Kaloo Singh vs CLIMATE CHANGE
- Court
- Central Administrative Tribunal
Central Administr
rative Tribunal
h, New Delhi
Principal Bench
(Nainital Circu
uit Sitting)
M.A. No.489
97/2025
IN
O.A. No.438
82/2025
26
Order reserved on : 28.10.20
026
Or
rder pronounced on : 18.11.20
Hon’ble Mr. Ajay Pratap
Hon’ble Mr. Rajinder Ka
p Singh, Member (J)
ashyap, Member (A)
1. Kaloo
aged
S/o L
R/o V
o Singh
about 88 years
Late Shankar Lal
Village - Manduwalla, Dehradun
n -248007
2. Prem
aged
S/o L
R/o H
Mark
m Nath
about 85 years
Late Chanan
House No.251, Bhud Gaon, Pand
ket, P.O. Prem Nagar, Dehradun
dit Wari - Phase II, Near Lovely
-248007.
...Applican
nts
(By Adv
vocate: Shri Kishore Rai)
VERSU
n of India,
ugh the Secretary to Governmen
stry of Environment, Forests & C
US
1. Union
Throu
Minis
Indira
New D
nt of India,
Climate Change,
a Paiyaran Bhavan, Ali Ganj, Jo
Delhi - 110003.
r Bagh Road,
2. Union
Throu
Minis
North
n of India,
ugh the Secretary to Governmen
stry of Finance, Department of E
h Block, Loknayak Bhawan, New
nt of India,
Expenditure,
w Delhi - 110001.
3. The C
Pocke
New D
Comptroller and Auditor Genera
al of India,
Marg,
et -9, Deen Dayal Upadhayaya M
Delhi - 110124.
4. India
Throu
2480
n Council of Forestry Research
ugh the Director General, ICFRE
& Education,
E. P.0. New Forest, Dehradun
06.
5. The D
P.O. N
Director, Forest Research Institu
ute,
New Forest, Dehradun 248006.
...Responden
. Ayush Pokhriyal for Mr. Abhij
nts
(By Adv
Negi)
vocate: Shri T.C. Aggarwal, Mr
jay
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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2 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
O R D E R
Hon’ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A):
MA 4897/2025
By filing the accompanying OA, the applicant is seeking the
following reliefs:-
“(i.) To set aside the ICFRE letter No. 39-19/97-ICFRE/Pension
(KS) dated 07.07.2025 along-with the enclosed calculation
sheet of pension at the time of superannuation ICFRE letter
No. 39-19/97-ICFRE/Pension (KS) dated 14.07.2025
(ii.) To set aside the ICFRE letter No. 63-19/2017-1CFRE
(Representations) dated 20.03.2018 being unsustainable in
law, which directly violate the Terms & Conditions of
Appointment of Group C' & 'D' employees absorbed in
Autonomous ICFRE from 01.04.1993, which were approved
under the Constitutional Powers of Article 53(1) by His
Excellency, the President of India vide Para 2 & 11 of ICFRE
Order No 16-28/93-1CFRE dated 20.08.1993.
th
(iii.) To Re-fix the Revised Basic Pay in the 5 CPC Approved Pay
Scale of Rs. 6,500/= to 10,500/= w.e.f. 01.01.1996 for the Post
of Research Assistant Grade -I (General) as provided on Page
2 of ICFRE Notification No. F. 63-19/2016-CFRE dated
01.03.2017 in compliance of the Terms & Conditions of
Appointment of Group C' & 'D' employees absorbed in
Autonomous ICFRE from 01.04.1993 duly approved under the
Constitutional Powers of Article 53(1) by His Excellency, the
President of India vide Para 2 & 11 of ICFRE Order No 16-
28/93-1CFRE dated 20.08.1993
(iv.) A direction to Grant Two Additional Increments as applicable
as provided in clause 5 of ICFRE Circular No.39-10/93-ICFRE
dated 08.09.1995 in the 5"CPC Approved Pay Scale of Rs.
6.500/- to 10,500/- with effect from 01.01.1996.
(v.) A direction to Re-Calculate the Pension and Pensionary
Benefits based on the Re-fixed Basic Pay as per the
Recommendations of 5h CPC at the time of Superannuation
and on Two Additional Increments as provided in Clause 6 and
at the rates as provided in Clause 5 of ICFRE Circular No. 39-
th
10/93-ICFRE dated 08,09.1995 in the 5 CPC Approved
Revised Pay Scale of Rs. 6.500/- to 10,500/-.
(vi.) A direction to Revise Pension of Pre-2006 Retirees based upon
last pay drawn alone from 01.01.2006 and in compliance of
ICFRE's own statement before Hon’ble Central Administrative
Tribunal (PB), New Delhi in the Counter Affidavit dated
th
23.11.2016 in OA No. 4493 of 2015 on implementation of 6
Central Pay Commissions Recommendations as provided in
Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, PG & Pensions,
Department of Pensions and Pensioners Welfare OM F. No.
38/37/08-P&PW (A) dated 01.09.2008 and OM dated
03.10.2008
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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3 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
(vi.) A direction to arrange to pay the arrears of difference in Pay,
applicable two additional increments, Pension and Pensionary
Benefits together with dearness allowance/dearness relief etc.
from 01.01.1996 onwards till the date of actual payment along
with interest calculated @9% per year.
