THE SECRETARY, KANNUR DISTRICT POLICE CO.OP.SOCIETY LTD., NO.C.1384 vs K.KANCHANA

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANU
TH
FRIDAY, THE 5 DAY OF JUNE 2026 / 15TH JYAISHTA, 1948
MFA (ECC) NO. 95 OF 2017
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 28.02.2017 IN ECC NO.137 OF
2014 OF EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER (INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL), KOZHIKODE
APPELLANT/OPPOSITE PARTY No.2:
THE SECRETARY,
KANNUR DISTRICT POLICE
CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD. NO.C.1384,
A.R.POLICE CAMP, KANNUR.
BY ADVS.
SR.P.U.SHAILAJAN
SMT.D.N.NISHANI
SHRI.M.SURESH KUMAR
RESPONDENTS/APPLICANTS & OPPOSITE PARTY No.1:
1 K.KANCHANA
W/O. LATE ANILKUMAR C.V,
CHOORAYI VAYAKKARA HOUSE, CHIRAKKAKAVU ROAD,
NETTUR P.O., THALASSERY,
KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN - 670 105.

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2 K.ATHIRA
D/O. LATE ANILKUMAR.C.V.,
CHOORAYI VAYAKKARA HOUSE, CHIRAKKAKAVU ROAD,
NETTUR P.O., THALASSERY,
KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN - 670 105.
3 AKSHAY KUMAR.K
S/O. LATE ANILKUMAR.C.V.,
CHOORAYI VAYAKKARA HOUSE, CHIRAKKAKAVU ROAD,
NETTUR P.O., THALASSERY,
KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN - 670 105.
4 THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
POLICE HEADQUARTERS,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.
BY ADV SRI.C.P.PEETHAMBARAN
OTHER PRESENT :- ADV.NEERAJA VENUGOPAL
THIS MFA (ECC) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
29.05.2026, THE COURT ON 05.06.2026 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:

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[CR]

S.MANU, J.
--------------------------------------------------
M.F.A.(ECC).No.95 of 2017
-------------------------------------------------
th
Dated this the 05 day of June, 2026
JUDGMENT
The second opposite party in ECC No.137/2014 of the
court of the Industrial Tribunal and Employees Compensation
Commissioner, Kozhikode is the appellant herein. Respondents 1
to 3 were the applicants before the Commissioner. Fourth
respondent herein was the first opposite party.
2. The respondents 1 to 3 approached the
st
Commissioner contending that the husband of the 1
respondent and father of respondents 2 and 3, Anilkumar died
of electrocution while he was engaged in the construction of iron
roof sheeting work in the office building of the appellant society
on 16.7.2011 at about 2 pm. While he was doing welding work

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an iron pipe came in contact with a high-tension line passing
nearby and was thrown away by electric shock. Though he was
immediately taken to hospital he succumbed to injuries. The
claimants contended that the deceased was aged 45 years and
his monthly wage was Rs.12,000/-. A total amount of
Rs.10,36,640/- was claimed as compensation.
3. The appellant denied the claims of the respondents 1
to 3. Alleged employer-employee relationship was denied. It
was contended that the deceased was an independent
contractor for roofing work and the work was entrusted to him
as he submitted the lowest quotation in response to the public
notice inviting quotations for the roofing work. Further it was
contended that Anilkumar had employed some other persons
and was not doing any work directly. According to the appellant,
the accident occurred due to his negligence. While he was giving
instructions to the employees the iron rod came in contact with
the electric line and he got electrocuted. On sympathetic

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considerations, an amount of Rs.50,000/- was given to
respondents 1 to 3 from the common benefit fund of the society.
The appellant asserted that it had no liability to pay
compensation as there was no employer-employee relationship.
st
4. The 1 respondent was examined as AW1 and the
Honorary Secretary of the appellant was examined as RW1.
Exts.A1 to A5 were marked on the side of the respondents 1 to
3. Ext.B1, file pertaining to the roof construction was marked
on the side of the appellant. The learned Commissioner, on
appreciation of evidence, concluded that there was employer-
employee relationship. It was found that the deceased himself
was working under the appellant as a welder. The learned
Commissioner adopted Rs.8,000/- as the monthly wages of the
deceased for the purpose of calculating compensation. The
Commissioner fixed the compensation at Rs.6,77,760/-.
Interest at the rate of 12% from the date of accident was also
granted. In addition, an amount of Rs.5,000/- was granted

