Gyanender vs State

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: May 06, 2026
% Pronounced on: May 20, 2026

+ CRL.M.C. 5769/2022, CRL.M.A. 22715/2022

AISHVIR SINGH (INSPECTOR) .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Sr. Adv. and
Mr. Gautam Narayan, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Sukrit Seth, Mr. Sreedhar K.,
Ms. Radhika and Ms. Ananya
Sharma, Advocates
Mr. Ranbir Singh K., Mr. Ayush
Bhattal and Mr. Chaitanya Singh,
Advs.
Versus
STATE .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Satish Kumar, APP with Ms.
Upasna Bakshi, Mr. Aditya Vikram
Singh and Mr. Dinesh Kr.,
Advocates with SI Chetan Panwar,
PS: Chhawla
Mr. Sanjeev Bhandari, ASC with
Mr. Arjit Sharma, and Ms. Sakshi
Jha, Advs.

+ CRL.M.C. 1664/2024, CRL.M.A. 6403/2024

GYANENDER .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Ranbir Singh K., Mr. Ayush
Bhattal and Mr. Chaitanya Singh,
Advs.
Versus
STATE .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Satish Kumar, APP with Ms.
Upasna Bakshi, Mr. Aditya Vikram
Singh and Mr. Dinesh Kr.,
CRL.M.C. 5769/2022 & CRL.M.C. 1664/2024 Page 1 of 10

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:BABLOO SHAH
Signing Date:20.05.2026
04:58:38

Advocates with SI Chetan Panwar,
PS: Chhawla
Mr. Sanjeev Bhandari, ASC with
Mr. Arjit Sharma, and Ms. Sakshi
Jha, Advs)
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAURABH BANERJEE

J U D G M E N T

1. By virtue of the present petition(s) under Section 482 of the Code of
1
Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of
2
India, the petitioner(s) seek setting aside of the order dated 22.02.2022 ,
alongwith all the consequential order(s)/ direction(s) pursuant thereto,
passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTSC) (POCSO)-02,
3
Dwarka Courts, New Delhi .
2. Succinctly put , the present FIR was registered on 21.06.2019 under
4
Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 pursuant to the complaint
made by the complainant since her minor daughter ( victim ) was missing
from her residence. After due investigation, the victim was recovered and
her medical examination was conducted, whereafter her statements under
Sections 161 and 164 of the CrPC came to be recorded. Pursuant thereto,
Sections 328 and 376 IPC as also Section 4 of the Protection of Children
5
from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 were added in the matter.
3. It is the case of the petitioner(s) that the investigation was initially
conducted by ASI Ram Lal, who undertook steps for tracing the victim

1
Hereinafter “ Cr.P.C. ”
2
Hereinafter “ impugned order ”
3
Hereinafter “ ASJ ”
4
Hereinafter “ IPC ”
5
Hereinafter “ POCSO ”
CRL.M.C. 5769/2022 & CRL.M.C. 1664/2024 Page 2 of 10

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:BABLOO SHAH
Signing Date:20.05.2026
04:58:38

immediately upon registration of the FIR, including visits to various
locations, collection of relevant records and circulation of information
through appropriate channels. Upon recovery of the victim, the
investigation was thereafter transferred to other IO(s) from time to time. In
fact, the petitioner in CRL.M.C. 5769/2022 ( the then IO ) and the petitioner
in CRL.M.C. 1664/2024 ( the then Head Constable) , claim that they had
discharged their duties in accordance with law during their respective
tenures and substantial progress in investigation had already taken place
during the period of their postings.
4. More so, during the course of investigation, one of the co-accused
persons in the aforesaid FIR made an application seeking anticipatory bail
before the learned ASJ, which was although disposed vide order dated
22.02.2022, however, the learned ASJ called for the Status Report qua
cause/ reasons for delay of the investigation. The relevant portion of the
said order reads as under:-
“ … …The present FIR was registered on 21.06.2019.
However, the investigation has not been completed as yet.
IO SI Sapana has stated that she has been assigned this
case on 31.01.2022.

