Dr. G. Srinivasan vs Union Of India
- Court
- Supreme Court
REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 1218
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 479 OF 2018
DR. G. SRINIVASAN … APPELLANT
VS.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. The exposition of Hon’ble D.A. Desai, J. (as His Lordship then was) in
1
Ajit Singh v. the State of Punjab remains the authoritative
statement of the genesis and object of probation in service
jurisprudence. It reads:
7. When the master-servant relation was governed by the archaic
law of hire and fire, the concept of probation in service jurisprudence
was practically absent. With the advent of security in public service
when termination or removal became more and more difficult and
order of termination or removal from service became a subject-
matter of judicial review, the concept of probation came to acquire a
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
MANIK KUMAR
Date: 2026.11.16
17:50:38 IST
Reason:
1
(1983) 2 SCC 217
Page 1 of 27
certain connotation. If a servant could not be removed by way of
punishment from service unless he is given an opportunity to meet
the allegations if any against him which necessitates his removal
from service, rules of natural justice postulate an enquiry into the
allegations and proof thereof. This developing master-servant
relationship put the master on guard. In order that an incompetent
or inefficient servant is not foisted upon him because the charge of
incompetence or inefficiency is easy to make but difficult to prove,
concept of probation was devised. To guard against errors of human
judgment in selecting suitable personnel for service, the new recruit
was put on test for a period before he is absorbed in service or gets
a right to the post. Period of probation gave a sort of locus pententiae
to the employer to observe the work, ability, efficiency, sincerity and
competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post,
the master reserved a right to dispense with his service without
anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period which is
styled as period of probation. Viewed from this aspect, the courts
held that termination of service of a probationer during or at the end
of a period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a
punishment because the servant so appointed has no right to
continue to hold such a post any more than a servant employed on
probation by a private employer is entitled to [see Parshotam Lal
Dhingra v. Union of India : AIR 1958 SC 36) : 1958 SCR 828 : 1958
SCJ 217 : (1958) 1 LLJ 544]. The period of probation therefore
furnishes a valuable opportunity to the master to closely observe the
work of the probationer and by the time the period of probation
expires to make up his mind whether to retain the servant by
absorbing him in regular service or dispense with his service. Period
of probation may vary from post to post or master to master. And it
is not obligatory on the master to prescribe a period of probation. It
is always open to the employer to employ a person without putting
him on probation. Power to put the employee on probation for
watching his performance and the period during which the
performance is to be observed is the prerogative of the employer.
(emphasis ours)
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2. The instant appeal, by special leave granted on 16 January, 2018,
involves a controversy whose origin is the termination of the
2
appellant’s probationary service by the Institute , the second
respondent. The lis has to be decided bearing in mind the above
instructive passage and the other precedents in the field; also, given
the fact that a judgment of affirmation is under challenge, interference
2
Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore
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would not be called for unless perversity, in some measure, is
demonstrated.
3. Appellant was employed as an Associate Professor in the Institute,
which is funded by the Central Government. Vide office memorandum
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dated 10 April, 2013, he was informed as follows:
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
The services of Dr. G. Srinivasan, Associate Professor in the
Centre for Earth Sciences at the Institute is terminated w.e.f.
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afternoon of 9 May 2013 being the date of expiry of the notice
period of one month.
Accordingly, Dr, G. Srinivasan stands automatically relieved
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from the duties of the Institute w.e.f 9 May, 2013 and ceases to be
on the rolls of the Institute. He is required to produce No Due
Certificate before the expiry of the notice period.
This issues with approval of the Competent Authority.
Registrar
4. Challenging the said memorandum, the appellant had preferred a writ
3 4
petition before the High Court of Karnataka . A Single Judge dismissed
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it on 22 October 2013. An appeal carried from the order of dismissal,
too, met a similar fate. The writ appeal was dismissed by an order
rd
dated 23 November, 2013. Appellant took exception to the said order
as late as in 2016 by presenting the special leave petition, out of which
this appeal has arisen, at a point of time when the contractual period
of five years for which he was appointed had practically expired.
Ostensibly, it is only honour and reputation that the appellant can
salvage and not reinstatement in service should he succeed in this
appeal.
