.W.10 gave his
final opinion under Ex.P8 that the cause of death was "due to
asphyxia due to strangulation". On the basis of the medical
opinion, the case was altered from Section 174 Cr.P.C. to
Section 302 IPC.
8. During investigation, the identity of the deceased was
established as Manda Swapna with the assistance of P.Ws.5
and 8. The Investigating Officer also examined the persons
acquainted with the deceased and collected the relevant call
data records. On 01.11.2018, the appellant was apprehended
and, according to the prosecution, in the presence of
mediators, he made a disclosure statement and led the police
to the scene of offence, from where a towel allegedly used in
the commission of the offence and the mobile phone of the
deceased were recovered from nearby bushes. His mobile
phone was also seized from his possession.
9. The prosecution further relied upon the statements of
LWs.14 and 15, the driver and conductor of the private bus,
recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. According to the
prosecution, both witnesses had stated that they could
identify the person who received the deceased at Vengalapur
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village. As LWs.14 and 15 died before they could enter the
witness box, their statements were marked as Exs.P22 and
P23 through P.W.14, the learned Magistrate who recorded the
said statements. A Test Identification Parade was also
conducted by P.W.14, in which P.Ws.5 and 7 and LWs.14 and
15 allegedly identified the appellant.
10. The case was taken on file for the offences punishable
under Sections 302, 201 and 404 of IPC and, after compliance
with Section 207 of Cr.P.C., was committed to the Court of
Sessions. Charges were framed against the accused for the
said offences. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to
be tried.
11. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution
examined P.Ws.1 to 14, marked Exs.P1 to P23 and produced
M.Os.1 to 11. After completion of the prosecution evidence,
the accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with
reference to the incriminating circumstances appearing
against him. He denied the allegations and did not adduce
any defence evidence.
12. The trial Court, after appreciating the oral and
documentary evidence, held that the prosecution had
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established the homicidal death of the deceased through the
evidence of P.W.10 and Exs.P7 and P8. The trial Court
further relied upon the evidence of P.Ws.5 and 7, the Section
164 Cr.P.C. statements of LWs.14 and 15, Ex.P21 - Test
Identification Parade proceedings, and the recovery of the
towel at the instance of the accused, and concluded that the
last-seen theory and the chain of circumstances connected the
appellant with the offence.
13. The trial Court further held that the recovery of
M.O.6/towel at the instance of the accused, coupled with the
evidence of P.W.9 and the Investigating Officer, established
the offence under Section 201 of IPC. However, insofar as
Section 404 of IPC was concerned, the trial Court held that
the prosecution failed to establish that M.O.9/mobile phone
belonged to the deceased and, accordingly, acquitted the
accused of the said offence.
14. Consequently, the trial Court convicted the appellant
under Sections 302 and 201 IPC, convicted for the offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal
Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to
pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default to suffer simple
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imprisonment for three months, for the offence under Section
302 of IPC and to undergo simple imprisonment for three
years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to suffer
simple imprisonment for two months, for the offence under
Section 201 of IPC. Aggrieved thereby, the present Criminal
Appeal has been preferred.
15. Heard Sri C. Raghu, learned Senior Counsel
representing Sri Kona N.D.V. Ramana Rao, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant and Sri M. Ramachandra
Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the
respondent-State.
16. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant
submitted that the trial Court erred in convicting the
appellant as the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and that the entire prosecution case
rests upon circumstantial evidence and that the
circumstances relied upon by the prosecution do not form a
complete and unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that
the appellant alone committed the offence. He further
submitted that the evidence of P.Ws.5 and 7, who are stated
to be colony elders, does not establish that they had witnessed
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the deceased being taken by the appellant on the date of
occurrence. Their evidence, at the most, establishes that the
appellant and deceased were acquainted with each other and
that they intended to marry, which by itself cannot connect
the appellant with the homicidal death of the deceased.
17. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the trial Court
principally relied upon the statements of LWs.14 and 15, the
driver and conductor of the bus, recorded under Section 164
Cr.P.C. However, both witnesses died before entering the
witness box and, therefore, their statements were not
subjected to cross-examination and that such statements
could not be treated as substantive evidence of the fact that
the appellant was the person who received the deceased at
Vengalapur village.
18. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that the Test
Identification Parade was not conducted in a proper manner
and that the persons who participated in the parade were not
of similar features and appearance. Therefore, the
identification proceedings could not safely be relied upon to
establish the identity of the appellant. Further, he challenged
the recovery of M.O.6/towel, contending that the alleged
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disclosure and recovery do not establish that the towel was
used in the commission of the offence and that the
prosecution failed to establish any scientific connection
between the towel and the deceased and that the recovery, by
itself, cannot complete the chain of circumstances.
