DHAWAL KHULLAR vs STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
- Court
- Uttarakhand High Court
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HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Criminal Misc Application No. 946 of 2024
th
30 October, 2026
Dhawal Khullar and Another
……….Applicants
Versus
State Of Uttarakhand and Others
……….Respondents
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Presence:-
Ms. Manisha Bhandari, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Shaswat
Siddhant and Mr. Pritish Arya, learned counsel for the applicants.
Mr. Pratiroop Pandey, learned A.G.A. for the State.
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Hon’ble Mr. Alok Mahra, J. (Oral)
By means of the present Criminal
Miscellaneous Application, instituted under Section 528
of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
(hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’), the applicants have
assailed the charge-sheet dated 02.05.2024, the
summoning order dated 22.11.2024 passed by the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pauri Garhwal, in
Criminal Case No.792 of 2024, State Vs. Siddhartha
Bagri and Others, arising out of Case Crime/F.I.R.
No.01 of 2024 dated 09.01.2024, under Section 304-A of
the Indian Penal Code, as well as the entire
consequential proceedings of the aforesaid criminal
case.
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2. Learned senior counsel for the applicants
would submit that M/s Pravaig Dynamics Private
Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Company’) is a
company incorporated under the Companies Act, having
its registered office at New Delhi and corporate office at
Bengaluru. The Company is engaged in the development
and manufacture of electric vehicles, batteries, artificial
intelligence-based technologies and special-purpose
vehicles for various applications, including vehicles
designed for use in enclosed and demarcated areas such
as shipyards, airports, safari parks, national parks and
reserved forests; that, applicant no.1 is the Director and
Chief Technical Officer, whereas applicant no.2 is the
Director and Chief Executive Officer of the Company.
3. Learned senior counsel would further submit
that the present proceedings emanate from an
unfortunate accident dated 08.01.2024 at Rajaji Tiger
Reserve, Uttarakhand, in which six persons lost their
lives; that, the F.I.R. was lodged on 09.01.2024 by
respondent no.3, Rajesh Chandra Joshi, Forest Range
Officer, Rajaji Tiger Reserve, at Police Station
Laxmanjhula, District Pauri Garhwal. It is contended
that the Company had supplied an Interceptor Safari
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AWD Electric Vehicle, being a Special Purpose Vehicle
(SPV), for trial and evaluation pursuant to an
arrangement between the Company, M/s Aska
Equipment Private Limited and the Forest Department,
Government of Uttarakhand; that, the demonstration
and trial of the vehicle were being conducted under the
supervision of the concerned Forest Department
officials; that, the initial trial conducted in the morning
was successful; however, during a subsequent ride, ten
persons were permitted to board the vehicle,
notwithstanding its seating capacity of 7+1 persons. It is
further contended that the driver had cautioned the
occupants against overloading but was allegedly
persuaded to accelerate the vehicle, resulting in loss of
control and the unfortunate accident. Learned senior
counsel would also refer to the CCTV footage installed in
the vehicle, which, according to the applicants, depicts
the driver informing the occupants about the
acceleration capacity of the vehicle and thereafter
increasing its speed.
4. Learned senior counsel would submit that
neither of the applicants was present at the place of
occurrence nor was either of them involved in
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conducting the field trials or demonstration of the
vehicle; that, the entire exercise was allegedly under the
supervision and control of the Forest Department
officials and representatives of M/s Aska Equipment
Private Limited. It is contended that the applicants
cannot be subjected to criminal prosecution merely on
account of their respective positions as Director/Chief
Technical Officer and Director/Chief Executive Officer of
the manufacturing company, particularly when the
prosecution has not attributed any specific act,
omission, knowledge or culpable negligence to either of
them in relation to the alleged occurrence. She would
further submit that the applicants duly cooperated with
the investigation and responded to the notices issued
under Sections 91 and 160 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973; that, they appeared before the
Investigating Officer on 17.01.2024 and 08.02.2024 and
furnished the requisite documents and explanations;
that, the applicant no.2 also appeared before the
Investigating Officer on 24.04.2024, whereupon his
statement was recorded; that, despite such cooperation
and the material furnished by them, the Investigating
Officer proceeded to submit the charge-sheet under
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Sections 279, 304-A and 338 IPC, without properly
considering the explanations and documents submitted
by the applicants. It is contended that neither the F.I.R.
nor the material collected during investigation discloses
any specific act of rashness or negligence attributable to
the applicants.
