Sh. Gohar Alam vs Shri Jabbar Khan & Ors.

$~42
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
% Date of decision: 20 April, 2026
+ RFA 382/2026, CM APPL. 25599/2026 & CM APPL. 25600/2026
SH. GOHAR ALAM
S/o Sh. Sabir Miya
R/o A-II/183, Madangir,
New Delhi-110062
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Nazim Husain Qureshi, Mr. Aadil
Jameel, Mr. Fakre Alam, Mr. Vikram
Singh, Advocates

versus

1. SHRI JABBAR KHAN
S/o Shri Kalu Khan
R/o 9/196, Gali No.9,
DDA Flats, Shops No.2-3,
Madangir, New Delhi-110062

2. SHRI DURGA DAS
S/o Late Sh. Khairati Lal
R/o 150-1, Nagar Nigam,
W. No. 39, Velalge Mehal,
Tehsil Amritsar Distt. Amritsar (Punjab)

3. SHRI PAWAN KOLI
S/o Late Krishan Lal
R/o 9/196, First Floor,
Gali No.9, Dda Janta Flats,
Madangir New Delhi-110062
.....Respondents
Through: None


Signature Not Verified
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
Signing Date:02.05.2026
16:23:44
RFA 382/2026 Page 1 of 23

CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
J U D G M E N T (oral)
1. Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 ( hereinafter referred to as „CPC‟ ) has been filed against
the Judgment dated 10.10.2025 whereby the Suit filed by the Plaintiff for
Possession, Declaration and Permanent Injunction, was dismissed.
2. Brief facts, are that the Property bearing No.9/196, Gali No.9,
DDA Flats, Shop No.2 & 3, Madangir, New Delhi 110062 (hereinafter
referred to as „ Suit Property‟ ), was allocated to Sh. Kharati Lal, by DDA
vide file No. F-29 (461)/73/HB dated 28.10.1993. Shri Kharati Lal expired
on 28.10.1993 and his wife Smt. Dullo Devi also expired on 10.02.1989.
They were survived by three sons, namely Kishan Lal, Sh. Rajender and
Shri Durga Das .
3. Thereafter, all the legal heirs of Shri Kishan Lal , son of Khairati Lal
executed a Relinquishment Deed dated 23.05.2013, in favour of Sh. Pawan
Koli, S/o late Shri Kishan Lal, i.e. Defendant no. 3 .
4. Sh. Rajender S/o Sh. Kharati Lal executed a Relinquishment Deed
in favour of Shri Durga Das , s/o late Sh. Kharati Lal i.e. Defendant no.2, on
03.06.2013.
5. The Plaintiff purchased the Suit Property from the erstwhile owners
Sh. Durga Das and Sh. Pawan Koli, by way of GPA dated 20.10.2015 and
he is the sole and absolute owner of the Suit Property.
6. It was further submitted that the Defendant promised to handover
the possession of the said shops within two months after the execution of the
Sale, i.e. 20.10.2015. Further, the Defendants failed to handover the
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ARORA
Signing Date:02.05.2026
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possession to the Plaintiff and started blackmailing and extorting money
from the Plaintiff, to hand over the possession of both the shops.
7. The Plaintiff sent a Legal Notice dated 12.02.2026 to the
Defendants, calling upon to hand over the possession of the shop nos. 2 and
3, within 30 days and in case of non-compliance, the Defendants will be
liable to pay @ Rs. 6,000/- per month from the receipt of the said Legal
Notice. Further, the Defendant were only in the possession of shop nos. 2
and 3 on a license basis for two months, which was, by way of Legal Notice
dated 12.02.2026 stood cancelled, and therefore, the Defendants were
unauthorized occupants of the shop nos. 2 and 3 in the Suit Property.
8. The Plaintiff, thus filed a Suit for Possession, Declaration and
Permanent Injunction.
9. The Defendant No.1 i.e. Jabbar Khan in his Preliminary
objections, took the defence that the Plaintiff has concealed material facts
and he not the owner of the Suit property; the documents on which the
Plaintiff relied upon are false and fabricated. Further, it was claimed that
there has been misjoinder of the parties, because the Plaintiff had failed to
mention as to why he has made Defendant No. 2 and 3 a party to the Suit.
