MRS. SHRUTI SOOD ALIAS SHRUTI BANERJI, vs MRS. SARITA BANERJI,
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
- 1 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
R
TH
DATED THIS THE 24 DAY OF APRIL, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO
WRIT PETITION NO.5971 OF 2026 (GM-FC)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.4443 OF 2026 (GM-FC)
IN WP No.5971/2026
BETWEEN:
MRS. SHRUTI SOOD ALIAS SHRUTI BANERJI,
W/O LATE AMIT BANERJI
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
EMBASSY CASABELLA,
R/O NO.001, GROUND FLOOR,
NO.28/1, KASTURBA ROAD,
LAVELLE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
…PETITIONER
Digitally signed
by
VIJAYALAKSHMI
B N
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
(BY SRI. ANANT MANDGI, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI.AMIT A MANDGI.,ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. MRS. SARITA BANERJI,
W/O OF LATE MONO BRATA BANERJI
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS OLD,
2. MRS. PREETI BANERJI CHOPRA,
D/O OF LATE MONO BRATA BANERJI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS OLD,
BOTH THE ABOVE MENTIONED PERSONS ARE
RESIDING AT VILLA 127,
PRESTIGE GOLFSHIRE,
NANDI HILL ROAD, KARAHALLI POST,
KUNDANA HOBLI, TALUK DEVANAHALLI,
BENGALURU,
KARNATAKA- 562 164.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. SANTOSH S.GOGI, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1 AND R2)
- 2 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED
12/01/2026 PASSED BY THE LEARNED V ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE,
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT SITTING AT DEVANAHALLI IN
PROCEEDINGS BEARING G AND WC NO. 15010 OF 2025 WHICH HAD
DISMISSAL IA NO. V FILED BY THE PETITIONER HEREIN (ANNX-A)
AND CONSEQUENTLY, TO ALLOW IA NO. V FILED BY THE
PETITIONER HEREIN.
IN WP NO.4443/2026
BETWEEN:
MRS. SHRUTI SOOD @ SHRUTI BANERJI,
W/O LATE AMIT BANERJI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
EMBASSY CASABELLA,
R/O NO.001, GROUND FLOOR,
NO.28/1, KASTURBA ROAD,
LAVELLE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. ANANT MANDGI, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI.AMIT A MANDGI.,ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. MRS. SARITA BANERJI,
W/O OF LATE MONO BRATA BANERJI
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS OLD,
2. MRS. PREETI BANERJI CHOPRA,
D/O OF LATE MONO BRATA BANERJI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS OLD,
BOTH THE ABOVE MENTIONED PERSONS ARE
RESIDING AT: VILLA 127,
PRESTIGE GOLFSHIRE,
NANDI HILL ROAD, KARAHALLI POST,
KUNDANA HOBLI, TALUK DEVANAHALLI,
BENGALURU,
KARNATAKA- 562 164.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. SANTOSH S.GOGI, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1 AND R2)
- 3 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASHING THE COMMON
ORDER DATED 12.01.2026 PASSED BY THE LEARNED V
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT
SITTING AT DEVANAHALLI IN PROCEEDINGS BEARING G AND
W.C. NO. 15010 OF 2025 WHICH HAD ALLOWED I.A. NO. III
FILED BY THE RESPONDENTS.
THESE PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 27.03.2026 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO
CAV ORDER
The W.P.No.5971/2026 is filed challenging the order
dated 12.01.2026 passed by the learned V Additional District
Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, sitting at Devanahalli (‘the
Family Court’ for short), in G & W.C.No.15010/2025, whereby
I.A.No.5 filed by the petitioner came to be dismissed, seeking
issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the said order and
consequently to allow I.A.No.5.
The W.P.No.4443/2026 is filed to issue writ of certiorari
and quash the impugned order dated 12.01.2026 passed by the
learned V Additional District Judge, Bengaluru Rural District,
sitting at Devanahalli (‘the Family Court’ for short), in G &
- 4 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
W.C.No.15010/2025, whereby I.A.No.III filed by the
respondents herein came to be allowed.
2. The petitioner herein/mother is the respondent
before the family Court and the respondents herein are the
petitioners before the Family Court.
3. The petitioner herein is the mother of the minor
child and the respondent No.1 herein is the grand mother and
respondent No.2 is the Aunt of the minor child.
4. For convenience of reference, the parties herein are
referred to as per their rankings before this Court.
