STATE VIGILANCE vs HEMANTA KU.PARIJA

THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLLP No.154 of 2013

CNR No. ODHC010307232013
(In the matter of an application under Section 378 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 )

State of Orissa Petitioner
…….

-Versus-
Hemanta Kumar Parija Opposite Party
…….

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sangram Das, SC (Vigilance)

For the Opposite Party : Mr. Deba Prasad Das, Advocate

CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 01.10.2026 : Date of Judgment: 31.10.2026

S.S. Mishra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of
acquittal dated 13.09.2013 passed by the learned Additional District
Judge-cum-Special Judge (Vigilance), Balasore, in VGR No. 26 of 1997
corresponding to T.R. No. 225 of 2007, whereby the opposite party,

Hemanta Kumar Parija, was acquitted of the charges under Sections 7
and 13(1)(d), punishable under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988.
2. Heard Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel (Vigilance) for
the petitioner and Mr. Deba Prasad Das, learned counsel for the
opposite-party.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the informant was the owner
of two tractors. On 23.05.1997, one of his tractor-trolleys, bearing
registration Nos. OR-01A-4656 and OR-01A-4657, was transporting
morum from a quarry at Charanpal to his village, Singiri, when the
vehicle was intercepted by personnel of the Forest Department near
Sinduragoura Thakurani Temple. The opposite party, who was then
working as a Forester at Nilagiri, was a member of the patrolling party.
As the informant could not produce the requisite transit permit, the
prosecution alleged that the Range Officer and the opposite party
demanded illegal gratification for releasing the vehicle and refraining
from initiating prosecution. The alleged demand of Rs.5,000/- was
subsequently settled at Rs.2,000/-, payable on or before 27.05.1997.

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4. Aggrieved by the alleged demand, the informant submitted a
written report before the Vigilance authorities on 26.05.1997. During the
preparatory meeting conducted, the vigilance officer demonstrated the
reaction between phenolphthalein powder and sodium carbonate solution
in the presence of the informant and the official witnesses, including
P.W.8 and P.W.10. The currency notes intended to be used in the trap
were treated with phenolphthalein powder, and the informant was
instructed to hand over to the opposite party only upon demand.
According to the prosecution, when the informant subsequently met the
opposite party at the Nilagiri Forest Range Office, he offered the amount
of Rs.2,000/-. The opposite party allegedly retained a sum of Rs.500/- in
his wallet and placed the remaining currency notes on his table. Upon
receiving the predetermined signal, the vigilance party entered the room,
recovered the currency notes and conducted the hand-wash procedure,
during which the sodium carbonate solutions turned pink. The relevant
currency notes, wash solutions and other articles were seized, and the
chemical examination report confirmed the presence of phenolphthalein

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in the relevant solutions. On completion of investigation and obtaining
sanction for prosecution, the charge-sheet was submitted.

5. The prosecution examined eleven witnesses to establish the
charges. The defence examined D.W.1, who was present at the time of
trap.
6. Upon appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court held that
the prosecution had failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable
doubt. The learned trial Court observed that the alleged prior demand
had not been satisfactorily proved through the testimony of the informant
or other reliable evidence and that the circumstances surrounding the
trap did not establish an unequivocal demand or voluntary acceptance of
illegal gratification by the opposite party. It further noted the
discrepancies concerning the number and recovery of the currency notes
and considered the defence explanation supported by D.W.1 and the
evidence relating to the exchange of currency. Holding that the recovery
of tainted money and the positive hand-wash test, by themselves, were
insufficient to establish the charges in the absence of satisfactory proof
of the requisite demand and acceptance, the learned trial Court declined