Moreover, the Plaintiff had not paid the proper court fee for the present suit.
Thus, the Suit of the Plaintiff is without any cause of action and liable to be
dismissed.
10. As per the Defendant, Jabbar Khan the correct facts are Sh.
Khairati Lal s/o Sh. Nathu Ram claimed to have acquired the Suit property
on license, from the DDA. He also used to claim that he had constructed
three shops on the ground floor. In the year of 1991, Sh. Khairati Lal let out
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ARORA
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Signature Not Verified
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ARORA
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ARORA
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acknowledged in in writing and also, gave a No objection for the Defendant
No.1, to apply for his own electricity meter, in the Suit Property.
18. The Defendant No.1 has also proved two documents, i.e. Revenue
receipts dated 05.06.1991 as Ex. DW 1/5 (colly.) and the landlord's „no
objection‟ for the installation of an electricity connection and a carding
machine ( rui dhunne ki machine ), in which, Sh. Khairati lal received pagdi
amount of Rs. 30,000/- from Defendant No.1. These two documents, further
reveals that in the event of a sale of the shops, the sale proceeds would be
apportioned at 25% for the landlord and 75% for the tenant. DW-1 further
deposed that these documents were executed by Sh. Khairati Lal, in his
presence and witnessed by Sh. Charanjeet.
19. DW2, Pawan Koli , Defendant No.2, deposed by way of affidavit
Ex. DW2/A and relied upon the Relinquishment Deed dated 23.05.2013,
Mark B.
20. The learned District Judge after appreciating the evidence,
dismissed the Suit of the Plaintiff.
21. Aggrieved by the Impugned Judgment dated 10.10.2025 , the
present Appeal has been preferred by the Plaintiff/Appellant.
22. The grounds of challenge are that the learned Trial Court has
failed to appreciate the cross examination of Plaintiff, as well as the
testimony of Defendant no. 3, who has proved the case of the Plaintiff.
23. The Ld. Trial Court has failed to observe that Defendant Nos. 2 and
3 are not the owners of the Suit Property, and they were not competent to
execute further title documents in favour of the Appellant by ignoring the 35
rent receipts produced by Defendant No. 1, i.e. 28 Rent Receipts as Ex.
DW1/1 (colly), executed by Sh. Khairati Lal, grandfather of Defendant No.
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ARORA
Signing Date:02.05.2026
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3, Ex.DW1/2 executed by Smt. Leela, mother of Defendant No. 3, and
Ex.DW1/3 (colly) executed by Sh. Rajinder, uncle of Defendant No. 3.
These receipts collectively establish that Defendant No. 1 recognized
Khairati Lal and his legal heirs as the owners/landlords. Since Defendant
No. 1 never disputed the ownership of these legal heirs, the Court's rejection
of their capacity to transfer title, is unsustainable.
24. The Ld. Trial Court erringly observed that Defendants No. 2 and 3
lacked the competence to convey title of the Suit Property because they
produced no document of a transfer from the DDA; it simultaneously failed
to address the legal status of the ownership of Suit Property after the demise
of the original allottee, i.e. Sh. Khairati Lal. Consequently, by dismissing the
validity of the documents executed by the legal heirs without identifying the
rightful owner, the Ld. Trial Court has left the title of the Suit property in a
state of legal uncertainty, thereby creating an improper „cloud‟ over the
ownership of the Suit Property.
25. The Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the Appellant's
documentary evidence of title, i.e. GPA, Will, etc. Ex. PW-1/4, executed on
20.10.2015 by Defendant No. 1 and 3 in favor of the Appellant,
substantiated the Appellant's ownership in the Suit Property. Conversely,
Respondent No. 1, who relied upon informal, handwritten documents, failed
to establish his own claim of ownership.
26. The Ld. Trial Court erred by giving undue weight to the Written
Statement of Respondent No. 3 , while ignoring his subsequent admissions.
Respondent No. 3 originally denied the sole ownership of the Appellant, and
alleged a breach of contract. Further, the Ld. Trial Court also failed to
consider Respondent no.3 had filed an Application under Order VI Rule 17
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CPC dated 16.08.2019, wherein he expressed a clear intent to sell the Suit
Property to the Appellant.
