M/S RKTC-PHIL (JV) vs COAL INDIA LIMITED

Court: Chhattisgarh High Court
Case type: WRIT PETITION ALL ORDERS CIVIL RELATED TO OTHER MATTER
Decided on: 27-03-2026

<div> 1 2026:CGHC:14472-DB NAFR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2026.03.30 10:59:27 +0530 BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 1251 of 2026 M/S RKTC-PHIL (JV) Registered Office HIG 07, Sector- 02, Behind Madan Complex, Shankar, Nagar, Raipur, Chhattisgarh Through Rohit Kumar Sinha, The Assistant Account Manager And Authorized Signatory S/o Late S.K. Sinha, Aged About 40 Years R/o MIG-30 R.P. Nagar, Housing Board Colony, Phase -II Niharika, Korba Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - Coal India Limited Head Office Coal Bhawan, Premise No. 04, MAR Plot No. AF III, Action Area, 1A New Town, Rajarhat, Kolkata , -700156 2 - South Eastern Coal Field Limited, Through General Manager (Civil/HOD), S.E.C.L. Seepat Road, Bilaspur (C.G.) -495006 3 - The Chairman - Cum Managing Director, S.E.C.L. Seepat Road, Bilaspur (C.G.) - 495006 ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr.Bhaskar Payasi, Advocate For Respondents : Ms.Fouzia Mirza, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr.Vaibhav Shukla, Advocate Hon’ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board 2 Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 27/03/2026 1. Heard Mr.Bhaskar Payasi, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Ms.Fouzia Mirza, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr.Vaibhav Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. The petitioner has prayed for the following relief(s): “10.1 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records in relation to the case of the petitioner from the Respondent authorities. 10.2 This Hon'ble Court be kindly be pleased to set- aside/quash the Annexure P/1 dated 10.03.2026 passed by the Respondent no1 disqualifying the petitioner in the technical bid. 10.3 This Hon'ble Court be kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to allow the petitioner to participate in the final bid. 10.4 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief(s), which is deemed fit and proper in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. Facts of the case are that the Respondent, S.E.C.L., floated NIT No. GM(C)/SECL/BSP/e-T_TK/Amadand-CHP/2025-26/12 dated 22.10.2025 for Planning, Design, Engineering, Construction, Fabrication, Erection, Supply, Installation, Testing, Trial Run, and Commissioning of a Coal Handling Plant (CHP), including Operation & Maintenance (O&M) during a Defect Liability Period (DLP) of five (5) years, on a turnkey basis at Amadand OCP (4.00 MTY) of Jamuna & Kotma Area (Tender ID No. 2025_SECI_346075_1). 3 Seven tenderers, including the Petitioner, submitted their respective bids in response to the aforesaid NIT. Clause 8.4(A) of the NIT provides that the intending tenderer must have experience, in its own name, of successfully completing similar works during the last ten (10) years ending on the last day of the month preceding the one in which bid applications are invited. The clause further stipulates that such experience must satisfy any one of the following criteria: (i) three similar completed works, each costing not less than 20% of the estimated cost; or (ii) two similar completed works, each costing not less than 25% of the estimated cost; or (iii) one similar completed work costing not less than 40% of the estimated cost. 4. The NIT defines “Similar Nature of Work” to include design, supply, installation, construction, and commissioning of Integrated Coal Handling Plants (CHP) or other bulk material handling systems with conveyor systems, Rapid Loading Systems (RLS), Unit Train Loading Systems (UTLS), RCC or structural steel silos, bunkers, surge bins or burden hoppers with conveyor systems, or any plant including CHP or bulk material handling systems with conveyor systems, as well as work identical in name and nature to the tendered work. It is further specified that conveyor systems include belt conveyors, pipe conveyors, high-angle conveyors, and chain conveyors. The NIT further requires that the intending tenderer submit documentary evidence in support of the aforesaid experience in the form of copies of work orders and completion certificates indicating the value and period of work, and that TDS certificates may be submitted during 4 clarification, if required. The Petitioner duly submitted all requisite experience documents with respect to similar work involving design, supply, installation, construction, and commissioning of a coal washery, clearly indicating the quantum and period of work in Annexure B, along with the tender documents. It is noteworthy that the conditions relating to work experience do not 5. state anywhere that a work order issued by one department or unit of a company to another department or unit of the same company would not be considered valid experience. Respondent No. 1 disqualified the technical bid of the Petitioner on grounds which are not expressly provided in the NIT, as reflected in the impugned decision annexed as Annexure P/1 . The reason stated for disqualification is that the bidder was required to submit copies of work orders and work completion certificates issued by the employer indicating the value and period of work. There is no stipulation in the relevant clause of the NIT requiring that such documents