Neycer (India) Ltd. vs Gmb Ceramics Ltd.

Court
Supreme Court

NON-REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 1251

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5937-5938 OF 2021

NEYCER (INDIA) LTD. … APPELLANT

VS.

GMB CERAMICS LTD. … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
st
1. These civil appeals, by special leave granted on 21 September, 2021,
th 1
stem from a common judgment and order dated 24 September, 2018
2
passed by a Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta . In exercise of
its intra-court appellate jurisdiction, the Division Bench allowed the
3 4
appeal preferred by the respondent, GMB Ceramics Ltd. , and dismissed
5 6
the cross-appeal preferred by the appellant, Neycer (India) Ltd.
[formerly Neiveli Ceramics and Refractories Limited (NCRL)].

Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
MANIK KUMAR
Date: 2026.11.19
19:25:40 IST
Reason:
1
impugned judgment
2
High Court
3
APO No. 34 of 2016
4
GMB
5
APOT No. 42 of 2016
6
Neycer
Page 1 of 19

2. In the process, the impugned judgment reversed the judgment and
th
order dated 14 October, 2015 passed by a Single Judge of the High
7
Court on Neycer’s application under Sections 30 and 33 of the
8
Arbitration Act, 1940 —which had restricted the arbitral award dated
rd 9
23 June, 1999 passed by the Umpire to a sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/-
(Rupees two crore)—and restored the Umpire’s award in its entirety, i.e.,
Rs.11,69,62,910/- (Rupees eleven crore sixty-nine lakh sixty-two
thousand nine hundred and ten) together with interest @ 15% per
annum.
3. Learned senior counsel Mr. Amit Sibal and Mr. Sanjiv Sen appearing for
Neycer in the two appeals, while assailing the impugned judgment as
well as the award, addressed us at considerable length, setting out the
facts of the case and placing reliance upon several precedents relevant
to the issues arising in these appeals. Per contra , Mr. Siddharth
Bhatnagar, learned senior counsel appearing for GMB, too, advanced
detailed arguments in support of the award of the Umpire, since upheld
by the impugned judgment.
4. Facts leading to the arbitration culminating in the award of the Umpire
have been adequately and lucidly referred to in the judgment of the
Single Judge as well as the impugned judgment; hence, to avoid
prolixity, it is considered unnecessary to reiterate them here.

7
G.A. No. 4026 of 2000 in Award Case No. 32 of 2000
8
the Act
9
award
Page 2 of 19

5. Having bestowed our anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions and on perusal of the materials on record, we find that the
controversy in these appeals rests upon four principal issues:
a. Whether the Division Bench erred in reversing the Single Judge’s
10
finding that GMB’s claims in the arbitral reference were restricted
to Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) and that the Umpire
exceeded his jurisdiction in awarding sums beyond that limit?
b. Whether the Division Bench erred in reversing the Single Judge’s
setting aside of the award under Schedule ‘C’ of GMB’s claims on
merits?
c. Whether the Umpire’s interpretation of Clause 20 of the Agreement
th th 11
dated 29 November, 1986 (later amended on 26 June, 1987)
warranted the award to be set aside in part by the Single Judge?
d. Whether sustaining of the award to the extent of Rs.2,00,00,000/-
(Rupees two crore) (comprising Schedules ‘A’, ‘D’, and part of ‘E’ of
GMB’s claims) by the Single Judge warrants any interference under
Section 30 of the Act or on account of subsequent developments?
6. The parameters of judicial review under Section 30 of the Act are well
settled. A court hearing objections to an arbitral award does not sit in
appeal over the findings of the arbitrator or umpire on the merits, nor
does it re-appraise the evidence. However, a clear and vital distinction

10 th
Statement of Claim dated 16 April, 1990, claiming a sum of Rs.8,82,73,000/- (Rupees
eight crore eighty-two lakh seventy-three thousand), subsequently amended, ultimately
aggregating to Rs.17,16,57,000/- (Rupees seventeen crore sixteen lakh fifty-seven
thousand) under six Schedules.
11
the Agreement
Page 3 of 19

