SHRI GOPAL PAL AND ORS vs PRAN KRISHNA SINGHA AND ORS

Court
Calcutta High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE

Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Prasenjit Biswas

SA 393 of 2000


Shri Gopal Pal & Ors.
-Versus-
Pran Krishna Singha & Ors.

For the Appellants : Mr. Bhaskar Ghosh, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Ambu Bindu Chakraborty.


For the Respondents : Mr. Jayanta Das.
Ms. Soumitra Ghosh.


Hearing concluded on : 20.08.2026

Judgment On : 17.11.2026
Judgment uploaded on : 17.11.2026
Prasenjit Biswas , J:-
1. The present appeal has been preferred at the instance of the
defendants/appellants, assailing the judgment and decree dated
th th
29 September, 1999 and 4 October, 1999, respectively, passed

2

by the learned Special Judge (E.C. Court)-cum-Additional District
and Sessions Judge, Midnapore, in Title Appeal No. 160 of 1997.
2. By the impugned judgment and decree, the learned First
th
Appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree dated 18
August, 1997, passed by the learned Trial Court in Title Suit No.
78 of 1992. The learned First Appellate Court, upon consideration
rd
of the matter, declared the plaintiffs' entitlement to a 2/3 share
in the suit property and, accordingly, restrained the
defendants/appellants from interfering with the plaintiffs' peaceful
rd
possession in respect of their said 2/3 share in the suit property.
3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid
judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court,
the defendants/appellants have preferred the instant appeal,
calling into question the legality and propriety of the impugned
judgment and decree.
4. This appeal was admitted by the Hon’ble Division Bench of
this court by passing an order dated 22.12.1999 and the following
substantial question of law have been formulated-
(1) Whether the Court of Appeal below in reversing
the finding of the Trial Court erred in law substantially in
not arriving at definite findings that the lands in
question were alienated for legal necessity by the
widows i.e. Sashi and Kusumi?

3

(2) Whether the Court of Appeal below erred in law
substantially in not holding that the deed of transfer was
not proved formally in terms of the provisions of the
Indian Evidence Act?
(3) Whether the Court of Appeal below erred in law
substantially in rejecting the counter claim of the
defendants whereby the findings of the Trial Court were
reversed without discussing any reason for such
reversal?
5. All the points formulated hereinabove are taken up together
for consideration and discussion, as they are intrinsically
interrelated and overlap with one another. For the sake of brevity
and to avoid unnecessary repetition, the same are being
considered and adjudicated upon conjointly.
6. The plaintiffs/ respondents (herein) instituted a suit for
declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the suit
property mentioned in the schedule of the plaint. The suit was
dismissed by the Trial Court by passing the judgement and the
counter claim filed by the defendants was allowed allowing their
title and possession in respect of the suit property.
7. Against the said judgement and decree passed by the Trial
Court the plaintiffs preferred appeal which was allowed and the
suit was sent back on remand and after remand the following two
additional issues were framed-

4

(1) Was there any legal necessity in case of transfer in
favour of the predecessor of the plaintiffs?
(2) Can the recitals of the alleged deed of sale be believed
as a proof of evidence?
8. The learned Trial Court, upon consideration of the pleadings
of the parties and the evidence adduced on their behalf, dismissed
the suit instituted by the plaintiffs and allowed the counter claim
filed by the defendants. While doing so, the learned Trial Court
held that the defendants had been able to establish their
possession over the entire sixteen annas share of the property
described in Schedule ‘Ka’ to their written statement by adducing
oral evidence. The learned Trial Court further held that the
defendants had right, title, interest and possession over the suit
property and had acquired title thereto by way of adverse
possession. On the basis of such findings, the learned Trial Court
concluded that the defendants were entitled to the reliefs prayed
for in their counterclaim.
9. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid
judgment and decree, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal, being Title
Appeal No. 160 of 1997. The said appeal was allowed by the
learned First Appellate Court, and the judgment and decree passed
therein have been assailed in the present second appeal.
10. The learned First Appellate Court, upon reappraisal of the
evidence and materials available on record, held that the plaintiffs

5

were entitled to a decree declaring their right, title and interest in
respect of an undivided two-thirds share in the suit property. The
learned First Appellate Court further held that the plaintiffs were
entitled to a decree of injunction in respect of their said share.
11. At the very outset, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf
of the appellants firstly contended that Sashi and Kusumi were
admittedly illiterate and pardanashin ladies. In such
circumstances, the burden lay upon the plaintiffs, who claimed and
derived benefits under the two deeds in question, to establish that
the said deeds were executed by Sashi and Kusumi upon their fully
understanding the nature and effect of the transactions embodied
therein. It was further submitted that the plaintiffs were required
to prove that, prior to the execution of the said deeds, the
executants had received independent advice and had acted with a
clear understanding of the consequences of their acts. According to
the learned Advocate, where a transaction is challenged on the
ground that the executants were illiterate and pardanashin ladies,
the burden of establishing the validity and genuineness of the
transaction rests upon the persons seeking to derive benefits there
from. In support of such contention, reliance was placed upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v.
1
Jangbahadur Rai and Others , particularly paragraph 6 thereof,

1
AIR 1963 SC 1203

6

as well as the decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court
in Kartick Prasad Gorai and Others v. Nemai Prasad Gorai
2
and Others , particularly paragraph 21 thereof.
12. Secondly, the learned Advocate for the appellants contended
that the First Appellate Court, while reversing the judgment and
decree passed by the learned Trial Court, failed to adhere to the
principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction as laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari v.
3
Purushottam Tiwari . It was argued that, while reversing a
judgment of dismissal or allowing a suit by setting aside the
findings of the Trial Court, the First Appellate Court is required to
undertake an independent and reasoned examination of the entire
evidence on record, address the material findings recorded by the
Trial Court, and assign cogent reasons for disagreeing with such
findings. According to the learned Advocate, the First Appellate
Court failed to discharge its duty in the manner contemplated by
the aforesaid decision.
13. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, the learned
Advocate for the appellants argued that the First Appellate Court
committed substantial errors of law in reversing the judgment and
decree passed by the learned Trial Court. It was, therefore,

2
AIR 1998 Cal 278

3
(2001) 3 SCC 179

7

contended that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the
First Appellate Court are unsustainable in law and liable to be set
aside. Accordingly, the learned Advocate prayed for allowing the
present second appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment and
decree of the First Appellate Court, and restoring the judgment
and decree passed by the learned Trial Court.
14. It is an admitted position that the suit property originally
belonged to three brothers, namely, Adhar Pal, Sridhar Pal and
Shibu Pal, each of whom had an undivided one-third share therein.
Their respective names were duly recorded in the C.S. Record of
Rights (C.S.R.O.R.). The suit property comprises two khatians,
namely, Khatian Nos. 121 and 274.
15. Adhar Pal and Sridhar Pal died intestate, leaving behind their
respective widows as their only legal heirs. The widow of Adhar Pal
was Kusumi Dei, also known as Kusumi Pal, whereas the widow of
Sridhar Pal was Sashi Dei, also known as Sashi Pal. According to
the plaintiffs/respondents, upon the death of their respective
husbands, Kusumi and Sashi inherited an undivided one-third
share each in the suit property. Subsequently, by two registered
sale deeds dated 23.03.1924 and 01.04.1924, respectively,
Kusumi and Sashi transferred their respective one-third shares in
favour of Ashutosh Singha, the predecessor-in-interest of the

