Rajdhani Handicraft Through Proprietor, Mr. Ajay Jain vs Anita Gola

Court
Delhi High Court

$~72
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 05.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010523032026
+ RC.REV. 416/2026, CM APPL. 75195/2026 (Stay) & CM
APPL. 75196/2026 (Ex.)

RAJDHANI HANDICRAFT THROUGH PROPRIETOR, MR.
AJAY JAIN .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Bharat Gupta, Mr. Varun
Tyagi, Mr. Ishan Srivastava,
Mrs. Snigdha Jena and Mr.
Prashant Verma, Advocates.
versus

ANITA GOLA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Ankur Mahindro and Mr.
Shubham Agarwal, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (ORAL)

1. The present Petition, filed under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi
1
Rent Control Act, 1958 , seeks to assail the Order dated
2
14.10.2026 , passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller,
3
Central District, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi, in the Review
4
Application bearing No. Misc. SCJ 242 of 2026 as well as the
5
Order dated 24.04.2026 , passed by the learned ARC in Eviction

1
DRC Act
2
Review Order
3
learned ARC
4
Review Application
5
Impugned Order
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:16.11.2026
15:48:43
RC.REV. 416/2026 Page 1 of 12

6
Petition, being RC/ARC No. 39/2026 , titled “ Anita Gola vs.
Rajdhani Handicraft” .

2. Admittedly, the Petitioner herein did not file an application
seeking leave to defend in the aforesaid eviction proceedings. The
reason for such non-filing has been set out in paragraph nos. 4 and 5
of the present Petition in the following terms:
“4. That though the notice/summon of the said eviction petition
issued by the Learned ARC vide order dated 22.01.2026
was never served upon the Petitioner lawfully, however,
since the Petitioner had acquired notice of the petition, he
got his representation recorded before the Learned ARC
through Counsel on 02.04.2026 and sought time to file
application seeking leave to defend the said petition. True
copy of order dated 22.01.2026 passed by Learned ARC is
annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-P-4 and true copy
of order dated 02.04.2026 passed by Learned ARC is
annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-P-5 respectively.
5. That, however, Counsel for the Petitioner did not apprise
Petitioner about the mandatory requirement of filing the
leave to defend application within a period of 15 days from
the date of service, and therefore, leave to defend
application was never filed, and hence, on 24.04.2026, the
Learned ARC heard and adjudicated the said eviction
petition ex-parte and allowed the same in favour of the
Respondent and against the Petitioner.”

3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the service of
summons upon the Petitioner was not effected “lawfully” and,
therefore, the statutory period prescribed for filing the leave to defend
application could not have commenced. He submits that the Petitioner
has placed the relevant grounds in this regard on record along with the
present Petition.
4. Learned counsel further submits that, upon becoming aware of
the proceedings, the Petitioner had entered appearance through
counsel before the learned ARC and had sought time to file the leave

6
Eviction Petition
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:16.11.2026
15:48:43
RC.REV. 416/2026 Page 2 of 12

to defend application. However, the said application could not be filed
within the prescribed period.

5. He, therefore, contends that the learned ARC erred in
proceeding on the premise that the Petitioner had failed to file the
leave to defend application and, consequently, in invoking the
deeming provision contained in Section 25-B(4) of the DRC Act.
6. Per contra , learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent, who appears on advance service, submits that the
Impugned Order as well as the Review Order do not suffer from any
infirmity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction.
7. He submits that the learned ARC has rightly proceeded in
accordance with the statutory scheme governing proceedings under
Section 25-B of the DRC Act and has correctly applied the
consequence contemplated under Section 25-B(4) thereof upon the
Petitioner’s failure to file the leave to defend application within the
prescribed period.
8. Learned counsel further submits that the grounds urged in the
present Petition merely seek to reiterate the submissions already
advanced before the learned ARC and do not disclose any
jurisdictional error, material irregularity or perversity in the orders
impugned herein.
9. He, therefore, contends that such re-agitation of the merits of
the matter is impermissible within the limited scope of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act and that the
present Petition is liable to be dismissed.
10. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:16.11.2026
15:48:43
RC.REV. 416/2026 Page 3 of 12

with their able assistance, perused the material available on record,
including the Impugned Order and the Review Order.

11. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
12. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
7
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
8 9
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
13. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
10
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
11
Grover .
14. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25-(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,

7
(1998) 8 SCC 119
8
(2014) 9 SCC 78
9
(2022) 6 SCC 30
10
2024:DHC:9322
11
2025:DHC:11285
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:16.11.2026
15:48:43
RC.REV. 416/2026 Page 4 of 12

including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”

15. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra) , a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra) ,
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
16. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-
B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:16.11.2026
15:48:43
RC.REV. 416/2026 Page 5 of 12

arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Judgment
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
17. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order and Review Order are required
to be examined.
18. Before adverting to the grounds of challenge, for the sake of
completeness and clarity, this Court deems it apposite to reproduce the
relevant findings returned by the learned ARC. The relevant portions
of the Impugned Order read as under:
“7. Section 25-B (4) of the Delhi Rent Control Act provides that
the tenant shall not contest the prayer for eviction unless they file
an affidavit stating the ground on which they seek to contest the
application for eviction and obtains leave from the controller. Such
leave for contesting has to be sought within 15 days from service of
summons . Since such leave has not been sought within 15 days, the
assertions made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall
be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the petitioner shall be
entitled for an order for eviction on the said ground.
8. The respondents are, therefore, deemed to have admitted the
relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the
respondents. Further, respondents are also deemed to have admitted
that the petitioner requires the tenanted premises for the bonafide
need of his dependent son and that no other reasonably suitable
accommodation is available to the petitioner. It is also well settled
law that a landlord is the best judge of his requirement and
whether or not the tenanted premises is adequate for running of the
business of the petitioner, is not for the tenant or even the court to
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:16.11.2026
15:48:43
RC.REV. 416/2026 Page 6 of 12

decide . In this regard the ratio of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi
in the case of Tarun Kumar Vs. Parmanand Garg in RC. Rev.
No. 56/2018 decided on 09.11.2023 , is to be noted where it was
held as under :-
“52. The Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court has
repeatedly held that the Courts are not to sit in the
armchair of the landlord and dictate as to how the
available property of the landlord is to be best utilized by
him. The landlord is the absolute owner of his property
and the best person to decide which property is to utilized
in what way is the landlord himself. In addition, the
respondent also cannot dictate as to how the landlord is to
utilize his property.
53.The landlord possesses the prerogative to determine
their specific requirements, exercising full autonomy in
this regard. It is not within the purview of the court to
impose directives on the landlord regarding the nature or
quality of their chosen usage of the tenanted premises.
Essentially, the courts should refrain from prescribing any
standard or guidelines for the landlord’s residential
choices.”
9. Further, in the case titled as Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm
Prem Machinery 2000 SC 534 , it was observed as under:-
"It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge
of his requirement for residential or business purpose and
he has got complete freedom in the matter, (See: Prativa
Devi (Smt.) v. T.K Krishnan, [1996] 5 SCC 353. In the
case in hand the plaintiff/landlord wanted eviction of the
tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it
was suitable and it cannot be faulted."
10. Therefore, the eviction petition u/s 14 (1) (e) of Delhi Rent
Control Act is allowed and an eviction order is passed u/s 14 (1) (e)
r/w Section 25-B of Delhi Rent Control Act in favour of the
petitioner and against the respondents in respect of tenanted
premises i.e. shop and rooms in property bearing no.4485-4486,
Dal Mandi Chowk, Shora Kothi, Paharganj, Delhi more
specifically shown in red colour in the site plan filed with the
eviction petition. It is made clear that the petitioner shall not be
entitled to get the eviction order executed before the expiry of six
months running from today.”