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to draw the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988, and acquitted the opposite party. The relevant part
of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“ 11. In the instant case, the prosecution case rests on direct
evidence. However, the prosecution has brought out no
circumstances leading to an irresistible conclusion of guilt of
the accused. As already indicated the circumstances indicated
in the evidence of PWs 6, 8 & 10 supports the defence plea. In
the facts and circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that
the defence plea has been falsified. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Suraj Mal (supra) took a view that mere recovery of
the tainted money divorced from the circumstances under
which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when
the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere
recovery of money by itself cannot prove the charge of the
prosecution against the accused in the absence of any
evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the
accused has voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be
the bribe. The prosecution has squarely failed to substantiate
such a charge. It is the settled law that where the burden of an
issue lies upon the accused, he is not required to discharge
that burden by leading evidence to prove his case beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is sufficient if the accused person
succeeds in providing a preponderance of probability in
favour of his case. As soon as he succeeds in doing so, the
burden shifts to prosecution which still has to discharge its
original onus that never shifts i.e. that of establishing on the
whole the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. In
this connection, reference may be made to Jhangam v. State:
1966 (3) SCR 736. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Andhra
Pradesh v. Basudeva Rao: AIR 2004 SC 960 (in a case under
the old PC Act, Act-II of 1947) held that the evidence of
demand of bribe need not be satisfied through direct evidence.
Direct evidence is one of the modes through which a factum
can be proved. Therefore, when it is proved that the accused
accepted The gratification, presumption u/s 20 of the Act can
be raised. In order to raise the presumption u/s 20 of the Act,
the prosecution has to prove that the accused accepted or

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obtained or has agreed to obtain for himself, or any other
person any gratification or any valuable thing from any
person. It shall be presumed that he accepted such things as a
motive or reward mentioned in Sec. 7 of the Act. For raising
presumption u/s 20 of the Act, the prosecution initially must
lay the basis by proving that the accused accepted or obtained
gratification other than legal remuneration for himself. In the
instant case, no such basis has been laid by the prosecution.
The prosecution has not satisfactorily proved the acceptance
either. In that view of the matter the presumption u/s 20 of the
Act could not be raised. Thus the decision in M. Narsinga Rao
v. State of Andhra Pradesh: 2001 SAR (Criminal) 132
accordingly, would not be applicable. In the same vein Girija
Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh: (2007) 28 OCR (SC) 428
is also not be applicable. It has been held in the case of V.
Venkata Subbarao v. State: 2007 Cri LJ 754 (SC) that
presumption that money was accepted as a motive or reward
cannot be raised when demand by accused has not been
proved. The prosecution relied upon a decision in Som
Prakash v. State of Delhi: AIR 1974 Supreme Court 989 and
Girija Prasad (supra) regarding trustworthiness of police and
departmental witnesses. In the instant case, evidence of PWs 9
& 11 taken in isolation would not be sufficient to prove the
prosecution case. Moreover, PW 11 deposed that 18 numbers
of currency notes were recovered from the table of the
accused. The seizure and the evidence of PW 10 is otherwise.
The recovery of three more 100 rupee currency notes remain
unexplained. Accordingly, the decisions bear no assistance to
the prosecution.
”


7. Assailing the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel appearing
for the State contended that the learned trial Court committed a
serious error in its appreciation of the evidence and failed to consider
the circumstances as a whole. He submitted that the complainant
could not be treated as an accomplice merely because he was the

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person who initiated the vigilance proceedings and that his
testimony, if found trustworthy, could constitute the basis of
conviction without insistence upon corroboration as an inflexible
rule. The evidence on record, including the statements concerning
the original demand and the circumstances leading to the trap,
furnished sufficient material to establish that illegal gratification had
been demanded. The learned trial Court, according to the State,
failed to draw the appropriate inference from the evidence of the
witnesses and the surrounding circumstances.
8. He further contended that the recovery of the tainted currency
notes from the table and wallet of the opposite party, coupled with
the positive result of the hand-wash test, constituted significant
incriminating circumstances which ought not to have been
considered in isolation. The opposite party's explanation that he had
merely exchanged a Rs.500/- note for smaller denomination notes
was inherently improbable and did not satisfactorily account for the
recovery of the tainted currency. He argued that, once the
prosecution had established the acceptance of gratification other than

