PUSHPA JAISWAL vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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CGHC010413402026 2026:CGHC:45231
SOURABH
BHILWAR
NAFR
Digitally signed by
SOURABH BHILWAR
Date: 2026.10.28
10:37:06 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 7671 of 2026
Pushpa Jaiswal D/o Shankar Lal Jaiswal, Aged About 34 Years
Working As Guest Lecturer (Political Science) At Government
Gundadhur P.G. College Kondagaon, Distt-Kondagaon (C.G.) R/o
House No. 204, Bajar Para Distt-Kondagaon (C.G.)
... Petitioner
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - The Secretary, Department Of
Higher Education Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Distt - Raipur
(C.G.)
2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - The Secretary, Department Of
General Administration, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Distt-
Raipur (C.G.)
3 - The Commissioner, Higher Education - Directorate, New Raipur,
Distt-Raipur (C.G.)
4 - The Principal, Government Gundadhur Pg College Kondagaon,
Distt-Kondagaon, (C.G.)
... Respondents
(Cause title is taken from Case Information System)

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For Petitioner : Mr. Shubham Tiwari, Advocate.
For Respondents/State : Mr. Shahil Singh, Panel Lawyer

Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge
Order on Board
27/10/2026
1. By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner seeks a
direction to the respondent authorities to consider her
representations dated 29.05.2026 and 05.08.2026 and grant all
monetary benefits admissible during the period of maternity
leave. The petitioner also seeks quashment of Clause 11.2 of
the circular dated 17.07.2026 and a direction to the respondent
authorities to issue a revised circular extending maternity leave
benefits to Guest Lecturers in accordance with law.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has
been working as a Guest Lecturer in the respondent College
since 16.08.2024 and, after availing maternity leave, rejoined
her duties on 19.08.2026. Learned counsel submitted that
despite being entitled to monetary benefits during the period of
maternity leave under Section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act,
1961, the respondent authorities have failed to release the same
despite representations dated 29.05.2026 and 05.08.2026.
Learned counsel further submits that the denial of such benefits
pursuant to Clause 11.2 of the circular dated 17.07.2026 is
contrary to the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, the petitioner
seeks release of the monetary benefits admissible during her

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maternity leave and quashment of the impugned clause of the
circular.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submits that
since the petitioner was not a regular employee she cannot
claim benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, as such,
she is not entitled to get monetary benefit.
4.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
pleadings and documents appended thereto.
5.
Before proceeding further it would be noteworthy to mention
here that a woman employee, at the time of advanced
pregnancy cannot be compelled to undertake hard labour as it
would be detrimental to her health and also to the health of the
foetus. It is for this reason that it is provided in the Maternity
Benefit Act, 1961 that she would be entitled to maternity leave
for certain periods prior to and after delivery. I have gone through
the different provisions of the Act, but I do not find anything
contained in the Act which entitles only regular women
employees to the benefit of maternity leave and not to those who
are engaged on casual basis or on muster roll on daily wage
basis or the employees engaged as guest.
6.
In fact, the Act, 1961 was enacted to secure women's right to
pregnancy and maternity leave and to afford women with as
much flexibility as possible to live an autonomous life, both as a
mother and as a worker, if they so desire.

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7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dr. Kavita Yadav
vs. Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
Department and others reported in (2024) 1 SCC 421 held in
paras 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14 and 15 as under:
“"6. The main question which falls for determination
in this appeal is as to whether the maternity benefits,
as contemplated in the 1961 Act, would apply to a
lady employee appointed on contract if the period for
which she claims such benefits overshoots the
contractual period.
7. Ms. Rachita Garg, learned counsel appearing for
the respondentemployer, sought to defend the
reasoning given in the judgment under appeal. Her
main argument is that once the term or tenure of the
contract ends, there cannot be a notional extension
of the same by giving the employee the benefits of
the 1961 Act in full, as contemplated in Section 5(2)
thereof. It is her submission that any benefits that the
appellant would be entitled to ought to be within the
contractual period.
8. We have reproduced earlier in this judgment the
provisions of Section 12(2)(a) of the 1961 Act. The
aforesaid provision contemplates entitlement to the
benefits under the 1961 Act even for an employee

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who is dismissed or discharged at any time during
her pregnancy if the woman, but for such discharge
or dismissal, would have been entitled to maternity
benefits or medical bonus. Thus, continuation of
maternity benefits is in built in the statute itself,
where the benefits would survive and continue
despite the cessation of employment. In our opinion,
what this legislation envisages is entitlement to
maternity benefits, which accrues on fulfillment of
the conditions specified in Section 5(2) thereof, and
such benefits can travel beyond the term of
employment also. It is not co-terminus with the
employment tenure.
9. A two Judge Bench of this Court in the case of
Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Female Workers
(Muster Roll) & Anr. [(2000) 3 SCC 224], while
dealing with a similar claim by female muster roll
workers who were employed on daily wages, opined
that the provisions relating to maternity benefits in
the 1961 Act would be applicable in their cases as
well. That dispute had reached this Court through
the Industrial Tribunal and the High Court. Before
both these fora, the Union espousing the cause of
the female workers was successful. In that case,
point of discrimination was highlighted as regular