8

plaintiffs/respondents (herein), upon receipt of the consideration
money stipulated in the deeds.
16. The plaintiffs further contend that the consideration money
for the aforesaid transactions was paid to Kusumi and Sashi out of
the joint family fund (ejmali fund) of Ashutosh Singha, Pran
Krishna Singha and Iswar Singha. It is their specific case that,
following such purchases, the suit property continued to be
possessed jointly (ejmali) by the predecessors-in-interest of the
plaintiffs/respondents Nos. 2 to 11. Thereafter, Shibu Pal, the
surviving brother of Adhar Pal and Sridhar Pal, also died,
whereupon his share in the suit property devolved upon Ashutosh
Pal, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants/appellants.
17. On the basis of the aforesaid transactions and subsequent
devolution of the respective interests, the plaintiffs claim that they
acquired right, title and interest in, and possession over, the suit
property by way of purchase and inheritance. According to them,
although their predecessor-in-interest had acquired the requisite
right and interest in the property, the subsequent R.S. Record of
Rights was prepared erroneously and does not correctly reflect
their lawful entitlement.
18. Per contra, the case of the defendants/appellants is that
Kusumi and Sashi had become unchaste during the lifetime of their
respective husbands and had left their matrimonial homes to live

9

with other persons. On that premise, the defendants contend that
neither Kusumi nor Sashi inherited any right, title or interest in the
suit property upon the death of their respective husbands.
Consequently, according to the defendants, the subsequent
transfers purportedly effected by them in favour of Ashutosh
Singha were legally ineffective, and the plaintiffs' claim to title over
two-thirds of the suit property is unsustainable.
19. The defendants/appellants have further challenged the
validity of the two registered sale deeds dated 23.03.1924 and
01.04.1924, alleging that the same were procured by fraud and
misrepresentation. It is also their contention that the transactions
were not supported by any legal necessity. On these grounds, the
defendants dispute the acquisition of any right, title or interest in
the suit property by Ashutosh Singha or by the plaintiffs through
him.
20. The defendants/appellants, on the other hand, assert that
they are the owners of sixteen annas, that is, the entirety of the
suit property. They deny that the plaintiffs/respondents or their
predecessors-in-interest ever possessed the suit property at any
point of time. Rather, they claim to have remained in continuous
possession thereof and seek to sustain their claim, inter-alia, on
the ground of adverse possession.

10

21. Thus, the rival claims essentially give rise to questions
concerning the devolution of the respective shares of the original
co-sharers, the entitlement of Kusumi and Sashi to inherit their
husbands' interests, the validity and legal effect of the two
registered sale deeds, the nature and continuity of possession over
the suit property, and the correctness of the subsequent R.S.
Record of Rights. The determination of these issues would require
consideration of the relevant documentary and oral evidence on
record, together with the applicable principles of succession,
transfer of property and adverse possession.
22. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiffs/respondents,
placing reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench of
this Court in Sumati Pahari and Others v. Umapada Pahari
4
and Others , (Headnote- A, B, C and F ) that the production of
registered deeds from the custody of the plaintiffs, being the
vendees or their successors-in-interest, coupled with the recitals in
the deeds recording delivery of possession to the purchasers,
constitutes significant evidence in support of the acceptance and
due execution of the transactions. It is further submitted that,
once such registered instruments are produced and relied upon,
the burden of rebutting the evidentiary presumption arising from
their registration and the surrounding circumstances rests upon

4
2025 (3) Indian Civil Cases 313 (Cal.)

11

the party who challenges their genuineness and legal effect.
According to the plaintiffs/respondents, the defendants/appellants
have failed to discharge that burden by adducing cogent, reliable
and legally admissible evidence.
23. The suit was instituted, inter-alia, on the strength of two
registered sale deeds executed by Kusumi and Sashi in favour of
Ashutosh Singha, the predecessor-in-interest of the
plaintiffs/respondents Nos. 2 to 11, on 23.03.1924 and
01.04.1924, respectively. The said instruments have been marked
as Exhibits 1 and 2 in the present case. The transactions in
question, therefore, took place in the year 1924, several decades
before the institution of the suit and long before the birth of the
parties who have subsequently entered the witness box.
24. In this context, the antiquity of the documents assumes
considerable significance. Neither the plaintiffs/respondents nor
the defendants/appellants could, by reason of their age, have had
any personal knowledge of the circumstances prevailing at the
time of execution of the deeds. The plaintiffs, being successors-in-
interest of the original purchaser, were not in a position to testify
from personal knowledge regarding the precise circumstances
which compelled Kusumi and Sashi to alienate their respective
interests in the suit property. Equally, the defendants could not
claim personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the

12

execution of the deeds merely by reason of their relationship with
the parties to the transactions. The absence of such personal
knowledge, however, cannot by itself operate to the prejudice of
the plaintiffs or render the registered instruments legally
ineffective. Rather, in the absence of reliable evidence discrediting
those instruments, their contents and the circumstances disclosed
therein assume considerable evidentiary importance.
25. It is necessary, however, to distinguish between the
evidentiary value of a registered instrument and the legal
presumption, if any, arising from its registration. Registration of a
document does not, by itself, conclusively establish the truth of
every recital contained therein or the validity of the transaction in
all its aspects. Nevertheless, the production of the original
registered instruments from the custody of the persons claiming
under them, together with recitals acknowledging the transaction
and recording delivery of possession, constitutes relevant and
material evidence in determining whether the transactions were
genuinely intended to be acted upon. Such circumstances must be
assessed cumulatively with the other evidence on record.
26. In the present case, the deeds were executed and registered
in 1924, and the plaintiffs rely upon them as the source of their
predecessor's title to the respective shares of Kusumi and Sashi.
Significantly, the instruments contain recitals to the effect that

13

possession of the property transferred there under was delivered
to the purchaser. Such recitals lend support to the plaintiffs' case
that the transactions were not merely formal or colourable
arrangements but were intended to operate upon the interests of
the transferors in the suit property. The subsequent production of
the instruments by the plaintiffs, who claim through the original
purchaser, is also a circumstance which lends support to their
claim under those documents.
27. The evidentiary significance of these circumstances must be
examined in the light of the principle discussed in case of Sumati
Pahari ( supra ). The proposition advanced on behalf of the
plaintiffs is that, where registered instruments are produced from
the custody of the persons claiming under them and their recitals
are consistent with the alleged transfer and delivery of possession,
the party impeaching those instruments must place sufficient
material before the Court to discredit the transactions. Applying
that principle to the facts of the present case, the defendants
cannot succeed merely by making a bare denial of the execution or
legal effect of the deeds. Their challenge must be supported by
cogent evidence capable of displacing the evidentiary value of the
registered instruments and the circumstances attending their
production.