19. Learned Senior counsel further contended that although
P.W.10 opined that the cause of death was asphyxia due to
strangulation, the medical evidence does not establish the
identity of the assailant. He contended that the presence of a
ligature mark and the medical opinion regarding strangulation
only establish the cause of death and do not, by themselves,
connect the appellant with the offence. Therefore, he
submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the
circumstances of motive, last seen, identification and recovery
beyond reasonable doubt and that the circumstances relied
upon by the trial Court are capable of more than one
interpretation. He contended that the benefit of doubt ought
to have been extended to the appellant and prayed for setting
aside the conviction and sentence and acquitting him.
20. In support of his submissions, he relied upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in George and others
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1
v. State of Kerala and another , wherein paragraph No.36, it
is held as follows:
“36. We may now turn to the evidence of PW 50, detailed
earlier. From the judgment of the trial court we notice that the
substantial parts of its comments, (quoted earlier) are based on
his statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC and not his
evidence in court. The said statement was treated as
substantive evidence; as would be evident from the following,
amongst other observations made by the learned trial court:
“If Ext. P-42 (the statement recorded under Section
164 CrPC) is found to be a genuine statement it can be
used as an important piece of evidence to connect the
accused with the crime.”
In making the above and similar comments the trial
court again ignored a fundamental rule of criminal
jurisprudence that a statement of a witness recorded
under Section 164 CrPC cannot be used as substantive
evidence and can be used only for the purpose of
contradicting or corroborating him. Instead of
appreciating the evidence of PW 50 from that
perspective the trial court confined its attention mainly
to his statement so recorded and discredited him. This
legal infirmity apart, factually also the trial court
committed patent errors. As earlier noticed, one of the
grounds for disbelieving him was that in the trip-sheet
the name of the person who performed the journey,
namely, A-1 was not shown. If the trial court had cared
to look into the other trip-sheets which form part of
Ext. P-54 it would have found that in none of them the
name of the person who hired the car is mentioned.
1
(1998) 4 SCC 605
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The trial court was, therefore, not at all justified in
commenting upon such non-mentioning of the name of
the hirer and concluding therefrom that the document
was suspect. The comments of the trial court that PW
50 made the statement before the Magistrate (Ext. P-
42) to oblige the police as his brother was arrested in
connection with an excise case is also without any
basis whatsoever. In drawing the above inference the
trial court was much influenced by the fact that the
car in question, namely, KEK 3114 was seized by the
police on 31-5-1990 and that it was released on 28-6-
1990. According to the trial court it was wrongfully
detained by the police for such a long period to compel
PW 50 to make a statement according to its dictate.
Once a car is seized in connection with a case it can be
returned pursuant to the order of a competent court
only and there is nothing on record to indicate that in
spite of such an order the car was not returned so as
to entitle the trial court to comment that the long
detention of the car was itself a suspicious
circumstance. Having gone through the evidence of PW
50 we find that each of the reasons canvassed by the
trial court for disbelieving PW 50 is either legally
unsustainable or factually incorrect.”
21. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Pandurang Kalu Patil and another v.
2
State of Maharashtra , wherein paragraphs Nos.5, 14 and
15, it is held as follows:
“5. Even the recent decision in State of Maharashtra v. Damu
[(2000) 6 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1088] this Court followed
2
AIR 2002 SUPREME COURT 733
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Pulukuri Kottaya [AIR 1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533] with
approval. The fallacy committed by the Division Bench as per
the impugned judgment is possibly on account of truncating
the word “fact” in Section 27 of the Evidence Act from the
adjoining word “discovered”. The essence of Section 27 is that it
was enacted as a proviso to the two preceding sections (see
Sections 25 and 26) which imposed a complete ban on the
admissibility of any confession made by an accused either to
the police or to anyone while the accused is in police custody.
The object of making a provision in Section 27 was to permit a
certain portion of the statement made by an accused to a police
officer admissible in evidence whether or not such statement is
confessional or non-confessional. Nonetheless, the ban against
admissibility would stand lifted if the statement distinctly
related to a discovery of fact. A fact can be discovered by the
police (investigating officer) pursuant to an information elicited
from the accused if such disclosure was followed by one or
more of a variety of causes. Recovery of an object is only one
such cause. Recovery, or even production of object by itself
need not necessarily result in discovery of a fact. That is why
Sir John Beaumont said in Pulukuri Kottaya [AIR 1947 PC 67 :
48 Cri LJ 533] that (AIR p. 70, para 10) “it is fallacious to treat
the ‘fact discovered’ within the section as equivalent to the
object produced”. The following sentence of the learned Law
Lord in the said decision, though terse, is eloquent in conveying
the message highlighting the pith of the ratio: (AIR p. 70, para
10)
“Information supplied by a person in custody that ‘I
will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house’
does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were
discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of
the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the
informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved
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to have been used in the commission of the offence,
the fact discovered is very relevant.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. Learned counsel then contended that the High Court had
gone wrong in relying on the evidence of PW 18 Dy SP who said
that when A-2 was arrested and interrogated, a gun was
disinterred pursuant to the information supplied by him. It is
on the said aspect that the Division Bench of the High Court
considered the ratio in Pulukuri Kottaya [AIR 1947 PC 67 : 48
Cri LJ 533] . What PW 18 said in the Court is that the
statement made by A-2 had been recorded in Ext. 91
memorandum. We have noticed from the said memorandum the
following statement of A-2 as recorded therein: “I have kept the
firearm concealed behind the old house in a heap of wood.”