exists in law between an error within jurisdiction and an error in excess
of jurisdiction. As exposited by this Court in Sudarsan Trading Co. v.
12 13
State of Kerala , Associated Engineering Co. v. Govt. of A.P. ,
14
and Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Annapurna Construction , an
arbitrator or umpire is a creature of the contract and the reference; he
has no power, apart from what the parties have conferred upon him. If
he commits an error in the construction of the contract while remaining
within its parameters, it is an error within his jurisdiction and cannot be
interfered with unless it is erroneous and apparent on the face of the
award. Conversely, if he wanders outside the contract or enlarges the
scope of the reference to decide matters not submitted to him, he
commits a jurisdictional error going to the root of his authority. As Lord
15
Parmoor observed in Attorney-General for Manitoba v. Kelly
[quoted with approval in Associated Engineering Co. (supra)]:
It would be impossible to allow an umpire to arrogate to himself jurisdiction
over a question which, on the true construction of the submission, was not
referred to him. An umpire cannot widen the area of his jurisdiction by
holding, contrary to the fact, that the matter which he affects to decide is
within the submission of the parties.
(emphasis ours)

7. A dispute as to the jurisdiction of the umpire or the scope of the
submission is a matter that lies outside the award and must be
determined by the Court on an objective examination of the documents
constituting the reference.

12
(1989) 2 SCC 38
13
(1991) 4 SCC 93
14
(2003) 8 SCC 154
15
(1922) 1 A.C. 268
Page 4 of 19

8. In the impugned judgment, the Division Bench erred in equating the
jurisdictional question of the scope of the reference with a mere matter
of “plausible reading” of documents on merits, and in declining to
interfere on the ground that the Umpire’s construction of the pre-
reference correspondence was a “plausible” one. Umpire, it is settled
law, cannot confer jurisdiction upon himself by misconstruing the terms
of the reference.
9. When the pre-reference correspondence exchanged between the parties
is examined, the scope of GMB’s reference to arbitration is
unambiguous:
a. Before the invocation of arbitration, GMB had, following its letter
th 16
dated 9 August, 1989 complaining of project overrun, repeatedly
quantified its project cost overrun at Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two
th 17 th
crore) in its messages through telex dated 28 August, 1989 , 4
18 th 19
September, 1989 , and 11 September, 1989 .
th
b. After Neycer invoked the arbitration clause by its letter dated 19
20
September, 1989 in respect of its own claims and called upon GMB
to nominate its arbitrator and desist from using Neycer’s logo/brand
th 21
name, GMB responded by a telex dated 6 October, 1989 that it

16
Ext. G-54
17
Ext. G-57
18
Ext. G-63
19
Ext. G-66
20
Ext. G-67
21
Ext. G-68
Page 5 of 19

would henceforth not put Neycer’s brand name on its wares to
minimise complications, and categorically stated:
NOW THE MATTER BOILS DOWN TO OUR CLAIM FOR OVERRUN
AMOUNT ONLY FOR WHICH WE WILL DECIDE ABOUT THE NAME OF
ARBITRATOR AND LET U (sic, YOU) KNOW IN DUE COURSE.

th 22
c. This was followed by GMB’s telex dated 19 October, 1989 , the
foundational document whereby GMB nominated its arbitrator,
specifically defining the reference as:
FOR ADJUDICATION OF OUR CLAIM FOR OVER RS. 2 CRORES (RS.
TWO CRORES) IN RESPECT OF ALL OUR LOSSES SUSTAINED AND IS
BEING SUSTAINED BY US DUE TO VARIOUS BREACHES COMMITTED
AND STILL BEING COMMITTED BY YR (sic, YOU) UNDER THE SAID
AGREEMENT.

th 23
d. In its subsequent letter dated 24 October, 1989 (which was sent
five days after nomination of its arbitrator, thereby constituting the
arbitral tribunal), GMB reiterated that it was claiming the project
overrun of over Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) from Neycer,
while stating in respect of marketing assistance and non-use of the
brand name that it “reserves” its rights to claim losses and damages.
10. As rightly held by the Single Judge, reading these communications
together and separately leaves no scope for doubt that GMB nominated
its arbitrator for the adjudication of a quantified claim of
Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) in respect of all losses sustained
by it. Once the reference was crystallised by the appointment of GMB’s
arbitrator per Ext. G-71 for a claim of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two
crore), GMB could not unilaterally enlarge the scope of the reference by