14

28. Another important aspect of the matter concerns the alleged
absence of legal necessity for the execution of the deeds. In this
connection, reliance has been placed by the learned Advocate for
the plaintiffs/ respondents upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in case of Smt. Rani and Another v. Smt. Santa
5
Bala Debnath and Others , (paragraphs 13, 14 and 15) . The
principle emerging from the said decision, as relevant to the
present controversy, requires the Court to examine the nature of
the alienation, the legal character of the transferors' interest and
the evidentiary burden resting upon the parties who challenge the
transaction. The question of legal necessity cannot be determined
in the abstract; it must be considered in the light of the recitals in
the instruments and the evidence, if any, adduced to contradict
them.
29. In the instant case, the deeds themselves disclose the
circumstances in which the transactions were undertaken. Exhibit
1, executed by Kusumi, contains recitals explaining that certain
portions of the shares of Kusumi and Sashi had previously been
transferred in favour of their ‘ bhasur’ (brother of their husbands),
namely, Shibu, and an attempt had been made to repay the loan,
but the liability had not been fully discharged. The deed further
indicates that, following the death of Shibu, there was no person

5
AIR 1971 SC 1028

15

available to look after the property and that the transferors had no
other sufficient means to repay the outstanding loan. These
recitals furnish an explanation for the alienation and are material
in determining whether the transactions were supported by
circumstances which the transferors considered to necessitate the
sale.
30. It is true that the mere insertion of recitals in a registered
deed does not invariably establish, as an incontrovertible fact, the
existence of legal necessity. The Court must remain conscious of
the distinction between a recital explaining the purpose of an
alienation and independent proof of the truth of that recital.
Nevertheless, where the transaction is of considerable antiquity,
the persons who executed the instruments are no longer available
to testify, and neither party possesses direct personal knowledge
of the circumstances prevailing at the relevant time, the recitals in
the registered instruments cannot be discarded without sufficient
justification. It constitutes relevant evidence which must be
weighed against the materials, if any, produced by the party
disputing the transactions.
31. Here, the defendants have not succeeded in producing
cogent and reliable evidence to demonstrate that the
circumstances disclosed in the deeds were false or that the sales
were otherwise unsupported by the purposes stated therein. Their

16

challenge rests principally upon the assertion that the transactions
were unnecessary and invalid. Such an assertion, unsupported by
satisfactory evidence, is insufficient to discredit instruments which
were executed and registered more than a century ago. In the
circumstances, this Court finds no adequate evidentiary basis for
rejecting the explanation contained in the deeds merely because
the plaintiffs could not independently testify to the events of 1924.
32. The defendants have also challenged the transactions on the
ground that the deeds were procured by fraud and
misrepresentation. This allegation requires separate consideration,
since fraud cannot be presumed merely because a transaction is
old or because the party challenging it disputes its legal effect.
33. It is a settled principle of law that a party alleging fraud
must plead the material particulars of the fraud and establish the
same by cogent evidence. A vague or general allegation that a
registered instrument was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation
does not, by itself, furnish a sufficient ground for declaring the
instrument invalid. The pleadings must disclose the nature of the
alleged deception, the manner in which it was practised, the
persons responsible for it and the circumstances in which the party
concerned was induced to execute the document. The requirement
of specific pleading is particularly important where the challenge is

17

directed against an instrument which has remained in existence for
several decades.
34. In the present case, although the defendants have alleged
that the two sale deeds were obtained by fraud and
misrepresentation, they have failed to substantiate that allegation
by satisfactory evidence. No cogent material has been brought on
record to establish the particular acts of deception allegedly
practised upon Kusumi or Sashi, or to demonstrate that either of
them executed the deeds under circumstances which vitiated their
consent. In the absence of adequate particulars and convincing
proof, the allegation remains an unsubstantiated assertion. The
Court, therefore, cannot invalidate the registered instruments
merely on the strength of such a general challenge.
35. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants
has placed reliance upon the decision rendered by this Hon’ble
Court in Kartick Prasad and Others v. Nemai Prasad Gorai
6
and Others , particularly paragraph 21 thereof, in support of the
contention that the protection afforded to a pardanashin woman in
relation to the execution of a deed cannot automatically be
extended to an illiterate male merely because he is unable to read
or understand the contents of the instrument. It was argued that,
where an illiterate male, having sufficient experience in dealing

6
AIR 1998 Cal 278

18

with property, executes a deed, the party seeking to derive benefit
from such instrument must establish that its contents were read
over and explained to the executant and that the executant
understood the nature and effect of the transaction. According to
the appellants, in the absence of such proof, the registered deeds
in question cannot be relied upon to establish the plaintiffs’ claim
to title over the suit property. Learned Advocate also placed
reliance on the point upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of
Mst. Kharbuja ( supra )
36. The aforesaid submission requires consideration in the light
of the facts and circumstances of the present case, particularly the
considerable antiquity of the two registered deeds upon which the
plaintiffs/respondents have founded their claim.
37. It is an admitted position that the two deeds were executed
and registered in the year 1924, namely, on 23.03.1924 and
01.04.1924. The parties to the present litigation were either not
born at the time of execution of the said instruments or were too
young to have any personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding their execution. Consequently, neither the
plaintiffs/respondents nor the defendants/appellants could be
expected to furnish direct oral evidence regarding the precise
manner in which the deeds were executed, whether their contents
were read over and explained to the executants, or whether the

19

executants fully understood the nature and consequences of the
transactions. The absence of such direct evidence is, therefore,
attributable to the considerable lapse of time since the execution
of the instruments and must be assessed in that context.
38. The principal question, therefore, is whether the plaintiffs'
claim should fail merely because they have been unable to adduce
direct oral evidence concerning events which occurred more than a
century ago, particularly when the defendants, who challenge the
instruments, are equally unable to provide any reliable first-hand
account of those events. In the considered opinion of this Court,
the controversy cannot be resolved merely by placing the abstract
burden of proof upon one party without examining the
documentary evidence and the other circumstances appearing on
record.
39. In this connection, it is necessary to bear in mind that the
expression burden of proof is used in two distinct senses. First, it
may refer to the legal burden resting upon a party to establish the
facts necessary to obtain a judgment in its favour. Secondly, it
may refer to the evidential burden, that is, the obligation of a
party to adduce evidence on a particular issue as the trial
progresses. The legal burden ordinarily remains upon the party
asserting the affirmative of a particular proposition, subject to the
applicable statutory provisions and the nature of the issue. The

20

evidential burden, however, may shift from one party to another in
the course of the proceedings, depending upon the evidence
adduced and the facts established.
40. The distinction assumes particular significance in the present
case. Where the parties have joined issue on a particular question
and have adduced evidence, the Court is required to evaluate the
entire body of evidence and determine which version is more
probable and sustainable in law. If the evidence, taken as a whole,
enables the Court to arrive at a definite conclusion on the disputed
issue, the abstract question as to which party initially bore the
burden of proof may lose much of its practical significance.
Conversely, where the evidence remains inconclusive and the
Court is unable to determine the issue on its merits, the legal
burden of proof assumes decisive importance, and the party upon
whom that burden rests must bear the consequence of the failure
to establish its case.
41. Applying these principles to the present controversy, it
appears that the plaintiffs/respondents have relied upon the two
registered deeds as the foundation of their claim to title. The
instruments have been produced and marked as Exhibits 1 and 2.
The plaintiffs’ claim through Ashutosh Singha, in whose favour the
deeds were executed by Kusumi and Sashi. The defendants, on the
other hand, dispute the legal efficacy of the instruments and