3
Writ Petition No. 20022/2013
4
High Court
5
Writ Appeal No. 6539/2013 (S-DIS)
Page 3 of 27
5. The factual background of the appellant’s short tenure with the
6
Institute is this. It was pursuant to an advertisement for the post of
Associate Professor with the Centre for Earth Science, a project backed
by the Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India, that the
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appellant received a confirmation dated 6 January, 2010, sealing his
appointment.
6. The terms of appointment stipulated that the appellant would be
engaged on a contractual basis, with an initial contract lasting five
years. The nature of employment for the first year would be on
probation, and the appellant’s continuation would be subject to an
assessment of his performance by the competent authority. The
appointment letter recorded that the Scheme, Regulations and Bye-
Laws of the Institute would govern the appointment.
th
7. Appellant joined the Institute on 15 April, 2011. During the period of
his probation, his performance and suitability for continuation in
7
service came to be considered by the Committee constituted by the
Institute for the Centre for Earth Science.
8. Upon consideration of the appellant’s performance, the Committee, in
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its meetings held on 25 May and 5 June, 2012, recommended
extension of his probation for a further period of one year. The
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Institute accepted the said recommendation on 27 June, 2012.
6
Advt. No. 5/2009
7
Committee of Professors
Page 4 of 27
9. Upon a subsequent consideration of the appellant’s performance by a
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newly constituted Committee on 26 March, 2013, it was
recommended that his services be discontinued.
10. The Institute acted upon the Committee’s recommendation. Vide the
th
office memorandum of 10 April, 2013, issued in exercise of powers
under Regulation 13.5 of the Institute Regulations, the appellant was
discharged from service. Incidentally, the said regulation permitted a
termination simpliciter without assigning of any reasons during the
probationary period. What weighed against the appellant was the lack
of change in his behaviour, as well as the consensus between the
Committee and the third respondent, which echoed concerns regarding
the appellant’s unsuitability for the Institute due to his inability to
fraternise with his co-workers.
11. Thoroughly discontented with such abrupt termination of his service,
the appellant invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court seeking
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quashing of the office memorandum dated 10 April, 2013, along with
Regulation 13.5 of the Institute Regulations. The Single Judge, while
spurning the appellant’s challenge, reasoned that the appellant’s
services were terminated due to his unsuitability to render service for
the Institute, and that there was no stigma attached to the
termination. The Division Bench seized of the writ appeal, for similar
reasons, chose not to interfere.
12. Mr Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant,
argued that:
Page 5 of 27
(a) the order of termination, though innocuous in form, is punitive in
substance;
(b) appellant’s termination from service was neatly camouflaged as a
simpliciter termination, whereas the concluded findings recorded
against him by the Committee, without notice and hearing, driven by
the bias of the third respondent, constituted the foundation for such
termination;
(c) the order of termination was a culmination of repeated complaints
made against the appellant by the third respondent due to their pre-
existing disagreements, and the presence of the third respondent in
the meeting could not have culminated in an unbiased evaluation of
the appellant’s tenure by the Committee;
(d) the veil, if lifted, would show that the termination was not the
outcome of a bona fide assessment of suitability during probation but
a condemnation for a specific act visited without inquiry; and
(e) the third respondent, being the Chairman of the Centre for Earth
Science and a member of the Committee, had influenced its
recommendation and ensured that the appellant is shown the door.
13. Mr. Bhushan further contended on behalf of the appellant that the
extension of his probation was contrary to Regulation 13.3 of the
Institute Regulations, which initially prescribed a period of one year.
According to the appellant, any extension of probation was required to
be supported by reasons and was not permissible in the manner
adopted by the Institute. It was also his contention that the appellant’s
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pending appeal against the extension of probation was not duly
considered before the impugned office memorandum came to be
issued.
14. Mr. Bhushan also highlighted that the appellant had challenged
Regulation 13.5, which allows the discharge of a probationary
employee without assigning any reasons, as arbitrary.
15. In support of the appellant’s claim that the Institute gave him an
extremely raw deal, Mr. Bhushan placed reliance on the decisions of
8
this Court in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab , Anoop Jaiswal
9
v. Government of India , Indra Pal Gupta v. Managing
10
Committee, Model Inter College Thora , Union of India v.
11 12
Mahaveer C. Singhvi and State Bank of India v. Palak Modi .