5. The brief facts of the case are that:-
The petitioner is the wife of late Mr. Amit Mono Banerji.
Their marriage was solemnized on 29.03.2009 at Mumbai as
per Hindu rites and customs and was registered on 03.07.2010
under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Out of the wedlock, a
daughter, namely Ms. Riya Banerji, was born on 20.06.2012.
The petitioner asserts that she is the natural guardian of the
minor child under Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956. The respondent No.1 is the mother of
- 5 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
the deceased and respondent No.2 is the sister of the
deceased.
6. After the marriage, the petitioner and her husband
commenced their matrimonial life at rented premises at
Meenakshi Residency, Arekere, Bengaluru, and thereafter
resided at various rented accommodations in Bengaluru. At the
time of marriage, the deceased was employed as a Senior
Corporate Executive with Accenture (India), Bengaluru. In
October 2011, respondent No.1 shifted from Delhi to Bengaluru
and, according to the petitioner, continuously interfered in the
marital life of the couple, even after the birth of the minor child
in June 2012.
7. It is stated that the deceased ventured into
business from the year 2014 by co-founding Aperon Realty
Private Limited with one Mr. Vikas Katoch, and in 2015 started
Purpleyo Technologies Private Limited with one Mr. Karan
Chopra. Both ventures failed. In 2017, the deceased co-
founded TableSpace Technologies Private Limited along with
Mr. Kunal Mehra, Mr. Srinivas Prasad and Mr. Karan Chopra,
which subsequently achieved considerable commercial success.
- 6 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
It is relevant that respondent No.2 is married to the said Mr.
Karan Chopra.
8. From 01.09.2018 to 31.03.2023, the petitioner and
the deceased resided in a rented apartment bearing Flat
No.001 at Embassy Casabella, Bengaluru, which, owing to the
attachment of the family and out of affection towards the
petitioner, was later purchased in her name by a registered
Sale Deed dated 03.04.2023. In mid-2023, an apartment
bearing No.304 at Van Gogh’s Garden, Bengaluru, was allotted
to the deceased by TableSpace Technologies Private Limited,
where the petitioner, the minor child and respondent No.1
resided from June 2023. On 14.06.2023, the deceased also
purchased Villa No.127 at Prestige Golfshire, Devanahalli, which
was furnished by mid-2024.
9. It is the case of the petitioner that the deceased
suffered from serious ailments affecting his liver and lungs and
had longstanding habits of excessive smoking and alcohol
consumption, which intensified after the success of TableSpace
Technologies Private Limited post-2017. Despite repeated
requests by the Petitioner, the deceased continued such habits,
resulting in deterioration of his health and behavioural changes,
- 7 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
including irritability and marital discord.In mid-2024, owing to
his illness and mental condition, the deceased advised the
petitioner and the minor child to reside at the Van Gogh
residence so as to insulate them from his condition, while he
resided at the Golfshire villa. The petitioner states that she
periodically ensured that the minor child stayed with the
deceased at the Golfshire villa and, during such visits, found
him in an inebriated and unstable condition.
10. The deceased passed away on 06.01.2025 due to
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Thereafter, the
petitioner, the minor child and respondent No.1 resided at Villa
No.127, Prestige Golfshire. During his lifetime the deceased,
had amassed substantial assets and was holding the position of
Founder Chairman, Director and Chief Executive Officer of
TableSpace Technologies Private Limited. It is stated that after
the demise of the deceased, disputes arose between the
petitioner and respondents regarding the estate. According to
the petitioner, respondents, under the influence of respondent
No.2 and her husband Mr. Karan Chopra (who assumed control
as Chairman, Co-CEO and Director of TableSpace Technologies
Private Limited), sought to compel the petitioner to accept an
- 8 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
unfavourable and minimal share in the estate and exerted
continuous pressure upon her and her parents.
11. In this background, the petitioner, for herself and
on behalf of the minor child, instituted P&SC No.3/2025 on
02.05.2025 before the Principal Senior Civil Judge and JMFC,
Devanahalli seeking a succession certificate. The said
proceedings were intimated to TableSpace Technologies Private
Limited by letter dated 03.05.2025.Immediately thereafter, on
05.05.2025, a notice was caused to be issued in the name of
TableSpace Technologies Private Limited by Mr. Karan Chopra
calling upon the petitioner to vacate the Van Gogh residence
within 72 hours, followed by a reminder notice dated
07.05.2025 issued within 48 hours. The petitioner vacated the
premises on 08.05.2025.The petitioner thereafter instituted a
partition suit in O.S. No.68/2025 before the competent Court at
Devanahalli, wherein an ex parte ad interim order dated
15.05.2025 was granted restraining Respondent No.1 and
TableSpace Technologies Private Limited from alienating the
schedule properties.