21

contend that the plaintiffs have failed to establish the
circumstances necessary to sustain their claim.
42. In such circumstances, the Court cannot confine its
consideration to the absence of direct oral testimony regarding the
execution of the deeds. It must also examine the nature of the
instruments, their registration, the recitals contained therein, the
circumstances disclosed by those recitals, the custody from which
the documents were produced, and the other evidence bearing
upon their genuineness and the transactions they purport to
record.
43. It is true that registration, by itself, does not conclusively
establish that the contents of a document were explained to its
executant or that every recital contained therein is true. Equally,
the mere production of a registered instrument does not dispense
with the obligation of the party relying upon it to establish the title
claimed under it. Nevertheless, the absence of direct oral evidence
regarding events of such remote antiquity cannot, in itself,
constitute a sufficient ground for rejecting the instruments. Their
evidentiary value must be assessed cumulatively with the other
circumstances established on record.
44. In the present case, the deeds contain recitals concerning
the circumstances in which the transactions were undertaken, the
interests purportedly transferred, and the delivery of possession to

22

the purchaser. Exhibit 1 also refers to the earlier transaction
involving portions of the interests of Kusumi and Sashi, the
outstanding loan, the unsuccessful attempt to discharge the
liability, and the circumstances which allegedly necessitated the
subsequent sale. These recitals are relevant to the determination
of the nature and purpose of the transactions. Although such
recitals are not conclusive proof of every fact stated therein, they
constitute material evidence which cannot be disregarded merely
because neither party possesses personal knowledge of the events
of 1924.
45. The decision relied upon by the learned Advocate for the
appellants must also be understood in its proper context. The
principle discussed in Kartick Prasad Gorai ( supra ), concerning
the protection afforded to a pardanashin woman and the proof
required in relation to the execution of a deed by an illiterate
person, cannot be applied mechanically without regard to the
nature of the transaction and the evidence available in the
particular case. The question whether a particular executant
requires special protection, and whether the party relying upon the
deed has discharged the requisite burden of proving its execution
and the executant's understanding of the transaction, must be
determined on the facts of that case.

23

46. The principle that a party relying upon a deed may be
required to prove that its contents were read over and explained to
an illiterate executant does not, by itself, establish that every
registered instrument executed by an illiterate person is invalid in
the absence of direct oral testimony from a person who witnessed
its execution. Nor does it follow that, where the events are of
remote antiquity and the original participants are no longer
available to testify, the Court must necessarily reject the
instrument. The evidentiary question must be determined by
considering the applicable rules of law, the nature of the challenge,
and the cumulative effect of the documentary and oral evidence.
47. It is also significant that the appellants' challenge cannot
succeed merely by pointing out that the plaintiffs have not
produced a witness who personally heard the contents of the
deeds being read over and explained to Kusumi and Sashi. The
appellants must establish the legal and factual basis of their
challenge in accordance with the applicable law. At the same time,
the plaintiffs cannot be relieved of their initial obligation to
establish the title claimed under the deeds merely because the
appellants are unable to furnish direct evidence concerning their
execution. The Court must, therefore, distinguish between the
initial legal burden resting upon the plaintiffs to establish their

24

claim and the evidential burden arising upon the production of the
registered instruments and the surrounding circumstances.
48. Where the plaintiffs have produced the registered
instruments upon which their claim is founded, the Court must
examine whether the evidence as a whole is sufficient to establish
the transactions and the title derived there under. If the
defendants have not adduced cogent evidence to discredit the
instruments or to establish the alleged circumstances rendering
them ineffective, that failure may be taken into account while
evaluating the rival claims. However, the ultimate conclusion must
rest upon the evidence and the applicable legal principles, and not
upon the mere failure of the defendants to prove their allegations.
49. In the instant case, the appellants have not been able to
demonstrate, by reliable evidence, which the two deeds were
forged, fraudulently procured, or otherwise incapable of conveying
the interests which Kusumi and Sashi possessed. Their contention
regarding the absence of proof that the contents were read over
and explained must be examined against the background of the
considerable age of the instruments and the absence of direct
evidence from either side. In these circumstances, the Court is
required to determine the issue on the basis of the available
documentary evidence and the reasonable inferences which may
legitimately be drawn there from.

25

50. It follows that the decision relied upon by the learned
Advocate for the appellants does not, by itself, lend sufficient
support to the proposition that the two registered deeds must be
disregarded merely because the plaintiffs have been unable to
adduce direct oral evidence concerning the circumstances of their
execution. The said decision lays down a principle concerning the
protection of certain executants and the burden of proving the
circumstances surrounding the execution of a deed; it does not
dispense with the Court's obligation to assess the entire evidence
in each case.
51. Accordingly, this Court is unable to accept the appellants'
submission that the plaintiffs' claim must fail solely on account of
the absence of direct oral evidence regarding the execution of the
deeds in 1924. The proper course is to examine Exhibits 1 and 2,
their recitals, their registration, the circumstances of their
production, and the other evidence on record, and thereafter
determine whether the plaintiffs have discharged the legal burden
of establishing their title. The decision in Kartick Prasad Gorai
( supra ), when considered in its proper perspective, does not
justify a contrary conclusion merely because the parties are unable
to testify from personal knowledge about events which occurred
long before their birth.

26

52. It is further contended on behalf of the plaintiffs/respondents
that the genuineness and legal efficacy of the two registered deeds
dated 23.03.1924 and 01.04.1924 must be considered in the light
of the principle embodied in Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872. It is submitted that, having regard to the considerable
antiquity of the instruments, neither the heirs of the transferors
nor the heirs of the transferee, nor the witnesses to the deeds or
the scribe, were available to testify regarding their execution when
the deeds were challenged in the present proceedings. In such
circumstances, the plaintiffs/respondents contend that the Court
must assess the genuineness of the instruments by applying the
statutory presumption available in respect of ancient documents,
provided the conditions prescribed by law are satisfied.
53. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance has been
placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rattan
7
Singh and Others v. Inder Pal Singh , particularly paragraph
71 thereof, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows:
“71. The presumption in favour of a 30-year old
document is, therefore, a rebuttable presumption.
Nothing prevented the plaintiff to rebut the presumption
by leading appropriate evidence in order to disprove the
same. Since the plaintiff failed to do so, the said

7
AIR 2021 SC 899

27

document would be binding on the plaintiff. As a matter
of fact, the parties had acted upon the terms of the said
document without any demur since 1963 and it was,
therefore, not open to resile therefrom at this distance
of time. Hence, the trial Court was right in holding the
1963 GPA, to be a genuine document.”
54. The aforesaid decision is relevant to the controversy in hand,
particularly with regard to the evidentiary value of ancient
documents, the rebuttable nature of the presumption arising
therefrom, and the significance of the conduct of parties who have
acted upon such documents over a considerable period.
55. In support of his submission learned Advocate for the
plaintiffs/ respondents cited a decision rendered by the Hon’ble
High Court at Patna in case of Haradhan Mahatha and others
8
Vs. Dukhu Mahatha (paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 15)
56. It is profitable to quote paragraphs 10 and 11 of the above
referred report which are as follows-
“10. The principle underlying Section 90 is that if a
document, thirty years old or more, is produced from
proper custody and is, on its face, free from suspicion,
the Court may presume that it has been duly executed
and attested. The reason for incorporating Section 90 is
founded on necessity and convenience. It is extremely
difficult and sometimes impossible to prove handwriting,
signature and execution and attestation of ancient