must mandatorily be issued by an “employer,” nor has any corrigendum or clarification been issued by the Respondents to this effect. The NIT does not define or explain the phrase “issued by employer,” nor does it state that any certificate not issued by an employer would be invalid. In the present case, the work order and completion certificate 6. submitted by the Petitioner pertain to work assigned by one wing of the company, namely the Washery Unit, to another wing, namely the Civil/Construction Unit. It cannot be held that work involving 5 construction, design, supply, and installation assigned internally between distinct wings of the same company should be disregarded, especially in the absence of any specific prohibition in the NIT. The Respondents cannot assign vague and baseless reasons for disqualification without citing any specific clause, provision, or condition of the NIT, particularly when the Petitioner is otherwise technically qualified. Clause 14(b) of the NIT mandates that the Tender Committee shall furnish information online clearly indicating any shortcomings or omissions and allow seven (7) days’ time for submission of clarifications. In the present case, there has been a gross violation of the aforesaid provision, as no opportunity or intimation was provided to the Petitioner regarding any alleged shortcomings in the documents submitted. The Petitioner submitted a representation dated 14.03.2026 via email as well as speed post to the Respondents, raising its grievance. In the said representation, the Petitioner specifically stated that all requisite experience certificates had been duly submitted and that the rejection appeared to be hyper-technical in nature, and requested an opportunity to justify and substantiate its credentials, as well as a request to open its price bid on a provisional basis. No response has been received from the Respondents to the aforesaid representation till date. Hence, this petition. 7. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the impugned action of the Respondent authority is wholly illegal, arbitrary, erroneous, and contrary to the terms of the NIT as well as settled principles of law. It 6 is submitted that the Petitioner has duly furnished valid and sufficient experience certificates in accordance with the eligibility criteria prescribed under the NIT, thereby fully qualifying for the technical bid. It is further submitted that the work order and completion certificate relating to work executed by RKTC Infratech Ltd. (Coal Washery Unit), which was assigned to its Civil/Construction wing for construction, installation, design, and commissioning of a coal washery with a conveyor system, clearly demonstrate the Petitioner’s requisite experience in similar nature of work. Similarly, the work order and completion certificate pertaining to PHIL Coal Beneficiation Pvt. Ltd. (Coal Washery Unit), assigned to its Civil/Construction wing for execution of similar works, also establish the technical capability and experience of the Petitioner in handling such projects. Learned counsel submits that there is no legal prohibition or restriction on a company assigning work from one of its specialized units to another unit or division possessing the requisite expertise. Such internal allocation of work is a recognized and valid business practice and cannot be a ground for disqualification. It is contended that the reasons assigned by the Respondents for 8. disqualification of the technical bid are vague, unsustainable, and devoid of any reference to a specific clause or provision of the NIT, thereby rendering the impugned action arbitrary and legally untenable. It is further submitted that the Respondents have acted arbitrarily in presuming that the experience certificates submitted by the Petitioner are not valid for the purpose of technical qualification, 7 despite there being no such disqualification criterion in the NIT. Learned counsel draws attention to the circular relating to “Guidelines for e-Procurement of Works and Services, 2023,” particularly Chapter 2, Clause 7.6(1), which mandates that public authorities, including subsidiaries of Coal India Limited, should keep the experience criteria broad-based so as to enable participation of bidders having experience in similar nature of work across various sectors. The impugned action is contrary to the spirit and mandate of the said guidelines. It is submitted that the Respondents have adopted a hyper-technical approach in rejecting the Petitioner’s bid, which is discriminatory, unreasonable, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel further submits that, in the impugned decision itself, the Respondent authority has categorically recorded that the NIT does not stipulate any requirement regarding “employer” or “end user.” This admission clearly establishes that the ground taken for disqualification is dehors the terms of the NIT and hence unsustainable. It is contended that the observations made by the SECL Tender Committee in the evaluation document are merely based on subjective interpretation and are not supported by any express provision of the NIT. Such interpretation cannot be used to disqualify an otherwise eligible bidder. It is further submitted that the Respondents have failed to consider that the experience certificates and completion certificates issued by an Independent Chartered Engineer, in respect of work assigned internally