15. The fact discovered by PW 18 is certainly not the gun. The
fact discovered is that A-2 had concealed the gun (Article 5/2)
behind the old house under a heap of wood. It was the same
gun with which A-2 had fired at PW 2 and that aspect has been
proved with the help of other evidence.”
22. Per contra , learned Additional Public Prosecutor
appearing for the respondent-State supported the judgment of
the trial Court and submitted that the prosecution had
established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt
through a complete chain of circumstantial evidence. He
further submitted that the evidence of P.Ws.5 and 7
establishes the close relationship between the deceased and
the appellant and that the deceased had left the house to meet
the appellant pursuant to their decision to marry and that the
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evidence of the bus driver and conductor, as recorded under
Section 164 Cr.P.C., establishes that the deceased travelled by
bus on the date of occurrence and was received by the
appellant at Vengalapur village.
23. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that
LWs.14 and 15 died before they could be examined in Court
and, therefore, their statements recorded under Section 164
Cr.P.C. were rightly brought on record through P.W.14, the
learned Magistrate who recorded them and that the said
statements are corroborated by the Test Identification Parade
proceedings, wherein the appellant was identified by the
relevant witnesses. He further submitted that the medical
evidence of P.W.10 and Exs.P7 and P8 establishes that the
death of deceased is a homicidal death due to asphyxia
caused by strangulation and that the medical evidence is
consistent with the prosecution case regarding the manner in
which the deceased was killed.
24. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor contended that
the recovery of M.O.6/towel at the instance of the appellant is
an important incriminating circumstance. The recovery was
proved through P.W.9 and the Investigating Officer and
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corroborates the prosecution version regarding the manner of
commission of the offence. He further contended that the
last-seen circumstance assumes significance as the deceased
was seen proceeding to meet the appellant on the date of
occurrence and was subsequently found dead and that the
time gap between the deceased being last seen with the
appellant and the discovery of her dead body was sufficiently
proximate and that the appellant failed to furnish any
explanation regarding the circumstances in which the
deceased died.
25. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor further contended
that the discrepancies and omissions pointed out by the
defence are minor in nature and do not affect the core of the
prosecution case and that when the evidence of P.Ws.5, 7, 9
and 10, the evidence of the Investigating Officer, the Section
164 Cr.P.C. statements of LWs.14 and 15, the Test
Identification Parade proceedings and the recovery of M.O.6
are considered cumulatively, they establish a complete chain
of circumstances connecting the appellant with the homicidal
death of the deceased. Therefore, he prayed the Court to
dismiss the Criminal Appeal.
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26. In support of the submissions of the learned Additional
Public Prosecutor, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Vijaya Singh and another v. State of
3
Uttarakhand , wherein paragraph No.31, it is held as follows:
“31. Having said so, we deem it fit to observe that a statement
under Section 164 CrPC cannot be discarded at the drop of a
hat and on a mere statement of the witness that it was not
recorded correctly. For, a judicial satisfaction of the Magistrate,
to the effect that the statement being recorded is the correct
version of the facts stated by the witness, forms part of every
such statement and a higher burden must be placed upon the
witness to retract from the same. To permit retraction by a
witness from a signed statement recorded before the Magistrate
on flimsy grounds or on mere assertions would effectively
negate the difference between a statement recorded by the
police officer and that recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. In
the present matter, there is no reasonable ground to reject the
statements recorded under Section 164 CrPC and reliance has
correctly been placed upon the said statements by the courts
below.”
27. The following points arise for consideration in the
Criminal Appeal:
i. Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the death of Manda Swapna was homicidal
and that the appellant/accused was responsible for
causing her death by strangulation, thereby committing
the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC?
3
2024 INSC 905
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ii. Whether the prosecution has established beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant caused
disappearance of evidence of the offence, or gave false
information with the intention of screening himself from
legal punishment, thereby committing the offence
punishable under Section 201 IPC?
iii. Whether the judgment of conviction and sentence
passed by the trial Court under Sections 302 and 201
IPC warrants interference by this Court?