8
AIR 1993 Patna 129

28

documents after lapse of many years. Further reason for
incorporating this provision is that if the two conditions
enumerated in Section 90 are fulfilled, then in relation to
documents the execution and attestation of which are
not denied, the necessity of formal proof is waived and
thereby Court's time is saved.
11. The question arises in which case the Court should
exercise discretion of raising presumption and in which
one the discretion should be refused. In my view, there
cannot be any straight-jacket for exercising discretion
by the Court under Section 90 of the Act. If the two
conditions laid down in Section 90 are fulfilled in relation
to a particular document and its genuineness is not
disputed, then the Court should exercise its discretion
under Section 90 of the Act, even if the executant or
attesting witnesses are alive and available, and admit
the document into evidence thereby waiving its formal
proof. Otherwise un-necessarily Court's time will be
wasted in formally proving the document by examining
witnesses and the same will frustrate the very purpose
of incorporating Section 90 in the Act. It has been noted
by Lord Hailsham in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th
Edition, Volume 17 in para 129 that such documents
prove themselves notwithstanding the fact that one of
the subscribing witnesses is alive.
12. In my view, if the executant or attesting witnesses
are not alive or available in relation to a document, the
genuineness of which is disputed and mode of proof as
required under Section 69 of the Act is also not possible,
the Court should raise a presumption under Section 90
of the Act in relation to due execution and attestation of
document, if it comes to the conclusion that the
document is such that it is likely to have been executed,

29

having regard to the common course of human conduct
and there are no circumstances exciting suspicion of the
Court such as artificiality and unnaturalness or
correction or tampering with document. In the case of
Shafiq-un-Nissa v. Shaban AH Khan, ILR XXVI Allahabad
581, the Privy Council was considering the effect of
Section 90 of the Act. Both the conditions were in
existence, but genuineness of the document was
disputed and the Courts in India refused to mark the
document as an exhibit under Section 90 of the Act and
called the party for formally proving the document as in
their opinion there was evidence in the case which
raised great suspicions as to the document itself. When
the matter was taken to the Judicial Committee the
decision of the Indian Courts was upheld and it was
observed thus :
"Under these circumstances, their Lordships are not
surprised that the Judges, both in the Civil Court and in
the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, exercised the
discretion which is vested in them by Section 90 by not
admitting the document to evidence without formal
proof, although it is more than thirty years old, and
purports to come from the proper custody. It should be
added that the Court considered that there was
evidence in the case which it is not necessary to go into,
and to which in fact, their Lordships' attention has not
been pointedly drawn -- which raised great suspicions as
to the document itself."

57. Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, embodies a rule
of evidence founded upon necessity and convenience. Where a
document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced

30

from custody which the Court considers proper in the particular
case, the Court may presume that the signature and every other
part of the document which purports to be in the handwriting of a
particular person is in that person's handwriting and, in the case of
a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and
attested by the persons by whom it purports to have been
executed and attested.
58. The rationale underlying this provision is readily
understandable. As the years pass, the persons who executed
ancient documents, the witnesses who attested them and the
persons who prepared them may no longer be alive or available. It
may consequently become extremely difficult, and in some cases
practically impossible, to establish the handwriting, signatures,
execution and attestation of such instruments by the ordinary
methods of proof. To insist upon formal proof in every such case,
notwithstanding the passage of several decades and the
unavailability of the persons directly connected with the
transaction, would often render the adjudication of longstanding
proprietary rights unduly difficult and, in some cases, impossible.
59. The statutory presumption is, therefore, intended to address
the practical difficulties associated with proving ancient
documents. It enables the Court, upon satisfaction of the
prescribed conditions, to presume due execution and attestation

31

without insisting upon the examination of persons who may have
died long before the dispute arose. The provision facilitates the
administration of justice by allowing the Court to consider ancient
instruments on the basis of their age, proper custody and apparent
character, together with the surrounding circumstances.
60. Nevertheless, the presumption under Section 90 is neither
automatic nor conclusive. The mere fact that a document is more
than thirty years old does not, by itself, compel the Court to accept
it as genuine. The document must have been produced from
proper custody, and the Court must consider whether its
appearance and surrounding circumstances give rise to any
reasonable suspicion concerning its genuineness. Circumstances
such as apparent artificiality, unnatural recitals, material
alterations, tampering or other features casting doubt upon the
instrument may justify withholding the presumption or may rebut
it once raised. Further, Section 90 does not dispense with proof of
every fact asserted in the document, nor does it conclusively
establish the truth of all its recitals or the legal validity of the
transaction recorded therein.
61. The question, therefore, is not merely whether the deeds in
the present case are more than thirty years old, but whether they
satisfy the statutory conditions for raising the presumption and

32

whether the circumstances appearing on record warrant
acceptance of their genuineness.
62. In the present case, the two deeds were executed and
registered in 1924. They are, therefore, more than a century old.
By the time their genuineness came to be challenged in the
present proceedings, neither the original transferors, Kusumi and
Sashi, nor the original transferee, Ashutosh Singha, was available
to testify concerning the execution of the transactions. The
persons who witnessed the deeds and the scribe who prepared
them were likewise not available to furnish direct evidence
regarding the circumstances in which the instruments were
executed.
63. Consequently, neither side could reasonably be expected to
produce direct oral testimony from the original participants
concerning the precise manner of execution, the explanation of the
contents, or the circumstances attending the transactions. The
absence of such evidence must be considered in the light of the
exceptional age of the documents and the very difficulty which the
legislature intended to address by incorporating the provision
relating to ancient documents.
64. In these circumstances, the Court must examine whether the
deeds were produced from proper custody and whether their
appearance, contents and surrounding circumstances are

33

consistent with genuine transactions. The fact that the
plaintiffs/respondents claim through the original transferee and
rely upon the instruments as the foundation of their title is a
relevant circumstance in assessing their custody. The registration
of the deeds, their recitals concerning the nature and purpose of
the transfers, and the statements recording delivery of possession
are also matters which may properly be considered in the overall
evaluation of their genuineness. None of these circumstances,
taken in isolation, is conclusive; their cumulative effect must be
assessed in determining whether the statutory presumption is
attracted.
65. It is also material that the deeds disclose circumstances
explaining the alienations. As discussed earlier, Exhibit 1 contains
recitals concerning an outstanding loan, the unsuccessful attempt
to discharge the liability and the circumstances which allegedly led
Kusumi to execute the sale. The instruments further contain
recitals concerning the enjoyment of the property and delivery of
possession to the purchaser. These features are relevant in
examining whether the documents bear the characteristics of
genuine instruments executed in the ordinary course of
transactions concerning immovable property.
66. If, upon examination, the Court finds that the deeds are
more than thirty years old, have been produced from proper

34

custody and are free from circumstances reasonably exciting
suspicion, it may invoke the presumption under Section 90 in
favour of their due execution and attestation. The burden would
then lie upon the party challenging their genuineness to produce
appropriate evidence capable of rebutting that presumption. The
party challenging the deeds cannot succeed merely by pointing to
the absence of witnesses who have been unavailable for several
decades, particularly when the very purpose of the statutory
provision is to obviate the necessity of such formal proof in
appropriate cases.
67. In the present case, the appellants have alleged that the
deeds were procured by fraud and misrepresentation and have
questioned the circumstances in which the transactions were
undertaken. However, such allegations must be established by
cogent evidence. The mere assertion that the contents of the
deeds were not explained to the transferors, or that the
transactions were not supported by legal necessity, does not by
itself rebut the statutory presumption of due execution and
attestation, if otherwise attracted. The Court must distinguish
between the genuineness of an instrument and the legal validity or
binding effect of the transaction recorded therein. While Section 90
may assist in establishing due execution and attestation, the
existence of transferable title, the capacity of the executants and

35

the legal consequences of the alienations must still be determined
in accordance with the applicable law.
68. The decision in Rattan Singh ( supra ) assumes further
significance because the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised not
only the rebuttable character of the presumption concerning an
ancient document but also the importance of the parties' conduct
in relation to that document. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed
that the document in question had been acted upon by the parties
without demur since 1963 and that, in the absence of evidence
sufficient to rebut the presumption, it was not open to the
challenging party to resile from the document after such a long
lapse of time.
69. The underlying principle is that the Court must consider the
conduct of the parties alongside the documentary evidence. Where
a document has been treated as genuine and acted upon over a
considerable period, such conduct may provide significant
corroboration of its authenticity and the parties' recognition of the
transaction. A party cannot ordinarily be permitted to disregard
the consequences of a transaction merely because, after the
passage of several decades, it seeks to challenge the document,
particularly when the challenge is unsupported by reliable
evidence.