22
Ext. G-71
23
Ext. G-72
Page 6 of 19

a subsequent letter, i.e., Ext. G-72. Moreover, on facts, a mere
“reservation of rights” to claim damages in the future did not constitute
a reference of an existing dispute to arbitration.
11. The decisions in Juggilal Kamlapat v. N.V. Internationale Crediet-
24
En-Handels Vereeninging ‘Rotterdam’ and State of Orissa v.
25
Asis Ranjan Mohanty , relied upon by GMB and the Division Bench,
are clearly distinguishable. In Juggilal Kamlapat (supra), the reference
was a general submission of a dispute regarding breach of contract and
a consequential difference in price, without any pecuniary cap. In Asis
Ranjan Mohanty (supra), this Court expressly noted that the
memorandum of reference and the order of the Subordinate Judge
therein did not confine the reference only to the amount initially
mentioned in the contractor’s letter. In the present case, GMB itself
defined and limited the pecuniary ambit of its reference to
Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rs. two crore), as per Exts. G-68 and G-71.
12. Equally unacceptable are the two subsidiary reasons assigned by the
th
Division Bench: first , that Neycer’s invocation letter dated 19
September, 1989 per Ext. G-67 kept the scope of reference wide open
by referring to “ the said disputes and any other dispute that may be
raised between the parties ”; and second , that Neycer could not object
to the scope of reference having contested all of GMB’s claims on merits.

24
AIR 1955 Cal 65
25
(1999) 9 SCC 249
Page 7 of 19

13. Neycer’s invocation letter was a notice under the arbitration clause
calling upon GMB to nominate its arbitrator to decide Neycer’s disputes
and any counter-disputes GMB might raise; in answer thereto, GMB itself
specified and restricted the dispute raised by it to Rs.2,00,00,000/-
(Rupees two crore). Further, Neycer had from the very inception—in
paragraph 25 of its Rebuttal Statement and paragraph 2(f) of its
Additional Counter Statement—expressly objected that GMB’s claims
beyond Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) were outside the scope of
the reference. Contesting claims on merits without prejudice to a
pleaded jurisdictional objection does not amount to waiver or confer
jurisdiction by acquiescence.
14. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the Single Judge that the
Umpire acted in excess of his jurisdiction in entertaining claims beyond
Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore). Consequently, the first issue is
decided against GMB.
15. Turning to the second issue: under Schedule ‘C’, GMB claimed
Rs.3,50,00,000/- (Rupees three crore fifty lakh) as damages for being
prevented from using the logo/brand name “GMB-NEYCER”, asserting
that it would require Rs.70,00,000/- (Rupees seventy lakh) per annum
for five years in advertising expenditure to build its own brand image.
rd
Relying solely upon an estimate dated 3 April, 1990 prepared by an
26
advertising agency, Sista’s Pvt. Ltd. , the Umpire assessed the required
expenditure at Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees fifty lakh) per annum for five

26
Ext. G-99
Page 8 of 19

years, i.e., Rs.2,50,00,000/- (Rupees two crore fifty lakh) and, after
deducting Rs.46,57,000/- (Rupees forty-six lakh fifty-seven thousand)
towards 2% royalty payable to Neycer under Clause 15 on projected net
sales, awarded Rs.2,03,43,000/- (Rupees two crore three lakh forty-
three thousand) to GMB.
16. Quite apart from the fact that this claim fell outside the reference limit
of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) and that GMB had in Ext. G-68
agreed not to use the brand name and in Ext. G-72 merely reserved its
right to claim damages, the Single Judge rightly set aside the award
under Schedule ‘C’ on the merits as wholly speculative, perverse and
based on no evidence.
17. When the Umpire made his award in June 1999, the five-year period
from the commencement of commercial production (December 1989 to
December 1994) had long expired. As demonstrated by GMB’s own
audited balance sheets and annual reports on record (i.e., Exts. N-94,
N-74, G-110, and G-115), GMB’s actual expenditure on advertisement,
publicity, and film expenses across the entire five-year period from
1988-89 to 1992-93 aggregated to only Rs.35,31,794/- (Rupees thirty-
five lakh thirty-one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four) while
GMB’s plant, in fact, remained closed from October 1991 to August 1993.
Nobody from Sista’s Pvt. Ltd. was examined to prove the estimate dated
rd
3 April, 1990. Once the five-year period had elapsed and actual figures
of expenditure were available on record in GMB’s own audited accounts,
damages could not be awarded based on a hypothetical estimate made
Page 9 of 19