As per Mr. Bhushan, these decisions are all instances where no stigma
was recorded in the termination order; yet, the termination was set
aside as punitive as the reasons for the misconduct/termination were
recorded behind the probationer’s back.
16. Mr. S. S. Ramdas, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
Institute, vehemently opposed the appellant’s contentions and
contended that termination of the appellant’s employment was indeed
a simpliciter termination. According to him, if an order of termination
is a fallout of unsatisfactory service evaluated on the basis of overall
8
AIR 1974 SC 2192
9
(1984) 2 SCC 369
10
(1984) 3 SCC 384
11
AIR 2010 SC 3493
12
(2013) 3 SCC 607
Page 7 of 27
performance, such an order need not assign any reason as there is no
stigma attached to it, and will be classified as a simpliciter termination.
The discharge of the appellant, as per Mr. Ramdas, was based on
numerous factors deliberated by the Committee, including his conduct.
17. Mr. Ramdas further argued that it is entirely within the employer’s
domain to assess the performance of a probationary officer during
probation. An overall assessment of work would include the conduct of
such an officer. Such assessment and consequent termination of
service is not amenable to a challenge under Article 226 of the
13
Constitution .
18. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Ramdas on the decision of this Court
14
in State of West Bengal v. Tapas Roy to support the contention
that if no moral turpitude or misconduct is alleged in the order of
termination, it cannot be deemed stigmatic. A reference was made to
the decision in Deepti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendranath Bose
15
National Centre for Medical Sciences to demonstrate that where
no enquiry is conducted against an employee and the employer wishes
to discontinue the services of an employee against whom there exists
a complaint, a simple order of termination would not be stigmatic, as
such a complaint constitutes the motive and not the basis for
termination. The recommendations of the Committee, in the present
case, were only a motive and not the entire basis for the appellant’s
13
the Constitution of India, 1950
14
(2006) 6 SCC 453
15
(1999) 3 SCC 60
Page 8 of 27
termination, according to Mr. Ramdas. Since no enquiry was initiated
against the appellant, the termination cannot be branded as stigmatic.
19. Mr. Shanthkumar Mahale, learned senior counsel appearing for the
third respondent, supported the decision of the Institute and submitted
that the appellant’s services were discontinued following an
assessment of his suitability during the period of probation. He denied
the allegations of bias attributed to the third respondent and submitted
that the decision was an institutional assessment of the appellant’s
suitability for continuation in service.
20. It was, accordingly, submitted on behalf of the third respondent that
the decision to discontinue the appellant’s services was neither
founded upon any charge of misconduct nor intended to impose any
punishment, but was an exercise of the power available to the Institute
under its Regulations governing probationary employment.
21. Having heard the arguments that were advanced, we now embark on
analysing the appellant’s claim in light of the materials on record.
22. The questions to be answered are whether the appellant’s termination
was simple or punitive, and whether the High Court rightly declined to
interfere with the order of discharge.
23. The facts of this appeal present a classic motive-versus-foundation
test. There is a plethora of authoritative pronouncements of this Court
on the said topic, and we need to be guided by the essence thereof.
An attempt to ascertain how the law has developed would seem to be
apposite.
Page 9 of 27
24. In Samsher Singh (supra), a 7-Judge Bench of this Court held that,
in deciding whether, in a given case, a termination was by way of
punishment or not, the Court should look to the substance of the
matter and not the form. It was inter alia observed as follows:
64. Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is
under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer
is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence
of any rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may
come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or
for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude
the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be
discharged. No punishment is involved in this. The authority may in
some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may
result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. But in those cases the
authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the
probationer with a view to giving him a chance to make good in other
walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation.
If, on the other hand, the probationer is faced with an enquiry on
charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services
are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311(2) he
can claim protection. In Gopi Kishore Prasad v. Union of India [AIR
1960 SC 689 : (1960) 2 SCR 982 : (1960) 1 Lab LJ 262] it was said
that if the Government proceeded against the probationer in the
direct way without casting any aspersion on his honesty or
competence, his discharge would not have the effect of removal by
way of punishment. Instead of taking the easy course, the
Government chose the more difficult one of starting proceedings
against him and branding him as a dishonest and incompetent officer.
*
66. If the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the
substance of the order is that the termination is by way of
punishment then a probationer is entitled to attract Article 311. The
substance of the order, and not the form, would be decisive.