27. Moreover, the Ld. Trial Court overlooked affidavit of evidence and
cross-examination of Defendant No.2 wherein he explicitly admitted to
having sold the suit property to the Appellant. These subsequent admissions,
effectively supersede his initial defense and should have been treated as
conclusive.
28. The Ld. Trial Court has wrongly observed the actual legal status of
Respondent No. 1, who has taken contradictory stands regarding his
possession of the Suit Property. Whilst, Respondent No. 1 claimed in his
cross-examination to be the owner defending his title , his own pleadings and
prior conduct, suggests otherwise.
29. Specifically, the Ld. Trial Court overlooked the categorical
admission of tenancy in a previous legal proceeding; in Rent Petition No. E-
421/2009, titled „Jabbar Khan vs. Smt. Leela‟, filed by the Respondent,
under Section 45 of the DRC Act . In that petition, the Respondent explicitly
admitted to being a tenant. Having admitted his status as a tenant in a
judicial proceeding, he should be estopped from now asserting ownership
based on unverified, handwritten documents.
30. It is therefore stated that the impugned judgement be set aside and
the Suit of the plaintiff/Appellant be decreed.
Submissions heard and record perused.
31. The Plaintiff has filed the Suit for declaration that he was the owner
and sought possession of Suit property from Defendant No.1 Jabbar Khan,
being the tenant in the Suit property. The first aspect for consideration is
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whether the Appellant was able to establish his ownership in the suit
property.
Whether the Plaintiff/Appellant is the Owner/Landlord of the Suit
Property:
32. The Plaintiff claimed to have become the owner, having purchased
and acquired ownership rights in the suit property from the erstwhile
owners, namely Durga Das S/o Khairati Lal and Pawan Koli S/o Krrishan
Lal, through Agreement to Sell, GPA etc. dated 20.10.2015.

33. To appreciate his assertion, it would be pertinent to refer to the
pleadings as well as the evidence, wherein the Plaintiff had explained that
originally the Suit Plot was allotted to Khairati Lal by DDA, vide File No.F-
29 (461)/73/HB dated 25.06.1976. The ownership of Khairati Lal is not
challenged as Jabbar Khan has admitted that he was inducted as a tenant by
him, since prior to 1991.
34. Shri Khairati Lal expired on 28.10.1993 and his wife Dullo Devi
expired on 10.02.1989. They were survived by three sons, namely; Kishan
Lal, Rajinder and Durga Das.
35. On the demise of Shri Krishan Lal, all the legal heirs of Kishan Lal,
i.e. wife and the daughters, executed a Relinquishment Deed dated
23.05.2013, Mark B, in favour of Pawan Koli , Defendant No.3, son of
Krishan Lal S/o Khairati Lal.
36. It was contended by Defendant No. 1, i.e. Jabbar Khan, that the
Relinquishment Deed dated 23.05.2013 Ex. Mark B had not been duly
proved and, therefore, Sh. Pawan Koli cannot be held as having derived any
ownership rights through Kishan Lal.
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ARORA
Signing Date:02.05.2026
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41. In Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. v. Manjit Kaur & Ors. 2019 SCC
OnLine SC 975, the Supreme Court held that Section 27 of the Limitation
Act is an exception to the general rule that limitation only bars the remedy;
where a person who could challenge a transfer or assert a competing title
does not sue within the prescribed period, his right to the property itself
stands extinguished and a corresponding substantive right crystallizes in the
person in whose favour limitation has run.
42. Likewise, in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India in
Civil Appeal No. 16899 of 1996 explains that, once limitation has expired,
the earlier owner's title is lost and the new right becomes secure, Section 27
of the Limitation Act thus „destroying‟ the old right while perfecting the
new one.
43. In the present case, neither Rajender nor the legal heirs of late
Kishan Lal have ever challenged the Relinquishment Deeds dated
23.05.2013 and 03.06.2013, any right they had to assert a contrary title to
the Suit Property now stands extinguished under Section 27 of the
Limitation Act, and the derivative title in favour of Durga Das and Pawan
Koli by virtue of the Relinquishment Deeds, is crystallized and is beyond
collateral attack, in these proceedings. Pawan Koli and Durga Das thus, are
established to be the two joint owners of the Suit property.
