Ram Ugrah Sharma vs Kanchan Mala

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

st
% Reserved on: 21 January, 2026
th
Pronounced on: 12 March, 2026

+ RFA 68/2026 & CM APPL. NOS. 4172/2026,
4173/2026, 4174/2026

RAM UGRAH SHARMA .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Bhardwaj S. Iyengar, Advocate.

versus

KANCHAN MALA .....Respondent
Through: None

CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

J U D G M E N T

NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.

CM APPL. 4174/2026 (delay of 36 days in refiling)
1. An Application has been filed by the Appellant seeking condonation of
delay of 36 days in re-filing the Appeal.
2. For the reasons stated in the Application, the delay of 36 days in re-filing
the Appeal, is condoned.
3. The Application is disposed of, accordingly.
CM APPL. 4173/2026 (for enlargement of time to deposit Court fees)
4. The present application has been filed by the Appellant seeking
enlargement of time to deposit the court fee amounting to ₹1,00,084/-. At the
outset, it is noticed that the requisite court fee on the present appeal has not been
Signature Not Verified
RFA 68/2026 Page 1 of 9

Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
Signing Date:13.03.2026
13:07:31

fully paid. The Registry shall compute the deficit court fee, if any, and ensure
that the same is recovered from the appellant. Application is disposed of
accordingly with the above direction.
RFA 68/2026 & CM NO.4172/2026
5. This Regular First Appeal under Section 96 read withOrder XLI Rule 1of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) has been
preferred by the Appellant challenging the Judgment and decree dated
25.08.2025 of the learned District Judge-04, New Delhi, whereby the Suit filed
by the Appellant seeking damages on account of malicious prosecution , was
dismissed as being premature.
6. The genesis of the present Appeal lies in an Application filed by the
Respondent under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC seeking the rejection of the Plaint.
The learned District Judge vide Impugned Order dated 25.08.2025, allowed the
Application, holding that the suit was premature , as an Appeal against the
Appellant’s acquittal in the criminal case, was pending adjudication before the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana.
7. Aggrieved thereby, the Appellant has preferred the present appeal.
8. The Appellant had filed a Suit bearing CS DJ ADJ 51/2022, seeking
damages in the sum of Rs. 1,00,00,000/-, on account of malicious prosecution in
FIR No. 216/2017 under Sections 323, 376, 452 and 506 Indian Penal Code,
1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) .
9. The averments made in the Suit were that Appellant is a senior decorated
officer of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), having served the nation
for more than three decades with an unblemished service record and having
received several commendations, appreciation letters and rewards, during the
course of his service.
10. According to the Appellant, the Respondent lodged a complaint at Police
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RFA 68/2026 Page 2 of 9

Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
Signing Date:13.03.2026
13:07:31

Station Sector-9A, Gurugram on 30.09.2017, alleging that at about 9:30 AM on
the same day, the Appellant/Plaintiff had forcibly entered her residence, used
abusive language, physically assaulted her and attempted to commit rape upon
her. On the basis of the said complaint, FIR No. 216/2017 was registered
against the Appellant on the same day for offences punishable under Sections
323, 376, 452 and 506 of the IPC.
11. The Appellant was arrested on 06.10.2017 and, as stated by him, was
subjected tocustodial interrogation for about 6 daysand thereafter, remanded to
judicial custody for approximately 28 days.
12. It is the case of the Appellant that consequent to the said Complaint, he
was placed under deemed suspension from service, with effect from 06.10.2017
to 02.09.2020, i.e. for approximately three years, and that the same had serious
repercussions on his professional standing, career prospects and reputation.
13. During the period of suspension, Appellant’s place of posting was
changed from Delhi to Hyderabad vide Order dated 23.02.2018. Aggrieved
thereby, the Appellant filed Writ Petition being W.P.(C) No. 3584/2018 before
the Delhi High Court, wherein the operation of the said posting Order was
stayed, vide an Interim Order dated 16.05.2018. The Writ Petition was disposed
of vide Order dated 16.01.2019, directing that the interim protection would
continue till the conclusion of the cross-examination of the prosecutrix in the
criminal trial arising out of FIR No. 216/2017, with a further direction that the
Appellant would thereafter, report to the transferred posting.
14. He subsequently preferred a SLP (C) No. 14203/2019 in the Supreme
Court, against the Order dated 16.01.2019, which was disposed of vide Order
dated 14.07.2020 directing the Union of India, to re-examine the issue of his
transfer.
15. The criminal case was tried before the Court of the learned Additional
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RFA 68/2026 Page 3 of 9

Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
Signing Date:13.03.2026
13:07:31

Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Gurugram and vide Judgment dated
04.10.2019, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove the offences
alleged against him beyond reasonable doubt, and acquitted the Appellant of all
charges.
16. The Government of Haryana subsequently examined the matter and by a
communication dated 27.02.2020, decided not to prefer an Appeal, against the
Order of acquittal. According to the Appellant, this decision further reinforced
his position regarding the falsity of the allegations levelled against him.
17. However, the Respondent independently preferred an Appeal before the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana, challenging the Appellant’s acquittal in the
criminal case.
18. The Appellant made several Representations to the concerned authorities,
seeking revocation of his suspension. Ultimately, through Directorate Order No.
D-IX-27/2017-CRC dated 03.09.2020, his suspension was revoked and the
entire period from 06.10.2017 to 02.09.2020 was treated as “period spent on
duty” for all purpose.
19. The Appellant contends that the Complaint lodged by the Respondent,
was false and malicious, causing serious injury to his reputation, career and
personal life, while also resulting in financial loss and mental trauma. He in
support of his allegation of mala fide conduct, further points to the
Respondent’s involvement in multiple disputes.
20. On the basis of the aforesaid circumstances, the Appellant instituted a
Suit CS OJ ADJ 51/2022for seeking compensation of ₹1,00,00,000/- for the
mental agony, social stigma, financial loss, and irreparable damage to his
personal and professional reputation due to malicious prosecution, before the
learned District Judge.
21. During the pendency of the Suit, the Respondent filed an Application
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RFA 68/2026 Page 4 of 9

Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
Signing Date:13.03.2026
13:07:31

under Order VII Rule 11 CPC contending that the Suit was premature,
inasmuch as a criminal Appeal against the Appellant’s acquittal, had been
preferred before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana and was pending
adjudication.
22. By the Impugned Order dated 25.08.2025 , the learned District Judge
relied upon the decision of this Hon'ble Court in Trilok Chand Bansal vs.
Bharat Bhushan Bansal CS (OS) 470/2016, decided on 23.03.2017 and allowed
the Application and rejected the plaint, holding that the suit was premature, in
view of the pendency of the Appeal against acquittal and was therefore, barred
by law at this stage.
23. Aggrieved, the Appellant has challenged the impugned Order primarily
on the ground that the learned District Judge has misconstrued the scope of
Article 74 of the Limitation Act, 1963 . It is contended that the said provision
clearly stipulates that a Suit for compensation for malicious prosecution, must
be filed within one year from the date “when the plaintiff is acquitted or the
prosecution is otherwise terminated.” According to the Appellant, the language
of the provision is plain and does not require that the acquittal must attain
finality upon exhaustion of appellate remedies.
24. It is further submitted that the learned District Judge erred in holding that
the prosecution had not “terminated” in favour of the Appellant, merely
because an Appeal against the acquittal, is pending before the High Court of
Punjab & Haryana. The submission of the Appellant is that the statute does not
use the expression “finally acquitted”. The pendency of an Appeal, therefore,
does not postpone the accrual of the cause of action.
25. The Appellant also contends that there exists divergence of judicial
opinion on the interpretation of Article 74 of the Limitation Act . Reliance is
placed upon certain decisions of the Bombay High Court, including Malabai
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RFA 68/2026 Page 5 of 9

Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
Signing Date:13.03.2026
13:07:31

w/o Pralhad Bhoyar v. Sumanbai w/o Narayanrao Dubey , 2007(1) ALL MR
102 (Bom) and Nilkanth Baliram Sawarkar v. Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale,
2019(2) Mh.L.J. 265(Bom), to contend that limitation for filing a Suit for
malicious prosecution, would commence from the date of acquittal.
26. It is lastly urged that if the view adopted by the learned District Judge is
sustained, an acquitted person may be compelled to await the outcome of
appellate or revisional proceedings for several years, or even decades before
instituting a Civil Suit for damages. In the present case, the Appeal against
acquittal has been preferred by the Respondent–Complainant and not by the
State, and the pendency of such Appeal, cannot preclude the Appellant from
pursuing his civil remedy.
Submissions heard and record perused.

27. Essentially, the controversy arising in the present Appeal pertains to the
question of whether a Suit seeking damages for malicious prosecution, can be
instituted immediately upon the acquittal of the Appellant by the Trial Court, or
whether such cause of action would arise only after the acquittal attains finality,
i.e. upon the disposal of any Appeal preferred against the said Judgment.
28. The relevant facts are not in dispute. FIR No. 216/2017 was lodged on
30.09.2017 against the Appellant. Consequent thereto, the Appellant was
arrested, subjected to custodial interrogation and placed under deemed
suspension from service from 06.10.2017 until 02.09.2020, which period was
subsequently treated as time spent on duty. The criminal proceedings ultimately
culminated in the acquittal of the Appellant, by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge (Fast Track Court), Gurugram, vide Judgment dated 04.10.2019.
29. It is also undisputed that the Respondent/Complainant has preferred an
Appeal against the said Judgment of acquittal before the High Court of Punjab
& Haryana, which remains pending adjudication. The question which
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RFA 68/2026 Page 6 of 9

Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
Signing Date:13.03.2026
13:07:31

therefore, arises is whether the Appellant could maintain a Civil Suit for
damages for malicious prosecution, notwithstanding the pendency of the
said Appeal.
30. The legal position in this regard is well settled. Under Article 74 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, a Suit for compensation for malicious prosecution is
required to be instituted within one year from the date “when the plaintiff is
acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise, terminated.” The provision thus,
contemplates that the criminal proceedings must terminate in favour of the
plaintiff, before a claim for damages for malicious prosecution can be
maintained.
31. The necessity of finality of criminal proceedings in such cases, has been
recognized by this Court in Laxmi Narayan Soni v. Roop Chand Soni, 99 (2002)
DLT 186, whereit was held that the cause of action for a Suit for damages for
malicious prosecution arises only when the Order of acquittal attains finality ,
and not merely upon the trial court’s acquittal, while Appellate proceedings are
pending.
32. A similar view was taken in Trilok Chand Bansal (Supra) , wherein it was
observed that a Suit for damages for malicious prosecution instituted during the
pendency of an Appeal against acquittal would be premature , as the
prosecution cannot be said to have finally terminated in favour of the Plaintiff,
until the acquittal attains finality.
33. In this context, the scope of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 also assumes relevance. The provision empowers the Court to
reject a Plaint where the claim disclosed therein is barred by law or is otherwise
palpably, untenable. Where the cause of action itself is incomplete , owing to
the absence of final termination of the criminal proceedings, the Suit would not
be maintainable.
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RFA 68/2026 Page 7 of 9

Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
Signing Date:13.03.2026
13:07:31

34. Applying the above principles to the present case, although the Appellant
has been acquitted by the Trial Court, the said acquittal is presently the subject
matter of an Appeal pending before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. The
criminal proceedings, therefore, cannot be said to have attained finality.
35. The Appellant has contended that Article 74 of the Limitation Act refers
merely to the date of Acquittal and does not require that such Acquittal must
attain finality upon exhaustion of appellate remedies. Reliance has been placed
on several decisions of the Bombay High Court, including Malabai w/o Pralhad
Bhoyar (Supra) , and Nilkanth Baliram Sawarkar (Supra) , to argue that the
period of limitation commences from the date of acquittal by the Trial Court
and is not dependent upon the outcome of any Appellate proceedings.
36. While this Court has considered the said submissions, the issue in the
present case is not merely one of computation of limitation, but rather the
maintainability of the Civil claim itself. A Suit for malicious prosecution
inherently rests upon the premise that the criminal proceedings have
conclusively terminated in favour of the plaintiff. Where an Appeal against the
acquittal is pending, whether preferred by the Complainant or the State, the
possibility of reversal of the acquittal, cannot be ruled out.
37. Entertaining a civil claim for damages at such a stage would therefore, be
premature and may lead to inconsistent findings, the civil claim being
intrinsically linked to the final outcome of the criminal proceedings. If the
Appellate court were to interfere with the acquittal, the very foundation of the
Appellant’s claim for damages for malicious prosecution, could stand materially
altered.
38. The Appellant has also urged that the pendency of the Criminal Appeal
has resulted in prolonged hardship, including suspension from service,
reputational harm and mental distress. While this Court does not disregard the
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Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
Signing Date:13.03.2026
13:07:31

consequences allegedly suffered by the Appellant, such considerations cannot
override the settled legal requirement that the criminal proceedings must
terminate finally in favour of the plaintiff, before a civil claim for malicious
prosecution, can be maintained.
39. It is also clarified that this Court has expressed no opinion on the merits
of Appellant’s claim or on the correctness of the judgment of acquittal passed
by the trial court, which continues to remain under consideration before the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana.
40. An acquittal which is under challenge in Appellate proceedings, cannot
be treated as a final termination of the prosecution for the purposes of
maintaining a claim for malicious prosecution.In the given circumstances, it
cannot be said that a cause of action had accrued to the Appellant, at the time of
institution of the Suit.
41. Consequently, this Court finds no infirmity in the view taken by the
learned District Judge in rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, on
the ground that the Suit was premature.
42. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in the present
Regular First Appeal, which is hereby, dismissed .
43. The aforesaid Appeal is disposed of in the above terms, along with
pending Applications, if any.

(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE
MARCH 12, 2026/RS


Signature Not Verified
RFA 68/2026 Page 9 of 9

Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
Signing Date:13.03.2026
13:07:31