M/S Bharatiya Vidya Bhavans Public School vs M. Vimala
- Court
- Supreme Court
REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 833
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. ……………./2026
[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 17336/2023]
M/S BHARATIYA VIDYA BHAVAN’S
PUBLIC SCHOOL …APPELLANT
VERSUS
M. VIMALA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
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2. This appeal registers a challenge to the judgment and order dated 9
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June, 2023 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court for the State
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of Telangana at Hyderabad . While dismissing an intra-court appeal of
the appellant, the Division Bench affirmed the decision of a Single Judge
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allowing the writ petition of the first respondent.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2026.08.12
14:16:43 IST
Reason:
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impugned judgment
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High Court
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W.A. No.908 of 2008
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W.P. No.9325 of 2007
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3. Appellant initially appointed the first respondent as a teacher on ad hoc
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basis on 22 June, 2003 till the end of the academic year 2003-04. She
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was re-appointed on 25 June 2004 and then again on 5 June, 2005,
till the end of the academic years 2004-05 and 2005-06, respectively.
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Subsequently, by an order dated 25 January, 2006, the first respondent
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was placed on probation for a period of one year w.e.f. 1 January, 2006.
The order of appointment made it clear that the first respondent shall
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continue to be on probation till 31 December, 2006 and her appointment
will not be effective thereafter, unless a fresh order is issued extending
the period of probation.
4. Correspondence was exchanged by and between the appellant and the
first respondent on the point of genuineness of the certificates of
qualifications submitted by the latter. Ultimately, through an order dated
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7 March, 2007, the appellant informed the first respondent that she is
allowed to continue as Primary Grade Teacher up to the end of the
academic year 2006-2007, meaning thereby that the appellant did not
require the first respondent’s service thereafter.
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5. Challenging the order dated 7 March, 2007, the first respondent invoked
the writ jurisdiction of the High Court seeking, inter alia, the following
relief:
“9. For the reasons stated above, it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court
may be pleased to issue an appropriate Writ, Order or direction,
preferably one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus, declaring the
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impugned proceedings of the 2 respondent vide bvbsjh / hyd. No.
500 / F.No. PF60 / 2007, dated:7.3.2007 terminating the services of
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the petitioner as Teacher in the 2 respondent School as arbitrary,
illegal, violative of principles of natural justice and violative of Section
79 read with Section 83 of A.P. Education Act, 1982 and set aside the
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same and consequently direct the 2 respondent to continue the
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petitioner in service as Teacher and pass such other or further orders
as are necessary.
10. It is further prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to
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DIRECT the 2 respondent herein to continue the petitioner herein in
service as Teacher, pending disposal of the main Writ Petition and
pass such other or further orders as are necessary.”
6. A counter affidavit was filed by the appellant before the Single Judge. It
was pleaded therein that doubt arose whether the first respondent’s B.
Ed. degree was recognised by the National Council for Teacher
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Education /University Grants Commission . As pleaded, no teacher
education programme could have commenced in any institution without
obtaining recognition from the NCTE in terms of the provisions of the
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National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 ; that, the first
respondent had secured her B.Ed. degree from Bhartiya Shiksha
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Parishad, Lucknow in 1997, which was not an institution having
recognition of the NCTE; that, degrees relating to teachers’ education
obtained from an institution not recognised by the NCTE is not valid for
employment; and that the list of recognised institutions released by the
NCTE on its website did not include Shiksha Parishad. Enquiry made by
the appellant with the UGC also revealed that Shiksha Parishad was not
included in the list of recognised universities maintained by the UGC. It
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was, thus, informed to the first respondent by a letter dated 9 January,
2007 as follows:
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“With reference to your letter dt. 23 October 2006, I am directed to
inform you that we have since received the intimation from the
University Grants Commission (U.G.C) that Bharatiya Shiksha
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NCTE
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UGC
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NCTE Act
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Shiksha Parishad
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Parishad, Lucknow is not included in the list of Universities
maintained by the U.G.C.
We therefore regret our inability to accede to your request.”
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Later, by a letter dated 7 March, 2007, impugned in the writ petition,
the first respondent was informed to the following effect:
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“In continuation of our letter dt. 9 January 2007, I am directed to
inform you that you are allowed to continue as a Primary grade
Teacher up to the end of the current academic year 2006-07.”