in 1990. We may, in this behalf, profitably refer to the decisions of this
27
Court in ONGC v. Off-Shore Enterprises Inc. and Unibros v. All
28
India Radio . Notably, while disallowing GMB’s claim under Schedule
‘B’ (i.e., Research & Technology Development Expenditure), the Umpire
himself accepted Neycer’s contention that mere anticipated
expenditures unsupported by evidence of actual expenditure could not
be awarded; yet, the Umpire adopted a diametrically opposite yardstick
for Schedule ‘C’. Since GMB’s actual expenditure of Rs.35,31,794/-
(Rupees thirty-five lakh thirty-one thousand seven hundred and ninety-
four) was less than the 2% royalty of Rs.46,57,000/- (Rupees forty-six
lakh fifty-seven thousand) deductible in favour of Neycer, GMB suffered
no net loss under this head. The Division Bench was clearly in error in
reversing the Single Judge’s well-reasoned interference with Schedule
‘C’ of GMB’s claims.
18. Adverting now to the third issue concerning Clause 20 of the Agreement,
Mr. Sibal particularly emphasised the Umpire’s mis-reading of the said
clause. He contended that the manner in which the contractual
stipulations were construed amounted to rewriting the contract at the
hands of the Umpire. He painstakingly took us through the award in
which Clause 20 was interpreted. Since much turns on Clause 20, we
deem it appropriate to reproduce the same herein:
20. TIME SCHEDULE
Subject to the delivery of the equipment, the consultants shall
endeavour to commission the plant within 18 calendar months

27
(2011) 14 SCC 147
28
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1366
Page 10 of 19

from the date of sanction of the term loan by financial
institutions.

19. Mr. Sibal contended that a plain reading of Clause 20 makes it clear that
the time schedule envisaged for Neycer was contingent upon the
delivery of equipment by GMB, which was delayed; and that by using
the expression “shall endeavour”, the parties intended that Neycer was
only required to make an earnest effort rather than undertake an
absolute obligation to commission the plant within a rigid timeframe. He
further submitted that under the Agreement—for which Neycer was to
receive a know-how and technical services fee of Rs.20,00,000 (Rupees
twenty lakh), out of which Rs.18,00,000/- (Rupees eighteen lakh) was
to be reinvested in GMB’s equity share capital, leaving a net cash
consideration of only Rs.2,00,000 (Rupees two lakh)—Neycer’s role was
to impart technical know-how and to “advise”, “assist”, and “help” GMB
in establishing its plant. Contrary thereto, the Umpire treated the project
as a “joint venture” and stretched Neycer’s obligations so far as to foist
upon Neycer open-ended liabilities for five years of projected profits
under Schedule ‘E’ [Rs.3,46,45,000/- (Rupees three crore forty-six lakh
forty-five thousand)] and five years of normal, penal, and compound
interest on GMB’s term loans from December 1989 to March 1994 under
Schedule ‘F’ [Rs.4,56,99,000/- (Rupees four crore fifty-six lakh ninety-
nine thousand)].
20. We find substantial force in the contentions advanced by Mr. Sibal to the
extent that the Umpire could not have construed Clause 20 and the
Page 11 of 19

Agreement as a turnkey guarantee or an insurance policy underwriting
GMB’s entire business profitability and debt servicing for five years after
the commencement of commercial production. Even on the Umpire’s
own finding, the delay in commissioning the plant was seven months
st
(from the extended date of 31 January, 1989 to August 1989). While
the expression “shall endeavour” in Clause 20, read with Clause 18,
required Neycer to make earnest and timely efforts to assist in
commissioning the plant, Neycer’s contractual role could not be
stretched to treat it as a joint-venture partner underwriting five years of
projected profits under Schedule ‘E’ and five years of compounding loan
interest up to March 1994 under Schedule ‘F’, even covering a period
such as October 1991 to August 1993 when GMB’s plant remained closed
due to labour problems and disconnection of electric power by the Orissa
State Electricity Board, as recorded in the Board for Industrial and
29
Financial Reconstruction (BIFR)’s Draft Rehabilitation Scheme .
Conscious of the limited role of courts in re-appreciating evidence under
Section 30 of the Act, we are of the considered opinion that the Single
Judge rightly set aside the award in part, to the extent it travelled
beyond the permissible ambit of the reference and the contract.
21. Lastly, turning to the fourth issue and Neycer’s grievance that the
Division Bench failed to consider its cross-appeal independently and that
the Single Judge ought to have set aside the entire award even to the
extent of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore), we have independently