(emphasis ours)
25. The question of whether, in a given case, the termination was by way
of punishment or not was once again extensively reviewed by this
Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra). It is an authority in which
almost all precedents on the point were considered, and the principles
Page 10 of 27
laid down in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries
16
Corporation Ltd. were reiterated.
26. One does find in Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra) reference to the
decision of Hon’ble V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (as His Lordship then was) in
Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor
17
Sabha .
As to “foundation”, it was said: (SCC p. 617, para 53)
“[A] termination effected because the master is satisfied of the
misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the
service of the delinquent servant, is a dismissal, even if he had the
right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing
order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case, the grounds are
recorded in different proceedings from the formal order, does not
detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the
guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate.
Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the
termination of service, the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits
as on simple termination, are given and non-injurious terminology is
used.”
(emphasis supplied in original)
and as to motive: (SCC pp. 617-18, para 54)
“ 54 . On the contrary, even if there is suspicion of misconduct, the
master may say that he does not wish to bother about it and may
not go into his guilt but may feel like not keeping a man he is not
happy with. He may not like to investigate nor take the risk of
continuing a dubious servant. Then it is not dismissal but termination
simpliciter, if no injurious record of reasons or punitive cut-back on
his full terminal benefits is found. For, in fact, misconduct is not then
the moving factor in the discharge.”
(emphasis supplied in original)
16
(1999) 2 SCC 21
17
(1980) 2 SCC 593
Page 11 of 27
27. Paragraph 21 of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra) summarises what
would amount to ‘motive’ and what would constitute ‘foundation’ by
ruling as follows:
21. If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind
the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the
simple order of termination is to be treated as “ founded ” on the
allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no
findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct
an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the
employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a
case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position
if the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the
allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or
he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a
circumstance, the allegations would be a motive and not the
foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid.
28. It was also pointed out in Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra) that
stigma might be inferred from the references quoted in the termination
order although the order itself might not contain anything offensive.
29. A profitable reference may further be made to the decision of this Court
18
in Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. , which followed close
on the heels of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra). There, this Court
delineated the concepts of ‘foundation’ and ‘motive’ while adjudicating
whether the termination of a probationary employee is stigmatic in the
following words:
28. The important principles which are deducible on the concept of
“motive” and “foundation”, concerning a probationer, are that a
probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be
terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation
on account of general unsuitability for the post in question. If for the
determination of suitability of the probationer for the post in question
or for his further retention in service or for confirmation, an inquiry
is held and it is on the basis of that inquiry that a decision is taken
to terminate his service, the order will not be punitive in nature. But,
if there are allegations of misconduct and an inquiry is held to find
18
(2000) 5 SCC 152
Page 12 of 27
out the truth of that misconduct and an order terminating the service
is passed based on that inquiry, the order would be punitive in nature
as the inquiry was held not for assessing the general suitability of the
employee for the post in question, but to find out the truth of
allegations of misconduct against that employee. In this situation,
the order would be founded on misconduct, and it will not be a mere
matter of “motive”.
29. “Motive” is the moving power which impels action for a definite
result, or to put it differently, “motive” is that which incites or
stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services
of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor
which impelled the employer to take this action? If it was the factor
of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the
action would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of
serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry
is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and
a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to
other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of
misconduct which were found to be true in the preliminary inquiry.
(emphasis ours)
30. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical
19
Sciences , a coordinate Bench of this Court, speaking through
Hon’ble Ruma Pal, J. (as Her Ladyship then was), indicated the judicial
mechanism for determining whether the termination of a probationer’s
service was punitive or not. It was held that the judicial review
authority should first apply the form test to see whether the order is
stigmatic; and, if the order survives such test, then the test of
substance should be applied. One of the judicially developed tests for
determining whether an order of termination is punitive or not was
also referred to therein. We can do no better than quote the relevant
passages hereunder:
21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in
substance, an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior
to the termination there was ( a ) a full-scale formal enquiry ( b ) into
19
(2002) 1 SCC 520
Page 13 of 27
allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which ( c )
culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the
termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of
the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is
missing, the termination has been upheld.
*
28. Therefore, whenever a probationer challenges his termination
the court’s first task will be to apply the test of stigma or the “form”
test. If the order survives this examination the “substance” of the
termination will have to be found out.