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women employees were extended the benefits of
the said Act but not those who were employed on
casual basis or on muster roll on daily wage basis.
This Court observed, in paragraph 27 of the said
judgment:
"27. The provisions of the Act which have
been set out above would indicate that they
are wholly in consonance with the Directive
Principles of State Policy, as set out in Article
39 and in other articles, specially Article 42. A
woman employee, at the time of advanced
pregnancy cannot be compelled to undertake
hard labour as it would be detrimental to her
health and also to the health of the foetus. It
is for this reason that it is provided in the Act
that she would be entitled to maternity leave
for certain periods prior to and after delivery.
We have scanned the different provisions of
the Act, but we do not find anything contained
in the Act which entitles only regular women
employees to the benefit of maternity leave
and not to those who are engaged on casual
basis or on muster roll on dailywage basis."
10. Broadly, a similar view is reflected in a more
recent judgment of this Court in the case of Deepika

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Singh vs Central Administrative Tribunal And Others
[(2022) 7 SCR 557]. Though this decision dealt with
Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972, in
relation to maternity leave and the 1961 Act was not
directly applicable in that case, this Court analysed
certain provisions of this Act to derive some
guidance on a cognate legislation.
11. This Court observed in the case of Deepika
Singh (supra):
“19. Subsection (1) of Section 5 confers an
entitlement on a woman to the payment of
maternity benefits at a stipulated rate for the
period of her actual absence beginning from
the period immediately preceding the day of
her delivery, the actual day of her delivery
and any period immediately following that
day. Sub-section (3) specifies the maximum
period for which any woman shall be entitled
to maternity benefit. These provisions have
been made by Parliament to ensure that the
absence of a woman away from the place of
work occasioned by the delivery of a child
does not hinder her entitlement to receive
wages for that period or for that matter for the
period during which she should be granted

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leave in order to look after her child after the
birth takes place.
20. The Act of 1961 was enacted to secure
women's right to pregnancy and maternity
leave and to afford women with as much
flexibility as possible to live an autonomous
life, both as a mother and as a worker, if they
so desire. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.
Female Workers (Muster Roll), a twojudge
Bench of this Court placed reliance on the
obligations under Articles 14, 15, 39, 42 and
43 of the Constitution, and India's
international obligations under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and
Article 11 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women to extend benefits under the
Act of 1961 to workers engaged on a casual
basis or on muster roll on daily wages by the
Municipal Corporation of Delhi. The Central
Civil Services (Leave) Rules 1972, it is well to
bear in mind, are also formulated to entrench
and enhance the objects of Article 15 of the
Constitution and other relevant constitutional
rights and protections."

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14. Our independent analysis of the provisions of the
1961 Act does not lead to an interpretation that the
maternity benefits cannot survive or go beyond the
duration of employment of the applicant thereof. The
expression employed in the legislation is maternity
benefits [in Section 2(h)] and not leave. Section 5(2)
of the statute, which we have quoted above,
stipulates the conditions on the fulfilment of which
such benefits would accrue. Section 5(3) lays down
the maximum period for which such benefits could
be granted. The last proviso to Section 5(3) makes
the benefits applicable even in a case where the
applicant woman dies after delivery of the child, for
the entire period she would have been otherwise
entitled to. Further, there is an embargo on the
employer from dismissing or discharging a woman
who absents herself from work in accordance with
the provisions of the Act during her absence. This
embargo has been imposed under Section 12(2)(a)
of the Act. The expression "discharge" is of wide
import, and it would include "discharge on
conclusion of the contractual period". Further, by
virtue of operation of Section 27, the Act overrides
any agreement or contract of service found
inconsistent with the 1961 Act.

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15. In our opinion, a combined reading of these
provisions in the factual context of this case would
lead to the conclusion that once the appellant
fulfilled the entitlement criteria specified in Section
5(2) of the Act, she would be eligible for full maternity
benefits even if such benefits exceed the duration of
her contract. Any attempt to enforce the contract
duration term within such period by the employer
would constitute "discharge" and attract the
embargo specified in Section 12(2)(a) of the 1961
Act. The law creates a fiction in such a case by
treating her to be in employment for the sole purpose
of availing maternity benefits under the 1961 Act."
8. It is not the case of the respondents herein that the job of the
petitioner is not similar to that of a regular Lecturers or that she is
unable to perform the duties of a regular Lecturer. It is claimed
that the petitioner though is appointed as Guest Lecturer, she is
performing same duties and responsibilities undertaken by a
regular Lecturer. Therefore, the respondent authorities are not
justified in holding that the petitioner who is working as Guest
Lecturer is not entitled for monetary benefit.
9. Considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter in the light of
orders passed by the Supreme Court, it is abundantly clear that
the salary for the period when the petitioner had gone to
maternity leave cannot be denied on the ground that she was

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serving as a Guest Lecturer. Further considering the case that
once the petitioner was granted maternity leave, the
respondents are under obligation to release the salary of the
petitioner forthwith in respect of the period when she had gone
for maternity leave.
10.
Accordingly, the respondents are directed to take an appropriate
decision in accordance with rules and guidelines, as the
petitioner is entitled for maternity leave and pass an appropriate
orders in respect of petitioner's claim for unpaid salary for the
period she had gone for maternity, at the earliest preferably
within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy
of this order.
Sd/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
$. Bhilwar