Let report in writing be called from previous IO and SHO
concerned as to why the investigation has not been
completed in the case till date. Previous IO and SHO are
directed to appear in person on the next date of hearing…
… ”
[Emphasis Supplied]

5. Thereafter, the learned ASJ, vide a subsequent order dated
12.04.2022, had recorded as under:-
“… … Accordingly, departmental enquiry has been ordered
against Inspector Aishvir Singh and Inspector Gyanender
CRL.M.C. 5769/2022 & CRL.M.C. 1664/2024 Page 3 of 10

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:BABLOO SHAH
Signing Date:20.05.2026
04:58:38

Rana, the then SHOs and the then MHCR PS Chhawla, i.e.
HC Sunil No. 1249/DW. Explanation of this officials
namely, Sh. Anto Alphone (IPS), Sh. Santosh Kumar Meena
(JPS) and Sh. Shankar Choudhary (IPS) who have remained
posted as DCP / Dwarka during the given period, is being
called for lack of supervision on their part. Further,
explanation notices are being issued to Sh. Kulbir Singh, the
then ACP / Chhawla and Sh. Manoj Kumar Meena, ACP /
Chhawla for their supervisory lapses into the matter. ”
[ Emphasis Supplied ]

6. As evident from above, despite disposal of the anticipatory bail
application, the learned ASJ continued to retain the proceedings on board
and proceeded to call for the Status Reports regarding the progress of
investigation in the aforesaid FIR. Thereafter, the learned ASJ had also
directed departmental enquiry as also explanations from the then concerned
SHO(s), previous SHO(s) and IO(s) regarding the alleged delay in
completion of investigation, directing their appearance before the Court,
and continued to monitor proceedings thereof against the petitioner(s) and
other Police Officials.
7. In the proceedings before this Court, the direction to conduct a
departmental enquiry qua the delay in investigation as also the directions to
expedite the same, were stayed by this Court vide order dated 16.12.2022.
8. Learned (senior) counsel for the petitioner(s) submitted that the
impugned order as also the consequential orders reflect judicial overreach,
since the learned ASJ had become ‘ functus officio ’ upon disposal of the
anticipatory bail application. Hence, he could not have continued the
proceedings for calling Status Reports, summoning Police Officials or
monitoring the disciplinary proceedings arsing therefrom.
9. The learned senior counsel further submitted that adverse
CRL.M.C. 5769/2022 & CRL.M.C. 1664/2024 Page 4 of 10

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:BABLOO SHAH
Signing Date:20.05.2026
04:58:38

observations and directions for initiation of departmental enquiry were
issued against the petitioner in CRL.M.C. 5769/2022 without affording him
an opportunity to be heard, making the said action a clear violation of the
principles of natural justice, especially as the impugned observations
virtually prejudged the conduct of the said petitioner rendering the
disciplinary enquiry a mere formality. Reliance was placed upon the
6
judgment(s) entitled State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar , Om
7 8
Prakash Chautala v. Kanwar Bhan , Teesta Setalvad v. State of Gujarat
9
and Dr. Dilip Kumar Deka v. State of Assam to contend that adverse/
disparaging remarks cannot be made against a person without affording an
opportunity of hearing, unless such remarks are necessary for adjudication
of the lis .
10. Learned (senior) counsel for the petitioner(s) also submitted that the
learned ASJ exceeded its jurisdiction in directing and monitoring
disciplinary proceedings against Police Officials, which fall within the
administrative domain of the Police Department. Reliance in this regard is
10
placed upon Pramod Kumar Jha v. State of Bihar , as also judgments
11
passed by Co-ordinate Benche(s) of this Court in State v. Yogender Singh
12
and Rakesh Chand v. State wherein it was held that though a Court may
express displeasure regarding lapses in investigation, it cannot direct
initiation or monitoring of disciplinary proceedings against Police Officials,

6
(2000) 8 SCC 382
7
(2014) 5 SCC 417
8
(2004) 10 SCC 88
9
(1996) 6 SCC 234
10
Criminal Appeal No.1092/2022
11
2015 SCC OnLine Del 14203
12
2015 SCC OnLine Del 14193
CRL.M.C. 5769/2022 & CRL.M.C. 1664/2024 Page 5 of 10