28. In the light of the submissions made by both the
learned counsel and a perusal of the material available on
record, the following points arise for consideration. Since the
prosecution case rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence
and there is no direct eyewitness to the actual occurrence, it
is necessary to examine each of the circumstances relied upon
by the prosecution independently and thereafter consider
whether all such circumstances, taken cumulatively, form a
complete chain pointing only towards the guilt of the
appellant/accused.
29. At the outset, it is not in dispute that the deceased
Manda Swapna died an unnatural death. P.W.10 is the
Medical Officer who conducted the post-mortem examination
over the dead body. According to his evidence, he found a
ligature mark around the neck measuring approximately 20
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inches in length and one inch in width, which was horizontal
and running through the middle of the neck and was
suggestive of strangulation or throttling. He also preserved
the hyoid bone for forensic examination. Subsequently, after
receipt of the FSL report, he gave his final opinion under
Ex.P8 that the cause of death was due to asphyxia due to
strangulation.
30. The evidence of P.W.10, therefore, establishes the
nature and cause of death of the deceased. The evidence of
P.W.1, the VRO, and P.W.2, the VRA, further establishes that
an unidentified female dead body was found near Bandam
Bore in the shivar of Vengalapur village and that the matter
was initially reported as a suspicious death. P.Ws.3 and 6 are
the panch witnesses to the scene observation and inquest
proceedings, while P.W.4 is the photographer who
photographed the dead body and scene of offence. Their
evidence supports the fact that the dead body was found at
the place in question and that the police conducted the
necessary proceedings.
31. However, the fact that the deceased died due to
strangulation, though an important circumstance, by itself
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does not establish the identity of the person who caused her
death. Medical evidence can establish the nature and cause
of death, but in the absence of other reliable evidence
connecting the accused with the occurrence, such medical
evidence cannot by itself form the basis for recording a
conviction against the accused. Therefore, the crucial
question is whether the prosecution has established the nexus
between the appellant and the homicidal death of the
deceased through legally admissible and reliable evidence.
32. The prosecution mainly relies upon the circumstances
of the relationship between the deceased and the appellant,
the alleged last-seen circumstance, the Test Identification
Parade, the statements of LWs.14 and 15 recorded under
Section 164 Cr.P.C., and the alleged recovery of M.O.6/towel
at the instance of the appellant. Each of these circumstances
requires careful scrutiny.
33. So far as the evidence of P.W.5 is concerned, he is
stated to be a colony elder who had provided shelter to the
deceased. His evidence establishes that the deceased was
residing in the colony and that the appellant had come to his
house and expressed his intention to marry the deceased.
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P.W.5 also identified the dead body of the deceased from her
clothes and footwear when the police showed the photograph
of the dead body. His evidence further indicates that the
deceased had left the house during the Dussehra festival and
had gone with the appellant.
34. P.W.7 is another colony elder. His evidence is to the
effect that he knew the deceased for a considerable period and
that the appellant used to visit her. He also stated that the
appellant had expressed his intention to marry the deceased
and that the deceased had informed him that the appellant
would marry her. Thus, the evidence of P.Ws.5 and 7
establishes that the deceased and the appellant were
acquainted with each other and had a close relationship and
that there was an intention on their part to marry.
35. However, the said circumstance has to be appreciated
within its proper limits. The existence of a relationship
between the deceased and the appellant is not, by itself,
sufficient to establish that the appellant committed the
murder of the deceased. The said circumstance may provide a
background to the prosecution case, but it cannot substitute
the requirement of proving the essential link connecting the
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accused with the actual occurrence. Even assuming that the
appellant and deceased were last known to be acquainted with
each other, the prosecution must establish by reliable
evidence that the appellant was with the deceased at or
immediately prior to the time of her death.
36. The prosecution, therefore, heavily relies upon the
evidence of LWs.14 and 15, the driver and conductor of the
private bus in which the deceased allegedly travelled from
Jagtial towards Vengalapur on 20.10.2018. Admittedly, both
LWs.14 and 15 died before they could be examined before the
trial Court. Their statements recorded under Section 164
Cr.P.C. were marked as Exs.P22 and P23 through P.W.14, the
learned Magistrate who recorded the said statements.
37. According to Exs.P22 and P23, the deceased allegedly
boarded the bus at Jagtial at about 09.30 a.m. and informed
the driver/conductor that her name was Swapna and that she
was going to meet Vamshi, with whom she was in love. It is
further stated that when the bus reached Peddamma Gudi of
Vengalapur village, the deceased requested the driver to stop
the bus and got down, whereupon a male person wearing a
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pink-coloured towel around his neck received her. The said
witnesses further stated that they could identify that person.