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legal remuneration, the statutory presumption ought to have been
raised and that the opposite party had failed to rebut the same by
cogent evidence. The State, therefore, submitted that the findings of
the learned trial Court were contrary to the evidence on record and
that leave to appeal deserved to be granted.
9. This Court has carefully examined the judgment passed by the
learned trial Court, the reasons assigned therein, and the evidence
adduced by both the prosecution and the defence during trial. This
Court has also considered the grounds urged in the present appeal
and heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-State as
well as the learned counsel for the respondent at length. The rival
submissions have been duly considered in the light of the materials
available on record.
10. Before interfering with an order of acquittal, this Court is also
required to bear in mind the well-settled principles governing an
appeal against acquittal. In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v.
State of Karnataka & Ors. , reported in 2026 INSC 67 , the Hon'ble

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Supreme Court has reiterated that where two reasonable conclusions
are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial
Court. It has further been held that if the view taken by the trial
Court is a possible view based on the evidence available on record,
the appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal merely
because another view is also possible. Interference is warranted only
when the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is
based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where
compelling and substantial reasons exist showing that the acquittal is
clearly unreasonable. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this
Court, it can be said that if two reasonable
conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the
Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible. The following principles have to be kept in
mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the
appeals against an order of acquittal:

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(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission
to consider the material evidence on record;
(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when
there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing
so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a
compelling reason for interference.
(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a
possible view which could have been taken on the basis of
the evidence on record;
(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion
was possible.
”

Equally, in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka , reported in
2024 INSC 104 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
presumption of innocence, which every accused enjoys during trial, gets
strengthened and concretized once the trial culminates in an order of
acquittal. Consequently, while exercising appellate jurisdiction against
an acquittal, a higher threshold is required to rebut such reinforced
presumption. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are

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manifestly unsustainable or perverse, the appellate Court ought to
exercise great restraint in upsetting the acquittal. It was held thus:-
“24. We may firstly discuss the position of law
regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal
appeal. For, that is the foundation of this
challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven
guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of
the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the
case ends in acquittal. The presumption of
innocence gets concretized when the case ends in
acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on
appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that
the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets
strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to

rebut the same in appeal.”

11.
The appellate jurisdiction against an order of acquittal is,
therefore, not intended to facilitate a fresh substitution of the opinion of
the trial Court merely because a different view on the evidence is
conceivable. As reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulasareddi
@ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra) , the
appellate Court must first satisfy itself that the judgment of acquittal is
vitiated by patent perversity, misreading or non-consideration of material
evidence, or is so unreasonable that no prudent person could have

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arrived at such a conclusion. Equally, as held in Mallappa & Ors. v.
State of Karnataka (supra)
, the reinforced presumption of innocence
following an acquittal places a higher threshold upon the appellate Court
before upsetting the findings recorded by the trial Court. Thus, unless the
conclusions reached by the trial Court are wholly unsustainable on the
evidence available on record, judicial restraint rather than substitution of
views remains the governing principle in an appeal against acquittal.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this
Court finds that the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court
cannot be said to be either perverse or wholly unreasonable. Merely
because another view may also be possible, the same cannot furnish a
ground to reverse the acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

12. At this distant point in time, the absence of compelling and
substantial reasons warranting interference, reversal of the acquittal
would itself occasion serious prejudice and would be a travesty of
justice. At this belated stage, presumption of innocence prevailed in
favour of the opposite party for more than 13 years, as he was acquitted

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by the Court below. Reversing such presumption at this stage would not
only be harsh, but it would be against the cardinal principle of
reformatory criminal jurisprudence. This Court, therefore, finds no legal
or factual justification to unsettle the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal
passed by the learned trial Court. In view of the aforementioned, this
Court is not inclined to grant leave against the judgment of acquittal
impugned herein.
13. Accordingly, the CRLLP stands dismissed.

(S.S. Mishra)

Judge


The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
st
Dated the 31 October, 2026/Ashok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB
MOHAPATRA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 05-Nov-2026 19:59:15

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