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:BABLOO SHAH
Signing Date:20.05.2026
04:58:38

as the same amounts to pre-judging their conduct and encroaching upon
administrative functions of the Police Department.
11. Learned APP for the State, supported all the aforesaid contentions
made by the learned (senior) counsel for the petitioner(s), and submitted
that the fate/ result/ outcome of the proceedings against the concerned
Police Officials was beyond jurisdiction of the learned ASJ and adverse
remarks passed, without affording an opportunity to be heard, is a blatant
violation of the principles of natural justice.
12. Based on the submissions made by the learned (senior) counsel for
the petitioner(s) as also the learned APP for the State as well as perusal of
the pleadings as also judgments on record, in a nutshell, the whole issue is
revolving around the scope/ extent of jurisdiction vested in the learned ASJ
under the concurrent circumstances, especially, in directing a departmental
enquiry and following up the same after disposal of the anticipatory bail
application.
13. It is well settled position of law that whilst considering an
application for grant of bail, the Court is only required to, based on the
records available before it and upon its satisfaction, take a decision qua
either grant and/ or dismissal thereof. The Court, under no circumstances,
is to spread its wing far beyond the reach by leaning towards something
which is not within its purview while adjudicating an application for grant
of bail. In effect, it is not the domain of the Court to pass directions/
strictures beyond its jurisdiction while considering an application for grant
13
of bail. In fact, the Hon’ble Apex Court in State v. M. Murugesan , while

13
(2020) 15 SCC 251
CRL.M.C. 5769/2022 & CRL.M.C. 1664/2024 Page 6 of 10

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:BABLOO SHAH
Signing Date:20.05.2026
04:58:38

considering the question regarding scope of jurisdiction of Court, while
considering an application for grant of bail, had categorically observed as
under:-
“ 11. We find that the learned Single Judge [M.
Murugesan v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 12414] has
collated data from the State and made it part of the order
after the decision [M. Murugesan v. State, Criminal
Original Petition No. 1618 of 2019, order dated 18-2-2019
(Mad)] of the bail application, as if the Court had the
inherent jurisdiction to pass any order under the guise of
improving the criminal justice system in the State. The
jurisdiction of the court under Section 439 of the Code is
limited to grant or not to grant bail pending trial. Even
though the object of the Hon'ble Judge was laudable but
the jurisdiction exercised was clearly erroneous . The effort
made by the Hon'ble Judge may be academically proper to
be presented at an appropriate forum but such directions
could not be issued under the colour of office of the court. ”
[ Emphasis Supplied ]


14. In light of the above, once in the present scenario, there is no dispute
that the learned ASJ had admittedly disposed of the application for grant of
anticipatory bail through a final order/ judgment, hence, all actions taken
thereafter by the said learned ASJ, were well beyond the permissible scope,
as once the proceedings before the learned ASJ stood concluded/ closed,
there was nothing surviving/ alive and/ or pending before him for whatever
reason(s). As such, for all purposes, the learned ASJ was ‘ functus officio ’
after disposing of the application for grant of anticipatory bail.
15. Therefore, directing departmental enquiry and following up the same
alongwith passing adverse remarks against the incumbents, and that too
without issuing any notice(s) upon the petitioner(s) calling for any response
from their side(s) was completely unwarranted and impermissible.
CRL.M.C. 5769/2022 & CRL.M.C. 1664/2024 Page 7 of 10

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:BABLOO SHAH
Signing Date:20.05.2026
04:58:38