29. Before considering the facts of the case before us one further,
seemingly intractable, area relating to the first test needs to be
cleared viz. what language in a termination order would amount to a
stigma? Generally speaking when a probationer’s appointment is
terminated it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether
by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used
in the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the
stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not
stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit
in every order of termination of a probationer’s appointment, is also
not stigmatic. The decisions cited by the parties and noted by us
earlier, also do not hold so. In order to amount to a stigma, the order
must be in a language which imputes something over and above
mere unsuitability for the job.
(emphasis ours)
31. Pavanendra Narayan Verma (supra) was later considered by a 3-
Judge Bench in Tapas Roy (supra). Applying the law laid down
therein, this Court held:
7. The order of discharge has, as we have already indicated, set out
several instances of the respondent absenting himself unauthorisedly
from the training centre. These facts have been relied upon for the
purpose of concluding that the respondent was not interested in the
training and had no respect for discipline. This conclusion was a
ground for holding that the respondent was unsuitable for the Police
Department.
8. The High Court was of the view that Rule 10 of the Rules did not
apply to orders which were stigmatic. As has already been held by
this Court in Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of
Medical Sciences that in order to constitute a stigmatic order
necessitating a formal inquiry, it would have to be seen whether prior
to the passing of the order, there was an inquiry into the allegations
involving moral turpitude or misconduct so that the order of
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discharge was really a finding of guilt. If any of these three factors
are absent, the order would not be punitive. We have also held that
stigma in the wider sense of the word is implicit in every order of
termination during probation. It is only when there is something
more than imputing unsuitability for the post in question, that the
order may be considered to be stigmatic. In our view, the language,
quoted earlier in the discharge order, cannot be said to be stigmatic
as it neither alleges any moral turpitude or misconduct on the part
of the respondent nor was there an inquiry as such preceding the
order of discharge. The order has been passed strictly in terms of
Rule 10 of the Rules. We are, accordingly, of the view that the appeal
must be allowed. It is, accordingly, allowed and the impugned order
is set aside.
(emphasis ours)
32. The test evolved through precedents and, as crystallised in paragraph
21 of Pavanendra Narayan Verma (supra), extracted above, again
arose for consideration of a 3-Judge Bench in Vijayakumaran C.P.V.
20
v. Central University of Kerala . After quoting paragraph 21 and
drawing guidance from it, this is what the Bench held:
11. In the present case, all the three elements are attracted, as a
result of which it must follow that the stated order is ex facie
stigmatic and punitive. Such an order could be issued only after
subjecting the incumbent to a regular inquiry as per the service rules.
As a matter of fact, the Internal Complaints Committee had
recommended to proceed against the appellant appropriately but the
Executive Council proceeded under the mistaken belief that in terms
of Clause 7 of the contract, it was open to the Executive Council to
terminate the services of the appellant without a formal regular
inquiry as per the service rules.
33. At this juncture, it would also be appropriate to consider the decisions
cited by Mr. Bhushan.
34. A 3-Judge bench in Indra Pal Gupta (supra) interfered with the order
of termination of probationary service observing that:
10. It is seen from the letter dated June 30, 1969 by which the
services of the appellant were terminated that the resolution of the
Managing Committee dated April 27, 1969 is made a part of it by
20
(2020) 12 SCC 426
Page 15 of 27
treating it as an enclosure to that letter. The resolution actually
begins with a reference to the report of the Manager, and states that
the facts contained in the report were “serious” and “not in the
interests of the institution”. It further refers to the fact that the
appellant was asked to give his explanation to the allegations made
in the said report. That report stated:
“It is also evident that the seriousness of the lapses is enough to
justify dismissal but no educational institution should take that
botheration.”
11. The above report was the real foundation on which the decision
of the Managing Committee was based. This is a case where the order
of termination issued is merely a camouflage for an order imposing
the penalty of termination of service on the ground of misconduct.
35. In Anoop Jaiswal (supra), the allegation against the
appellant/probationer was that he had instigated other probationers to
reach late for physical training at the gymnasium in a Police Academy.