5. Learned senior counsel would submit that the
vehicle in question was a Special Purpose Vehicle
manufactured for field trials and evaluation and was not
a mass-production vehicle intended for ordinary use on
public roads; that, the Company had obtained a valid
trade certificate under the applicable provisions of the
Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, for developmental
testing, trials and demonstrations. It is further
contended that the vehicle was manufactured in
accordance with the applicable safety and visibility
standards and incorporated components procured from
reputed manufacturers; that, the test engineer deputed
to operate the vehicle was duly trained and authorised
for the purpose, thus, according to the applicants,
neither any manufacturing defect nor any culpable act
or omission on their part has been established in
connection with the accident.
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6. Learned senior counsel would further submit
that even if the allegations contained in the F.I.R. and
the charge-sheet are accepted at their face value, the
essential ingredients of the offences punishable under
Sections 279, 304-A and 338 IPC are not made out
against the applicants; that, to attract Section 279 IPC,
the prosecution must establish that the accused was
driving a vehicle on a public way in a rash or negligent
manner so as to endanger human life or cause hurt or
injury, however, neither of the applicants was driving
the vehicle or was present at the place of occurrence.
Similarly, for attracting Section 304-A IPC, the death
must be the direct and proximate consequence of a rash
or negligent act attributable to the accused, and such
act must be the causa causans of the occurrence rather
than merely a remote or incidental cause; that, mere
association with, ownership of or management of the
manufacturing company cannot, by itself, constitute the
basis for fastening criminal liability upon its Directors
for an accident involving a vehicle manufactured by the
Company.
7. Learned senior counsel would also submit
that criminal liability cannot be fastened upon the
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Directors or senior managerial personnel of a company
merely by virtue of their official designations, in the
absence of specific allegations disclosing their individual
involvement and culpable conduct. In support of the
aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil Bharti
Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation , (2015) 4 SCC
609, wherein it has been held that criminal liability is
primarily personal and that vicarious criminal liability
cannot be imposed unless the statute specifically
provides for the same. Reliance has also been placed
upon Keki Hormusji Gharda v. Mehervan Rustom Irani ,
(2009) 6 SCC 475; Shiv Kumar Jatia v. State (NCT of
Delhi) , (2019) 17 SCC 193; and M/s Thermax Ltd. v. K.M.
Johny
, (2011) 13 SCC 412, to contend that the Directors
and senior managerial personnel cannot be prosecuted
merely on account of their positions in the company,
unless the allegations and material disclose their
individual role in the commission of the alleged offence.
She would further submit that the principles enunciated
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Brahm Dass v. State of
Himachal Pradesh , (2009) 7 SCC 353, require the
prosecution to establish the necessary element of
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rashness or negligence for attracting Sections 279 and
304-A IPC; that, in the present case, no such act or
omission has been attributed to the applicants. It is
contended that the accident occurred during a
subsequent trial ride when the vehicle was allegedly
carrying passengers beyond its prescribed seating
capacity and was being driven at an excessive speed;
that, the applicants had neither operational control over
the vehicle at the relevant time nor any role in the
manner in which the driver chose to operate it.
8. Learned senior counsel would lastly submit
that the applicants had earlier approached this Court by
filing WPCRL No.462 of 2024, seeking quashing of F.I.R.
No.01 of 2024, however, during the pendency of the said
petition, the charge-sheet came to be submitted. It is
contended that neither the F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet
discloses the essential ingredients of the alleged offences
against the applicants and that the learned court below,
while passing the impugned summoning order, failed to
consider the absence of any specific role or culpable act
attributable to them; that, consequently, continuation of
the criminal proceedings against the applicants would
amount to an abuse of the process of law. It is,
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therefore, prayed that the impugned charge-sheet,
summoning order and all consequential proceedings,
insofar as they relate to the applicants, be quashed.