12. On 29.05.2025, respondents No.1 and 2 instituted
proceedings under Sections 7 and 10 of the Guardian and
- 9 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
Wards Act, 1890 (‘the G & WC Act’ for short) in
G&W.C.No.15010/2025 seeking to be appointed as guardians of
the person and property of the minor child and also seeking
injunction restraining the petitioner from interfering with
custody. Along with the said petition, I.A.No.II under Section
12 of the Act and I.A. No.III under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2
CPC were filed.On 31.05.2025, the learned District and
Sessions Judge, Bengaluru Rural (Vacation Bench) passed an
ex parte order of temporary injunction restraining the petitioner
from forcibly interfering with the custody of the minor child.
The proceedings were subsequently transferred and
renumbered before the learned V Additional District Judge,
Bengaluru Rural, Devanahalli.
13. The petitioner entered appearance on 16.06.2025
and filed her statement of objections and I.A.No.V under Order
XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC seeking to vacate the ex parte order
dated 31.05.2025. On 08.07.2025, the petitioner filed a
counter claim under Sections 7, 17 and 25 of the G & WC Act,
r/w. Sections 6 and 13 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship
Act, 1956 seeking to be declared as guardian and for
permanent custody of the minor. The respondents filed their
objections on 21.07.2025 and 06.08.2025, and the petitioner
- 10 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
filed objections to I.A.No.II filed by the respondents herein
under section 12 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 to
appoint them as guardian of person and property of minor
child, Ms.Riya Banerji, on 21.08.2025 . During the pendency of
the proceedings, the minor child was interviewed by the Family
Court on 29.11.2025.
14. Based on the pleadings, oral and documentary
evidence, the Family Court by order dated 12.01.2026, allowed
I.A. No.III filed by the respondents and dismissed I.A.No.V filed
by the petitioner, thereby continuing the restraint against the
petitioner and denying her visitation. Aggrieved by the said
common order, the petitioner has filed present writ petition.
15. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner in both
the petitions would contend that the proceedings have been
initiated by the grandmother and aunt seeking custody of the
minor child as against the mother, who is the natural guardian,
physically and mentally fit, and fully capable of safeguarding
the welfare and best interests of the child. Further contended
that the impugned order is in contravention of Section 6 of the
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, which recognises
the mother as the natural guardian after the father, and the
- 11 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
Family Court has failed to give due weight to such statutory
mandate.
16. It is contended that the Family Court has failed to
consider the pleadings and documents placed on record,
including the fact that the minor child was in the continuous
care and custody of the petitioner from birth till May 2025, and
that the petitioner has attended to all aspects of the child’s
upbringing, including medical care, vaccinations, school
admission, payment of fees, attendance at parent-teacher
meetings, co-curricular activities and overall social and
emotional development, including care taken during the COVID
period in 2020.The Family Court has erred in allowing I.A.
No.III without adjudicating the competing applications for
custody, including I.A.No.II filed by the respondents and the
applications filed by the petitioner, thereby rendering the said
applications, including those seeking custody, visitation and
communication (I.A. Nos. VI to X), infructuous.
17. It is contended that respondent No.1 is aged about
74 years and suffers from age-related ailments including blood
pressure issues and is not in a position to attend to the daily
needs of the minor child, who is engaged in academic and co-
- 12 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
curricular activities such as tennis and dance, whereas
respondent No.2 has her own family obligations. The petitioner
asserts that she is financially, socially and emotionally capable
of caring for the minor, who, being a girl in her adolescent age,
requires the care and company of her mother. The petitioner
further contends that she was residing with the minor child till
May 2025 at both the Van Gogh residence and Golfshire villa,
and that she was forcibly evicted from the Van Gogh residence
pursuant to notices dated 05.05.2025 and 07.05.2025 issued at
the instance of respondent No.2’s husband. The respondents
threatened to restrain her from entering the Golfshire villa,
thereby alienating her from the minor child with intent to gain
control over the estate of the deceased.