Without holding any inquiry, the appellant/probationer was discharged
from service. The termination order recorded that the Government was
satisfied he was unsuitable for service. In the course of hearing before
a coordinate Bench, the Government indicated that it was not averse
to reinstating him in service. Even then, the Court examined the
records in detail and, taking into account all the attendant
circumstances, recorded its satisfaction that the Director of the
Academy wished to make the case of the appellant/probationer an
example for others, including those other probationers who were
similarly situated, so that they may learn a lesson therefrom, and this
provided the foundation for the order of discharge. The coordinate
Bench held that where the form of the order is merely a camouflage
for an order of dismissal for misconduct, it is always open to the court
before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and
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ascertain the true character of the order. If the court holds that the
order, though in the form, is merely a determination of employment,
is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment, the court would not be
debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to
the rights conferred by law upon the employee.
36. Mahaveer C. Singhvi (supra) also happens to be a 3-Judge Bench
decision. The probationer, therein, was employed with the Ministry of
External Affairs in its overseas divisions. The probationer had
protested the non-allotment of his preferred choice of language, in
deviation from the established procedure, and an inquiry had been
initiated against him. Though the probationer found no adverse
findings recorded against him in the inquiry, his service was
terminated nevertheless, leading to the challenge. This Court
attributed the basis for this termination to communications by a Joint
Secretary against the probationer. The Court, thus, held the discharge
to be punitive in character, which was motivated by considerations not
reflected in the impugned order.
37. In Palak Modi (supra), a coordinate Bench reiterated that a
probationer has no right to hold the post and his service can be
terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation
on account of general unsuitability for the post held by him. It was
further held that if the competent authority holds an inquiry for judging
the suitability of the probationer or for his further continuance in
service or for confirmation and such inquiry is the basis for deciding to
Page 17 of 27
terminate his service, then the action of the competent authority
cannot be castigated as punitive; however, if the allegation of
misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action taken, the ultimate
decision taken by the competent authority can be nullified on the
ground of violation of the rules of natural justice. On facts, the Court
found that the foundation of the action taken by the General Manager
was the accusation that while appearing in the objective test, the
private respondents had resorted to committee-eyeing. IBPS had
relied on the computer’s analysis and sent a report to the Bank stating
that 18 candidates were suspected of having used unfair means. The
authority concerned then sent for the seating arrangement chart and
treated it as evidence to conclude that the private respondents had
indeed used unfair means in the examination. This exercise was not
preceded by an inquiry involving the private respondents, and no
opportunity was given to them to defend themselves against the
charge of use of unfair means. In other words, they were condemned
unheard, which, in the considered view of the Court, was legally
impermissible.
38. Considering that this appeal raises a recurring question in service
jurisprudence - whether an order discharging a probationer is punitive
or simple – it is considered useful to delineate the framework within
which such question should be decided.
39. Our understanding of the principles, exposited by this Court to identify
whether a termination is punitive or simple, would guide us in
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answering the aforesaid question. After providing the answer, we
propose to examine the challenge laid by the appellant to his discharge
from service, to the extent it is considered appropriate, in view of what
we have noted in the concluding part of paragraph 4 above.
40. While examining an order discharging a probationer, when challenged
on the ground that it is punitive, the inquiry of the court ought to be
structured around the following parameters:
a. Object and purpose of probation — At the beginning of our
judgment, we referred to Ajit Singh (supra). The said decision
clarifies the objective behind probationary employment and the
purpose it seeks to serve. Probation is a period of trial to assess an
employee’s suitability. Such a period is meant to give time and afford
the employer an opportunity to assess the suitability of an employee
vis-à-vis the post to which he is appointed. This enables the employer
to decide on the retention of the employee assessed to be suitable by
confirming him in service, while weeding out any undesirable
employee by ordering his discharge without holding a formal inquiry,
should his credentials and performance at the time of appointment
prove to be deceptive.
b. The contours and limits of veil lifting — Since weeding out an
undesirable employee for unsuitability ordinarily carries with it no
stigma, lifting of the veil to look into the background file is neither
necessary nor permissible. However, should the facts of a particular
case so warrant, it would be permissible to lift the veil to examine the
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true nature of the order only within the circumscribed limits
necessary to ascertain whether the alleged unsuitability is the real
ground or merely a cloak for a punitive action founded on a specific
misconduct, but not to re-appreciate suitability.