38. The trial Court treated Exs.P22 and P23 as substantive
evidence and relied upon them for establishing the last-seen
circumstance. The trial Court proceeded on the premise that
as LWs.14 and 15 had died, their statements recorded under
Section 164 Cr.P.C. became relevant and could be used as
evidence after examining the Magistrate who recorded them.
In our considered view, the said approach requires
reconsideration in the light of the settled principles governing
statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
39. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of George (cited
supra), has reiterated that a statement of a witness recorded
under Section 164 Cr.P.C. cannot be treated as substantive
evidence and ordinarily can be used for the purpose of
contradicting or corroborating the testimony of such witness.
The Court specifically disapproved an approach where the
trial Court treated the statement recorded under Section 164
Cr.P.C. as substantive evidence instead of appreciating the
evidence of the witness before the Court.
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40. The significance of the said principle becomes even
greater in the present case because LWs.14 and 15 did not
enter the witness box at all. Therefore, there is no substantive
testimony of either of those witnesses before the trial Court
which could be corroborated or contradicted by their earlier
statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Their statements,
therefore, cannot be elevated into substantive evidence merely
because the witnesses died before trial.
41. The evidence of P.W.14, the learned Magistrate,
establishes that he recorded the statements of LWs.14 and 15
under Section 164 Cr.P.C. It also establishes the fact that the
statements were recorded by him in the course of his judicial
duties. However, the evidence of the Magistrate as to the
recording of the statements does not transform the contents of
those statements into substantive testimony regarding the
facts narrated by the deceased bus passengers. The
Magistrate was not an eyewitness to the occurrence and had
no personal knowledge as to whether the deceased was
actually received by the appellant at Vengalapur village.
42. The distinction between proving the fact that a
statement was recorded and proving the truth of the contents
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of that statement is material. P.W.14 can establish that
Exs.P22 and P23 were recorded before him, but he cannot give
substantive evidence regarding the truth of the matters stated
therein merely because he recorded them. Consequently, the
contents of Exs.P22 and P23 cannot, in the facts of the
present case, be treated as substantive evidence establishing
that the appellant was the person who received the deceased
from the bus.
43. The contention of the learned Additional Public
Prosecutor that the statements become substantive evidence
because the witnesses died before entering the witness box
cannot be accepted merely on that ground. The death of a
witness may affect the availability of his testimony, but it does
not, by itself, convert every previous statement made by him
into substantive evidence unless the statement falls within a
specific statutory exception permitting its use for that
purpose. The trial Court, therefore, ought to have examined
the precise statutory basis on which Exs.P22 and P23 could
be treated as substantive proof of the last-seen circumstance.
44. The reliance placed by the trial Court upon Sections 6
and 35 of the Evidence Act also does not cure the
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fundamental defect. Section 6 relates to facts forming part of
the same transaction and is concerned with the relevancy of
facts. Relevancy and admissibility are distinct from the
question whether a particular statement can be treated as
substantive proof of the truth of its contents. Similarly,
Section 35 concerns entries in public records made by a
public servant or by a person performing a duty specially
enjoined by law. The mere fact that a Magistrate recorded a
statement in the discharge of judicial duty does not mean that
every assertion contained in that statement becomes
substantive proof of the truth of the assertion.
45. The presumption regarding regularity or genuineness of
an official act also cannot be confused with proof of the truth
of the facts narrated by the person whose statement was
recorded. At the highest, the evidence of P.W.14 establishes
that the statements were recorded in the manner stated by
him. It does not establish, from his personal knowledge, that
the person described by LWs.14 and 15 was in fact the
appellant or that the deceased was actually received by the
appellant at the bus stop. Further, the judgment relied upon
by the prosecution is also not helpful, as there is a factual
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difference in the present case, since the said driver and
conductor were not examined by the Court.
46. The Test Identification Parade evidence also requires
consideration in this context. Ex.P21 relates to the
identification proceedings conducted by P.W.14. The trial
Court relied upon the identification of the appellant by P.Ws.5
and 7 and by LWs.14 and 15. However, insofar as LWs.14
and 15 are concerned, their identification cannot
independently supply substantive evidence of the last-seen
circumstance when the witnesses themselves were not
examined before the trial Court. The identification
proceedings cannot be treated as a substitute for substantive
testimony which was never given in Court.
47. As regards P.Ws.5 and 7, their identification of the
appellant only establishes that they identified the person
whom they already knew as Nakka Vamshi. Their evidence,
as noticed above, establishes acquaintance and relationship
between the appellant and the deceased. It does not establish
that they saw the appellant taking the deceased to the place
where her dead body was subsequently found or that they saw
the appellant with the deceased immediately before her death.