16. In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mir Mohammad Omar
(supra) whilst addressing the issue of judicial overreach, had held as
under:-
“ 41. The Division Bench of the High Court instead of
dealing with the circumstances of the case and issues
involved made only some general comments and after
castigating the investigating officers in severe language
reached the final part of its judgment upholding the
conviction under Section 364/34 IPC and reduced the
sentence to the period which the convict had already
undergone. The Division Bench used unkind remarks against
the investigating officer saying "investigation of the case was
perfunctory and suffered from serious lacuna and
irregularity". Learned Judges of the Division Bench did not
make any reference to any particular omission or lacuna in
the investigation. Castigation of investigation unfortunately
seems to be a regular practice when the trial courts acquit
accused in criminal cases. In our perception it is almost
impossible to come across a single case wherein the
investigation was conducted completely flawless or
absolutely foolproof. The function of the criminal courts
should not be wasted in picking out the lapses in
investigation and by expressing unsavoury criticism against
investigating officers. If offenders are acquitted only on
account of flaws or defects in investigation, the cause of
criminal justice becomes the victim. Effort should be made
by courts to see that criminal justice is salvaged despite
such defects in investigation. Courts should bear in mind
the time constraints of the police officers in the present
system, the ill-equipped machinery they have to cope with,
and the traditional apathy of respectable persons to come
forward for giving evidence in criminal cases which are
realities the police force have to confront with while
conducting investigation in almost every case . Before an
investigating officer is imputed with castigating remarks the
courts should not overlook the fact that usually such an
officer is not heard in respect of such remarks made against
CRL.M.C. 5769/2022 & CRL.M.C. 1664/2024 Page 8 of 10

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:BABLOO SHAH
Signing Date:20.05.2026
04:58:38

them. In our view the court need make such deprecatory
remarks only when it is absolutely necessary in a particular
case, and that too by keeping in mind the broad realities
indicated above . ”
[ Emphasis Supplied ]

17. The aforesaid position has, time and again, been reiterated,
particularly in a judgment rendered by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
14
entitled Ajit Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) as well. The same has, in fact
been followed in various subsequent decisions, the most recent one being
15
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Nilesh Mishra and Ors. , which reads as under:-
“ 51. Consequently, the learned Trial Court while
considering the application for grant of bail cannot pass
directions/ strictures since the jurisdiction of the Court on
such an occasion is limited to either the grant or dismissal
of bail of the accused pending trial .

52. It is not in doubt that the orders of the Court must be
obeyed and complied with. Further, no individual shall be
allowed to diminish the authority and majesty of the Court.
However, scathing remarks tend to have lasting
consequences. It cannot be overlooked that every word
that forms part of the record/judicial order gains
permanence .

53. For this reason, strong criticism, vituperative remarks,
may have a devastating impact on the reputation and career
of the officials involved in the case. Such remarks, as has
been observed by Courts in a catena of decisions, are not
only unnecessary but also have serious consequences on
the careers of public servants. ”
[ Emphasis Supplied ]

18. In light of the above, although this Court appreciates the diligence/
concern qua the alleged issues of delay in investigation demonstrated by

14
2022 SCC OnLine Del 3945
15
2025 SCC OnLine Del 812
CRL.M.C. 5769/2022 & CRL.M.C. 1664/2024 Page 9 of 10

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:BABLOO SHAH
Signing Date:20.05.2026
04:58:38

the learned ASJ, however, considering the means and manner of directing a
departmental enquiry and following up the same, alongwith passing
adverse remarks, adopted therein, which are beyond the scope and ambit of
the learned ASJ, especially whence it was only dealing with an application
for grant of anticipatory bail, the present petition deserves to be allowed.
19. In view of the afore-going, the present petitions are allowed and the
impugned order dated 22.02.2022 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge (FTSC) (POCSO)-02, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi and all
the consequential proceedings/ directions passed pursuant thereto are set
aside and the adverse remarks, if any, are expunged.
20. Accordingly, the present petitions along with the pending
application(s), are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
21. Since this Court, despite repeated orders passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and this Court, has had the occasion of coming across
various orders of similar nature passed by the learned Trial Court(s), let a
copy of this judgment be sent to the Principal & District Judges of all the
districts for onward circulation to all the concerned Judges and for onward
notification to proceed keeping in mind the purport and meaning of an
application for grant of (anticipatory) bail.


SAURABH BANERJEE, J.
MAY 20, 2026/ab/aks
CRL.M.C. 5769/2022 & CRL.M.C. 1664/2024 Page 10 of 10

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:BABLOO SHAH
Signing Date:20.05.2026
04:58:38