c. The motive-foundation test as a substantive, and not a mechanical,
inquiry — The distinction between ‘motive’ and ‘foundation’, however,
does not admit of a purely mechanical application. The motive-
foundation distinction has to turn on the substance of the record as
a whole, and not merely the form of the order; and, therefore,
necessarily involves a measure of judicial assessment of whether
‘misconduct’ was the ‘motive’ or the ‘foundation’. This requires a
reading of the entire record, and in that reading some element of a
Judge’s individual perception as to what is ‘motive’ and what
constitutes ‘foundation’ inevitably enters - what to one mind appears
as the mere occasion for examining the probationer’s suitability may
appear to another as the very foundation of the order. The Court
must, therefore, not look merely at the words of the order or the
language employed therein, but at whether any alleged misconduct
was the trigger for it or the ground of condemnation itself.
d. Demarcating stigma from mere administrative assessment — It
cannot be gainsaid that termination of a probationer’s service by
ordering his discharge by an ostensibly innocuous/non-stigmatic
order, whatever the language used, imports an element of
unsuitability either on account of ineptitude or misconduct or moral
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turpitude or otherwise. However, the implicit unsuitability, even if
explicit in the termination order, does not make it stigmatic, thereby
converting a simple termination into a punitive order. Mere use of a
word like ‘unsatisfactory’ or ‘unsuitable’ does not amount to stigma.
The taint of stigma gains traction where the order imputes something
over and above mere unsuitability for the job. To separate the grain
from the chaff, three questions in sequence need to be answered.
First , does the order on its face, carry any imputation against the
probationer? Second , if the order is innocuous on its face, does the
material placed disclose that the foundation thereof is a finding of
misconduct and not a mere assessment of suitability? Third , does that
foundation, in substance, visit the probationer with civil
consequences likely to affect his prospects of future employment?
Only if the answers to both the second and third questions are in the
affirmative does the taint of stigma gain traction. A grievance, a
complaint, or an adverse perception, without more, remains chaff.
e. The scope and bounds of the Pavanendra test — it is the aforesaid
three-stage filter to discern stigma that Pavanendra Narayan
Verma (supra) must be understood to embody. Notably, the test laid
down in paragraph 21 thereof has neither been overruled nor doubted
in any subsequent decision of this Court. It continues to be applied
as one of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether, in
substance, an order of termination is punitive. Since the test is stated
to be “one” of the judicially evolved tests, it is not exhaustive and is
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to be read along with the stigma test in paragraph 29 of the same
judgment and the object of inquiry test.
f. The final inquiry — The inquiry, therefore, is not whether the order
is innocuous in form but whether, on a fair reading of the record as a
whole, the termination was the outcome of a bona fide assessment
of suitability, or a punishment for a specific act visited without the
protection of an inquiry. If it is the former, the order must stand as
termination simpliciter ; if the latter, it cannot survive without
compliance with due process – where Article 311(2) of the
Constitution applies, by an inquiry thereunder, and in other cases, by
an inquiry in accordance with the applicable service rules and the
principles of natural justice.
41. Having delineated the parameters, at this juncture, we consider it
appropriate to observe that since the issue in the present appeal is
now essentially academic, a detailed reference to and/or discussion of
the underlying factual allegations is neither necessary for
determination nor warranted in the circumstances of the case. Any
elaboration of such facts, particularly observations touching upon the
appellant’s conduct, might affect his future prospects. We, therefore,
propose to refer only to such facts as are strictly necessary to decide
the controversy.
42. In light of the observations in Samsher Singh (supra), it is considered
apt to refer to the rules governing the procedure for terminating
probationary employment framed by the Institute. In its counter
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affidavit, the Institute has referred to Regulations 13.3 and 13.5, which
are reproduced hereunder:
13.3 It shall be open to the Appointing Authorities to offer
appointments under one of the following alternatives.
(a) On contract for a period up to five years in the first instance,
which shall include a period of probation of one year in cases of both
teaching and non-teaching staff; or
(b) xxxxxxx
It shall be open to the Appointing Authority to extend the period of
probation of a member of the staff from time to time or permit
waiver, if it considers it necessary.
13.5 All appointments shall be terminable on a notice in writing on
either side without assigning any reasons. The duration of the period
shall be:
(a) During the period of probation: one month
(b) After the period of probation:
for Teaching Staff: not less than six months
for those other than Teaching Staff: terminating on the last day of a
term of six months.
