RAJENDRA KUMAR VERMA vs SHRIMATI KOMAL VERMA

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CGHC010174122025 2026:CGHC:45666-DB
NAFR
PAWAN
KUMAR
JHA
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally
signed by
PAWAN
KUMAR JHA
FA(MAT) No. 165 of 2025
Rajendra Kumar Verma S/o Shri Devendra Kumar Verma Aged About 41
•
Years Presently Residing At E.W.S. 36, In Front Of Bafna Mangalam,
Padmanabhpur, Tehsil And District Durg, Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant/ Applicant
versus
• Shrimati Komal Verma W/o Rajendra Vermam D/o Shri Bhagwati Prasad
Verma Aged About 39 Years R/o Plot No. 988/5, Ispat Nagar, Near Karma
Bhavan, Ward Number 63, Risali, Bhilai Tehsil And District Durg,
Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent/ Non-applicant
For Appellant : Mr. Ashwin Panickar, Advocate
For Respondent : None, though served.
Division Bench
Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge
Hon'ble Smt. Sushma Sawant, Judge
JUDGMENT ON BOARD
Per Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge
28/10/2026
1. This appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short
“Act of 1984”) is filed by appellant questioning the legality and sustainability
of the impugned judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No. 933/2024
dated 15.04.2025 by learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Durg (C.G.),
whereby the suit/ application filed by appellant under Section 13 (1) (i-a) of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short “Act of 1955”) seeking decree of
divorce was dismissed.

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2. Brief facts of the case, as projected by the appellant/plaintiff before the
Family Court, are that:-
( a ) Marriage of appellant with the respondent/ defendant was solemnized
on 29.06.2012 according to Hindu rites and customs. Out of their wedlock,
two daughters, namely, Bhavya Verma and Riddhi Verma, were born in the
years 2013 and 2023, respectively. It is pleaded that, soon after the
marriage, respondent started quarrelling with him and his family members
over trivial matters. She insisted him on living separately from his parents
and pressurized him to seek partition in the family property. Even after
several efforts by him and his family members to maintain matrimonial
harmony, conduct of the respondent continued.
( b ) Appellant further pleaded that, due to continuous matrimonial disputes
between them, he submitted a written application before the community
head on 09.08.2024, seeking separation from the respondent. On
20.08.2024, respondent also submitted a written application expressing her
willingness to live separately from him. Thereafter, on 23.08.2024, the
respondent left the matrimonial home along with their younger daughter,
and the appellant informed this fact to the concerned police station. The
respondent subsequently returned to the matrimonial home, and on
13.09.2024, the parties executed an agreement before a Notary, in
presence of witnesses, expressing their consent to live separately.
( c ) It was further pleaded that the appellant had been residing separately
from the respondent for a considerable period and that repeated efforts of
reconciliation by their family members and community elders had failed.
According to him, respondent continued to reside at the matrimonial home
with children and was unwilling to agree to a divorce by mutual consent,
despite earlier agreement between the parties. Appellant pleading that the
matrimonial relationship had deteriorated beyond reconciliation and that

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the respondent's conduct had caused him mental agony, he instituted a
suit under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955, seeking dissolution of the
marriage on the ground of cruelty.
3. Respondent/ defendant did not appear before the Family Court and the
written statement is also not filed on her behalf, she has been proceeded
ex parte.
4. Appellant in support of application under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of
1955 filed before the trial court has examined himself as PW-1 and
submitted his affidavit under Order XVIII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. He reiterated the allegations made in his application
regarding frequent quarrels, interference of the respondent's parental
family, pressure to live separately from his parents and the alleged threats
given to him. He also relied upon the documents ie., marriage registration
certificate as Ext. P-02(c), marriage card as Ext. P-03, rent agreement
dated 18.09.2024 as Ext. P-05(c), applications submitted before the
community head, the agreement dated 13.09.2024 as Ext. 04(c), the police
complaint, police station Nevai dated 23.08.2024 as Ext. P-06(c).
5. Learned trial Court based on the pleadings made has formulated as many
as two issues for consideration and upon considering the evidence brought
in record, observed that although the appellant had alleged frequent
disputes between the parties, the allegations regarding mental and
physical cruelty had not been established by reliable evidence. It further
observed that the appellant and the respondent were residing separately
on account of their matrimonial disputes, but such circumstances, by
themselves, were not sufficient to grant a decree of divorce on the ground
of cruelty and has dismissed the suit by the impugned judgment and
decree, against which this appeal is filed.