(viii.) To Award the Cost of this Petition estimated @ Rs.......
(ix.) To award any other relief to which the applicants may be
found entitled under the circumstances of this Case.”
2. In nutshell, the grievance of the applicants is that the
respondents have illegally and arbitrarily denied them the benefit of
fixation of pay in the 5th Central Pay Commission revised pay scale
of Rs.6,500–10,500 w.e.f. 01.01.1996, along with two additional
increments admissible under Clause 5 of ICFRE Circular dated
08.09.1995, despite the same being allegedly mandated under the
terms and conditions of absorption of Group ‘C’ and ‘D’ employees
in ICFRE w.e.f. 01.04.1993, approved by the President of India vide
ICFRE Order dated 20.08.1993. The applicants further assail the
ICFRE communications dated 20.03.2018 and 07.07.2025,
including the pension calculation sheet, as being legally
unsustainable. They seek refixation of their pay, consequential
recalculation and revision of pension and other retiral benefits,
including revision of pension of pre-2006 retirees on the basis of
last pay drawn w.e.f. 01.01.2006, together with arrears of pay,
increments, pension, dearness allowance/dearness relief and
interest @ 9% per annum, besides costs and other consequential
reliefs.
3. Admittedly, there is delay in filing the accompanying OA, the
applicants have filed the present MA for condonation of delay of
2100 days in filing the accompanying OA.
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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4 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
4. Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the respondents
have filed their reply to the present MA as well as accompanying
OA.
5. In support of the present MA, learned counsel for the
applicants submitted that the applicants, by way of the
accompanying OA, are challenging the orders dated 07.07.2025 and
14.07.2025, whereby their claim for grant of revised basic pay in the
th
5 CPC-recommended pay scale of Rs.6500-10500 for the post of
Research Assistant Grade-I (General) w.e.f. 01.01.1996, along with
two additional increments as stipulated under Clause 5 of ICFRE
Circular No. 39-10/93-ICFRE dated 08.09.1995, in compliance
with the terms and conditions of appointment approved by the
President of India vide ICFRE Order No. 16-28/93-ICFRE dated
20.08.1993, has been rejected. The applicants are also seeking
consequential benefits, including revision of pension. It was
contended that the claim involves recurring financial consequences
and, therefore, the delay deserves to be condoned.
5.1 Learned counsel further submitted that although the prescribed
limitation for filing the OA was six months, the applicants could not
approach this Tribunal within the stipulated period as they had
been regularly pursuing their grievances before the respondents’
department in the hope of obtaining redressal. Learned counsel
urged that the delay of 2100 days was neither deliberate nor
intentional but had occurred on account of bona fide reasons.
5.2 Learned counsel also submitted that the applicants thereafter
approached their counsel for filing the OA, who prepared the
requisite pleadings, and the applicants are now pursuing their
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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5 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
remedy before this Tribunal without any further delay. Learned
counsel contended that the applicants have been pursuing their
legitimate claims and that their valuable rights are at stake.
5.3 Lastly, learned counsel prayed that the delay in filing the
accompanying OA be condoned in the interest of justice, failing
which the applicants would suffer irreparable loss and injury.
6. Per contra , learned counsel for Respondent No.4 vehemently
opposed the instant MA seeking condonation of delay in filing the
accompanying OA and submitted that the applicants have failed to
make out any sufficient cause, much less any bona fide or justifiable
ground, warranting exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in their
favour. Learned counsel contended that the delay is attributable
entirely to the inaction, negligence and lack of diligence on the part
of the applicants and, therefore, the instant MA deserves to be
dismissed.
6.1 Learned counsel submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah , reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 54, has categorically held that while considering an
application for condonation of delay, the Court must not commence
its consideration with the merits of the main matter. Rather, the
Court is required to first examine the bona fides of the explanation
furnished by the party seeking condonation. The relevant
observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as relied upon by
Respondent No. 4, are reproduced below:
“16. [...] Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the
matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a
long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in
such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that
the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering the plea for
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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6 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
condonation of delay, the court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by
the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally
balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the
matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not
merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public policy and
principles of equity. No court should keep the ‘Sword of
Damocles’ hanging over the head of a litigant for an
indefinite period of time. ”
(Emphasis supplied)
6.2 Learned counsel further submitted that the instant MA is
conspicuously silent regarding the steps allegedly undertaken by the
applicants between the passing of the impugned orders and the
expiry of the limitation period on 07.01.2026. Learned counsel also
contended that the applicants were required to establish that some
event or circumstance arising within the prescribed period of
limitation prevented them from instituting the accompanying OA
within time. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance is
placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State
of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary , reported in
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612, wherein it was held as under:
“7. [...] For example if the period of limitation is of 90 days then the
party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to
institute the proceedings within that period. What events occurred
after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is
required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was
unable to file it between the 1st day of limitation and the 90th day. It
is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation
for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and
pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient
cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance
arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file
the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the
expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may
be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation
which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the
limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed
must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation.
(See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495 :
AIR 1981 SC 733).”