9. Per contra , learned State counsel would
submit that during the course of investigation, it was
revealed that the Interceptor vehicle had been brought
to Rajaji National Park on 08.01.2024 for trial and had
also undergone trials at other places, including Tadoba
National Park, Maharashtra. However, the Company had
not received any purchase order for the said vehicle. It is
contended that the vehicle was merely a prototype,
which was neither fully developed nor certified by any
Government-authorised institution. Learned State
counsel would further submit that on the date of the
incident, the vehicle was initially driven by the Forest
Department officials in the Cheela forest area,
whereafter the Mechanical Engineer-cum-Driver took
ten forest officials/employees of the Company for a trial
run on Cheela Road, despite being aware that the
vehicle had a seating capacity of only eight persons;
that, during the said trial, the vehicle met with an
accident near Cheela Barrage, resulting in the death of
six persons.
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10. He would further submit that the CCTV
footage recorded by the cameras installed in the vehicle
revealed that the driver himself informed the occupants
about its capacity to attain a speed of 100 kmph within
four seconds and, at one point, accelerated the vehicle,
whereafter it went out of control and met with the
accident. He would also submit that no material was
collected during investigation to indicate that the Forest
Department officials had compelled the driver either to
carry passengers beyond the prescribed seating capacity
or to increase the speed of the vehicle. Learned State
counsel would further submit that the investigation
revealed that the Company had failed to ensure that the
trial of the prototype vehicle was conducted in
accordance with the requisite safety norms and
standards; that, the vehicle was allegedly not fully
equipped with essential safety features and had not
been certified by any Government-authorised
institution; that, no specialised training had been
imparted to the driver/Mechanical Engineer by any
recognised institution.
11. Learned State counsel would also refer to the
joint technical inspection conducted on 09.01.2024 by
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the concerned transport authorities, wherein it was
allegedly found that the rear seats of the vehicle were
not fitted with seat belts, no airbags had been installed
and all four windows were of a simple design fitted with
strips; that, these deficiencies were recorded in the joint
inspection report. He would further submit that the
statements of the applicants recorded during
investigation also disclosed that necessary safety
instructions had not been imparted to the
driver/Mechanical Engineer; that, applicant no.2 is
stated to have acknowledged that the presence of seat
belts could potentially have saved the lives of the
deceased; that, on the basis of the material collected
during investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted
the charge-sheet against the applicants,; that, learned
Magistrate, upon considering the case diary and the
material available on record, rightly found sufficient
grounds to proceed against the applicants and passed
the impugned cognizance and summoning order.
Therefore, no interference by this Court is warranted.
12. In response thereto, learned senior counsel
for the applicants would submit that the driver, being a
technically qualified person who had previously
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conducted trials and demonstrations of the subject
vehicle, was fully aware that the SPV had a seating
capacity of 7+1 persons. It is contended that neither of
the applicants had instructed or authorised the driver to
permit ten persons to board the vehicle or to drive it at
an excessive speed of 100 kmph, allegedly resulting in
the accident dated 08.01.2024. Learned senior counsel
would further submit that even paragraph 11 of the
counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents
indicates that the driver himself permitted persons
beyond the prescribed seating capacity to board the
vehicle and was aware of its technical limitations; that,
despite such knowledge, the driver proceeded to operate
the vehicle, which subsequently went out of control and
met with the accident. Thus, according to the
applicants, the alleged acts or omissions are attributable
to the individual conduct of the driver, and no criminal
liability can be fastened upon the applicants in the
absence of specific allegations or material demonstrating
their individual involvement or culpable negligence.