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48. The prosecution has, therefore, not been able to
establish through substantive evidence the crucial
circumstance that the deceased was last seen alive in the
company of the appellant immediately prior to her death. This
is not a minor discrepancy. In a case resting entirely upon
circumstantial evidence, the last-seen circumstance assumes
importance only when it is established by cogent and legally
admissible evidence and when the proximity between the time
of last seen and the time of death is such that the possibility
of intervention by another person is substantially excluded.
49. In the present case, once Exs.P22 and P23 are excluded
from consideration as substantive evidence, there remains no
direct or substantive evidence showing that the deceased was
last seen with the appellant immediately before her death.
P.Ws.5 and 7 establish the relationship between the two, but
not the last-seen circumstance on the date and at the relevant
place of occurrence.
50. The prosecution next relies upon the alleged disclosure
statement and recovery of M.O.6/towel. P.W.9 is stated to be
one of the mediators to the confession-cum-recovery
proceedings and P.W.13 is the Investigating Officer. Their
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evidence is relied upon to establish that the appellant gave
information leading to the recovery of M.O.6/towel from the
bushes near the scene of offence. M.O.7 is stated to be the
mobile phone of the accused which was seized from his
possession.
51. The evidentiary value of such recovery has to be
examined in the light of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
The principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Pandurang Kalu Patil (cited supra), is that the fact discovered
under Section 27 is not necessarily synonymous with the
object produced or recovered. The admissible portion is that
part of the information supplied by the accused which
distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered. Recovery of
an object by itself does not automatically establish that the
accused committed the offence.
52. Applying the above principle to the present case, even
assuming that the recovery of M.O.6/towel at the instance of
the appellant is proved, the recovery establishes only such
fact as is legally discoverable from the information furnished
by the accused. The prosecution must further establish the
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incriminating character of the recovered article and its nexus
with the commission of the offence.
53. In the present case, there is no reliable evidence
establishing that M.O.6/towel belonged to the appellant or
that it was the very towel used for strangulating the deceased.
Significantly, the prosecution relies upon the Section 164
Cr.P.C. statements of LWs.14 and 15 to suggest that the
person who received the deceased was wearing a pink-
coloured towel. Once the statements of LWs.14 and 15 are
not available as substantive evidence, the circumstance that
the towel allegedly recovered from the bushes was the same
towel noticed by the bus driver and conductor also loses its
evidentiary foundation.
54. Further, there is no satisfactory scientific evidence
placed on record establishing that M.O.6 contained any blood,
biological material or other incriminating substance
connecting it with the deceased. In the absence of such
corroborative evidence, the recovery of an ordinary article
such as a towel from bushes near the scene, even if proved,
cannot by itself establish that the appellant used that towel to
cause the death.
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55. The same reasoning applies to M.O.7, the mobile phone
of the appellant. The evidence of P.W.12, the Nodal Officer,
establishes the relevant mobile connection in the name of the
appellant. However, recovery of the appellant's own mobile
phone from his possession is not an incriminating
circumstance unless it connects him with the commission of
the offence. It does not establish that he was present with the
deceased at the place of occurrence or that he committed the
murder.
56. It is also significant that the trial Court itself found the
prosecution evidence insufficient to establish the charge
under Section 404 IPC concerning the alleged mobile phone of
the deceased. The trial Court held that there was no sufficient
evidence to establish that M.O.9 belonged to the deceased.
This finding demonstrates that the prosecution failed to
establish the ownership and evidentiary nexus of the
deceased's mobile phone. Therefore, the alleged recovery of
mobile-related material cannot be given greater evidentiary
significance than what the record permits.
57. The evidence of P.W.10, though reliable to the extent of
establishing the cause of death, also does not connect the
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appellant with the commission of the offence. The medical
evidence establishes strangulation, but it does not identify the
person who caused the strangulation. There is no scientific
evidence on record which connects the appellant with the
ligature mark or with the towel allegedly used in the offence.
58. P.Ws.1 and 2 are also not eyewitnesses to the
commission of the offence. P.W.1 merely set the criminal law
into motion on receiving information regarding the
unidentified dead body. P.W.2 informed P.W.1 about the
presence of the dead body. Their evidence is therefore
relevant to the discovery of the dead body and the initiation of
investigation, but it does not establish the involvement of the
appellant.
59. P.Ws.3 and 6, the panch witnesses, speak about the
scene observation and inquest proceedings and the articles
found at the scene. Their evidence establishes the
investigative steps undertaken by the police. P.W.4 speaks
about photographing the dead body and scene. These
witnesses do not connect the appellant with the actual
commission of the offence.
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60. P.W.8, the sister of the deceased, assisted in identifying
the deceased. Her evidence is relevant to the identity of the
deceased and the surrounding circumstances, but there is no
substantive evidence from her that she saw the deceased in
the company of the appellant immediately before the
occurrence or that the appellant caused her death.