(Emphasis supplied)
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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7 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
6.3 On the strength of the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel
contended that the applicants have failed to disclose any event or
circumstance which prevented them from filing the accompanying
OA within the prescribed period of limitation. Learned counsel
submitted that the absence of any explanation for the period
preceding the expiry of limitation is fatal to the instant MA and,
therefore, the same deserves rejection on this ground alone.
6.4 Learned counsel further submitted that the explanation
furnished by the applicants, namely, that they were regularly
approaching the Respondent Department in pursuit of their
grievances and thereafter approached counsel for preparation and
filing of the accompanying OA, does not constitute sufficient cause
for condonation of the inordinate delay. Learned counsel contended
that merely pursuing departmental representations or allegedly
availing a parallel remedy does not extend or suspend the statutory
period of limitation for approaching this Tribunal. The applicants
have failed to furnish any particulars whatsoever regarding their
alleged representations, meetings or approaches to the Respondent
Department. Neither the dates of such representations nor the
particulars of any meetings or correspondence have been disclosed.
Learned counsel submitted that vague and unsubstantiated
assertions of regularly approaching the Department cannot
constitute a legally acceptable explanation for the delay.
6.5 Learned counsel also pointed out that the applicants have not
disclosed when they approached their counsel, when the
accompanying OA was prepared, when the same was vetted or
finalised, or what steps were taken thereafter for its institution.
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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8 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
Further, the instant MA is equally silent regarding the explanation
for the delay between the expiry of the limitation period on
07.01.2026 and the actual date of filing of the accompanying OA.
Such omission, according to learned counsel, demonstrates that the
applicants have failed to explain the entire period of delay and have
not approached this Tribunal with due diligence.
6.6 Learned counsel further submitted that the expression
‘sufficient cause’ cannot be construed in a manner so as to condone
delay occasioned by negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides. In
this regard, reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar
Choudhary , reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612, wherein the
principles laid down in Basawaraj v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer , reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81, and Ajay
Dabra v. Pyare Ram , reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 92, were
reiterated. The relevant observations reproduced in the aforesaid
judgment are as follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where
a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the
applicant has to explain the court as to what was the ‘sufficient
cause’ which means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a
party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on
his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or
found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No
court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by
imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided
only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever,
amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions
and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
6.7 Learned counsel further submitted that the aforesaid
principles make it clear that the discretion to condone delay is
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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9 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
required to be exercised judiciously, on the basis of the facts and
circumstances of each case, and that the expression ‘sufficient
cause’ cannot be liberally interpreted where negligence, inaction or
lack of bona fides is attributable to the applicant(s).
6.8 Learned counsel also submitted that the applicants cannot
seek refuge under the principle of adopting a liberal approach in
matters of condonation of delay, as the said principle is not
absolute or unqualified. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of
the Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Sarla Devi v.
Jagan Nath , reported in 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1541, wherein it
was observed that although a liberal approach may be adopted to
advance substantial justice, the Court must remain vigilant and
cautious, particularly in view of the growing tendency to treat delay
as a non-serious matter.
6.9 Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing
Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy , reported in
(2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down
the guiding principles governing condonation of delay and observed
as follows:
“The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its
inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration... the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance
of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be
given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.”
(Emphasis supplied)
6.10 Learned counsel submitted that, in the present case, the
conduct of the applicants is characterised by unexplained delay,
absence of diligence and failure to disclose material particulars
concerning the steps allegedly undertaken by them. Learned
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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10 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
counsel also contended that the applicants have remained grossly
lax and negligent and have failed to demonstrate bona fide conduct
throughout the period of limitation as well as thereafter.
Condonation of such delay, according to learned counsel, would not
only overlook the settled principles governing limitation but would
also cause prejudice to Respondent No. 4.
6.11 Learned counsel accordingly submitted that the instant MA is
devoid of merit and is liable to be rejected by this Tribunal and
consequently, the accompanying OA be also dismissed.
7. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the applicants reiterated the
submissions as noted above.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the applicants as well as
learned counsel for Respondent No.4 and other respondents and
have carefully perused the pleadings available on record.
9. The limited question requiring consideration at this stage is
whether the applicants have demonstrated sufficient cause
warranting condonation of the delay of 2100 days in filing the
accompanying OA.
9.1 Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the delay
occurred on account of their continuous pursuit of grievances
before the respondent authorities and their bona fide expectation
that the matter would be resolved administratively. Further
contention is that the applicants subsequently approached their
counsel, got the OA prepared and are now pursuing their remedy
before this Tribunal. According to the applicants, the claim involves
recurring financial consequences relating to pay fixation and
pensionary benefits and, therefore, the delay deserves to be
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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11 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
condoned in the interest of justice. However, on the other hand,
learned counsel for Respondent No.4 vehemently opposed the
instant OA and submitted that the applicants have failed to furnish
any satisfactory explanation for the delay, particularly for the
period during which the limitation expired. Learned counsel
contended that the alleged pursuit of departmental representations,
without particulars or supporting material, cannot constitute
sufficient cause for condonation of such an inordinate delay.