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6. Learned counsel for appellant would submit that learned trial Court fell into
error in dismissing the suit filed by appellant/plaintiff without appreciating
the evidence brought in record by the appellant/plaintiff in appropriate
manner. It is submitted that the learned Family Court failed to properly
appreciate the evidence adduced by the appellant in support of the
grounds of cruelty. Appellant examined himself before the Family Court,
and reiterated the material averments made in the plaint and specifically
stated about the conduct of the respondent which caused him continuous
mental agony. He would submit that the Family Court failed to appreciate
that the respondent had herself agreed to reside separately from the
appellant and had also expressed her willingness to dissolve the marriage
by mutual consent, but subsequently withdrew from the said arrangement.
It is further submitted that the parties have been residing separately for a
considerable period and that repeated matrimonial disputes have made
their relationship practically impossible to continue. Learned counsel would
also submit that the respondent remained absent throughout the
proceedings before the Family Court and did not controvert the pleadings
and evidence of appellant. Learned Family Court, therefore, ought to have
considered these circumstances cumulatively while deciding whether the
conduct complained of, constituted cruelty within the meaning of Sections
13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned
judgment and decree be set aside and a decree of divorce be granted. In
support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the judgment passed by
the Kerala High Court in Beena M.S. v. Shino G. Babu , passed in Mat.
Appeal No. 43 of 2020, decided on 04.02.2022.
7. There is no appearance on behalf of respondent even after service of
notice in the present appeal, and has been proceeded ex parte .

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8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record
available before this Court.
9. The issue involved for consideration in this appeal before this Court is
whether the appellant has been able to establish that the respondent-wife
treated him with cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act
of 1955, so as to entitle him to a decree of divorce.
10. At the outset, it is relevant to note that the proceedings before the Family
Court were ex parte. However, merely because the respondent did not
appear and contest the proceedings, the allegations made by the appellant
could not automatically be accepted as proved. The appellant was still
required to establish the alleged matrimonial cruelty by leading cogent and
reliable evidence. An ex parte proceeding does not relieve the appellant of
the burden of proving the ground on which dissolution of marriage is
sought.
11. The expression "cruelty" occurring in Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955
has to be understood in the context of the matrimonial relationship. There
cannot be any fixed formula for determining mental cruelty. The Court has
to consider the nature of the conduct complained of, the circumstances in
which it occurred, its effect upon the other spouse and the matrimonial
relationship as a whole.
12. It is a well-settled principle of law that burden of proving allegation of
cruelty lies squarely on the parties who seeks dissolution of marriage on
that ground. Mere making of allegations in the pleadings is not sufficient;
the party asserting cruelty must establish the same by leading clear,
cogent, reliable, and legally admissible evidence before the Court. The
standard of proof in such cases is based on the preponderance of
probabilities; however, the evidence produced must be of such nature that
it inspires confidence and is capable of convincing the Court that the

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conduct complained of amounts to cruelty within the meaning of law. Vague
assertions, general allegations, or unsubstantiated statements, without
supporting material, cannot form the basis for granting a decree of divorce.
13. In the present case, the allegation made by appellant is alleged that the
respondent used to quarrel with him and his parents over trivial matters,
pressurize him to live separately from his parents and demand partition of
the family property. He has also alleged that the respondent and her
parental family threatened of lodging with false criminal cases and
termination of his employment. However, on a careful examination of his
affidavit and statement before the Family Court, it appears that the
allegations are substantially general in nature. No specific particulars of the
alleged incidents, their dates or the circumstances in which such conduct
caused serious mental agony to the appellant have been satisfactorily
established.
14. The mere fact that matrimonial disputes arose between the parties or that
they frequently quarrelled with each other would not, by itself, constitute
cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955. The
conduct complained of must be assessed in the facts and circumstances of
each case to determine whether it has attained such a degree of
seriousness as to make it unreasonable for the aggrieved spouse to
continue the matrimonial relationship.
15. Appellant relied upon the agreement dated 13.09.2024, Ext.P-07(c),
executed between the parties before a Notary in presence of witnesses,
whereby they agreed to reside separately and expressed their intention to
pursue divorce by mutual consent in accordance with law to contend that
initially the respondent-wife agreed to dissolve the marriage, but
subsequently withdrew from the said arrangement, which caused him
mental agony as alleged. The aforesaid document is merely an agreement