7. On behalf of the first respondent, it was contended before the Single
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Judge that with the expiry of one year from 1 January, 2006, the period
of probation concluded and she acquired the status of a regular teacher.
It was further contended that having regard to the provisions of Sections
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79 and 83 of the Andra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 , termination of the
first respondent's service without any enquiry was in breach of the
principles of natural justice; hence, it is illegal and arbitrary. It was finally
argued that approval of the competent authority did not precede the
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impugned order dated 7 March, 2007 and, hence, such termination was
without jurisdiction.
8. The writ petition was opposed by the appellant by relying on its counter
affidavit, referred to above.
9. The Single Judge proceeded to allow the writ petition vide judgment and
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order dated 24 July, 2008 observing, inter alia, as follows:
“Section 79 of the Act mandates that no employee in a private
educational institution shall be removed or dismissed, except by
conducting an enquiry and after obtaining the prior approval of the
competent authority. Section 83 of the Act deals with the case of
retrenchment. Here again, the prior approval of the competent
authority is mandatory. In Vasavi College of Engineering vs. A.
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the 1982 Act
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Suryanarayana 1991 (3) ALT 335, a Division Bench of this Court took
the view that prior approval of the competent authority is necessary
for removal of regular or temporary employee. Even assuming that
the petitioner did not become a regular employee, she deserves to
be treated as a temporary employee. Though the proposed cessation
of service is not on the basis of any disciplinary proceedings, it can
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be treated as the one under Section 83 of the Act. If the 2
respondent wanted to remove the petitioner from service, on the
ground that she does not hold the requisite qualification, he ought to
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have put her on notice. Even if the 2 respondent has nothing
objectionable against the petitioner, warranting issuance of notice or
conducting of domestic enquiry, the approval of the competent
authority was necessary under Section 83 of the Act.
On this short ground, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned
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order, dated 07.03.2007, is set aside. It is left open to the 2
respondent to follow the procedure prescribed by law, before the
appointment of the petitioner is discontinued. There shall be no order
as to costs.”
10. The judgment and order of the Single Judge having been carried in
appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court, in the impugned judgment,
held as follows:
“6. * A perusal of Section 79 makes it clear that no teacher or
member of the non-teaching staff employed in any private institution
shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after an
inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and
shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of
those charges. Admittedly, in the instant case, the appellant has
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discontinued the 1 respondent after continuing nearly for four years
on adhoc basis. But the appellant ought to have obtained prior
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permission from the competent authority before discontinuing the 1
respondent. The judgments relied upon by the appellant have no
application to the present case as those judgments pertain to the
employees for whom there is no protection as envisaged under
Sections 79 and 83 of the Act. Therefore, the learned Single Judge
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was justified in allowing the writ petition in favour of the 1
respondent and this Court is not inclined to entertain the writ appeal.
7. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is dismissed. No Costs.”
11. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the first
respondent at some length and considered the pleaded case of the
parties before the High Court in the light of the relevant law.
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12. It has not been disputed by learned counsel for the first respondent that
Shiksha Parishad was neither an institution recognised by the NCTE or
the UGC on the date the first respondent obtained her B.Ed. degree.
Since, however, the controversy pertains to teacher education
programme, it is the NCTE Act, and not the University Grants
Commission Act, 1956, that is relevant.
13. We have perused the NCTE Act. In view of the provisions of Sections 14,
16 and 17(4) of the NCTE Act, any degree pertaining to teacher’s training
obtained from an institution not enjoying the recognition of the NCTE has
no legal effect; thus, the consequence is, no candidate can be appointed
as a teacher without obtaining B.Ed. degree or any other teacher’s
training degree, which is an essential qualification, from an institution
recognised by the NCTE. In fact, any such degree from an unrecognised
institution is not worth the paper on which it is printed. Viewed in such
perspective, the first respondent did not have any legal right to claim
that she should have been continued on the post of a Teacher without a
valid B.Ed. degree.