Learned counsel further relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah (supra),
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary
(supra), Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer
(supra) and Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (supra) to contend that
negligence, inaction and lack of bona fides cannot be condoned
under the guise of a liberal approach.
10. We have considered the rival submissions. It is well settled
that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ occurring in the provisions
governing condonation of delay is required to be construed in a
manner that advances substantial justice; however, such an
approach does not dispense with the obligation of the applicants to
furnish a satisfactory and credible explanation for the delay. The
discretion to condone delay is judicial and cannot be exercised
mechanically merely because the applicants seek adjudication on
merits.
10.1 While considering the question of delay at hand, it is
important to refer to the decision of this Tribunal in OA
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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12 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
No.2532/2021, titled All India Civil Accounts Employees
Association and another vs. Union of India and another
decided on 18.12.2024, wherein it was observed: -
“13. To appreciate the first issue arising in the present OA, it will be
necessary to notice the Scheme of the Administrative Tribunals Act,
1985. For ready reference Section 19, 20, 21 of Act and Section 5 of
Limitation Act, 1963 reproduced as –
(A) “Section- 19. Applications to tribunals. —(1) Subject to
the other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by any
order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a
Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the
redressal of his grievance. Explanation.—For the purposes
of this sub-section, “order” means an order made—
(a) by the Government or a local or other authority within the
territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or
by any corporation 3[or society] owned or controlled by the
Government; or
(b) by an officer, committee or other body or agency of the
Government or a local or other authority or corporation 3[or society]
referred to in clause (a).
(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and
be accompanied by such documents or other evidence and by such fee
(if any, not exceeding one hundred rupees) 4[in respect of the filing of
such application and by such other fees for the service or execution of
processes, as may be prescribed by the Central Government].
[(3) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Tribunal
shall, if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary, that the
application is a fit case for adjudication or trial by it, admit such
application; but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may
summarily reject the application after recording its reasons.]
(4) Where an application has been admitted by a Tribunal under sub-
section (3), every proceeding under the relevant service rules as to
redressal of grievances in relation to the subject-matter of such
application pending immediately before such admission shall abate
and save as otherwise directed by the Tribunal, no appeal or
representation in relation to such matter shall thereafter be
entertained under such rules.
(B) Section 20. Applications not to be admitted unless other
remedies exhausted.—(1) A Tribunal shall not ordinarily
admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant
had availed of all the remedies available to him under the
relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to
have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant
service rules as to redressal of grievances,—
(a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other
authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order
under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation
made by such person in connection with the grievance; or
(b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other
authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
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13 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such
person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal
was preferred or representation was made has expired.
(3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available
to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President
or to the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be
deemed to be of one of the remedies which are available unless the
applicant had elected to submit such memorial.
(C) Section 21. Limitation.—(1) A Tribunal shall not admit
an application,—
(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of
sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the
grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the
date on which such final order has been made;
(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned
in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a
period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order
having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said
period of six months.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where—
(a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had
arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of
three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction,
powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this
Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and
(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been
commenced before the said date before any High Court, the
application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within
the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b),
of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date,
whichever period expires later.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one
year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of subsection (1) or, as the
case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if
the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not
making the application within such period.”
(D) Section 5 of Limitation Act 1963 envisages that:-
“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. —Any
appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the
provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or
the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not
preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
[Emphasis supplied]
14. A bare reading of the Section 21 of A.T. Act, 1985 would indicate
that sub-section (1) of Section 21 provides for limitation for redressal
of the grievances in clauses (a) and (b) and specifies the period of one
year. Sub-Section (2) amplifies the limitation of one year in respect of
grievances covered under clauses (a) and (b) and an outer limit of six
months in respect of grievances covered by subsection (2) is provided.
Sub-Section (3) postulates that notwithstanding anything contained
sub-section (1) or sub-Section (2), if the applicants satisfy the Tribunal
that they had sufficient cause for not making the application within
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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14 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
such period enumerated in sub-section (1) and (2) from the date of
application. The Tribunal has been given power to condone the delay
on satisfy itself that the applicant has explained the delay in filing
the application for rederssal of their grievances. The Sub-section (2)
has given power, right for making applications within one year of the
grievances covered under clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-Section (2). There
is no need for the applicant to give any explanation to the delay
having occurred during that period. Applicant entitled, as a matter of
right to invoke the jurisdiction of the court for redressal of their
grievances. If the application to be filed beyond that period, then the
need to satisfactory explanation for the delay caused till date
of filing of the application must be given and then the
question of satisfaction of the Tribunal in that behalf would
arise. Sub-Section (3) starts with a non-obstante clause
which rubs out the effect of sub-section (2) of Section 21 and
the need thereby arises to given satisfactory explanation for
the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the period
prescribed in Sub-Section (1) & (2) thereof.
15. Present OA has been filed under Section 19 of the A.T. Act, 1985
and intention of legislature is plain with opening words in subsection
(1) of Section 19 that subject to the other provisions of this Act, a
person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the
jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application. So also sub-
section (3) of Section 19 provides that on receipt of such OA subject to
other provisions of this AT Act, 1985 and coupled with the fact, the
Tribunal shall if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary,
that the such application is a fit case for adjudication or trial by it,
admit such application, but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it
may summarily reject the application after recording its reasons.
