Punjab State Warehousing Corporation Chandigarh On Chd And Ors vs Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal And Anr

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CWP-6489-2020 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
(237) CWP-6489-2020 (O&M)
Date of decision: November 11, 2026
PUNJAB STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION CHANDIGARH
AND ORS
...Petitioners
Versus
PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, BATHINDA AND
ANR
...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH
Present: Mr. Karan Singla, Advocate
for the petitioners.
None for respondent No.2-workman.

KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL)
1. The petitioner-Corporation has invoked the jurisdiction of this
Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, assailing the
award dated 18.09.2019 (Annexure P-1), passed by the Industrial Tribunal,
Bathinda, in Reference No.47 of 2013, whereby the reference was answered
in favour of respondent No.2-workman and the petitioner-Corporation was
directed to reinstate him with continuity of service and 25% back wages.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners-management
contends that the impugned award proceeds on an erroneous appreciation of
the facts and the material available on record. It is submitted that respondent
No.2-workman was initially engaged as a helper on daily-wage basis for 89
days in the year 1989 and was thereafter engaged on contractual basis from
time to time. His last engagement was pursuant to office order dated
20.02.2001, for the period from 08.08.2000 to 22.09.2001, on a consolidated
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salary of Rs.5,500/- per month. The terms of engagement specifically
stipulated that his services could be dispensed with at any time without
notice. It is further the case of the management that the workman himself
stopped attending duties with effect from 19.09.2001 and, consequently, his
services were never terminated by the management.
3. Learned counsel further submits that the workman raised the
industrial dispute after an inordinate delay of nearly 12 years, by issuing a
demand notice only on 25.10.2012, despite the alleged cessation of his
services having taken place in September 2001. It is pointed out that the
workman had earlier instituted Civil Suit No.162-1, dated 28.09.2001,
challenging the alleged termination, which was dismissed vide judgment and
decree dated 25.04.2008. The appeal preferred against the said judgment was
also dismissed on 15.01.2009. It is contended that the workman neither
furnished any satisfactory explanation for the delay nor disclosed the earlier
civil proceedings before the learned Tribunal.
4. Learned counsel also submits that the learned Tribunal failed to
appreciate the applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), inasmuch as the workman's
contractual engagement had come to an end upon expiry of the stipulated
period. It is argued that the mere completion of 240 days of service could
not, by itself, render the cessation of his engagement illegal. Accordingly,
the impugned award deserves to be set aside.
5. There is no appearance on behalf of respondent No.2-workman.
A perusal of the record shows that no one has been appearing on behalf of
respondent No.2 since 03.04.2025.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the
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relevant material on record.

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7. The principal questions arising for consideration are whether
the cessation of the workman's services was covered by the exception
contained in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act and whether the finding of illegal
retrenchment recorded by the learned Tribunal, in the face of the contractual
terms and the evidence available on record, calls for interference. The
objection regarding delay in raising the industrial dispute also requires
consideration.
8. The case of the management before the learned Tribunal was
that the workman had been engaged on contractual basis from time to time
and was lastly engaged for the period from 08.08.2000 to 22.09.2001, vide
office order dated 20.02.2001. It was specifically pleaded that his services
could be dispensed with at any time without notice and that, upon expiry of
the contractual period, his services automatically came to an end. The
management further asserted that the workman himself had abandoned his
duties with effect from 19.09.2001.
9. However, the evidence led by the management assumes
significance. MW-1, Sarabjit Singh, Junior Technician, during his cross-
examination, admitted that the workman had served the Corporation from
08.08.2000 to 19.09.2001 and had worked for more than 240 days in the
relevant calendar year. He further admitted that no notice, enquiry or
compensation had been given to the workman before dispensing with his
services. Significantly, the witness also admitted that it was pursuant to the
directions of the higher authorities that the services of the workman had
been dispensed with.
10. The aforesaid admissions have to be considered in their entirety.
While the management sought to attribute cessation of service to
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abandonment and expiry of the contractual period, its own witness admitted

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that the services of the workman were dispensed with pursuant to directions
of the higher authorities. This admission lends material support to the
workman's case that cessation of service was attributable to the management
and was not merely an automatic consequence of expiry of the contractual
engagement.
11. It is true that the last appointment order stipulated a contractual
period ending on 22.09.2001. However, the management's own case was that
the workman had stopped attending duties from 19.09.2001, i.e. before
expiry of the stipulated period. Thus, the question was not merely whether
the contractual period had expired, but whether the cessation of service was,
in fact, a consequence of non-renewal of the contract or was brought about
by the management before its expiry. The Tribunal was required to consider
the contractual stipulation in the light of the actual circumstances in which
the workman's services came to an end.
12. Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act excludes from the definition of
retrenchment termination of service resulting from non-renewal of the
contract of employment upon its expiry or termination in accordance with a
stipulation contained therein. The mere description of an engagement as
contractual, therefore, does not by itself establish that every cessation of
service would fall within the said exception. The nature of the engagement
and the circumstances in which the services actually came to an end are
material considerations.
13. In Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation Ltd.
v. Mamni, (2006) 9 SCC 434 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the
applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act in the context of contractual
employment. The provision has to be applied with reference to the nature of
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the engagement and the circumstances surrounding cessation of service, and
not merely on the basis of the nomenclature assigned to the appointment.
14. Adverting to the case in hand, another material circumstance
noticed by the learned Tribunal is that the management produced only the
attendance record pertaining to the workman's last engagement,
commencing from 08.08.2000 up to 22.09.2001, exhibited as Ex.M-2,
consisting of seven pages. The corresponding attendance record pertaining
to the earlier periods of engagement was not produced. The Tribunal also
noticed documents Ex.M-4 and Ex.M-5, which evidenced communications
addressed by the workman to the Managing Director and showed that he had
been re-engaged on 28.07.1998.
15. The learned Tribunal did not accept the workman's assertion of
continuous service since 1989 in the absence of supporting material.
Nevertheless, it found that the evidence available on record, particularly the
admission of MW-1 regarding the period of service and completion of 240
days, was sufficient to establish the requisite period of service for the
relevant engagement. The finding regarding completion of 240 days was,
therefore, not based merely upon the workman's assertion but also upon the
admission of the management's own witness.
16. Once the cessation of service is found to constitute
retrenchment and the workman is shown to have completed the requisite
period of continuous service, compliance with the mandatory requirements
of Section 25-F of the Act becomes necessary. In the present case, the
management witness himself admitted that no notice or compensation had
been given before dispensing with the workman's services. The finding of
the learned Tribunal that the cessation of service was contrary to the
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statutory requirements is, therefore, supported by the evidence on record.