36

70. Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case, the
Court must examine whether the parties and their predecessors-
in-interest acted upon the two deeds and whether their
subsequent conduct is consistent with the transactions recorded
therein. The plaintiffs/respondents claim title through Ashutosh
Singha under the two instruments, whereas the appellants dispute
the effect of those transactions. If the evidence establishes that
the deeds were acted upon and that the subsequent conduct of the
parties is consistent with the transfers, such circumstances would
lend further support to the plaintiffs' case. However, the binding
effect of the deeds must ultimately depend upon the evidence of
such conduct and the legal rights acquired under the transactions;
it cannot be inferred merely from the passage of time.
71. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish between the
presumption of due execution and attestation under Section 90
and the question whether the transaction is legally binding upon
the appellants. The former concerns the proof of the document as
an ancient instrument, whereas the latter requires consideration of
the title of the transferors, the nature of their estate, their capacity
to alienate the property and the legal consequences of the
transfers under the applicable law. The presumption under Section
90 cannot, by itself, cure a defect in title or conclusively establish
the existence of legal necessity. Nevertheless, where due

37

execution and attestation are supported by the statutory
presumption and the party challenging the document fails to
establish any legally sustainable ground for avoiding the
transaction, the instrument may properly be relied upon in
determining the rights of the parties.
72. In the present case, having regard to the age of the two
deeds, the unavailability of the original executants, the transferee,
the attesting witnesses and the scribe, and the absence of cogent
evidence substantiating the appellants' allegations of fraud and
misrepresentation, the Court finds no sufficient basis to reject the
instruments merely because their execution cannot now be proved
through direct oral testimony from the persons who participated in
the transactions. If the requirements of proper custody and
absence of suspicious circumstances are satisfied, the presumption
under Section 90 may appropriately be invoked in favour of their
due execution and attestation.
73. Accordingly, the decision in Rattan Singh ( supra ) lends
support to the plaintiffs/respondents' contention that the ancient
deeds cannot be discarded on the basis of unsupported allegations,
particularly where the party challenging them has failed to adduce
appropriate evidence to rebut the presumption available under the
law. To the extent that the evidence establishes that the parties or
their predecessors-in-interest acted upon the deeds, their

38

subsequent conduct also assumes significance in determining
whether the appellants can now disown the transactions.
74. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appellants have
failed to establish sufficient grounds for rejecting the two
registered deeds solely on account of the absence of direct
evidence concerning their execution in 1924. Subject to the
statutory requirements governing ancient documents being
satisfied and the plaintiffs establishing the requisite title and legal
efficacy of the transfers, the deeds are entitled to be relied upon in
adjudicating the rival claims. The appellants cannot defeat the
plaintiffs' claim merely by raising belated and unsubstantiated
objections to instruments executed more than a century ago.
75. The defendants have further sought to defeat the plaintiffs'
claim by alleging that Kusumi and Sashi had become unchaste
during the lifetime of their respective husbands and had left their
matrimonial homes to reside with other persons. On that basis, the
defendants contend that the widows did not inherit any interest in
the suit property and, consequently, had no transferable interest
capable of being conveyed to Ashutosh Singha.
76. This contention, apart from raising a question of law
concerning the widows' entitlement to inherit, is also founded upon
a factual allegation which the defendants were required to
establish by reliable evidence. The mere allegation that a widow

39

had become unchaste or had left her matrimonial home cannot,
without proof of the relevant facts and consideration of the law
applicable at the time of succession, be accepted as sufficient to
negate her proprietary rights. The legal consequences of such an
allegation must be determined with reference to the applicable
personal law and the precise circumstances in which the alleged
succession took place.
77. The evidence on record does not substantiate the
defendants' version. It appears from the deposition of the
witnesses that both Kusumi and Sashi remained alive until
approximately 1985. More importantly, the defendants have not
disclosed the names of the persons with whom the widows
allegedly left their matrimonial homes, nor have they satisfactorily
established where the widows resided thereafter. On the contrary,
D.W. 1 stated in his evidence that he had occasion to see Kusumi
and Sashi residing in the ‘ bastu’ during their lifetime. This
testimony materially undermines the defendants' allegation that
both widows had abandoned the property and gone away to live
with other persons.
78. In the absence of reliable evidence establishing the alleged
conduct of Kusumi and Sashi, the defendants' assertion that the
widows were disentitled to inherit their husbands' interests cannot
be accepted merely on the basis of an allegation made in the

40

written statement. A party seeking to defeat an otherwise
established claim of title must prove the factual foundation of the
defence upon which it relies. In the present case, the defendants
have failed to discharge that burden. Their allegation, therefore,
does not furnish a sustainable basis for rejecting the plaintiffs'
claim under the registered sale deeds.
79. The question of the widows' proprietary rights must also be
considered in the light of the subsequent statutory development
brought about by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Reliance has
been placed by the learned Advocate for the plaintiffs/respondents
upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Gulwant
9
Kaur and Another v. Mohinder Singh and Others , as well as
the decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Bhabani
10
Prosad Saha v. Sarat Sundari Choudhurani .
80. The appellants have placed reliance upon the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Naresh Kumar (Dead) by LRs
11
and Another v. Shakshi Lal (Dead) by LRs and Another ,
particularly paragraphs 6, 12 and 13 thereof, in support of their
contention that, under the traditional Hindu law prevailing prior to
the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a Hindu

9
AIR 1987 SC 2251
10
AIR 1957 Cal 527

11
AIR 1999 SC 928

41

widow held an estate of limited ownership in the property inherited
by her and that her power of alienation was subject to the
restrictions recognised by Hindu law. According to the appellants,
alienation by a Hindu widow could bind the reversioners only if it
was supported by legal necessity or was otherwise justified under
the principles of Hindu law. In the absence of such necessity, the
alienee would ordinarily acquire no more than the limited estate
possessed by the widow, which would not prejudice the rights of
the reversioners upon the termination of her estate.
81. The appellants have drawn particular attention to the
observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court that, under the traditional
Hindu law, no reversioner acquired a vested right to the property
during the lifetime of the widow, and that the eventual reversioner
did not claim through any person who had preceded him in the line
of succession. The decision further explains the nature of a Hindu
widow’s limited estate and the legal consequences flowing from an
alienation made by her.
82. The principle enunciated in the aforesaid decision is that the
interest of a Hindu widow in property inherited by her under the
traditional Hindu law was not equivalent to an absolute proprietary
interest. Her estate was subject to limitations governing alienation,
and she could ordinarily convey an absolute and binding title to the
alienee where the transfer was justified by legal necessity or by