13. Learned senior counsel would further submit
that the applicants had no direct connection with or
involvement in the unfortunate occurrence. Reference is
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also made to a Facebook livestream video recorded by a
Forest Department official, which allegedly depicts the
representatives of ASKA and the Forest Department
positioned at the rear and outside the vehicle at the
relevant time. She would further submit that the
respondents have incorrectly proceeded on the
assumption that the subject Interceptor Safari AWD SPV
vehicle was equipped with conventional doors and
windows, whereas, in fact, like other forest safari
vehicles, it was not provided with conventional doors
and windows. It is contended that the vehicle had
successfully undergone several trials and
demonstrations, including demonstrations conducted by
the Head of Forest Force (HoFF) and the Director
14. Learned senior counsel would further submit
that the subject vehicle was a Special Purpose Vehicle
designed for a specific purpose and was not intended for
use as an ordinary road vehicle. On this basis, it is
contended that the requirements of certification by the
Automotive Research Association of India (ARAI) under
the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, were not
applicable to the vehicle; that, the allegation that the
driver was untrained or inexperienced has also been
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disputed; that, the driver-cum-engineer had successfully
conducted several demonstrations and trials of the very
same vehicle and possessed adequate technical
knowledge and practical experience; that, he had also
received training as a racing driver and team engineer
from a reputed university and had experience in driving
and testing the vehicle for various agencies, including
the Indian Army.
15. Learned senior counsel would further submit
that the statements attributed to applicant no.2 have
been misquoted and misconstrued by the investigating
agency and do not support the allegations levelled
against the applicants. It is contended that the vehicle
was being used for a trial and demonstration during a
jungle safari and that the allegations relating to the
absence of seat belts and airbags have been incorrectly
interpreted by the respondents. Learned senior counsel
would, therefore, submit that the applicants have been
charge-sheeted without any cogent material and without
proper application of mind; that, the prosecution case,
according to the applicants, proceeds on an
impermissible assumption of vicarious criminal liability,
notwithstanding the absence of any statutory provision
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or specific material establishing their individual role,
knowledge or culpable conduct. It is further contended
that the investigation has failed to examine the
respective roles and responsibilities of the persons
actually involved in operating and supervising the trial
of the vehicle and has erroneously sought to attribute
criminal responsibility to the applicants merely on
account of their association with the Company.
Accordingly, the impugned charge-sheet, summoning
order and consequential proceedings, insofar as they
relate to the applicants, deserve to be quashed.
16. Heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the material available on record.
17. Having considered the rival submissions and
upon careful examination of the material available on
record, this Court finds that the controversy requiring
consideration is whether the applicants, merely by
virtue of being Directors and senior managerial
personnel of the Company, can be prosecuted for the
alleged offences under Sections 279, 304-A and 338 IPC,
in the absence of specific allegations and material
disclosing their individual role and culpable negligence
in relation to the accident.
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18. At the outset, it is a settled principle of
criminal jurisprudence that criminal liability is
essentially personal in nature. The mere fact that a
person holds the position of Director or occupies a
senior managerial position in a company does not, by
itself, make such person criminally liable for every act or
omission attributable to the company or its employees.
Unless a statute expressly creates vicarious criminal
liability, the prosecution must disclose the individual
role of the person sought to be prosecuted and the
requisite ingredients of the alleged offence. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of
Investigation , (2015) 4 SCC 609, has held that the
liability of a Director cannot be presumed merely on
account of the office held by him and that, in the
absence of a statutory provision creating vicarious
liability, the prosecution must establish the requisite
involvement and criminal intent of such individual. The
aforesaid principle has also been reiterated in Keki
Hormusji Gharda v. Mehervan Rustom Irani , (2009) 6
SCC 475, and Shiv Kumar Jatia v. State (NCT of Delhi) ,
(2019) 17 SCC 193.
19. So far as the offence punishable under
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Section 304-A IPC is concerned, the prosecution is
required to establish that the death was caused by a
rash or negligent act of the accused, which did not
amount to culpable homicide. The alleged act must be
the direct and proximate cause of death and not merely
a remote or incidental circumstance. Mere proof of an
unfortunate accident resulting in loss of human lives is
not sufficient to establish criminal negligence. There
must be material indicating such a degree of rashness
or negligence as would attract criminal liability.