14. However, what seems important in the context are Sections 79 and 83
of the 1982 Act. According to the High Court, the requirements thereof
were observed in the breach. To the extent relevant, Section 79 reads as
follows:
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79. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension,
etc., of employees of private institutions : - (1) No teacher or
member of the non-teaching staff employed in any private institution
(hereinafter in this Chapter referred to as ‘the employee') shall be
dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in
which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a
reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges:
Provided that no order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank
shall be passed under this sub-section against an employee other
than an employee of a minority educational institution without the
prior approval of such authority or Officer as may be prescribed for
different classes of private institutions;
Provided further that the management may prefer an appeal
against any order of the Officer or authority refusing approval under
this sub-section to such authority or officer and within such period as
may be prescribed.
(2) *
(3) *
(4) *
(5) *
Section 83 of the 1982 Act provides as follows:
83. Retrenchment of employees:- Where retrenchment of any
employee is rendered necessary by the management or competent
authority consequent on any change relating to education or course
of instruction or to any other matter, such retrenchment may be,
effected with the prior approval of the competent authority or the next
higher authority, as the case may be.”
Teacher is defined in Section 2(43) of the 1982 Act as follows:
(43) “Teacher” means any member of the teaching staff in an
educational institution appointed to give instruction in that
institution;
15. In light of the aforesaid definition of Teacher, it matters little whether a
teacher is a permanent teacher or is appointed on temporary basis.
Section 79 of the 1982 Act, on its own terms, does not carve out any
distinction and applies to all teachers in position in an institution. If any
teacher misconducts himself/herself and he/she has to be disciplined by
imposing punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, an
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enquiry in the manner ordained is a sine qua non . Therefore, it would
indeed seem to be imperative that a teacher cannot be punished,
including dismissal from service, unless an enquiry has been conducted
in the manner ordained by Section 79.
16. Also, the position seems to be clear from Section 83 that no employee
can be retrenched from service without the prior approval of the
competent authority. Employee not being defined in the 1982 Act, it
would include a teacher.
17. However, here, we are not concerned with any order punishing the first
respondent. We are concerned with termination of her probationary
service. Unless statutory rules or non-statutory rules/norms governing
service of an employee provide to the contrary, service on probation,
normally, would be guided by the terms of the offer of appointment. The
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first respondent was appointed on 25 January, 2006 on probation for a
year, i.e., till the end of 2006, and such period was extended till the end
of the academic year 2006-07. The offer of appointment made it clear
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that beyond 31 December, 2006, the appointment will not be effective
without a fresh order. Such offer also contained a clause to the effect
that “mere completion of the probationary period or period of extension
thereof would not entire (sic, entitle) you to automatic confirmation nor
will it imply confirmation” .
18. It would be profitable, at this stage, to note the decision of this Court in
Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre
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for Basic Sciences where the concepts of ‘motive’ and ‘foundation’ in
relation to termination of a probationer’s service emerged for
consideration. An instructive passage is found in paragraph 21, reading
as follows:
21. If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct,
behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental
enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as
“ founded ” on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was
not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not
inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not
want to continue the employee against whom there were
complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would
not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to
enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular
departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing
adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would
be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of
termination would be valid.
19. Since the first respondent was on probation and she came to be relieved
from service by an order of discharge, which is non-stigmatic, at best
lack of B. Ed. degree of the first respondent from a recognised institution
can be attributed as a motive for her discharge and not the foundation
therefor. We, thus, have no doubt that neither Section 79 nor Section 83
had any application on facts and in the circumstances.
20. Assuming that either Section 79 or Section 83 does have application,
what would be the legal position? Let us now deal with this aspect. The
question would require us to examine the effect of no enquiry being
conducted by the appellant and to simultaneously consider whether, the
B.Ed. degree obtained by the first respondent undoubtedly being a paper
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(1999) 3 SCC 60
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degree, the action of the appellant not to retain the first respondent in
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service beyond 31 March, 2007 on such ground should have been
nullified by the High Court.
21. We regret, we cannot concur with the High Court having regard to
absence of any dispute as to unworthiness of the B.Ed. degree obtained
by the first respondent. What Section 79 postulates is an opportunity of
defence to the teacher sought to be proceeded against. It has to be
remembered that audi alteram partem is not a ritual to be followed in
every case; it is flexible and not cast in a rigid mould. Its application
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The principles of
natural justice can be invoked only in such cases where, granting an
opportunity to defend the allegation could have affected the result and
prevented the allegation from being proved. But where, given the
attending circumstances, the allegation was bound to be proved in any
event, the mere failure to grant an opportunity will not be decisive. To
invalidate the final decision, the aggrieved must at least demonstrate
that he/she had a defence which, if properly considered, could have led
to a different outcome.