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executed between the parties before a Notary and is not a petition
presented before the competent Court under Section 13-B of the Act of
1955. Thus, no judicial proceeding for dissolution of marriage by mutual
consent had been instituted on the basis of the said document. Even
otherwise, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain ,
reported in (2009) 10 SCC 415 , has explained that mutual consent for
dissolution of marriage under Section 13-B of the Act of 1955 must
continue until the passing of the decree and either party is entitled to
withdraw such consent before the decree is passed and further held thus:
“ 27. In all the subsequent cases, the Supreme Court
invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of
the Constitution of India in order to do complete justice
to the parties when faced with a situation where the
marriage ties had completely broken and there was no
possibility whatsoever of the spouses coming together
again. In such a situation, this Court felt that it would be
a travesty of justice to continue with the marriage ties.
28. It may, however, be indicated that in some of the
High Courts, which do not possess the powers vested in
the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution,
this question had arisen and it was held in most of the
cases that despite the fact that the marriage had broken
down irretrievably, the same was not a ground for
granting a decree of divorce either under Section 13 or
Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
29. In the ultimate analysis the aforesaid discussion
throws up two propositions. The first proposition is that
although irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not one
of the grounds indicated whether under Sections 13 or
13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for grant of
divorce, the said doctrine can be applied to a proceeding
under either of the said two provisions only where the
proceedings are before the Supreme Court. In exercise
of its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution the Supreme Court can grant relief to the
parties without even waiting for the statutory period of
six months stipulated in Section 13-B of the aforesaid
Act. This doctrine of irretrievable breakdown of
marriage is not available even to the High Courts which
do not have powers similar to those exercised by the

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Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution.
Neither the civil courts nor even the High Courts can,
therefore, pass orders before the periods prescribed
under the relevant provisions of the Act or on the
grounds not provided for in Sections 13 and 13-B of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.”
16. In the present case, therefore, the mere fact that the respondent
subsequently did not proceed in accordance with the said agreement or
withdrew from her earlier willingness to dissolve the marriage by mutual
consent cannot, by itself, be construed as an act of cruelty. Appellant is
required to establish some independent conduct on the part of the
respondent amounting to cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-a) of
the Act of 1955. In absence of such proof, the aforesaid agreement and the
subsequent conduct alleged by the appellant cannot constitute a sufficient
ground for dissolution of marriage.
17. Another circumstance relied upon by the appellant is that he has been
residing separately from the respondent and that the parties have been
unable to resume their matrimonial relationship. In this regard, it is relevant
to examine the appellant's own pleadings and evidence. Perusal of
pleading made in the application would show that appellant has stated that
due to matrimonial disputes, he was compelled to reside separately from
the respondent for a considerable period. Similar statements have been
made in his evidence in-chief submitted in the form of affidavit under Order
XVIII Rule 4 of the CPC. However, neither the application nor his evidence
discloses any specific date from which the appellant and respondent
allegedly started residing together in the separate rented accommodation.
The rent agreement (Exhibit P-5C), relied upon by the appellant would
show that the agreement was executed on 18.09.2024 between the
landlord and the appellant, whereby the premises were let out to the
appellant for a period of eleven months. Though the agreement mentions
the commencement of the tenancy period from 01.05.2024 and its

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continuation up to 31.03.2025, the document itself was executed on
18.09.2024. It is also relevant to note that the agreement shows the
appellant alone as the tenant and does not establish that the respondent-
wife had also been residing with him in the said accommodation from the
commencement of the alleged tenancy. Further, the application under
Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955 was filed on 23.09.2024, i.e., merely
five days after execution of the aforesaid rent agreement. Thus, even if the
appellant's case regarding his separate rented accommodation is taken
into consideration, the material available on record does not establish the
specific period during which the parties actually resided together in the said
premises or the date from which the respondent allegedly started treating
him with cruelty therein.
18. In absence of any specific statement in the pleadings and evidence
regarding the commencement of such joint residence, the date mentioned
in the rent agreement, by itself, cannot be treated as proof that the parties
had been residing together in the rented accommodation since 01.05.2024.
More so when, the appellant has not produced any independent material to
establish that the respondent resided with him in the said premises and
subjected him to cruelty during that period.
19. In the facts of the present case, though the proceedings before the Family
Court were ex parte , a perusal of the affidavit submitted under Order XVIII
Rule 4 of the CPC and the appellant's examination before the Court would
show that there is no specific mention of the date on which he and the
respondent-wife started residing together in the separate rented
accommodation. The rent agreement is dated 18.09.2024, whereas the
application under Section 13 of the Act of 1955 was filed on 23.09.2024.
Thus, there was hardly any interval between the execution of the rent
agreement and institution of the divorce proceedings. Even otherwise, the