16. Thus the intention of the legislature is clear and object of the A.T.
Act, 1985 is clear as evident from the scheme extracted herein above.”
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
23. This Tribunal is empowered to consider application for
condonation of delay only if proper explanation of delay is given. In
present case in hand, the applicants have neither explained the factum
of delay in para 3 nor filed any MA for condonation of delay.
24. It is well settled in law in principles of service jurisprudence that
the Central Administrative Tribunal is a creature of the statute
(Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985) and the Tribunal is bound to
function within four corners of provisions of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 and this Tribunal just does not have any
jurisdiction to exercise power out of purview of provisions of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
25. So also the Division Bench of this Tribunal in case of Manoj
Kmar Vc. Union of India, OA No. 842 of 2023 (Patna)
dismissed the OA vide order dated 15.01.2024 and observed
that there is no prayer for condonation of delay, in absence of any
ground for condonation of delay, OA not maintainable under Section
21 of A.T. Act, 1985 and dismissed the OA on ground of limitation.
26. This Tribunal does not have power to condone delay as in present
case applicant had not given any explanation nor any MA for
condonation of delay filed. So also Division Bench of Hon’ble High
Court of M.P., in case of Union of India &ors Vs. Raj Kumar
Lodhi, M.P.No. 2448 of 2023 decided vide judgment dated
14.07.2023. Their Lordships held - “Tribunal has to function
within four corners of the statute, i.e. A.T. Act, 1985 which in
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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15 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
mandatory terms prescribes the period of limitation under Section 21
and also the parameters extending the period of limitation which
admittedly are not satisfied in the present case”.
27. Hon’ble Supreme Court in 3 Judge Bench decision in case
of Secretary to Government of India and others versus
ShivramMahadu Gaikwad, 1995, Supp (3) SCC 231. Their
Lordships held-
“2. The learned counsel for the Union of India
raised a preliminary contention, namely, that the
application was filed almost after about four years
from the date of discharge and, therefore, it was
clearly barred by Section 21 of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985. He pointed out that this
question was squarely raised in the counter filed in
answer to the respondent's application in the
following terms:
“These respondents state that the applicant herein
is challenging the order dated 7-10-1986
discharging him from the service and has filed this
application on 14-9- 1990, as such this application
is barred by the provisions of limitation under
Section 21 of the Central Administrative Tribunals
Act, 1985.”
When we turn to the judgment of the Tribunal, we
find that there is no mention about the question of
limitation even though it stared in the face. It
would immediately occur to anyone that since the
order of discharge was of 7- 10-1986 and the
application was filed in 1990, it was clearly barred
by limitation unless an application for condoning
the delay was made under Section 21(3) of the
Administrative Tribunals Act. No such application
was in fact made. Even if it was the contention of
the employee that he was suffering from
schizophrenia, that could have been projected as a
ground for condonation of delay under sub-section
(3) of Section 21 of the said statute. Even otherwise
without insisting on the formality of an
application under Section 21(3) if the Tribunal had
dealt with the question of limitation in the context
of Section 21 we may have refrained from
interfering with the order of the Tribunal under
Article 136, but it seems that the Tribunal totally
overlooked this question which clearly stared in
the face. Even the employee made no effort to
explain the delay and seek condonation. We find
no valid explanation on record for coming to the
conclusion that the case for condonation of delay is
made out. In the circumstances, there is no doubt
that the application was clearly barred by
limitation. It is also difficult to understand how the
Tribunal could have awarded full back wages even
for the period of delay for which the employee was
solely responsible. However, since application
itself is barred by limitation under Section 21 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, it deserves to be
dismissed.”
[Emphasis supplied]
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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16 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
28. In D.C.S. Negi Vs. Union of India & Ors decided on
07.03.2011 in SLP (C) No.7566/211 , Hon’ble Supreme Court
analyzed the provision of Section 21 of the Act, 1985 and held as –
“A reading of the plain language of the above
reproduced section makes it clear that the
Tribunal cannot admit on application unless the
same is made within the time specified in Clause
(a) and (b) of section 21(1) or section 21(2) or an
order is passed in term of Sub-section (3) for
entertaining the application after the prescribed
period. Since section found to have been made
within the prescribed period or sufficient cause is
shown for not doing so within the prescribed
period and an order is passed under section 21(3).”
[Emphasis supplied]
29. In Balwant Singh vs Jagdish Singh and Ors (2010) 8 SCC
685, Their Lordships held on the law of limitation as under:
“26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has
definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party
to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied
appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of
a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of
one party as a result of the failure of the other party to
explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own
party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then
alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has
been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and
remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other
party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a
result of his action vigilantly.”
[Emphasis supplied]
10.2 In OA No.1356/2025, titled Naresh Kumar vs. Union of
India and others , decided on 07.09.2026.
“9. Present OA has been filed under Section 19 of the A.T. Act, 1985
and intention of legislature is plain with opening words in sub
section (1) of Section 19 that subject to the other provisions of this
Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter
within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application. So
also subsection (3) of Section 19 provides that on receipt of such OA
subject to other provisions of this AT Act, 1985 and coupled with the
fact, the Tribunal shall if satisfied after such inquiry as it may
deem necessary, that the such application is a fit case for
adjudication or trial by it, admit such application, but where the
Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may summarily reject the application
after recording its reasons.