29
Ext. N-32
Page 12 of 19

examined Neycer’s challenges on the remaining issues within the settled
contours of Section 30 of the Act instead of remanding the matter after
nearly four decades of litigation. Having done so, we find no ground to
interfere with the Single Judge’s conclusions sustaining the award up to
Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore).
22. While Clause 20 did not make Neycer an insurer of GMB’s project for five
years, Neycer’s extreme contention that it had no enforceable obligation
whatsoever under the Agreement, and its challenge regarding the date
of sanction of the term loan, responsibility for the tunnel kiln, and
deputation of a senior technician under Clause 10, essentially invite us
to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute our own interpretation of
the Agreement for that of the Umpire.
th
23. By Addendum No. 1 dated 26 June, 1987, the parties consciously
substituted the word “Collaborators” for “Consultants” throughout the
Agreement. They incorporated specific assurances regarding the
achievement of guaranteed optimum production in Clause 12 and the
timely fulfilment of obligations in Clause 18. On the question of when
the 18-month period under Clause 20 commenced, the Umpire
construed Clause 20 alongside Clause 14(b) (which referred to a
communication issued by one or the other financial institutions
approving in principle the grant of term loan assistance) and Paragraph
30
2.15 of the Project Feasibility Report (prepared at Neycer’s instance,
which stated that commissioning was expected to be completed within

30
Ext. G-111
Page 13 of 19

18 months from the date of receiving the Letter of Intent from financial
institutions sanctioning the term loan). On that basis, the Umpire held
th 31
that the Letter of Intent dated 19 May, 1987 issued by Industrial
Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) as the lead institution (which carried
a specific sanctioned code number and set out the term loan allocations
of IFCI, Industrial Development Bank of India, and ICICI Bank)
constituted sanction of the term loan, and that the 18-month period
th st
expired on 19 November, 1988 and stood mutually extended up to 31
January, 1989.
24. Similarly, on a detailed appraisal of the oral testimony and documentary
rd th 32
evidence, including the Minutes dated 3 and 5 December, 1988 , the
33
report of SPB Projects and Consultancy Ltd. (SPB-PC) (which recorded
that SPB-PC undertook the procurement, coordination, and installation
of the tunnel kiln “on behalf of M/s. NCRL”), and contemporaneous
correspondence, the Umpire found as a fact that GMB had not defaulted
in delivering the equipment, that commissioning of the plant as a whole
occurred only upon trial production in August 1989 resulting in a delay
st
of seven months from the extended date of 31 January, 1989, and that
Neycer failed to retain a senior technician of general supervisory level at
the site after the change of management in August 1988 despite
repeated requests (Mr. U. Sarkar, Senior Vice President of Neycer, having
st
joined GMB as a full-time employee only on 1 January, 1990 after the

31
Ext. G-81
32
Ext. G-28
33
Ext. G-120
Page 14 of 19

project had already suffered, and GMB having validly objected under
Clause 10 to the suitability of an outside freelancer, Mr. Jagannatha Rao,
belatedly proposed by Neycer in September 1989). As the Single Judge
rightly held, these findings are based on a plausible construction of the
Agreement and appreciation of the evidence on record, and do not
disclose any error apparent on the face of the award.
25. Neycer’s reliance on Clause 13 is equally unavailing. The stipulation in
Clause 13 that Neycer shall not be called upon to provide additional
funds in the event of an overrun merely capped Neycer’s obligation to
contribute capital as a co-promoter at Rs.18,00,000/- (Rupees eighteen
lakh); it did not immunise Neycer from liability for damages resulting
from a breach of its contractual obligations.
26. As regards the 1993 amendments to the Statement of Claim, the Umpire
held, relying on settled legal principles, that the amendments merely
revised and recast the quantification of damages flowing from the same
breaches already pleaded without introducing a new cause of action, a
view which the Single Judge found not to be erroneous on the face of
the record. More importantly, once the total award is restricted to the
original reference limit of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore), the
sustained claims under Schedule ‘A’ [Rs.39,14,910/- (Rupees thirty-nine
lakh fourteen thousand nine hundred ten)], Schedule ‘D’
[Rs.1,23,61,000/- (Rupees one crore twenty-three lakh sixty-one
thousand), which was in fact reduced from the original claim of
Rs.1,99,43,000/- (Rupees one crore ninety-nine lakh forty-three
Page 15 of 19