19. The relevant findings returned in the Review Order are also
reproduced hereinbelow:
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:16.11.2026
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RC.REV. 416/2026 Page 7 of 12

“6. The power of review is a creation of statute and therefore, it
must be exercised within the limits of statute. In the present case,
the review application has been pressed on the ground of error
apparent on the face of the record. However, bare perusal of the
aforesaid submissions show that the said grounds do not amount
any error or mistake on the face of record. It is trite to state that any
error that requires a long drawn process of reasoning on points does
not amount to an error apparent on the face of record. It is pertinent
to note that no application for leave to defend was filed on behalf
of the applicant before the court to controvert the submissions /
pleadings made on behalf of petitioner. Section 25-B (4) DRC Act
provides that a tenant shall not contest the prayer for eviction
unless he files affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to
contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the
court. Such a leave for contesting ought to be filed within 15 days
from the day of service of summons upon the respondent. The
respondent in the present case was served in the present case on
12.03.2026, however, no application for leave to defend was filed
before the court within the statutory period of 15 days. As no such
leave had been filed within the period of 15 days, the respondent is
deemed to have admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant
between himself and the petitioner. He is also deemed to have
admitted that the petitioner requires the tenanted premises for his
bonafide requirement and that the petitioner does not have any
other reasonable suitable accommodation for the same. The
contention of the respondent that the petitioner failed to satisfy the
ingredients of Section 14(1)(e) r/w Section 25B DRC Act is devoid
of merits .
7. Furthermore, it is no longer res integra that power of review is a
creation of statute. Hence, the said power must be conferred by law
either specifically or under necessary implication. Power of review
is not inherent power and therefore, cannot be exercised by
Additional Rent Controller. In this regard, reliance is placed upon
observations of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Nand Kishore Vs.
Vijay 2009 (1) RCR 296 whereby it was held that no power of
review has been conferred upon ARC under Delhi Rent Control
Act . Accordingly, the present application for review of order is not
maintainable.
8. Thus, given the aforesaid observations and findings, present
application application under Section 25(B) (9) DRC Act r/w
Order 47 CPC r/w Section 14 CPC r/w Section 151 CPC for
review of order dated 24.04.2026 stands dismissed.”

20. This Court also finds it apposite to refer to the decision of this
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:16.11.2026
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RC.REV. 416/2026 Page 8 of 12

12
Court in M/s Digjam Ltd. v. Nisha Arora , wherein it has been held
that where no application seeking leave to defend is filed, the tenant
cannot thereafter contest the eviction proceedings as a matter of right.
The scope of interference by this Court, in such circumstances, would
nevertheless remain governed by the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the
DRC Act, which empowers this Court to call for the records of the
case for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality and propriety
of the order passed by the learned Rent Controller.
21. In the present case, the records are before this Court and the
submissions advanced by learned Counsel for both parties have been
duly considered. The principal grievance of the Petitioner is that the
summons were not served upon him “lawfully” and, consequently,
that the statutory period for filing the leave to defend application
ought not to have commenced. However, this contention has to be
examined in the context of the Petitioner’s own case as set out in the
present Petition.
22. The Petitioner himself states that, upon acquiring notice of the
eviction proceedings, he entered appearance through counsel before
the learned ARC on 02.04.2026 and sought time to file an application
seeking leave to defend. It is, therefore, not a case where the Petitioner
claims to have remained wholly unaware of the proceedings until after
the eviction order had been passed. On his own showing, the
Petitioner had acquired knowledge of the proceedings and had entered
appearance before the learned ARC through counsel.
23. The subsequent failure to file an application seeking leave to
defend within the statutory period is attributed by the Petitioner to the