…..
20. In S.S. Rathore Versus State of M.P.reported in AIR
1990 SC 10. Their Lordship’s has held that the repeated
unsuccessful representations not provided by law shall not have the
effect of extending the period of limitation.
21. P.S. Sadasiva Swamy Versus State of Tamil Nadu, AIR
1974 SC 2271. Their Lordship’s observed that “in promotion
matters the petitioner should approach the court at least with six
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
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17 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
months or at the most a year after promotion of his junior, because
to unsettle things settled long back is unjust and improper.”
22. In case of Shibha Shankar Mohapatra & Ors. Vs. State
of Orissa, (2010) 12 SCC 47 . Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
“it is well settled in service matters the question of seniority should
not be reopened after lapse of a reasonable period because that
result in disturbing the settled position which is not justifiable.”
23. We have already examined the scheme of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985. Clause (b) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 20 of A.T.
Act, 1985 specifically provides that this Tribunal shall not admit an
application under Sec 19 of Act, 1985, where a final order has been
made. The limitation prescribed under section 21 of Act, 1985 is
that the Tribunal shall not admit an application, in case a final
order has been made in connection with the grievances, unless the
application is made within one year from the date on which such
final order has been made. Applicant has himself filed final order
dt. 3.7.2008 and 2.9.2009 made by the competent authority,
rejecting claim of the applicant for retrospective promotion w.e.f.
1.10.1997. The applicant has not approached this Tribunal, within
limitation prescribed under Section 21 A.T. Act, 1985. So also not a
single reason, no sufficient cause shown to explain the sufficient
cause for delay in filing the OA, when original date of cause of
action had arisen on 8.9.1997, the date of non-consideration for
promotion against SC-point in the roster for promotion to the post
of Senior Radiographer.
24. The aforesaid analysis, shows clear case of negligence on the
part of applicant in approaching this Tribunal within a year of
original cause of action and not a single reason and no sufficient
cause shown in the application for condonation in delay in filing
this OA.
25. We are of the considered opinion that the applicant has
miserably failed to show any sufficient cause in filing the present
OA after enormous delay and in absence of sufficient cause, delay
cannot be condoned.
26. It is well settled in law in principles of service jurisprudence
that the Central Administrative Tribunal is a creature of the statute
(Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985) and the Tribunal is bound to
function within four corners of provisions of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 and this Tribunal just does not have any
jurisdiction to exercise power out of purview of provisions of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
27. The Division Bench of Hon’ble High Court of M.P., in case of
Union of India &ors Vs. Raj Kumar Lodhi , M.P. No. 2448 of
2023 decided vide judgment dated 14.07.2023. Their Lordships
held - “Tribunal has to function within four corners of the statute,
i.e. A.T. Act, 1985 which in mandatory terms prescribes the period
of limitation under Section 21 and also the parameters extending
the period of limitation which admittedly are not satisfied in the
present case”.
28. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) 7956
of 2011 in case of D.C.S. Negi versus Union of India & Ors,
decided on 07.03.2011 (2018) 16 SCC 721. Their Lordships
held as under:-
“10. The explanation given by the Petitioner for delayed
filing of the special leave petition is wholly unsatisfactory
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
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18 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
and there is no valid ground for exercise of power by this
Court Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
11. With the above observations, the special leave petition is
dismissed.
12. Before parting with the case, we consider it
necessary to note that for quite some time, the
Administrative Tribunals established under the Act
have been entertaining and deciding the
applications filed Under Section 19 of the Act in
complete disregard of the mandate of Section 21,
which reads as under:
21. Limitation.- (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an
application,-
(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in
Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made in
connection with the grievance unless the application is
made, within one year from the date on which such final
order has been made;
(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is
mentioned in Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 has
been made and a period of six months had expired
thereafter without such final order having been made,
within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of
six months.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Subsection (1),
where-
(a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made
had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during
the period of three years immediately preceding the date on
which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal
becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter
to which such order relates; and
(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had
been commenced before the said date before any High
Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if
it is made within the period referred to in Clause (a), or, as
the case may be, Clause (b), of Subsection (1) or within a
period of six months from the said date, whichever period
expires later.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1)
or Sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the
period of one year specified in Clause (a) or Clause (b) of
Sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six
months specified in Sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies
the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the
application within such period.
13. A reading of the plain language of the above reproduced
Section makes it clear that the Tribunal cannot admit an
application unless the same is made within the time
specified in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1) or Section
21(2) or an order is passed in terms of Sub-section (3) for
entertaining the application after the prescribed period.
Since Section 21(1) is couched in negative form, it is the duty
of the Tribunal to first consider whether the application is
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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19 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
within limitation. An application can be admitted only if the
same is found to have been made within the prescribed
period or sufficient cause is shown for not doing so within
the prescribed period and an order is passed Under Section
21(3).