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towards funeral expenses. Aggrieved by the order passed by
the learned Commissioner this appeal was filed.
5. No question of law was formulated while admitting
this appeal. In my view the following substantial question of law
arises for consideration:
Whether the deceased can be considered as an
employee for the purpose of Employees
Compensation Act despite the fact that he was
engaged through a tender process?
6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the
learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3.
7. The learned counsel for the appellant fervently
pleaded that no employer-employee relationship was existing
between the appellant and the deceased. The appellant issued
public notice inviting quotations for construction of a sheet roof.
The deceased submitted his quotation and the same being the
lowest, the work was awarded to him. He was therefore a

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contractor and not a workman. She further submitted that he
had engaged labourers and the work was executed through
them. When he visited the site to supervise the work on the
fateful day, he unfortunately got electrocuted. The learned
counsel referred to Ext.B1 file in support of the contention.
Further, the learned counsel submitted that the work
undertaken by the deceased was the construction of a roof,
which cannot be considered as part of the trade or business of
the appellant. Therefore, she submitted that in any view of the
matter the appellant is not liable to pay compensation to the
dependents of the deceased.
8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents 1
to 3 submitted that the deceased was actually an employee.
She argued that the deceased was also working along with other
labourers. The accident occurred while executing the work.
She also contended that the Employees Compensation Act, 1923
is a beneficial legislation and hence liberal interpretation is

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justified. She submitted that the deceased was engaged in work
essential for the maintenance of the building of the appellant
and, therefore, the same can be considered only as part of the
trade or business, as maintaining the business premises would
come under the expression 'business'. She relied on a judgment
of a Division Bench of this Court in Chief Post Master
General, Tvm. and another v. Lekha and another [2017 (3)
KLT 853]. She further submitted that the mere fact that a
quotation was submitted to get the work allotted cannot be a
reason to conclude that the deceased was not an employee
within the scope of the Employees Compensation Act. She hence
prayed that the appeal be dismissed by affirming the impugned
order.
9. In view of the question of law framed above, the only
aspect to be analysed is as to whether the deceased could be
considered as an ‘employee’ for the purpose of the Employees
Compensation Act. Ext.B1 proves that the appellant society had

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issued public notice inviting quotations for the work. The
deceased submitted the lowest quotation and therefore the work
st
was awarded to him. After his demise the 1 respondent
submitted a request to permit her to complete the work. The
same was accepted. Thereafter the work was finished and the
st
remaining payments were received by the 1 respondent.
10. Though the deceased submitted quotation and
undertook to construct the roof, he was not executing the work
entirely through other labourers. In this regard it is relevant to
take note of Ext.A1 FIR. It was lodged on the date of accident.
The FI Statement was given by one Rajeesh, a welder. It is
discernible from the FI Statement that the deceased was also
working as a welder along with the informant and another co-
worker named Shijil. It was clearly mentioned by the informer
that the GI pipe was picked up by the deceased for welding. In
my view, the FIR is a very relevant piece of evidence that
would show that the deceased along with some others was

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actually involved in the welding activity. Under such
circumstances, keeping in view of the objective of the
Employees Compensation Act, 1923, the deceased cannot be
considered as a contractor per se. He actively participated in
carrying out the task. Mere fact that he submitted a quote in
order to get the work awarded cannot be considered as a factor
compelling to conclude that he cannot be brought within the
scope of the expression ‘employee’ under the Act. Adopting such
a pedantic approach will defeat the purpose of the Act.
11. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Champalal v.
Daryavbai and others [1991 SCC OnLine MP 30] held as
under;
“6. Both the learned counsel have placed reliance on the
case of Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of
Saurashtra, AIR 1957 SC 264, wherein the Supreme
Court has held as under:
“The broad distinction between a workman and
independent contractor lies in this that while the

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former agrees himself to work the latter agrees
to get other persons to work. Now a person who
agrees himself to work and does so work and is,
therefore, a workman does not cease to be such
by reason merely of the fact that he gets other
persons to work along with him and that those
persons are controlled and paid by him. What
determines whether a person is a workman or an
independent contractor is whether he has agreed
to work personally or not. If he has, then he is a
workman and the fact that he takes assistance
from other persons would not affect his status.”
7. In the light of the aforesaid judgment it is crystal clear
that when a workman even though he may take a
contract, i.e., payment in lump sum for the amount of
work done, would not cease to be a workman only by
virtue of the contract if he agrees to work himself. It is
also manifest that if once a person agrees to work
himself and works in accordance with the agreement,
then merely because he gets other persons also to work
with him and those persons are controlled and paid by
him would not have the effect o f treating such workman