61. P.W.9 is the mediator to the alleged confession-cum-
recovery proceedings. His evidence may establish the
proceedings undertaken by the police and the recovery of the
article, subject to the admissibility of the information leading
to discovery. However, as already discussed, recovery alone
cannot establish the commission of murder unless the
recovered article is shown to have a reliable and incriminating
connection with the crime.
62. P.W.11/P.W.13, the police officers connected with
registration and investigation of the case, can establish the
steps taken during investigation. Their evidence regarding
investigation, however, cannot substitute substantive evidence
regarding the actual commission of the offence. The
prosecution must independently establish the incriminating
circumstances through legally admissible evidence.
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63. Thus, on an overall appreciation of the evidence, the
prosecution has established certain foundational facts,
namely, that Manda Swapna died an unnatural death by
strangulation, that her dead body was found near Bandam
Bore in the shivar of Vengalapur, that she was acquainted
with the appellant and that a towel was allegedly recovered
during investigation. However, the crucial connecting
circumstances between the appellant and the homicidal death
have not been established with the degree of certainty
required in a criminal trial.
64. The present case is admittedly one based entirely on
circumstantial evidence. The law relating to circumstantial
evidence is well settled.
65. At this stage, it is pertinent to note the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.
4
State of Maharashtra , wherein paragraph No.153, it is held
as follows:
153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an
accused can be said to be fully established:
4
(1984) 4 SCC 116
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(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be”
established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal
distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be
proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade
v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri)
1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made:
[SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be
and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the
mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and
divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they
should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that
the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the
one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to
leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the accused.
66. In the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (cited supra),
the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the five principles which
have to be satisfied before a conviction can be founded solely
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on circumstantial evidence: the circumstances must be fully
established; the established facts must be consistent only with
the hypothesis of guilt; the circumstances must be conclusive
in nature and tendency; they must exclude every possible
hypothesis except guilt; and the chain of evidence must be so
complete as to leave no reasonable ground consistent with
innocence and must show that, in all human probability, the
act must have been committed by the accused. These
principles continue to govern appreciation of circumstantial
evidence.
67. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case,
the first circumstance, namely, the relationship between the
appellant and the deceased, is established only to the extent
that they were acquainted and intended to marry. Such
circumstance is not conclusive of guilt. The second
circumstance, namely, the last-seen theory, has not been
established through substantive evidence because LWs.14 and
15 did not enter the witness box and their Section 164 Cr.P.C.
statements cannot, in the circumstances of the case, be
treated as substantive evidence.
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68. The third circumstance, namely, the Test Identification
Parade, does not independently establish the last-seen
circumstance. The identification of the appellant by P.Ws.5
and 7 only confirms his identity as the person whom they
already knew. The identification attributed to LWs.14 and 15
cannot be used as substantive proof of their assertions when
they were not examined before the Court.
69. The fourth circumstance, namely, the recovery of
M.O.6/towel, also does not complete the chain. Even
accepting the recovery as proved, the prosecution has not
established by independent evidence that the recovered towel
was the instrument used in strangulating the deceased or that
it contained any material connecting it with the deceased. As
held in Pandurang Kalu Patil, the discovery contemplated by
Section 27 is the discovery of a fact within the knowledge of
the accused and not merely the production of an object. The
evidentiary value of the discovery therefore depends upon the
further evidence connecting the discovered fact or article with
the offence.
70. The medical evidence establishes homicidal death but
does not connect the appellant with that death. The identity
40
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Crl.A.No.683 of 2025
of the deceased is established, but the identity of the assailant
is not established through any direct evidence. The
prosecution has not placed before the Court any independent
circumstance which conclusively establishes the presence of
the appellant at the scene of offence at or immediately before
the time of death.
71. It is also important to bear in mind that the burden
upon the prosecution in a case based on circumstantial
evidence does not become lighter merely because the deceased
and the accused were acquainted or because certain
circumstances create suspicion against the accused.
Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.
The circumstances must form a continuous and complete
chain and each important link must be established by legally
admissible evidence.
72. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor contended that
the circumstances have to be considered cumulatively and
that the last-seen circumstance, recovery and medical
evidence together point towards the guilt of the appellant.
There can be no dispute with the proposition that
circumstantial evidence has to be appreciated cumulatively.
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However, the cumulative effect can be considered only after
each material circumstance is independently established by
admissible and reliable evidence. A missing or legally
defective link cannot be supplied merely by combining other
circumstances which, individually or collectively, do not
establish the missing link.