14. In the present case, the Tribunal entertained and decided
the application without even adverting to the issue of
limitation. The learned counsel for the petitioner tried to
explain this omission by pointing out that in the reply filed
on behalf of the respondents, no such objection was raised
but we have not felt impressed. In our view, the Tribunal
cannot abdicate its duty to act in accordance with the
statute under which it is established and the fact that an
objection of limitation is not raised by the respondent/non-
applicant is not at all relevant.
15. A copy of this order be sent to the Registrar of the
Principal Bench of the Tribunal, who shall place the same
before the Chairman of the Tribunal for appropriate order.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
29. In Balwant Singh vs Jagdish Singh and Ors (2010) 8 SCC
685, Their Lordships held on the law of limitation as under:
“26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has
definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party
to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied
appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of
a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of
one party as a result of the failure of the other party to
explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own
party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then
alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been
thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and
remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party
of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of
his action vigilantly.”
[Emphasis supplied]
30. In State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Seshachalam (2017) 10 SCC
137, Their Lordships held –
“16. Filing of representations alone would not save the
period of limitation. Delay or latches is a relevant factor
for a court of law to determine the question as to whether
the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration.
Delay and/or latches on the part of a Government servant
may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to
others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would
not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it
is well known that law leans in favour of those who
are alert and vigilant.”
[Emphasis supplied]
31. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Chand Sharma Vs.
Udham Singh Kamal and Others (1999) 8 SCC 304, where
departmental representation against non-promotion was rejected
on 02.07.1991. OA was filed on 02.06.1994, i.e., after three years.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in view of Section 21(1)(a) of
the A.T. Act, the Tribunal could not admit the application and
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
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20 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
decide it on merits. The delay was sought to be covered by pleading
some new facts. The plea for which no foundation was laid before
lower court or Tribunal was not entertained by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court.
32. For the reasons stated hereinabove and law laid down by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in recent decision in case of Shivamma
(Dead) By LRS versus Karnataka Housing Board & Ors, 2025 Live
Law (SC) 899 - In condonation of delay is not a matter of right,
liberal approach is preferred to achieve substantial justice but at
the same time negligence, inaction, and ingredients of Sec. 5 of the
Limitation Act were not fulfilled and exercise of discretion was
clearly wrong.
33. In Result, M.A. No. 2445 of 2025, Application for condonation
of delay in filing the OA is hereby dismissed.
34. We have analysed in detail the issue and in the light of
aforesaid analysis. Accordingly, findings on the issue is decided
against the applicant and in favour of the respondent.
35. Accordingly, M.A. No. 2445/2025, Application for condonation
of delay in filing O.A. No. 1356 / 2025 is hereby dismissed. 36.
Resultantly, the OA is dismissed on account of delay and latches.
11. The aforesaid principles have been considered in the light of
the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board &
Others (supra) , Civil Appeal No. 11794 of 2025, decided on
12.09.2025, reported as 2025 INSC 1104. In the said judgment, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court undertook an exhaustive examination of
the principles governing condonation of delay under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963. The Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised
that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ requires an objective
assessment of the explanation furnished by the litigant and that the
entire period of delay must be satisfactorily explained. It was
further held that although the length of delay is not, by itself,
determinative, the conduct, diligence and bona fides of the party
seeking condonation are material considerations. The law of
limitation cannot be permitted to become an instrument for
condoning indolence, negligence or prolonged inaction.
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
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21 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
11.1 The Hon'ble Supreme Court also cautioned that the question of
condonation cannot be decided merely by examining the merits of
the underlying claim. The first and foremost requirement is to
ascertain whether the applicant has established sufficient cause for
not approaching the Court within the prescribed period. For facility
of reference, we reproduce the relevant paras of the said judgment
as under:-
“261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the
High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this
judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that
administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient
ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an
emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be
condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case
of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able
to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all
throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said.
But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought
not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also
equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to
its own lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such
callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and
should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of
delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for
State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be
cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants
cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the
fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later
stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put
all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate
delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add
insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section
100of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to
questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping
scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of
judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited
means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its
elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations
deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a
party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to
contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it
reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such
litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation
that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek
justice.
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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22 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and
apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process
of law.
265. In the result, this appeal stands allowed. The impugned
judgment and order of the High Court is hereby set aside. Apart
from the costs of Rs 25,000/- imposed by the High Court, to be paid
by the respondent no. 1 to the appellant, we impose an additional
cost of Rs 25,000/- on the respondent no. 1, to be paid to the
Karnataka State Legal Services Authority within a period of four
weeks from today.
266. The Court of Principle Judge (Junior Division), Kalaburagi, is
directed to proceed with the execution of the decree in favour of the
appellant in E.P. No. 2 of 2011, and shall ensure that the proceedings
conclude within a period of 2 months from the date of this judgment.
267. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 268.
Registry shall circulate one copy each of this judgment to all the
High Courts.”
12. From the above observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it
is evident that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphatically held
that administrative delay, lethargy, or procedural laxity cannot
constitute “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay and the courts
must not condone delay on casual, superficial, or routine grounds,
particularly when the applicant is a State authority. The object of
limitation laws is to ensure finality of litigation as reopening of
matters after inordinate delay defeats justice. Further, the State
stands on equal footing with private litigants and cannot claim
special indulgence merely due to bureaucratic inefficiencies.