18. It is further contended that the guardianship
proceedings instituted by the respondents are a counterblast to
the succession proceedings in P&SC No.3/2025 and the
partition suit in O.S.No.68/2025, and are intended to control
and usurp the share of the minor child in the estate of the
deceased, rather than being in the welfare of the child. The
petitioner challenges the reliance placed by the Family Court on
the interview of the minor child conducted on 29.11.2025,
contending that the child had been separated from the
- 13 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
petitioner for over seven months since May 2025 and was
under the exclusive custody and influence of the respondents,
giving rise to a strong possibility of tutoring and undue
influence. It is further contended that the child, having lost her
father and being separated from her mother, could have
undergone emotional distress, which was not considered. It is
also contended that the interview was conducted in the absence
of parties and their counsel.
19. It is further contended that the Family Court has
erred in denying visitation rights to the petitioner till the
completion of the child’s examinations in June 2026 without
any pleadings or material, thereby facilitating continued
alienation of the child from the mother and rendering pending
applications infructuous. The impugned order is contrary to
settled judicial precedents of the Apex Court and this Court,
which consistently hold that custody of a minor child ordinarily
rests with the parent, particularly the mother, unless
compelling circumstances exist.
20. In support of his contentions learned Senior
counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance on the
following judgments:-
- 14 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
•
Vivek Singh v. Romani Singh reported in AIR 2017
SC 929;
•
G Prabhudev and others v. Ranganayaki and
others reported in ILR 2025 2779;
31. From the legal position noticed above, the principles
governing the custody of the children can be summarised as
under:
(i) Custody of the child is distinct from guardianship;
(ii) The paramount consideration to determine the custody of
the child is the welfare of the child and not the rights of the
litigating parties;
(iii) Better financial resources and/or the love for the child may
be one of the relevant considerations, but it cannot be the sole
determining factor for the custody of the child;
(iv) "What is the wish/desire" of the child is different and
distinct from "what would be in the best interest of the child".
The wish/desire of the child can be ascertained through
interaction. The question as to "what would be the best interest"
is to be decided by the Court taking into account all the relevant
circumstances;
(v) A heavy duty is cast on the Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously in the background of all the relevant facts and
circumstances bearing in mind the welfare of the child as the
paramount consideration;
T. Tirumala Reddy and others v. APSEB Engineers
Association, Hyd and others reported in
MANU/AP/0552/1998
3. We are of the view that the preliminary objection
raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the CMA is
- 15 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
not maintainable has to be upheld. The learned Counsel for the
respondent has relied upon the Division Bench decision of this
Court in S. Elisha v. World Missionary Evangelism of India and
others MANU/AP/0886/1996: 1997 (4) ALD 604, wherein it was
held that the order passed by the Principal District Judge in the
original petition under Section 11 of the Act is not a decree
within the meaning of Section 2(2) CPC and, therefore, it is not
appealable either under Section 96 CPC. The learned Counsel for
the appellant has rightly contended that the said decision has no
application here. The learned senior Counsel for the appellant,
while clarifying his stand that the impugned order passed by the
Chief Judge, City Civil Court is not a decree, has, nevertheless,
contended that it is an appealable order under Order XLIII Rule
1 CPC. I is the contention of the learned Counsel for the
appellant that the application was filed under Order XXXIX Rules
1 and 2 CPC for injunction and the said application having been
allowed, an appeal lies under Section 104 read with Order XLIII
Rule 1 CPC. As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the
appellant, the decision relied upon by the respondent's Counsel
has no direct application. At the same time, we are of the view
that the impugned order is not appealable under Order XLIII
Rule 1 CPC either. It is true that the application was purportedly
filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. But the said
provision applicable to suits and appeals, cannot be projected
into the provisions of the Act unless is an enabling provision
which makes the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code
applicable. It must be noted that the Principal District Court (in
this case Chief Judge, City Civil Court) is exercising a jurisdiction
conferred by a special Act and it is not the ordinary jurisdiction
under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. The provisions
of Civil Procedure Code including Order XXXIX Rule 1 cannot be
made ipso facto applicable to the proceedings before the said
Court under a special Act merely because the Court which has
seisin of the matter is the Principal Civil Court of the district. This
is not to say that the Act, though skeletal in nature, precludes
- 16 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
any application for interim relief including an injunction being
sought by the aggrieved party if it relates to a matter concerning
the management or dissolution of the society. It is well settled
that the Court or a Tribunal which has Jurisdiction to try or
enquire into a matter, has all incidental and ancillary powers so
as to effectuate the substantive pose of powers conferred on the
Court or Tribunal. The power to enquire into and dispose the
application filed under Section 11 of the Act carries with it, in our
view, the incidental or ancillary power to grant an interim order
to prevent miscarriage of justice. Such power is; in our view, an
adjunct to the power of adjudication conferred on the Court
under Section 11 of the Act. That being the legal, position, we
cannot view the interlocutory application filed by the respondent
as an application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 CPC though a wrong
provision was cited, In reality and in substance, it must be
deemed to be an application filed under Section 11 of the Act
itself and the Court is empowered to pass appropriate orders
thereon in exercise of its incidental power as clarified above.