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document does not establish that the respondent-wife actually resided with
the appellant in the said rented premises from the date of commencement
of the tenancy. Therefore, the contention of appellant regarding separate
residence cannot be accepted as sufficient proof of cruelty. There was also
no reasonable period, on the basis of the material placed on record, to
ascertain that the respondent, even after commencing residence in the
rented accommodation, had treated the appellant with cruelty. The
evidence of appellant, therefore, does not establish the necessary factual
foundation for the relief sought by him.
20. There are material gaps in the appellant's own version regarding the period
of separate residence. On one hand, he has made a general assertion that
the parties had been residing separately for more than one and a half
years, whereas the rent agreement relied upon by him was executed only
on 18.09.2024. Although the agreement mentions an earlier
commencement date, there is no specific pleading or evidence explaining
when the parties actually shifted to the rented accommodation or whether
they ever resided there together. Thus, the material relied upon by him
does not sufficiently corroborate his assertion of prolonged separate
residence on account of the respondent's conduct which amounted to
cruelty. Appellant, having sought a decree of divorce on the ground of
cruelty, did not come with clean hands, he was expected to disclose the
material facts clearly and establish them through reliable evidence.
21. It is also well settled that matrimonial disputes are civil in nature and the
facts alleged by a party are required to be established on the standard of
preponderance of probabilities. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. N.G.
Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane , (1975) 2 SCC 326 , has held that the word
"satisfied" occurring in the matrimonial statute means satisfaction on a
preponderance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt. The

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Court has to examine whether the circumstances brought on record, taken
collectively, are sufficient to reasonably establish such allegations.
22. In the present case, the allegations made by the appellant are general in
nature and the material allegations regarding conduct of respondent,
quarreling with him and his family members, pressurizing him to live
separately from the family member, and other acts of harassment without
any independent or supporting evidence does not by itself establish that
the conduct of the respondent amounted to mental cruelty within the
meaning of Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955. Cruelty, particularly
mental cruelty, has to be determined upon consideration of the entire
matrimonial relationship and the cumulative effect of the conduct
complained of. Ordinary wear and tear of matrimonial life or mere
incompatibility between the spouses would not, by itself, be sufficient to
grant a decree of divorce.
23. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Gurbux Singh v. Harminder Kaur ,
( 2010) 14 SCC 301 observed thus:
“ 16. The married life should be assessed as a whole
and a few isolated instances over certain period will
not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be
precedent for a fairly lengthy period where the
relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because
of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, one party finds
it extremely difficult to live with the other party no
longer may amount to mental cruelty. Making certain
statements on the spur of the moment and expressing
certain displeasure about the behaviour of elders may
not be characterised as cruelty. Mere trivial irritations,
quarrels, normal wear and tear of married life which
happens in day to day life in all families would not be
adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty.
Sustained unjustifiable and reprehensible conduct
affecting physical and mental health of the other
spouse may lead to mental cruelty. Both the appellant
and the respondent being highly qualified persons, the
appellant being Principal in ITI College, the
respondent working as a Librarian in a government

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institute, an isolated friction on some occasion like
festival of lohri even in the presence of others cannot
be a valid ground for dissolving the marriage.”
24. In order to examine the cruelty, the principles laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in case of Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh , (2007) 4 SCC
511, would be a relevant guideline wherein the Court has indicated certain
illustrative instances at para 101 whereby the inference of mental cruelty
can be drawn. Para 101 reads as under :-
“101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for
guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate
some instances of human behaviour which may be
relevant in dealing with the cases of “mental cruelty”.
The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs
are only illustrative and not exhaustive:
( i ) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the
parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as
would not make possible for the parties to live with
each other could come within the broad parameters of
mental cruelty.
( ii ) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire
matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly
clear that situation is such that the wronged party
cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct
and continue to live with other party.
( iii ) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount
to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of
manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a
degree that it makes the married life for the other
spouse absolutely intolerable.
( iv ) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of
deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse
caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead
to mental cruelty.
( v ) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating
treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render
miserable life of the spouse.
( vi ) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of
one spouse actually affecting physical and mental
health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of
and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very
grave, substantial and weighty.