42

another recognised ground under the Hindu law. Where legal
necessity was not established, the alienation was not necessarily
void in its entirety; rather, the transferee would ordinarily acquire
only the estate which the widow herself was competent to convey,
leaving the rights of the reversioners unaffected upon the
termination of her limited estate.
83. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also explained that the
actual existence of legal necessity was not invariably indispensable
where the alienee established that a representation of necessity
had been made and that, after making bona fide enquiries, he had
reasonably satisfied himself that such necessity existed. In such
circumstances, the alienation could bind the reversioners
notwithstanding the subsequent failure to establish the actual
existence of the necessity. Conversely, where neither actual legal
necessity nor bona fide enquiry and a reasonable belief in its
existence was established, the alienee would ordinarily acquire
only the widow’s limited estate, without prejudice to the rights of
the reversioners.
84. The appellants contend that the aforesaid principles govern
the present controversy because the two sale deeds dated
23.03.1924 and 01.04.1924 were executed by Kusumi and Sashi
before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
According to them, even assuming that Kusumi and Sashi had

43

inherited their respective husbands’ interests in the suit property,
they could not have conveyed an absolute and indefeasible title to
Ashutosh Singha, the predecessor-in-interest of the
plaintiffs/respondents, unless the alienations were supported by
legal necessity or another legally recognised ground. It is,
therefore, argued that the plaintiffs cannot claim an absolute title
to the shares purportedly transferred under the two deeds merely
by relying upon their registration.
85. The appellants further submit that the recitals contained in
the deeds, by themselves, cannot conclusively establish the
existence of legal necessity. They contend that the plaintiffs were
required to establish either that the transfers were, in fact,
necessitated by circumstances recognised under traditional Hindu
law or that the purchaser had made bona fide enquiries and, upon
reasonable grounds, satisfied himself as to the existence of such
necessity. In the absence of such proof, according to the
appellants, the alienations could not prejudice the rights of the
reversioners beyond the limited interest which Kusumi and Sashi
were competent to transfer.
86. The legal proposition relied upon by the appellants is
undoubtedly relevant to the extent that it explains the nature of a
Hindu widow’s estate and the restrictions upon her power of
alienation under the traditional Hindu law. However, the

44

applicability of that principle to the present case must be examined
in the context of the precise nature of the estate inherited by
Kusumi and Sashi, the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the two deeds, the recitals contained therein, and the subsequent
statutory development brought about by the Hindu Succession Act,
1956.
87. It is also necessary to distinguish between an alienation
made by a Hindu widow during the subsistence of her limited
estate and the subsequent enlargement of her proprietary interest
by operation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The
latter provision enlarged the estate of a Hindu female in property
possessed by her, subject to the statutory conditions and
exceptions, and ordinarily converted a limited estate into an
absolute estate. Consequently, the legal effect of the subsequent
legislation cannot be ignored while determining the present rights
of the parties. At the same time, the mere subsequent enactment
of Section 14 cannot automatically validate an alienation which
was otherwise ineffective against the reversioners under the law
applicable at the time of its execution.
88. In the present case, the two deeds were executed in 1924,
and their recitals disclose the circumstances in which the transfers
were allegedly made. Exhibit 1 refers to the earlier transaction
concerning portions of the interests of Kusumi and Sashi in favour

45

of Shibu, the outstanding loan, the unsuccessful attempt to repay
the liability, and the absence of sufficient means to discharge the
same following Shibu’s death. The deeds also contain recitals
concerning the enjoyment of the property by metes and bounds
and the delivery of possession to the purchaser. These recitals
constitute relevant evidence in assessing the circumstances
surrounding the alienations, although their evidentiary value must
be considered alongside the other materials on record.
89. It is equally significant that the appellants have alleged that
Kusumi and Sashi were disentitled to inherit their respective
husbands’ interests because of their alleged conduct during their
husbands’ lifetimes. That allegation, however, must first be
established by reliable evidence before it can be used to defeat the
plaintiffs’ claim at its foundation. The question whether the widows
acquired the interests in the suit property in the first place is
logically anterior to the question whether their subsequent
alienations were binding upon the reversioners. If the widows
acquired no interest, the deeds could not transfer any such
interest; if they did acquire an interest, the nature and extent of
their power of alienation must be determined by applying the law
governing their estate at the relevant time.
90. Thus, the decision relied upon by the appellants correctly
identifies the principles governing the alienation of a Hindu widow’s

46

limited estate under traditional Hindu law. Nevertheless, whether
those principles ultimately assist the appellants in defeating the
plaintiffs’ claim depends upon the proof of the relevant factual and
legal ingredients. In particular, the Court must determine whether
Kusumi and Sashi inherited the shares claimed by the plaintiffs,
whether the alienations were supported by legal necessity or bona
fide enquiries concerning such necessity, and what legal
consequences followed from the operation of Section 14 of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, upon the interests, if any, retained by
the widows.
91. Accordingly, the aforesaid decision cannot be applied in
isolation to conclude that the two sale deeds were ineffective
merely because the appellants dispute the existence of legal
necessity. Its ratio must be applied to the established facts, the
recitals in the registered instruments, the evidence adduced by the
parties, and the applicable provisions of Hindu law. The ultimate
determination must turn upon whether the appellants have
established that the alienations were ineffective against the
interests which they claim as successors or reversioners, rather
than upon the abstract proposition that a Hindu widow’s power of
alienation was restricted under the traditional Hindu law.
92. The principle embodied in Section 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, is that property possessed by a female

47

Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the
Act, shall ordinarily be held by her as full owner and not as a
limited owner, subject to the statutory exceptions contained
therein. The provision was enacted to enlarge the limited estate of
a Hindu female into an absolute estate where the conditions
prescribed by the section are satisfied. The decissions cited above
are relevant to the consideration of the nature of a Hindu woman's
proprietary interest and the effect of the statutory enlargement of
that interest.
93. In the present case, however, the defendants have failed to
establish their principal contention that Kusumi and Sashi were
wholly disentitled to inherit the interests of their respective
husbands. Nor have they established any other legally sustainable
ground for holding that the widows lacked the capacity to transfer
their interests under the registered instruments. In the absence of
such proof, the defendants' challenge to the plaintiffs' title on this
ground cannot be sustained.
94. Another circumstance which deserves consideration is the
subsequent recording of the names of Kusumi and Sashi in the
R.S. Record of Rights approximately thirty years after the
execution of the sale deeds. Such subsequent entries cannot, by
themselves, conclusively establish title in favour of the persons
whose names appear therein, nor can they automatically nullify an