When once it is held that the application is not traceable to
Order XXXIX Rule 1 CPC and the order passed thereon is not
really an order felling under Order XXXTX, Rule 1 CPC. Order
XLIII Rule 1 CPC cannot be invoked for preferring an appeal We,
therefore, uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss the Civil
Miscellaneous Appeal as not maintainable.
•
The High Court of Karnataka v. Union of India by
division bench order dated 15.12.2025 passed in
W.P.No.24360/2023; and
•
Child Access and Custody Guidelines Along with
Parenting Plan by The Hon’ble High Court of
Calcutta .
- 17 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
21. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents
would contend that respondent No.1–grandmother possesses
the requisite capacity and calibre to maintain and care for the
minor child and has been providing a stable environment after
the demise of the child’s father. It is submitted that the
respondents have approached the Family Court seeking
appointment as guardians in the interest of the welfare of the
minor.
22. It is further contended that the injunction was
sought only to ensure continuity and stability in the life of the
minor child, particularly in view of her academic schedule. It is
submitted that the child had her examinations in April 2026 and
any disturbance at that stage would have been detrimental to
her academic interests.
23. It is also submitted that the respondents are not
opposed to the petitioner meeting the child and have expressed
willingness to facilitate visitation rights after completion of the
examinations in April 2026, and that the interim arrangement
was only to safeguard the welfare of the minor child.
24. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents
would contend that:-
- 18 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
•
Mohd. Irshad and Another v. Nadeem
reported in 2023 SCC Online Del 5394.
•
Sheila B Das v. P.R Sugasree reported in
(2006) 3 SCC 62.
•
Shazia Aman Khan and Another v. State of
Orissa and Others reported in (2024) 7 SCC
564.
•
Keshav R Thakur and Another v. Suchhibai
reported in (2005) 9 SCC 424.
•
Smt. Archana Pradhan v. State of
Karnataka in W.H.C No.79 of 2023, The
Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka.
•
Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi
Aggarwal reported in 2024 SCC Online SC
847.
25. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and
perused the material on record.
26. Having considered the rival contentions and upon
perusal of the material placed on record, it is evident that the
impugned order is one of temporary injunction arising out of an
application filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC.
Though the proceedings arise under the Guardian and Wards
Act, 1890 and are not strictly governed by the CPC wherein
principles underlying Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, namely
existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and
irreparable injury, are required to be satisfied. These
- 19 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
requirements are not diluted merely because the proceedings
arise under a special statute.
27. The petitioner is the natural mother of the minor
child. The present dispute is not between two natural
guardians, but between the mother on the one hand and the
grandmother and aunt on the other. This distinction is of
significance and must inform the approach of the Court while
considering interlocutory relief. An order of injunction at the
interlocutory stage cannot be passed in a manner that
completely excludes a natural parent from access to the child.
Such exclusion can be justified only where the material on
record discloses prima facie unfitness of the parent or a real
and imminent risk to the welfare of the minor.
28. The petitioner, being the mother, is the natural
guardian within the meaning of Section 6 of the Hindu Minority
and Guardianship Act, 1956, while remaining subject to the
paramount consideration of welfare of the minor. Though the
impugned order does not expressly displace such status, its
effect is to substantially curtail the petitioner’s ability to
exercise the incidents of natural guardianship. By continuing an
order of injunction which restrains the petitioner from access to
- 20 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
the minor child for a prolonged period, the Family Court has, in
substance, diluted the statutory recognition accorded under
Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 at
the interlocutory stage. In a situation where the dispute is not
between two natural guardians, any order resulting in complete
exclusion of the mother must be supported by compelling
circumstances demonstrable from the record.