However, the core question remains: Whether he can seek a Declaration
to be an owner of the Suit property, on the basis of these documents.
44. The Plaintiff had purchased the Suit Property from the erstwhile
owners Sh. Durga Das and Sh. Pawan Koli, by way of GPA dated
20.10.2015 and he is the sole and absolute owner of the Suit Property. The
title of Durga das and Pawan Koli, as discussed above has been established.
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ARORA
Signing Date:02.05.2026
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45. Durga Das, respondent No. 2 was proceeded ex-parte and he never
denied the execution of Agreement to Sell, etc. in favour of the Appellant.
Likewise, Pawan Koli, Respondent no.3 did not deny the execution of
documents, but only asserted that Appellant had not paid the entire
consideration amount, which does not take away the authenticity of
documents in favour of the Appellant.
46. Now the pertinent question is whether plaintiff can seek Declaration
of being the owner on the basis of Agreement to Sell, etc.

47. In the case of Suraj Lamps & Industries Pvt. Limited vs. State of
Haryana & Anr . 2009 (7) SCC 363 it has been held that mere Agreement to
Sell, etc. cannot be a basis to seek Declaration of Ownership in respect of a
Suit property, in the absence of a Sale Deed. Such documents may give a
rise to a party for Specific Performance of Agreement to Sell or to seek
protection of the Possession under Section 53(A), but these are not the
conventional documents of title and would not entitle the Plaintiff to a
Declaration of an absolute owner.
48. However, here is a case where the Plaintiff is seeking a superior
Title over the Respondent being the Tenant, in the Suit property. The
Appellant may not be entitled to a Declaration being an owner, but definitely
the chain of documents proves that he, under the GPA dated 20.10.2015
Ex.PW1/4 has been authorized by the Pawan Koli and Durga Das, the two
legal heirs/owners, to do all the acts stated therein in respect of the Suit
property which includes collection of rent and letting out the property to
different tenants. In the light of this GPA, the Plaintiff is shown to be a
landlord in respect of the Suit property.
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ARORA
Signing Date:02.05.2026
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49. The learned Trial Court, therefore, rightly held that the Plaintiff
cannot be declared as an owner, but the larger question in the present Suit,
was not ownership viz-a-viz the whole world, but it was only in respect of
the Defendant. The Plaintiff cannot be denied a locus to collect the rent or
evict the Defendant, on the basis of the Agreement to Sell, etc. especially
GPA dated 20.10.2015 Ex.PW1/4.
50. Even if the Relinquishment Deeds are overlooked, it can still not be
ignored that Durga Das and Pawan Koli being the Legal Heirs of Late Shri
Khairati Lal and co-owners, had duly executed a GPA in favour of the
Plaintiff. It is settled law that even one co-owner is authorized to execute
the GPA in favour of the third party, for and on behalf of the other co-
owners. The locus of Durga Das and Pawan Koli to further authorize the
Plaintiff to step into their shoes, for the purpose of collection of rent or
giving property on rent or seek its possession, by virtue of GPA, cannot be
overlooked .
51. It is, therefore, held that the Plaintiff being a landlord in respect
of the Suit premises, was entitled to seek the relief of Possession and
Arrears of Rent from the Defendant.
52. Having concluded the locus of the Plaintiff to maintain a Suit, the
next pertinent question arises in regard to the status of the Defendant No.1
in the suit premises.
Whether the Respondent No.1 Jabbar Khan, a tenant In the Suit property:
53. Defendant No.1 has not denied that he was inducted as a tenant by
Late Sh. Khairati Lal. The Respondent No.1/Jabbar Khan in his Affidavit of
Evidence has admitted being inducted as a tenant since prior to 1991, by
Khairati Lal. He claimed that some Pagri amount was paid by the
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Defendant to him and the rent was fixed at Rs.500/- per month. He has
proved receipt Ex. DW-1/5 (Colly.)
54. Sh. Jabbar Khan may have paid Pargi in the sum of Rs.30,000/-, but
it does not reflect that he became an owner of the property, especially in the
light of his own case that after the demise of Khairati Lal in the year 1993,
Kishan Lal, his son claiming himself to be the landlord and only legal heir,
had started collecting rent of Rs.500/- per month.