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as a contractor under the law. As such the crucial test is
that if a person agrees to work personally then he is a
workman, but if he does not work personally and gets
the work done from others, then he is an independent
contractor. Undisputedly in the instant case the
respondent had agreed to work himself and the accident
was also caused because he was also working himself.
Therefore, the fact that he also agreed to get assistance
of other workers in the contract would not change his
position and he shall not cease to be a workman only by
virtue of entering into a contract to seek the assistance
of other workmen also along with his work.”
[Emphasis added]
I completely concur with the viewpoint articulated in the
aforementioned judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. If
the other requirements are met, an individual who enters into a
contract to carry out a task and physically participates in it may
be deemed an ‘employee’, bearing in mind the purpose of the
Employees Compensation Act. It would be harsh, unfair,

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unrealistic, and unquestionably against the legislative intention
to hold that such a person cannot be recognized as an employee
for the purposes of the Act, for the mere reason that he hires
some additional workers to assist him in carrying out the task
undertaken by entering into the contract. However, if an
individual entering into a contract gets the work executed solely
through others and is not physically involved in the actual
execution of the activity, the situation will be quite different.
Therefore, in cases like this, Commissioners should diligently
evaluate the materials to find out the real nature of engagement
and decide whether the injured was only a contractor or was
involved in actual execution of work so that he can be
considered as an employee for the purpose of the Act.
12. As noted already, in the case on hand, there is
adequate evidence to show that the deceased was actually
involved in the welding work along with others. The co-worker
who gave the FI Statement clearly spoke that the deceased was

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working with him and the unfortunate accident occurred while
he was physically involved in the welding work.
13. The learned counsel for the appellant raised a
contention that the construction of roof cannot be considered as
an activity within the scope of the expression ‘trade or business’
in Section 12(1) of the Employees Compensation Act. She
therefore contended that the engagement of the deceased for
the work of construction of the roof will not fall within the ambit
of Section 12. The said contention cannot be accepted in view
of the discussion in paragraph 5 of the judgment in Chief Post
Master General (supra). The relevant paragraph is extracted
hereunder:-
“5. A mere reading of Section 12 of the Act would show
that the liability which can be fastened under that
provision would come into play only when any person
was employed for the purposes of “his trade or
business”. Before going into that question, it is material
to consider what is the legislative impact of Section 12
of the Act. It is really intended not to restrict the

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liability, but to extend the liability on the principal, by
applying the principle that in so far as the incident
which has resulted in injuries or death to victims, the
principal employer is initially liable to compensate the
victim, even though there is an intermediary by way of
a contract or entrustment etc. and violation of
covenants agreed upon. While interpreting Section 12
of the Act, a beneficial construction which would
promote the legislative intention has to be adopted and
the expression or wording used therein has to be
interpreted so as to advance justice and to promote the
legislative intention to give benefit to the victim and not
to reject it. So, the expression “trade or business” has
to be understood under this context and the duty of the
Court is to find out is there any nexus in between the
employment of the person concerned with the ‘trade or
business’ of the principal. The “trade” of a Post Office
would be something different from that of maintaining
a building wherein it was functioning. But, if the
building is owned by the second and third opposite
parties, the maintenance of the business place in a
good and healthy condition would form part of their
“business” and, if the matter is viewed under that
perspective, employment of some person, either on

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contractual basis or otherwise, for maintaining the
building/business place by conducting repairing work,
painting work etc. would come under the expression
“business” as incorporated under Section 12 of the Act.
No distinction has been drawn with respect to any
employee under Section 12 of the Act, based on the
nature of engagement, whether it is direct or through a
Contractor. There is a clear nexus in between the
alleged accident and the employment of the victim,
which would come under the purview of the expression
“business” engrafted under Section 12 of the Act. So,
there cannot be any escape for the second and third
opposite parties from the initial liability to compensate
the applicant (first respondent in the appeals).”
[Emphasis supplied]
14. In the light of the above discussion, I am of the
definite view that the question of law involved can be
answered only in favour of the respondents 1 to 3. Mere
fact that a person executed a contract for performing a
work would not be sufficient to hold that he cannot be

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treated as an employee under the Employees
Compensation Act.
In the result, I uphold the impugned order. M.F.A(ECC)
is dismissed.
Sd/-
S.MANU
JUDGE
skj