22. In the present case, even if an enquiry were conducted granting
opportunity to the first respondent to defend the allegation that the B.Ed.
degree obtained by her is not a valid degree and that the same has no
effect in law, she could not have persuaded the enquiry officer to hold in
her favour. In fine, the first respondent had not been subjected to any
harm or prejudice by reason of the failure of the appellant to hold an
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enquiry in the manner ordained by Section 79. For the same reason,
Section 83 would also not come to the aid of the first respondent.
23. We are reminded of the decision in Chairman, Board of Mining
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Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee , where
Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. pertinently observed as follows:
“ 13. The last violation regarded as a lethal objection is that the Board
did not enquire of the respondent, independently of the one done by
the Regional Inspector. … Natural justice is no unruly horse, no
lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the
decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and
the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being
conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no
breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion
of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities
and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can
neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this
jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt — that is the
conscience of the matter.”
(emphasis ours)
24. Reference may further be made to the decision in Escorts Farms Ltd.
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v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, U.P. , where it has
been held as follows:
“ 64. Right of hearing to a necessary party is a valuable right. Denial
of such right is serious breach of statutory procedure prescribed and
violation of rules of natural justice. … Rules of natural justice are to
be followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a
mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision
of the case on merits. In view of the legal position explained by us
above, we, therefore, refrain from remanding these cases in exercise
of our discretionary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India.”
(emphasis ours)
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25. In Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd , this Court held
as follows:
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(1977) 2 SCC 256
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(2004) 4 SCC 281
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(2005) 5 SCC 337
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22. The principle of natural justice, it is trite, is no unruly horse.
When facts are admitted, an enquiry would be an empty formality.
Even the principle of estoppel will apply. [See Gurjeewan Garewal
(Dr.) v. Dr. Sumitra Dash , (2004) 5 SCC 263. The principles of
natural justice are required to be complied with having regard to the
fact situation obtaining therein. It cannot be put in a straitjacket
formula. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the
relevant facts and circumstances of the case. …
(emphasis ours)
26. The decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sudhir Kumar
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Singh and Ors. also bears consideration where a 3-Judge Bench, after
considering a catena of decisions on natural justice, crystallized principles
as enumerated below:
42.1 . Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to
reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi
alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the
conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.
42.2. Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody
the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead
to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be
caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of
law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in
public interest.
42.3. No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach
of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case
against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel,
acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or
admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no
real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the
person complaining of the breach of natural justice.
42.4. In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or
indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not
pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact,
no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on
an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who
denies natural justice to a person.
42.5. The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere
apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should
exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of
likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural
justice.
(emphasis ours)
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(2021) 19 SCC 706
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27. It was faintly suggested by learned counsel for the respondent that the
Shiksha Parishad has obtained the recognition of the NCTE in the year
2022.
28. We are afraid, nothing turns on the recognition granted in 2022. Such
recognition cannot validate the degree obtained by the first petitioner in
the last century.
29. Also, reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the first respondent
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on the decision of this Court in Priyanka v. The State of Bihar .
Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the cited decision make it clear that the facts
were completely different and the conclusions drawn by this Court have
no relevance insofar as the present appeal is concerned. The
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Chhattisgarh Niji Kshetra Vishwavidyalaya Act, 2002 was declared ultra
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vires by this Court vide order dated 11 February, 2005. Protection was
granted to those students who had graduated during the time the 2002
Act was in force. We fail to appreciate as to how such decision is material
for the purpose of a decision on this appeal.
30. We are, thus, unhesitatingly of the opinion that the Single Judge of the
High Court was entirely wrong in allowing the writ petition of the first
respondent; and the Division Bench was equally in gross error in
upholding such wrong decision.
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2026 INSC 167
16
the 2002 Act
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31. The impugned judgment, in which the Single Judge’s order has merged,
is set aside. The civil appeal stands allowed; consequently, the writ
petition of the first respondent would stand dismissed.
32. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
………..……………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
…….……..…………………………J.
(SHEEL NAGU)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 06, 2026.
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