55. In this context, it is significant to refer to Rent Petition No.421/2009
under Section 45 Delhi Rent Act filed by Jabbar Khan , in July, 2009 against
Smt. Leela, wife of Late Shri Krishan Lal for restoration of electricity
supply allegedly disconnected by her. On 28.11.2008, Pawan Koli,
Respondent No.3 appeared before the learned ARC. Learned Counsel for
the Defendant submitted that the matter has been amicably settled and the
Petition was withdrawn.
56. In this Petition, the Defendant/Respondent Jabbar Khan admitted
that he had been inducted as a tenant by Khairati Lal, on a monthly rent of
Rs.500/- per month vide a Rent Deed dated 30.07.1991 and since then he
has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the tenanted
premises. According to the Appellant, Khairati Lal at the time of giving the
property on rent in 1991, had taken Rs.30,000/- as bayana/sanad from the
Appellant. He had also undertaken that he would pay Rs.60,000/- in case
Khairati Lal failed to give two shops on rent to the Appellant.
57. What further emerges from the Written Statement of the Appellant
and his testimony is that after the demise of Khairati Lal, his son Krishan
Lal started collecting the rent by asserting that the Suit Property had been
bequeathed to him by late Khairati Lal. It also emerges from the evidence
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that Krishan Lal had some acrimony with his wife Leelawati who had
started demanding rent from the landlord.
58. In view of this, the matter got amicably settled between the
Appellant and Leelawati, who took Rs.30,000/- from the Appellant to settle
the disputes and executed a document wherein she had no objection to the
rent being collected by Krishan Lal or for installation of electricity meter by
the Appellant in his name in the Suit Property. From the evidence on record,
it thus emerges that till 2009, the Appellant continued to enjoy the tenancy
rights in the Suit Property.
59. Similarly, Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act embodies the
doctrine of estoppel, under which no tenant, or person claiming through him,
is permitted during the continuance of the tenancy to deny that the landlord
had title at the commencement of the tenancy.
60. In D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagdish 1987 INSC 250, the Court
clarified that this estoppel continues so long as the tenancy subsists and only
yields where it is shown that the landlord‟s title has since lawfully come to
an end or the tenant, has been compelled to attorn to a paramount title
holder.
61. Thereafter, the Appellant claimed to have acquired ownership rights
from Kishan Lal on payment of Rs.2,20,000/- for which he had relied upon
the Receipt dated 26.01.2010 Ex. DW1/6. It was recorded in the said Letter
that while Appellant was a tenant under Sh. Khairati Lal since 1991, but
Kishan Lal had sold the two shops to the Appellant and accepted
Rs.2,20,000/- and that he would have no ownership rights in the Suit
Property and that he would not be collecting any rent thereafter, in respect of
the Suit Shop.
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Letter dated 05.06.1991 Ex.DW1/5 executed by Late Sh. Khairati Lal, it was
recorded that in case, the said property is sold, the Appellant would be
entitled to 75% of the sale consideration, while letting out the shop to the
Appellant and having accepted Rs.30,000/- as the bayana/sanad. From the
affidavit of the Appellant himself, it emerges and has also earlier discussed
while there may have been an understanding between the Appellant and the
Respondent in regard to sharing of the sale consideration on sale of the
property, but there is no denial that the Appellant was a tenant under
Khairati Lal and continued to be so till 2010, when he asserted that he had
purchased the Suit Property from Late Kishan Lal by payment of
Rs.2,20,000/- vide Receipt Ex.DW1/6.
66. Be as it may, these documents of the Defendant No.1, coupled with
his testimony reflect that these documents did not confer any ownership
rights on the Appellant/ Defendant No.1.
Whether the Plaintiff/Appellant is entitled to Possession:
67. The next question for consideration is that having found the
relationship of landlord-tenant between the appellant and Respondent No.1,
whether the Appellant is entitled to possession.
68. The Plaintiff had claimed that he had sent Legal Notices dated
12.01.2016 and 07.02.2016 under Section 106 TPA, Ex.PW1/5 and
Ex.PW1/7 respectively, claiming a rent of Rs.6,000/- per month and the
Reply to the Legal Notice is Ex.PW1/6.