12
2026:DHC:5781
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:16.11.2026
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RC.REV. 416/2026 Page 9 of 12

alleged failure of his counsel to apprise him of the mandatory
requirement of filing such an application within fifteen days.
However, the fact remains that no application seeking leave to defend
was filed before the learned ARC within the period prescribed under
Section 25-B(4) of the DRC Act. The learned ARC was, therefore,
required to consider the statutory consequence flowing from such non-
filing.
24. Section 25-B(4) of the DRC Act specifically provides that
where the tenant fails to file an affidavit seeking leave to defend
within the prescribed period, the statements made by the landlord in
the eviction application are liable to be deemed to have been admitted.
25. The learned ARC, while passing the Impugned Order,
proceeded on precisely this statutory basis and consequently treated
the averments contained in the eviction petition as deemed to have
been admitted. The Review Order, thereafter, also noticed that no
application seeking leave to defend had been filed within the
prescribed period and declined to interfere on the ground that the
Petitioner herein had failed to demonstrate any error apparent on the
face of the record.
26. The contention of the Petitioner that he ought to be granted an
opportunity to file the leave to defend application by condoning the
delay, also does not, on the material placed before this Court, disclose
any ground warranting interference in exercise of the limited
revisional jurisdiction. Even assuming that the Petitioner seeks
condonation of the delay in filing the leave to defend application, the
principles governing such consideration would necessarily require the
Petitioner to demonstrate circumstances which prevented him from
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BHATIA
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RC.REV. 416/2026 Page 10 of 12

taking the requisite steps within the prescribed period.
27. In this regard, the decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench of
this Court in Director, Directorate of Education & Anr. v. Mohd.
13
Shamim & Ors. , assumes relevance. The Petitioner, however, has
not specifically demonstrated any circumstance beyond his control
which prevented him from filing the leave to defend application
within the prescribed period. His own case is that he had acquired
notice of the proceedings, appeared through counsel on 02.04.2026
and sought time to file the application. The explanation thereafter is
confined to the alleged failure of counsel to apprise him of the
requirement of filing the application within fifteen days.
28. In the absence of any further circumstance demonstrating why
the statutory requirement could not be complied with despite the
Petitioner having entered appearance, the requisite foundation for
seeking such indulgence has not been established.

29. The Review Order also cannot be faulted merely because the
learned ARC declined to revisit the matter on the basis of the grounds
urged by the Petitioner. The power of review is a creature of statute,
and the learned ARC, while considering the Review Application,
examined whether the grounds urged disclosed an error apparent on
the face of the record. Having found that the grounds required a re-
examination of the matter and did not disclose such an error, the
learned ARC declined to exercise the power of review.
30. The Review Order further recorded that the leave to defend
application had not been filed within the statutory period and that,
consequently, the statutory consequences under Section 25-B(4) of the

13
2019 SCC OnLine Del 11490
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BHATIA
Signing Date:16.11.2026
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RC.REV. 416/2026 Page 11 of 12

DRC Act followed.
31. What is sought before this Court, therefore, is essentially a re-
examination of the circumstances in which the leave to defend
application could not be filed and a reconsideration of the
consequences that followed therefrom.
32. The Impugned Order and the Review Order, disclose that the
learned ARC has considered the relevant statutory provisions and has
proceeded on the admitted position that no application seeking leave
to defend was filed within the prescribed period. The Orders cannot,
therefore, be said to suffer from any absence of adjudication. Nor has
the Petitioner demonstrated any jurisdictional error, material
irregularity, perversity or manifest illegality in the decision-making
process warranting interference by this Court.
33. The findings returned by the learned ARC are founded upon the
statutory consequences contemplated under Section 25-B(4) of the
DRC Act and the material placed before it. This Court, in exercise of
its limited revisional jurisdiction, finds no ground to hold that the
Impugned Order or the Review Order suffers from any error
warranting interference.
34. Consequently, the present Petition, being sans merit, is
dismissed.
35. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.



HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 05, 2026/tk/jk
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:16.11.2026
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