73. Likewise, the contention that the appellant failed to
explain the circumstances surrounding the death cannot
relieve the prosecution of its primary burden. The prosecution
must first establish the foundational circumstances from
which an inference of guilt can legitimately be drawn. The
absence of an adequate explanation from the accused cannot
be used to fill serious gaps in the prosecution evidence.
74. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to
establish the most significant link, namely, that the deceased
was last seen alive with the appellant shortly before her death.
Once Exs.P22 and P23 are not treated as substantive
evidence, there is no reliable evidence to establish this
circumstance. The evidence of P.Ws.5 and 7 does not fill this
gap, as their evidence relates principally to the relationship
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Crl.A.No.683 of 2025
between the deceased and the appellant and not to the events
immediately preceding the death.
75. The prosecution has also failed to establish an
unbroken nexus between the recovered towel and the murder.
The recovery, standing alone, is insufficient. The medical
evidence does not connect the towel with the death. There is
no substantive evidence that the towel recovered at the
instance of the appellant was the same towel allegedly seen
around the neck of the person who received the deceased,
because the very statements of LWs.14 and 15 on which that
circumstance rests cannot be treated as substantive evidence.
76. Therefore, the circumstances relied upon by the
prosecution do not satisfy the five principles laid down in
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (cited supra). The circumstances
are not fully established in the manner required by law. They
do not, even when taken cumulatively, exclude every
reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the
appellant and the chain of circumstances is not complete so
as to lead to the conclusion that, in all human probability, the
appellant alone committed the offence.
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77. Consequently, though the evidence establishes that the
deceased suffered a homicidal death, the prosecution has not
established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was
the person who caused her death. The benefit of the missing
links in the chain must necessarily go to the appellant.
78. Coming to the offence under Section 201 of IPC, the trial
Court found the appellant guilty principally on the basis of the
alleged recovery of M.O.6/towel. Section 201 of IPC requires
proof that the accused caused disappearance of evidence of
the offence or gave false information with the intention of
screening the offender from legal punishment. Mere recovery
of an article at the instance of the accused, without
establishing the essential ingredients of the offence and the
connection of the accused with the underlying offence, cannot
by itself sustain a conviction under Section 201 of IPC.
79. Once the prosecution has failed to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the murder
and has further failed to establish that M.O.6 was the article
used in the commission of the offence and that the appellant
caused its disappearance with the requisite intention, the
conviction under Section 201 IPC also cannot be sustained.
44
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80. The evidence relating to Section 404 of IPC need not be
reconsidered in detail, as the appellant was already acquitted
of the said offence by the trial Court and there is no challenge
by the prosecution to the said acquittal before this Court.
81. On an overall consideration of the entire material on
record, this Court is of the view that the prosecution has
established the factum of homicidal death of Manda Swapna,
but has failed to establish the identity of the perpetrator
beyond reasonable doubt. The relationship between the
appellant and the deceased, the alleged last-seen
circumstance based upon the Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements
of deceased witnesses, the Test Identification Parade, the
recovery of M.O.6/towel and the medical evidence, when
examined individually and cumulatively, do not form a
complete chain of circumstances leading only to the guilt of
the appellant.
82. The principles relied upon by the learned counsel for the
appellant in George and Pandurang Kalu Patil (cited supra),
when applied to the evidence on record, reinforce the
conclusion that the Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements of LWs.14
and 15 cannot be treated as substantive evidence in the
45
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Crl.A.No.683 of 2025
absence of their testimony before the trial Court and that the
recovery under Section 27 must be confined to the fact
actually discovered and cannot, by itself, establish the
commission of the offence.
83. At the same time, the principle relied upon by the
learned Additional Public Prosecutor that circumstantial
evidence must be considered cumulatively is accepted as a
matter of law. However, the cumulative assessment must still
satisfy the requirement laid down in Sharad Birdhichand
Sarda (cited supra) that the chain must be complete and must
exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with
innocence. In the present case, the prosecution has not
crossed that threshold.
84. Therefore, this Court finds that the prosecution has
failed to prove the guilt of the appellant for the offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC beyond
reasonable doubt. The appellant is consequently entitled to
the benefit of doubt.
85. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The
judgment dated 30.05.2025 passed by the learned Principal
District and Sessions Judge, Jagtial, in S.C.No.04 of 2021,
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convicting the appellant/accused for the offences punishable
under Sections 302 and 201 IPC, is hereby set aside.
86. The appellant/accused is acquitted of the offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC by extending
the benefit of doubt. The appellant shall be set at liberty
forthwith, if he is not required in any other case.
Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand
closed.
__________________
K. LAKSHMAN, J
______________
K. SUJANA, J
Date:
SAI
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Crl.A.No.683 of 2025
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN
AND
THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA
P.D. ORDER
IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL.No.683 of 2025
HBHC010376392025
CNR.No.
Date: ______________
SAI