69. However, while asserting that the rate of rent was Rs.6,000/-, no
cogent evidence has been led by the Plaintiff in this regard. The record and
the admissions of the Respondent, only are that he was a tenant @
Rs.500/- which had been paying to Khairati Lal and thereafter, to his legal
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heir. There is nothing to corroborate the claim of the Appellant that the rent
was ever Rs. 6,000/- p.m.
Whether the Suit is barred under S.50 Delhi Rent Control Act,1958:
70. This raises the next pertinent question as to whether the Suit of the
Appellant, is barred u/s 50 DRC Act.
71. In the present case, Defendant No. 1, though admitted his induction
in the suit property as a tenant, but has throughout repudiated the
relationship of landlord and tenant and set up an independent title in himself.
He has claimed to have acquired the status of owner of the suit property on
the basis of pagri given to khairati Lal and on the demise had, on the
assurance of Kishan Lal, paid him a sum of Rs. 2,20,000/-, with an
assurance that he would not be evicted. It was asserted that no rent was paid
thereafter. Such act of the Defendant No.1 tantamount to forfeiture under
Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
72. For better understanding of Section 111(g) TPA which deals with
Determination of Lease and provides for circumstances in which the lease of
immovable property gets determined, is reproduced as under:
“By forfeiture; that is to say,
(1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition
which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may
re-enter; or
(2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such
by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming
title in himself; or
(3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease
provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening
of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or
his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of
his intention to determine the lease.”

73. In Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan vs. Municipal Board of Sitapur and
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Ors ., MANU/SC/0326/1964, while making a reference to the case of
Maharaja of Jeypore vs. Rukmini Pattamahadevi , MANU/PR/0154/1919,
AIR 1919 PC 1, the Apex Court observed that it was clear law that
permanent tenancies are within the rule and are liable to forfeiture, if there
is a disclaimer of tenancy or denial of the landlord‟s title. This disclaimer
of repudiation of landlord‟s title, must be clear and unequivocal and made to
the knowledge of the landlord. It was further observed that where there is a
disclaimer of tenancy and repudiation of landlord‟s title , it would amount to
forfeiture of relationship of landlord and tenant.
74. Likewise, in the case of Hatimullah and Ors. vs. Mahamad Arju
Choudhury MANU/WB/0396/1927, 113 Ind. Cas. 13, this aspect was further
explained by observing that where the tenant denies the Plaintiff‟s title to
recover rent on the bona fide ground of seeking information of such title or
having such title established in a Court of law in order to protect himself, he
cannot be charged with disclaiming the Plaintiff‟s title. But, where the
disclaimer is done not with this object, but with expressed repudiation of
tenancy under the Plaintiff, it would operate as forfeiture.
75. In Kundan Mal vs. Gurudutta , MANU/SC/0280/1989, JT 1989 (1) SC
147, it was held that the principle of forfeiture on disclaimer is founded on
the rule that a man cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time . Since
the consequence of applying the rule is very serious, the denial has to be
clear and in unequivocal terms.
76. Similar observations were made by the Supreme Court in Majati
Subbarao vs. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by Lrs . AIR 1989 SC 2187,
wherein the principle of forfeiture, as defined in the decision of the Apex
Court in Kundan Mal vs. Gurudutta , JT 1989 (1) SC 147, were fully
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endorsed. It was further noted that where there is a provision under the Rent
Act for eviction on the ground of repudiation of the title, then the remedy
with the landlord is only to approach under the Rent Act, as was the case in
Rajasthan Rent Law.
77. Certain State tenancy laws provide denial of title of landlord, as a
ground for eviction, in which case the remedy for the landlord is to approach
under Rent Law, but where there is no such provision in Rent Act as in
Delhi, the only remedy remains under the general civil law, to which the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is applicable.
78. The principle of forfeiture as recognized, was initially stated to be that
a denial of title in the Written Statement, cannot be taken advantage of in
that Suit, but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent Suit to be filed
by the landlord.