Similarly, the essential ingredients of Sections 279 and
338 IPC must be independently satisfied before an
accused can be subjected to prosecution under those
provisions. In Brahm Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh ,
(2009) 7 SCC 353, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
reiterated the necessity of establishing rashness or
negligence for attracting the aforesaid penal provisions.
19. In the present case, the prosecution primarily
relies upon the alleged overloading of the vehicle, its
acceleration during the trial run, the absence of certain
safety features and the alleged lack of adequate training
of the driver. However, these circumstances, even if
taken into consideration at this stage, do not, by
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themselves, establish the individual criminal culpability
of the applicants. The material placed before this Court
does not disclose any specific instruction issued by
either applicant to the driver to carry passengers beyond
the prescribed seating capacity or to drive the vehicle at
an excessive speed. Nor has any specific material been
brought to the notice of this Court demonstrating that
either applicant was present at the place of occurrence
or exercised operational control over the vehicle at the
relevant time.
20. It is also relevant that the driver-cum-
engineer was the person actually operating the vehicle
during the trial run. The rival submissions indicate that
he had knowledge of the seating capacity and technical
features of the vehicle. The applicants contend that the
driver himself permitted the occupants beyond the
prescribed seating capacity and accelerated the vehicle.
On the other hand, the State alleges that the Company
failed to ensure adequate safety arrangements and
proper training. However, the material referred to by the
prosecution, as noticed above, does not sufficiently
disclose the specific act or omission of either applicants
which can be said to constitute the proximate cause of
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the accident or establish the requisite criminal
negligence on their part.
21. This Court is conscious of the seriousness of
the incident, in which six valuable human lives were
lost. However, the gravity of the consequences of an
accident, by itself, cannot be a substitute for
establishing the essential ingredients of a criminal
offence against a particular accused. Criminal
prosecution cannot be sustained merely on the basis of
the designation or managerial position held by an
individual in a company. The prosecution must disclose
some specific act, omission or conduct attributable to
such individual, which, prima facie, satisfies the
ingredients of the offence alleged against him.
22. It is true that at the stage of taking
cognizance and issuing summons, the Court is not
required to undertake a meticulous examination of the
evidence or conduct a mini-trial. Nevertheless, the
material collected during investigation must disclose the
commission of an offence and provide sufficient grounds
for proceeding against the person summoned. In the
present case, even upon accepting the prosecution
allegations and the material relied upon by the
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investigating agency at their face value, the essential
link between the alleged acts or omissions of the
applicants and the accident has not been demonstrated.
The mere fact that the applicants were Directors of the
Company responsible for manufacturing the vehicle
cannot, in the absence of specific allegations and
supporting material establishing their individual
culpable conduct, furnish a sufficient basis for
subjecting them to criminal prosecution.
23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court
is of the considered opinion that the continuation of
criminal proceedings against the applicants, in the
absence of material disclosing their individual criminal
liability and the essential ingredients of the alleged
offences, would amount to an abuse of the process of
the Court. The present case, therefore, warrants exercise
of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section
528 BNSS to secure the ends of justice.
24. Accordingly, the present Criminal
Miscellaneous Application is allowed. The charge-sheet
dated 02.05.2024, the summoning order dated
22.11.2024 passed by the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Pauri Garhwal, in Criminal Case No.792 of
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2024, State Vs. Siddhartha Bagri and Others, and the
entire consequential proceedings of the aforesaid
criminal case, insofar as they relate to the present
applicants, are hereby quashed.
25. It is clarified that the observations made
hereinabove are confined to the consideration of the
case of the present applicants and shall not prejudice
the proceedings, if any, against the other accused
persons.
26. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed
of accordingly.
(ALOK MAHRA,J.)
30.10.2026
Mamta
MA
MTA
RANI
Digitally signed by MAMTA
RANI
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT
OF UTTARAKHAND,
ou=HIGH COURT OF
UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=6a812005bebfcf46
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9b, postalCode=263001,
st=Uttarakhand,
serialNumber=5de1751a4f
1d9cabfd54852c9e68911ca
8b66dd26690a191648ab5d
8dd004ef0, cn=MAMTA
RANI
Date: 2026.11.05 17:17:45
+05'30'
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