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17. The other contention raised by the petitioners concerns the
delay in raising the industrial dispute. Admittedly, the alleged cessation of
service took place in September 2001, whereas the demand notice was
issued on 25.10.2012. The management has also relied upon the earlier civil
proceedings instituted by the workman, which culminated in dismissal of the
suit on 25.04.2008 and dismissal of the appeal on 15.01.2009.
18. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and others,
(2000) 2 SCC 455, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that although no specific
period of limitation is prescribed for making a reference under Section 10 of
the Act, an industrial dispute which has become stale cannot be revived
merely by making a reference. Whether a dispute continues to remain alive
has to be examined in the facts and circumstances of each case.
19. The aforesaid principle was further explained by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department
and another, (2015) 15 SCC 1, wherein it was held that the absence of a
prescribed period of limitation does not confer an unrestricted right to raise
an industrial dispute at any point of time. Delay, laches and acquiescence are
relevant considerations. At the same time, the conduct of the workman and
the steps taken by him to pursue the grievance before another forum are also
relevant while determining whether the dispute had become stale.
20. In the present case, the workman had instituted civil
proceedings challenging the cessation of his services on 28.09.2001, shortly
after the alleged date of termination. The suit was dismissed on 25.04.2008
and the appeal was dismissed on 15.01.2009. The demand notice was
thereafter issued on 25.10.2012. Thus, the workman cannot be said to have
remained wholly inactive throughout the intervening period, as he had
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pursued civil proceedings challenging the cessation of his employment. The

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fact that those proceedings ultimately failed does not, by itself, establish that
the industrial dispute had become stale from its inception.
21. It is also relevant that the learned Tribunal restricted the award
of back wages to 25% from the date of issuance of the demand notice, rather
than granting back wages from the alleged date of termination. The delay
and the circumstances in which the industrial dispute came to be raised were,
therefore, relevant considerations in determining the extent of monetary
relief. The mere lapse of time, without considering the earlier proceedings
pursued by the workman and the relief actually granted, would not justify
setting aside the award.
22. The management has also referred to the three-year period
contemplated under Section 2A(3) of the Act. However, the present matter
arises out of a reference made by the appropriate Government under Section
10 of the Act. Section 2A(3) provides for a direct application by a workman
to the Labour Court or Tribunal in the circumstances contemplated by
Section 2A. The said provision cannot be mechanically applied to invalidate
a reference made under Section 10 of the Act.
23. This Court is conscious that the jurisdiction exercised under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is supervisory in nature. An
award of the Industrial Tribunal cannot be interfered with merely because
another view of the evidence is possible. Interference is warranted where the
findings suffer from perversity, patent illegality or an error of jurisdiction, or
where the Tribunal has adopted an approach contrary to the settled principles
of law.
24. In the present case, the learned Tribunal has considered the
contractual nature of the engagement, the period of service, the
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management's plea of abandonment, the admissions made by its own witness

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and the absence of compliance with Section 25-F of the Act. The contractual
stipulation, when read in the context of the management's own case
regarding cessation of service before expiry of the stipulated period and the
admission of MW-1 regarding the directions of the higher authorities, does
not establish that the cessation was merely on account of non-renewal of the
contract upon its expiry. The decision of the Division Bench in Satish Kumar
(supra) does not alter this conclusion, as the cessation in that case was
consequent upon expiry and non-renewal of the contractual engagement,
whereas the material circumstances in the present case are different.
25. Similarly, the objection regarding delay does not render the
reference unsustainable when considered in the background of the civil
proceedings pursued by the workman and the limited relief granted by the
learned Tribunal. No perversity, jurisdictional error or patent illegality has
been demonstrated in the impugned award so as to warrant interference by
this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India.
26. Consequently, finding no merit in the present writ petition, the
same is dismissed. The award dated 18.09.2019 passed by the Industrial
Tribunal, Bathinda, is upheld.
27. All pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(KIRTI SINGH)
November 11, 2026 JUDGE
Ritika
Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No

Whether reportable: Yes/No
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