48

earlier registered conveyance. A Record of Rights ordinarily carries
a rebuttable presumption of correctness in respect of the matters
which the applicable law requires to be recorded, but it does not,
merely by virtue of an entry, create or extinguish proprietary
rights independently of the underlying title.
95. Accordingly, the subsequent appearance of the names of
Kusumi and Sashi in the R.S. Record of Rights must be considered
along with the registered deeds, the recitals contained therein and
the other evidence concerning the devolution and possession of
the suit property. If the plaintiffs establish a valid transfer of the
widows' interests in favour of Ashutosh Singha, a subsequent
revenue entry, standing alone, would not be sufficient to defeat
the title derived under those instruments. Conversely, the precise
evidentiary effect of the subsequent entries would depend upon
the applicable statutory provisions and the circumstances in which
the entries were made.
96. It is also significant that the recitals in both deeds indicate
that Shibu, Kusumi and Sashi were enjoying the property by metes
and bounds. The deeds further explain that, following the death of
Shibu, the transferors were faced with difficulties in looking after
the property and arranging repayment of the outstanding loan,
which circumstances led them to execute the conveyances. These
recitals are consistent with the existence of identifiable interests in

49

the property and provide an explanation for the transfers. In the
absence of convincing evidence disproving these circumstances,
the recitals cannot be brushed aside as meaningless or fictitious.
97. On an overall assessment of the evidence, this Court finds
that the plaintiffs have produced the registered instruments upon
which their claim is founded; the instruments contain recitals
concerning the circumstances of the sales and delivery of
possession; and the defendants have failed to establish by cogent
evidence that the transactions were vitiated by fraud or
misrepresentation or that the transferors lacked the requisite
transferable interests. The defendants have also failed to
substantiate their allegation that Kusumi and Sashi were
disentitled to inherit their husbands' interests by reason of the
alleged conduct attributed to them.
98. It is further evident from the pleadings of the
defendants/appellants that they have adopted two distinct and
mutually inconsistent stands in support of their claim of right, title
and interest over the suit property. On the one hand, they seek to
justify their claim on the ground that they are entitled to succeed
to the suit property as reversioners and that the two registered
sale deeds executed by Kusumi and Sashi in favour of Ashutos
hSingha were ineffective in law. On the other hand, they assert
that they have been in possession of the suit property for a

50

sufficiently long period and have thereby perfected their title by
adverse possession. These pleas have been advanced without a
clear and specific foundation in the pleadings and without adducing
cogent evidence establishing the essential ingredients of either
claim.
99. The distinction between the two pleas is material. A claim
founded upon reversionary rights proceeds on the premise that the
claimant derives title through the legally recognised line of
succession and that the alienation made by the limited owner was
ineffective against the reversionary interest. A claim based upon
adverse possession, on the other hand, presupposes possession
which is hostile to the title of the true owner and which has
continued openly, peacefully and uninterruptedly for the period
prescribed by law. The two claims, therefore, rest upon different
legal foundations and require proof of different factual ingredients.
Although alternative pleas may be permissible in appropriate
circumstances, a party cannot succeed merely by asserting both
claims without specifically pleading the material facts necessary to
establish each of them.
100. In this connection, reliance may be placed upon the decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle
12
Venkata Subba Rao , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court

12
(2010) 14 SCC 316

51

considered the essential requirements for establishing title by
adverse possession. The Court observed that the appellants in that
case had failed to establish their claim of adverse possession,
particularly when their initial case was founded upon an alleged
purchase of the property or, alternatively, upon possession under
an agreement for sale, neither of which had been substantiated by
the production of the relevant documents. The decision
underscores the necessity of establishing the factual foundation of
the plea of adverse possession through specific pleadings and
cogent evidence.
101. The principle emerging from the aforesaid decision is that a
plea of adverse possession cannot be sustained merely on the
basis of a general assertion of long-standing possession. The party
setting up such a plea must specifically plead and establish the
date from which the possession became adverse, the nature of the
possession, the identity of the true owner against whom the
possession was hostile, and the manner in which the hostile
possession continued openly and uninterruptedly for the prescribed
statutory period. Mere possession, however long, does not
necessarily amount to adverse possession. Unless the possession
is shown to have been accompanied by the requisite hostile
animus and to have continued in the manner required by law, no
title can be acquired on that basis.

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102. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, it appears that the defendants/appellants have failed to
establish the essential ingredients of adverse possession. Their
principal contention is that Kusumi and Sashi were not entitled to
inherit the interests of their respective husbands and that the
plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest, Ashutosh Singha, consequently
acquired no valid title under the two registered sale deeds. At the
same time, the defendants assert that they themselves have
acquired title by adverse possession. However, they have not
satisfactorily established the precise point of commencement of
their alleged hostile possession, the nature of the hostility asserted
against the plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest, or the
manner in which such possession continued openly and
uninterruptedly for the requisite statutory period.
103. It is also significant that the defendants have not established
their claim of reversionary title by proving the necessary facts
concerning the devolution of the property upon them. A mere
assertion that the plaintiffs' predecessor acquired no valid title
under the registered deeds does not, by itself, establish that the
defendants are the lawful owners of the suit property. Equally, the
failure of the plaintiffs to establish any particular aspect of their
claim, if such failure were to occur, would not automatically confer

53

title upon the defendants. The defendants must succeed on the
strength of the legal and factual foundation of their own claim.
104. The defendants' reliance upon reversionary rights and
adverse possession must, therefore, be examined separately. If
their case is that they are entitled to the property as reversioners
because the alienations made by Kusumi and Sashi were
ineffective against their interest, they must establish the relevant
line of succession and the legal basis of their alleged reversionary
entitlement. If, on the other hand, they seek to establish title by
adverse possession, they must prove the requisite hostile
possession for the prescribed statutory period. Neither claim can
be accepted merely because the other party's title is disputed.
105. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the principles laid
down in Chatti Konati Rao ( supra ), this Court finds that the
defendants/appellants have failed to establish the essential
ingredients of their plea of adverse possession by specific
pleadings and cogent evidence. Their alternative assertion of
reversionary rights, without establishing the necessary legal and
factual foundation, cannot cure that deficiency. Accordingly, the
plea of adverse possession does not furnish a sustainable basis for
defeating the plaintiffs/respondents' claim founded upon the two
registered sale deeds.

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106. In view of the foregoing discussion, and having regard to the
evidentiary value of Exhibits 1 and 2, the explanation contained in
the deeds regarding the circumstances of the alienations, the
absence of cogent evidence substantiating the allegations of fraud
and misrepresentation, and the failure of the defendants to
establish their principal factual defences, this Court finds that the
defendants have not successfully rebutted the plaintiffs' case
founded upon the registered instruments. The decision in Sumati
Pahari ( supra ), relied upon by the plaintiffs/respondents, lends
support to the consideration of the registered deeds and the
surrounding circumstances in the manner discussed above.
107. All the points formulated by the Hon’ble Division Bench of
this court are decided accordingly.
108. In view of above facts and discussion made above I find
nothing material to interfere the impugned judgment and decree
th th
dated 29 September, 1999 and 4 October, 1999, respectively,
passed by the learned Special Judge (E.C. Court)-cum-Additional
District and Sessions Judge, Midnapore, in Title Appeal No. 160 of
1997.
109. Accordingly, the instant appeal be and the same is hereby
dismissed .
th
110. The judgment and decree dated 29 September, 1999 and
th
4 October, 1999, respectively, passed by the learned Special

55

Judge (E.C. Court)-cum-Additional District and Sessions Judge,
Midnapore, in Title Appeal No. 160 of 1997 is herby affirmed.
111. No order as to costs.
112. Let a copy of this Judgement along with the Trial Court
Records be sent down to the Trial Court at once.
113. Urgent Photostat copy of this judgment be supplied to the
parties upon payment of requisite fees as per provision of law.

(Prasenjit Biswas, J.)