43. A perusal of the extant regulations establishes that the Institute
reserved unto itself the power to terminate the employment of a
probationary employee without assigning reasons. In exercise of such
power, the impugned office memorandum was issued without
assigning any reasons. We, therefore, see no reason to hold that the
extant regulations were breached in discharging the appellant.
44. Regulation 13.5 has, however, been subjected to challenge by the
appellant. He has not shown how the relevant regulation is arbitrary
or disproportionately harsh in its operation. A probationer, given the
very object and purpose of probation as spelt out in Ajit Singh
(supra), cannot urge that reason(s) should be assigned in every case
of discharge. The challenge, in our opinion, is absolutely misconceived
and stands rejected.
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45. The distinction between ‘motive’ and ‘foundation’, as explained in
Deepti Prakash Banerjee (supra) and Chandra Prakash Shahi
(supra), is decisive in the present case. The mere existence of
circumstances which may have occasioned an assessment of the
appellant’s suitability would not, by itself, convert an otherwise
innocuous order of termination into one founded upon misconduct. On
an examination of the record, we find no material to establish that any
specific allegation of misconduct was investigated and found proved
against the appellant, or that such a finding constituted the foundation
of the order of termination. The decision of the Institute not to retain
the appellant in service followed an assessment of suitability during
probation and was not an order imposing punishment disguised as a
simple termination.
46. Appellant next contends that the order of termination, though
innocuous in form, is stigmatic in substance. We are unable to accept
this contention. Applying the test laid down in Pavanendra Narayan
Verma (supra), we find that there was no full-scale formal enquiry
into allegations of misconduct culminating in a finding of guilt against
the appellant. The termination order does not attribute any misconduct
or moral turpitude to him. The essential requirements for treating the
order as punitive are, therefore, not satisfied.
47. Even otherwise, applying the three-stage filter test, no stigma can be
said to have been cast on the appellant. Any decision to discharge a
probationer, and not confirm him in service, cannot be at the whims
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and caprices of the appointing authority; deliberations must precede
it. It is usual in such a case for the appointing authority to form an
opinion based on available records. The material available in such
records qua the probationer’s conduct, if found to be serious, could
lead to two courses of action. It could trigger an inquiry into the
probationer’s conduct; alternatively, the appointing authority may
choose not to proceed with an inquiry and simply discharge the
probationer. It is the second alternative that the Institute pursued
without bearing on the appellant civil consequences. We see no error,
much less glaring error, in such an action.
48. Appellant has also questioned the fairness of the decision-making
process and alleged bias in the assessment undertaken by the
Institute. We have examined the relevant records in this regard.
However, nothing therein persuades us to conclude that the decision
to discontinue the appellant’s services was founded upon any specific
charge of misconduct or was intended to visit him with a punishment.
The material on record, viewed as a whole, indicates that the Institute
assessed the appellant’s suitability for continuation in service during
the probationary period.
49. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are satisfied that the Institute
exercised its power under the applicable regulations to discontinue the
services of the appellant during the period of probation. The material
on record does not establish that the order, though expressed in
innocuous terms, was in substance founded upon any charge of
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misconduct. The order of discharge, therefore, cannot be characterised
as punitive.
50. Insofar as the contention that the appellant could not have been
continued on probation beyond the period of one year is concerned,
we find it to be equally unmeritorious. Although an appeal was stated
to have been filed by the appellant challenging such extension and no
decision was given thereon, the appellant accepted the extension of
the probationary period and continued to discharge his duties. It does
not appear that he approached any court alleging a failure/neglect by
the appellate authority to consider the appeal and seeking an
expedited decision on such appeal. In such circumstances, and
particularly having regard to the subsequent event of discharge and
the belated presentation of the special leave petition, the appellant is
not entitled to any relief on this score.
51. The impugned decision of the Institute, being one of termination
simpliciter during the probationary period, does not warrant
interference. The concurrent findings of the Single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court also suffer from no infirmity and
deserve to be upheld.
52. Finally, reverting to the decisions on which Mr. Bhushan placed
reliance, we say that the same were rendered on completely different
set of facts and, thus, are distinguishable; hence, the same too cannot
come to the aid of the appellant.
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53. The appeal is devoid of merit; consequently, the same stands
dismissed.
54. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
55. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.
………..……………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
…….……..…………………………J.
(SHEEL NAGU)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 16, 2026.
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