thousand)], and Schedule ‘E’ [restricted by the Single Judge to
Rs.37,24,090/- (Rupees thirty-seven lakh twenty-four thousand ninety),
well below the original unamended claim of Rs.1,87,22,000/- (Rupees
one crore eighty-seven lakh twenty-two thousand)] fall well within the
original unamended claim figures, rendering Neycer’s grievance
regarding the inflation of claims through the 1993 amendments—as well
as its contention regarding the subsequent waiver of loan interest under
GMB’s One-Time Settlement with its lenders in 2011-12, which pertained
to Schedule ‘F’—academic.
27. Specifically, the awards sustained by the Single Judge under Schedule
‘A’ [Rs. 39,14,910/- (Rupees thirty-nine lakh fourteen thousand nine
hundred ten) towards idle establishment, personnel, and utility
expenses proportionately for the 7-month delay from February to August
1989, the item-wise figures whereof were not disputed before the
Umpire], Schedule ‘D’ [Rs. 1,23,61,000/- (Rupees one crore twenty-
three lakh sixty-one thousand) towards losses suffered on account of
discounts and lower price realisation due to Neycer’s failure to provide
marketing and sales assistance under Clause 16], and Schedule ‘E’ [loss
of profit assessed based on the Project Feasibility Report prepared at
Neycer’s instance, scaled down by the Single Judge from
Rs.3,46,45,000/- (Rupees three crore forty-six lakh forty-five thousand)
to Rs.37,24,090/- (Rupees thirty-seven lakh twenty-four thousand
ninety) so as not to exceed the permissible limit of Rs.2,00,00,000/-
(Rupees two crore)] are supported by evidence on record and do not
Page 16 of 19

suffer from any infirmity warranting interference under Section 30 of the
Act. As rightly held by the Single Judge, relying upon Upper Ganges
34
Valley Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. U.P. Electricity Board , the
claims under the different Schedules being distinct and severable, the
valid portion of the award up to Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore)
was rightly sustained after severing the invalid excess.
28. To end, Neycer’s reliance on the order of the Appellate Authority for
th
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR) dated 11 February,
th
2003 and the BIFR’s Modified Rehabilitation Scheme (MS-08) dated 6
October, 2008, does not furnish a ground under Section 30 of the Act to
set aside the award. In any event, Paragraph 11.1 of MS-08 treated
GMB’s claim as an uncrystallized contingent liability pending the High
Court proceedings. It required Neycer/its promoters to infuse funds to
meet the same upon crystallisation so that the scheme would not be
derailed. Neycer’s own financial statements placed on record continued
to reflect the arbitral award as a contingent liability even after the repeal
of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. We,
therefore, find no justification to scale down the principal sum of
Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) sustained by the Single Judge.
29. However, we take note of the fact that pursuant to this Court’s interim
nd th
orders dated 22 November, 2018 and 7 January, 2019, Neycer
deposited a sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) on account of
the principal amount and a further sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two

34
(1973) 1 SCC 254
Page 17 of 19

crore) by way of interest, and the entire sum of Rs.4,00,00,000/-
(Rupees four crore) was withdrawn by GMB in January 2019. Having
regard to the fact that the dispute between the parties has spanned over
nearly four decades during which both companies underwent industrial
sickness, and considering that the principal sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/-
(Rupees two crore) sustained by the Single Judge along with an equal
sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) towards interest has
already been paid by Neycer and realised by GMB, we deem it just and
proper to direct that the said payment of Rs.4,00,00,000/- (Rupees four
crore) already received by GMB shall be treated as full and final
satisfaction of the award as modified by the Single Judge (both towards
principal and interest), and no further amount shall be recoverable by
either party from the other under the award.
30. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned judgment is set aside and the
th
judgment and order of the Single Judge dated 14 October, 2015
restricting the award to a principal sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two
crore) is restored. The sum of Rs.4,00,00,000/- (Rupees four crore),
comprising Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) each towards principal
and interest, deposited by the appellant and withdrawn by the
nd
respondent pursuant to the order of this Court dated 22 November,
2018, shall stand adjusted in full and final satisfaction of the award as
modified by the Single Judge. The undertaking furnished by the
respondent shall stand discharged.

Page 18 of 19

31. These civil appeals are, accordingly, disposed of.
32. Connected application(s), if pending, shall stand disposed of.
33. In the circumstances, parties are left to bear their own costs.


………………….………………….J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)





……………….…………………….J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 18, 2026.

Page 19 of 19