between different wings of the bidder companies (including JV partners), adequately 8 demonstrate execution capability and technical competence equivalent to that of any other bidder. Therefore, the rejection of the Petitioner’s technical bid on such untenable and extraneous grounds is arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of the Petitioner’s fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the 9. respondents opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitoners and submits that for work experience biddeers required to submit copy of work order, work completion certificate indicating value and period of work, issued by the employer against the Experience of similar work containing all the information as sought on-line. In case of Sub-contractor suitable document as per provision of eligibiity, if applicable. She further submits that the action of the Respondent authority in disqualifying the Petitioner from the technical bid is lawful, justified, and in consonance with the terms and conditions of the NIT, and therefore does not call for any interference by this Court. It is submitted that the mere submission of work experience certificates issued by one department or unit of a company to another department or unit of the same company does not constitute valid experience for the purpose of technical qualification. Learned Senior Advocate contends that the term “employer,” as contemplated under the NIT, necessarily refers to an independent and external entity, distinct from the bidder itself. The requirement of submission of work order and completion certificate 9 issued by the employer inherently presupposes an arm’s-length relationship between the contracting parties. It is further submitted that acceptance of the Petitioner’s contention that internal certificates issued between different units of the same company constitute valid experience would defeat the very object and purpose of prescribing eligibility criteria in a public tender. Learned Senior Advocate submits that, in such a situation, the Evaluation Committee would not be in a position to fairly and objectively assess the experience and capability of the bidder, as such internal certificates are susceptible to fabrication, manipulation, or procurement without actual execution of the work. It is further contended that there exists a legal embargo in recognizing work certificates issued internally within the same company. A company, being a single legal entity, cannot enter into a contract with itself, and its departments or units do not possess separate legal personality. Consequently, no valid employer- contractor relationship can arise between different units or departments of the same company, and any work purportedly executed under such internal arrangements cannot be treated as valid “completed work” for the purpose of meeting the experience criteria. Learned Senior Advocate further submits that, in the present case, the work experience certificate relied upon by the Petitioner has not been issued by any independent employer or project authority. On the contrary, the said certificate has been issued by a third-party Chartered Engineer engaged by the bidder itself, which lacks the element of independence and objectivity required for such 10 certification. It is submitted that such certification effectively amounts to self-certification by the bidder, which is not legally permissible and cannot be equated with a work completion certificate issued by an independent employer. Learned Senior Advocate submits that the requirement of certification by an independent employer is fundamental to ensuring transparency, authenticity, and credibility in the tender evaluation process. It is therefore submitted that the Evaluation Committee has rightly rejected the Petitioner’s technical bid on valid and reasonable grounds, and the said decision is neither arbitrary nor contrary to the provisions of the NIT. In view of the above, it is prayed that the present petition, being devoid of merit, be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the NIT document and other documents appended writ petiton and also perused the return filed by the respondnets. 11. The principal issue which arises for consideration is whether the experience certificates submitted by the Petitioner, issued internally between different units/departments of the same company and certified by a Chartered Engineer engaged by the bidder, satisfy the eligibility criteria prescribed under the NIT. 12. It is not in dispute that the NIT requires submission of copies of work orders and completion certificates indicating the value and period of work, issued by the “employer” against the experience of similar work. Though the NIT does not expressly define the term “employer,” 11 the same must be interpreted in the context of a public procurement process, which necessarily demands objectivity, transparency, and independent verification of credentials. 13. This Court finds merit in the submission advanced by learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents that the term “employer” inherently denotes an independent and external entity, distinct from the bidder. The requirement of submission of experience certificates issued by the employer presupposes the existence of an arm’s-length contractual relationship between two legally distinct entities. In the present case, the experience certificates relied upon by the 14. Petitioner pertain to work allegedly executed by one unit/department of a company for another unit/department of the same company. Admittedly, such units or departments do not possess independent legal status separate from the company itself. A company, being a single legal entity, cannot enter into a contract with itself, and therefore, no valid employer-contractor relationship can be said to exist in such internal arrangements. 