29. No such exceptional circumstance is discernible in
the present case. The material placed on record does not
indicate any prima facie unfitness on the part of the petitioner
nor any imminent risk to the welfare of the minor child so as to
justify total denial of access. The contention of the respondents
that continuity and stability in the child’s routine, particularly in
view of academic examinations, necessitated such restraint
cannot be accepted to the extent of supporting a blanket denial
of access. At the highest, such considerations may warrant
regulation of interaction, but not complete exclusion. The
submission that visitation may be deferred until completion of
examinations effectively results in denial of access for a
substantial period and cannot justify continuance of the present
restraint. The care giving role of respondent No.1 is a relevant
factor but cannot, at this stage, justify total exclusion of the
- 21 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
natural parent. In such circumstances, the requirements of
prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury,
as governing grant of injunction, are not satisfied.
30. It is also to be noted that though the Family Court
has interacted with the minor child, such interaction, at the
interlocutory stage, is only one of the relevant factors and
cannot be treated as determinative, particularly when the child
has been in the exclusive custody of respondents herein for a
considerable period. The possibility of influence, coupled with
the emotional circumstances arising from the loss of a parent,
necessitates a cautious approach in placing reliance on such
interaction at this stage. While such interaction is a relevant
factor, it cannot override other material considerations at the
interlocutory stage.
31. The Apex Court in Vivek Singh v. Romani Singh
has emphasised that arrangements which result in exclusion of
a parent, particularly the mother, from the life of a growing
child are detrimental to the child’s welfare and may give rise to
parental alienation. Though the said principle was laid down in
the context of final custody determination, it equally informs
interim arrangements. An interlocutory order resulting in
- 22 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
complete denial of maternal access must therefore be viewed
with circumspection, as it carries the potential of causing
irreversible emotional consequences.
32. Further, the Co-ordinate bench of this Court in G.
Prabhudev v. Ranganayaki has reiterated that the welfare of
the child is to be assessed in a holistic manner, balancing
emotional, psychological and developmental needs. An
arrangement which, at the interlocutory stage, places the child
exclusively within the domain of one set of relatives to the
complete exclusion of the natural parent is prima facie
inconsistent with such holistic assessment.
33. It is no doubt true that the Family Court possesses
incidental and ancillary powers to grant interim reliefs in
proceedings under the Guardian and Wards Act, as recognised
in T. Tirumala Reddy v. APSEB Engineers Association .
However, the exercise of such power must remain within the
limits of interlocutory jurisdiction. It cannot be employed to
create a situation which virtually determines custody or
excludes a natural guardian in the absence of compelling
justification.
- 23 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
34. In the considered view of this Court, the impugned
order, insofar as it continues a restraint resulting in complete
denial of access to the petitioner–mother, cannot be sustained
and is liable to be set aside. The nature of the impugned
restraint being absolute, it is not amenable to modification and
is liable to be set aside. It is clarified that setting aside the
injunction does not, by itself, determine custody but only
vacate the restraint on access.
35. At the outset, it is required to be noticed that the
impugned order arises out of proceedings under the Guardian
and Wards Act, 1890, wherein the Family Court exercises a
special jurisdiction. Though the impugned order pertains to
grant of an interim injunction, the nature of the proceedings
and the source of power are not strictly traceable to the
provisions of the CPC. In such circumstances, and particularly
where the interlocutory order results in serious civil
consequences affecting the rights of a natural guardian, this
Court is satisfied that the present writ petitions are
maintainable in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, especially
when the challenge is to the legality and propriety of the order
and not to re-appreciation of disputed facts.
- 24 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
36. In the result, this Court proceeds to pass the
following:
ORDER
(i) The writ petitions are allowed .
(ii) The impugned common order dated
12.01.2026 passed in G & W.C.No.15010/2025,
insofar as it allows I.A.No.III and rejects I.A.No.V, is
hereby set aside.
(iii) The order of injunction restraining the
petitioner–mother from access to the minor child
stands vacated.
(iv) It is clarified that this Court has examined
the matter only to the extent of the legality of the
injunction.
(v) The questions relating to custody, visitation
and appointment of guardian shall be decided by the
Family Court after full-fledged trial, in accordance
with law and uninfluenced by any observations made
herein.
(vi) All contentions are kept open.
Ordered accordingly.
- 25 -
WP No. 5971 of 2026
C/W WP No. 4443 of 2026
Pending IA’s if any, shall stand disposed of.
SD/-
(DR.K.MANMADHA RAO)
JUDGE
BNV