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( vii ) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect,
indifference or total departure from the normal standard
of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or
deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental
cruelty.
( viii ) The conduct must be much more than jealousy,
selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness
and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a
ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental
cruelty.
( ix ) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and
tear of the married life which happens in day-to-day life
would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the
ground of mental cruelty.
( x ) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and
a few isolated instances over a period of years will not
amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for
a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has
deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and
behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it
extremely difficult to live with the other party any
longer, may amount to mental cruelty.
( xi ) If a husband submits himself for an operation of
sterilisation without medical reasons and without the
consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly, if the
wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical
reason or without the consent or knowledge of her
husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental
cruelty.
( xii ) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse
for considerable period without there being any
physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to
mental cruelty.
( xiii ) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after
marriage not to have child from the marriage may
amount to cruelty.
( xiv ) Where there has been a long period of continuous
separation, it may fairly be concluded that the
matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage
becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By
refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not
serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows
scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the
parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental
cruelty.”

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25. In Samar Ghosh’s case ( supra ), Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held
that cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case and
may depend upon social status, customs, tradition, religious belief, human
values and value system. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and
tear of the married life which happens in day to day life would not be
adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.
26. The fact that the respondent did not appear before the Family Court and
was proceeded ex parte would not automatically entitle the appellant to a
decree of divorce. Even in an ex parte proceeding, the appellant was
required to establish the statutory ground pleaded by him by producing
acceptable evidence. Appellant has to stand on his own legs and he
cannot take advantage of weakness of respondent. The learned Family
Court, therefore, cannot be said to have committed any error in examining
the evidence produced by the appellant and determining whether the
allegations of cruelty were proved.
27. It is also relevant that the parties have two daughters out of their wedlock
and the appellant himself has stated that their maintenance and other
expenses are being borne by him. However, the existence of matrimonial
disputes or the fact that the parties are living separately cannot be treated
as sufficient grounds for dissolution of marriage unless the statutory
requirement of cruelty is established. Similarly, the plea of irretrievable
breakdown of marriage, raised in the grounds of appeal, cannot
independently form the basis for granting a decree of divorce under
Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955. The relief sought in the present
proceedings is specifically founded upon cruelty, and the appellant has
failed to establish the same. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a
ground for grant of divorce under the Act of 1955.

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28. The jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family
Courts Act, 1984 requires consideration of the correctness of the judgment
and decree passed by the Family Court on the basis of the material
available on record. On such consideration, we find that the learned Family
Court has appreciated the oral and documentary evidence led by the
appellant and has recorded a finding that the allegations of cruelty were
not proved. The said finding is based upon the evidence available on
record and no material has been shown to us which would warrant
interference with the same.
29. In the facts of the present case, the evidence brought by the appellant
does not establish conduct of such nature as would constitute matrimonial
cruelty within the meaning of provisions of Section 13(1) of the Act of 1955.
30. In the light of aforesaid law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, if we
examine facts of instant case, we find that whatever conduct/ behaviour of
respondent-wife has been alleged as cruelty by appellant-husband, is not
found to be proved by the appellant to that of a degree to grant decree of
divorce on the ground of cruelty.
31. The decision relied upon by learned counsel for appellant in Beena M.S.
(supra) is distinguishable on its own facts, as therein the parties had been
living separately since 2017, their matrimonial incompatibility was evident
from the initial stage of marriage and was supported by substantial
documentary and oral evidence, and other material showing the emotional
distress and deteriorated relationship between them. An application
seeking dissolution of marriage is required to be considered only with
reference to the statutory grounds envisaged under Section 13(1)(i-a) and
(i-b) of the Act of 1955, namely, cruelty and desertion, respectively, and it is
for the party seeking dissolution of marriage to plead and establish the
particular ground on which such relief is claimed. In the present case, the

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appellant has sought dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, but
has failed to establish the same by reliable evidence.
32. For the foregoing discussions, the appeal, being devoid of merit, is liable to
be and is hereby dismissed accordingly. The impugned judgment and
decree dated 15.04.2025 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family
Court, Durg, in Civil Suit No. 933/2024 are hereby affirmed.
33. All pending applications are disposed off.
A decree be drawn up accordingly.
Parties to bear their respective cost.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Parth Prateem Sahu) (Sushma Sawant)
Judge Judge
pwn