Condonation of delay is permissible only when bona fide, diligent,
and continuous efforts are demonstrated, establishing a genuine
“sufficient cause.” However, allowing delayed litigation prejudices
private parties, especially those with limited means, and leads to
prolonged and unjust harassment. Thus, no litigant should be
permitted to misuse the process of law through negligent or
apathetic conduct. Accordingly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
reinforced that delay must not be condoned unless strictly justified,
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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23 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
and that the courts should refuse to entertain time-barred matters
where no credible explanation exists, thereby upholding procedural
discipline and fairness in litigation. Though the aforesaid
observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court were rendered in the
context of governmental action, the legal principles enunciated
therein are of general application. The same, therefore, apply
mutatis mutandis to private parties/applicant seeking condonation
of delay in instituting the main proceedings, and is/are required to
be adhered to with equal rigor.
13. The aforesaid pronouncement assumes significance in the
present matter. Further, in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has emphasized that while
considering an application for condonation of delay, the Court must
first examine the bona fides of the explanation offered and cannot
commence its consideration with the merits of the main matter.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation is
founded upon sound principles of public policy and equity and
cannot be treated as a mere technicality. Thus, the question before
us is not whether the applicants may have an arguable claim
concerning pay fixation or pensionary benefits, but whether they
have satisfactorily explained their failure to approach this Tribunal
within the prescribed period.
14. In the present case, the applicants have sought to explain the
delay primarily on the ground that they were regularly approaching
the respondent authorities for redressal of their grievances.
However, the MA does not disclose the dates of such
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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24 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
representations, the particulars of the correspondence exchanged,
or any specific assurance or circumstance which prevented them
from instituting the accompanying OA within the prescribed
period. The mere assertion that departmental remedies were being
pursued, without supporting particulars, cannot by itself establish
sufficient cause for the entire period of delay.
15. We also find substance in the objection raised by Respondent
No.4 that the applicants have failed to explain what prevented them
from approaching this Tribunal within the period of limitation. In
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that the cause
preventing the institution of proceedings within limitation must be
traceable to a circumstance arising during the period of limitation
itself. Subsequent events may explain further delay in filing
proceedings, but cannot, by themselves, justify the initial expiry of
limitation. In the present case, no such circumstance has been
satisfactorily established by the applicants.
16. The applicants have also failed to furnish any particulars
regarding the date on which they approached their counsel, the
time taken in preparation or finalisation of the OA, or the steps
undertaken thereafter for its institution. The explanation furnished
is thus general and lacks the necessary particulars to demonstrate
continuous diligence throughout the period of delay. We are unable
to accept that the mere subsequent engagement of counsel and
preparation of the OA would, in the absence of any explanation for
the preceding period, constitute sufficient cause for condonation of
delay of 2100 days.
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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25 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
17. The contention of the applicants that their claim relates to
recurring financial consequences and pensionary benefits also does
not, by itself, furnish a sufficient ground for condoning the delay in
instituting the OA. The nature of the substantive claim cannot
substitute for the requirement of explaining the delay. As held by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v.
Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy
(supra), the conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to
its inaction or negligence are relevant considerations, and the
principle of liberal approach cannot be applied to the exclusion of
the interests of the opposite party.
18. We are conscious that the law relating to condonation of delay
does not require an unduly pedantic approach and that substantial
justice is an important consideration. Nevertheless, substantial
justice cannot be advanced by disregarding the statutory period of
limitation where the party seeking condonation has failed to
establish sufficient cause. In the present case, the applicants have
neither furnished a cogent explanation for the delay nor
demonstrated that they acted with reasonable diligence. Their
explanation is vague, unsupported by particulars and insufficient to
account for the inordinate delay of 2100 days.
19. In view of the foregoing discussion and having regard to the
principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H.
Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah (supra), State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary (supra) and Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
Nafar Academy (supra) and Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v.
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
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26 MA No.4897/2025 IN OA No.4382/2025
Karnataka Housing Board & Others (supra), we are of the
considered view that the applicants have failed to make out
sufficient cause for condonation of the delay in filing the
accompanying OA. The explanation furnished does not inspire
confidence and does not justify exercise of discretion in their
favour.
20. In view the above discussion, we dismiss the instant MA
seeking condonation of delay of 2100 days in filing the
accompanying OA. Consequently, the accompanying OA, being
barred by limitation, is also dismissed.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (Ajay Pratap Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
/ravi/
Digitally signed by RAVI KANOJIA
DN: C=IN, CN=RAVI KANOJIA, L=Central Delhi, O=CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL
BENCH, OU=Central Administrative Tribunal PRINCIPAL Bench, ST=Delhi, [email protected],
postalCode=110001, serialNumber=12da7dfe98e77c92dda4af6c196687700e5cc7e2bcc4fe78d730f8470c3e9a4f,
street=61/35, COPERNICUS MARG, NEW DELHI 110001, telephoneNumber=
5b491534ade0b015fafa6f7185daf00161f030b0bc4a2fa0c67dd30bd5b99ab9
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
RAVI KANOJIA Date: 2026.11.20 11:07:59+05'30'
Foxit PDF Reader Version: 2026.2.1