15. In absence of such a relationship, any work purportedly executed internally cannot be equated with “completed work” for the purposes of satisfying eligibility conditions in a competitive tender process. Accepting such internal certifications would dilute the sanctity of the tender conditions and undermine the level playing field required to be maintained amongst bidders. 16. This Court also finds substance in the contention that permitting 12 internal experience certificates would render the evaluation process susceptible to manipulation, as such documents may not carry the same degree of credibility and independent verification as those issued by an external employer. Further, it is an admitted position that the experience certificate relied upon by the Petitioner has not been issued by any independent employer or project authority, but by a Chartered Engineer engaged by the bidder itself. Such certification, in the considered view of this Court, lacks the element of independence and amounts, in effect, to self-certification, which cannot be treated at par with a completion certificate issued by an employer in the ordinary course of business. 17. The scope of judicial review in tender matters is limited. Unless the decision-making process is shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, or in violation of statutory or contractual provisions, this Court would be slow to interfere. In the present case, the decision of the Evaluation Committee appears to be based on a reasonable and plausible interpretation of the tender conditions and is aimed at ensuring fairness and transparency in the process. 18. This Court does not find the impugned action to be arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. On the contrary, the rejection of the Petitioner’s technical bid is founded upon valid considerations and cannot be said to suffer from any illegality warranting interference under writ jurisdiction. The Apex Court, in the matter of Banshidhar Construction Pvt. 19. 13 Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Others , {Civil Appeal No. 11005 OF 2024, decided on 04.10.2024}, taking note of the decisions rendered in various other celebrated judgments, observed as under:- “21. There cannot be any disagreement to the legal proposition propounded in catena of decisions of this Court relied upon by the learned counsels for the Respondents to the effect that the Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal in the matter of award of contracts and it merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made; and that the Government and its instrumentalities must have a freedom of entering into the contracts. However, it is equally well settled that the decision of the government/ its instrumentalities must be free from arbitrariness and must not be affected by any bias or actuated by malafides. Government bodies being public authorities are expected to uphold fairness, equality and public interest even while dealing with contractual matters. Right to equality under Article 14 abhors arbitrariness. Public authorities have to ensure that no bias, favouritism or arbitrariness are shown during the bidding process and that the entire bidding process is carried out in absolutely transparent manner. 22. At this juncture, we may reiterate the well-established tenets of law pertaining to the scope of judicial intervention in Government Contracts. 23. In Sterling Computers Limited vs. M/s. M & N 1 Publications Limited and Others , this Court while dealing with the scope of judicial review of award of contracts held: - “18. While exercising the power of judicial review, in respect of contracts entered into on behalf of the State, the Court is concerned primarily as to whether there has been any infirmity in the “decision making process”. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [(1982) 3 All ER 141] where it was said that: (p. 144a) 1 (1993) 1 SCC 445 14 “The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court.” By way of judicial review the court cannot examine the details of the terms of the contract which have been entered into by the public bodies or the State. Courts have inherent limitations on the scope of any such enquiry. But at the same time as was said by the House of Lords in the aforesaid case, Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [(1982) 3 All ER 141] the courts can certainly examine whether “decision-making process” was reasonable, rational, not arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.” 2 24. In Tata Cellular vs. Union of India , this Court had laid down certain priniciples for the judicial review of administrative action. “94. The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. 2 (1994) 6 SCC 651 15 (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. Based on these principles we will examine the facts of this case since they commend to us as the correct principles.” 