79. In the case of Guru Amarjit Singh vs. Rattan Chand and Ors .,
MANU/SC/0065/1994, AIR 1994 SC 227, the doctrine of forfeiture was
explained to be founded upon the existence of a lease under jural
relationship between a lessor and a lessee, as contemplated under Section
105 TPA . It is implicit that if the lease is in operation, the lessor has been
given a right to determine the lease for committing breach of a covenant or
for disclaimer by the lessee on the happening of any of the events specified
therein. The tenant, by repudiation of the relationship of landlord-
tenant, exposes himself to the risk of forfeiting his lease and giving a
right to the lessor to determine the lease. The repudiation, however, must
be clear and unequivocal and anterior to the issuance of the notice
determining the lease . Where there was an unequivocal admission of the
earlier relationship of landlord-tenant, but denial in the subsequent
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litigation, the tenant forfeits its right to lease.
80. However, in the case of Sada Ram & Ors. vs. Gajjan Shiama
MANU/PH/0080/1970, AIR 1970 P&H 511; Shiv Parshad vs. Smt. Shila
Rani MANU/HP/0009/1974, AIR 1974 HP 22, it has been held that the
proposition that a denial of title in the Written Statement cannot be taken
advantage of in that Suit, but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent
Suit to be filed by the landlord, would only lead to unnecessary multiplicity
of legal proceedings as the landlord would then be obliged to file a second
suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture, entailed by the
tenants‟ denial of his character as a tenant in the Written Statement.
81. In Sheikh Miadhar vs. Rajani Kanta Roy, MANU/WB/0481/1909, 5
Ind. Cas. 708, more light was thrown on this aspect, wherein it was held that
where in a suit for rent the Defendant denies the Plaintiff‟s title and claims
to hold under a third party, the Defendant can be, in a Suit for ejectment by
the landlord, debarred from pleading his tenancy and claiming protection
of possession on that ground. It was further observed that this principle
was embodied in Section 111(g) TPA , wherein one of the grounds for
forfeiture, was to set up a title in the third person or in himself.
82. In the case of Arjunlal Bhatt Mall Gothani and Ors. vs. Girish
Chandra Dutta and Ors ., MANU/SC/0326/1973, AIR 1973 SC 2256,
similar plea of having acquired ownership by virtue of documents of
purchase was raised by the tenant, who further claimed that because of this
Agreement, the old relationship of landlord and tenant, had come to any end.
It was held that the rights of the parties had to be worked out, on the basis of
this subsequent Agreement . It was obvious that when such Agreements
stood cancelled, the landlord would automatically be entitled to
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possession, under the terms of the Agreement.
83. In the present case, the Defendant No. 1 has consistently set up a
claim of ownership in him, based on an alleged Pagri payment and rent
receipts, while simultaneously denying the title of the Plaintiff, who holds a
valid GPA from the legal heirs of the original allottee. This act of claiming
an independent title and repudiating the landlord-tenant relationship
constitutes a clear and unequivocal disclaimer of his status as a lessee.
Such a disclaimer results in the forfeiture of the lease under Section
111(g)(2) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Having renounced the
character of his possession as that of a tenant, the Respondent No. 1 is no
longer entitled to the protection of tenancy under DRC Act , and the
Plaintiff is consequently entitled to determine the lease and seek
recovery of possession.
84. In view of the foregoing discussion, the status of the Plaintiff as
landlord by virtue of GPA dated 20.10.2015 Ex. PW-1/4, is established.
Simultaneously, by claiming ownership, the forfeiture of tenancy has been
incurred by Defendant No. 1 under Section 111(g)(2) of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882. Hence, the Suit is hereby, decreed for Possession and
Permanent injunction. The Defendant/Respondent No. 1 is directed to
hand over the possession, and is further restrained from creating any third-
party interest in the Suit Property.
Conclusion:
85. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the Impugned Judgement dated
10.10.2025 of learned District Judge is hereby, set aside and the Suit of the
Plaintiff for possession in respect of suit property is decreed. Further,
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relief of Permanent Injunction is granted and the Respondent No.1 is
restrained from creating third-party rights in the Suit Property.
86. The Appeal is allowed and the Suit of the Plaintiff/Appellant is
decreed. The pending Application(s) are disposed of, accordingly.


(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE
APRIL 20, 2026
N
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ARORA
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