25. It has also been held in ABL International Limited and Another vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation 3 of India Limited and Others , as under: - “53. From the above, it is clear that when an instrumentality of the State acts contrary to public good and public interest, unfairly, unjustly and unreasonably, in its contractual, constitutional or statutory obligations, it really acts contrary to the constitutional guarantee found in Article 14 of the Constitution.” 4 26. In Jagdish Mandal vs. State of Orissa and Others , this Court after discussing number of judgments laid down two tests to determine the extent of judicial interference in tender matters. They are: - “22. (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached;” (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or 3 ( 2004) 3 SCC 553 4 (2007) 14 SCC 517 16 imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.” 27. In Mihan India Ltd. vs. GMR Airports Ltd. and 5 Others , while observing that the government contracts granted by the government bodies must uphold fairness, equality and rule of law while dealing with the contractual matters, it was observed in Para 50 as under: - “50. In view of the above, it is apparent that in government contracts, if granted by the government bodies, it is expected to uphold fairness, equality and rule of law while dealing with contractual matters. Right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India abhors arbitrariness. The transparent bidding process is favoured by the Court to ensure that constitutional requirements are satisfied. It is said that the constitutional guarantee as provided under Article 14 of the Constitution of India demands the State to act in a fair and reasonable manner unless public interest demands otherwise. It is expedient that the degree of compromise of any private legitimate interest must correspond proportionately to the public interest.” 28. It was sought to be submitted by the learned Counsels for the Respondents relying upon the observations made in Central Coalfields Limited and Another vs. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium) and 6 Others , that whether a term of NIT is essential or not is a decision taken by the employer which should be respected. However, in the said judgment also it is observed that if the employer has exercised the inherent authority to deviate from the essential term, such deviation has to be made applicable to all the bidders and potential bidders. It was observed in Para 47 and 48 as under:- “47. The result of this discussion is that the issue of the acceptance or rejection of a bid or a bidder 5 ( 2022) SCC OnLine SC 574 6 (2016) 8 SCC 622 17 should be looked at not only from the point of view of the unsuccessful party but alsofrom the point of view of the employer. As held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] the terms of NIT cannot be ignored as being redundant or superfluous. They must be given a meaning and the necessary significance. As pointed out in Tata Cellular [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651] there must be judicial restraint in interfering with administrative action. Ordinarily, the soundness of the decision taken by the employer ought not to be questioned but the decision-making process can certainly be subject to judicial review. The soundness of the decision may be questioned if it is irrational or mala fide or intended to favour someone or a decision “that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached” as held in Jagdish Mandal [Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517] followed in Michigan Rubber [Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216]. 48. Therefore, whether a term of NIT is essential or not is a decision taken by the employer which should be respected. Even if the term is essential, the employer has the inherent authority to deviate from it provided the deviation is made applicable to all bidders and potential bidders as held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v.International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] . However, if the term is held by the employer to be ancillary or subsidiary, even thatdecision should be respected. The lawfulness of that decision can be questioned on very limited grounds, as mentioned in the various decisions discussed above, but the soundness of the decision cannot be questioned, otherwise this Court would be taking over the function of the tender issuing authority, which it cannot.” 20. Recently, the Apex Court in the matter of M/S. Steag Energy 18 Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. GSPC Pipavav Power Company Ltd. (GPPC) & Ors. {SLP (C) No(S).30209-30210 of 2025}, decided on 25.03.2026 held that the final choice is of the owner, and it is for the owner to take the final decision with necessary flexibility and pragmatism. While exercising judicial review of contractual matters, constitutional courts do not exercise, should not exercise ex-ante jurisdiction to pre-empt executive actions. On this count, High Court has exceeded the first principle of judicial restraint in contractual matters. 21. Applying the well settled proposition of law to the facts of this case, we do not find any merit in this petition and the petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed in this petition. As such, the writ petition is dismissed . No order as to cost. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Bablu </div>