Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt Ltd vs Veda Seed Sciences Pvt Ltd
- Court
- Delhi High Court
- Case type
- First Appeal Order Original Side Commercial
- Decided on
- 03-12-2025
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 31 July 2025
Pronounced on: 3 December 2025
+ FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025, CM APPL. 23741/2025, CM
APPL. 32462/2025, CM APPL. 32554/2025 & CM APPL.
34522/2025
KOHINOOR SEED FIELDS INDIA
PVT LTD .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Saurav Agarwal, Mr.
Shantanu Agarwal, Mr. Adarsh Ramanujan,
Mr. Kapil Rustagi, Mr. Saurabh Seth, Ms.
Chandreyee Maitra, Ms. Allaka M, Mr.
Manas Arora, Mr. Raghav Thareja, Mr.
Parth Singh and Mr. Ajay, Advs.
versus
VEDA SEED SCIENCES PVT LTD .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Raj Shekhar Rao, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Kapil Wadhwa, Ms. Sindoora, Ms.
Vishakha Gupta, Mr. Wamic Wasim, Ms.
Thithiksha Padmam and Mr. Anish Jandial,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
% JUDGMENT
03.12.2025
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:03.12.2025
14:54:38
FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025 Page 1 of 69
Facilitative Index to the Judgment
S. No. Subject Para Nos
1 The lis 1
2 Facts 2 - 7
3 The Plaint 3 – 3.3
4 IA 20138/2022 under Order II Rule 2 of the CPC and
order dated 12 July 2023 passed therein
4 – 4.2
5 (Miscellaneous para) 5
6 Rival Submissions before learned Single Judge 6 – 6.2
7 The Impugned Judgment 7 – 9
8 Re. Registration of asserted trade marks within
jurisdiction of this Court
7
9 Issues identified by learned Single Judge as arising for
consideration
8
10 Findings of learned Single Judge
9
(i) Re. Issue 1 – whether the cause of action for
filing the suit was also based on the Marketing
Agreement?
(ii) Re. Issue 2 – whether there was any cause of
action in the suit which included listing of the
infringement products on India Mart?
(iii)Re: Issue 3 – if no part of the cause of action
arose within the jurisdiction of this Court, whether
jurisdiction could be exercised because the appellant
has its head office in Delhi, even though the cause of
action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the High
Court where the subordinate office of the appellant is
located?
11 (Miscellaneous paras) 10 – 11
12 Rival Contentions of learned Counsel before this
Court
12 – 13
13 Submissions of Mr. Saurav Agarwal for the appellant 12
14 Submissions of Mr. Raj Shekhar Rao for the respondent 13
15 Analysis 14 – 21.4
16 Issue 14 – 14.2
17 The impugned judgment in a nutshell 15 – 15.2
18 (Miscellaneous para) 16
19 Whether the impugned judgment is correct in holding
that the registration of the asserted trade marks of the
appellant in Delhi would not confer jurisdiction on this
Court
17 – 17.13
20 Whether the Marketing Agreement formed part of the
cause of action for instituting the suit and, therefore,
whether the suit was amenable to the territorial
18 – 18.8
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:03.12.2025
14:54:38
FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025 Page 2 of 69
jurisdiction of this Court
21 Re. availability of the defendant’s products on e-
commerce websites
19 – 19.15
22 The decision in Banyan Tree Holding 19.4 – 19.4.6
23 The decision in World Wrestling Entertainment 19.5 – 19.5.5
24 The Ultra Home Construction principle, and reliance
thereon
20 – 20.5
25 Re. the plea that learned Single Judge relied on material
outside the plaint
21 – 21.4
26 Conclusion 22 - 25
The lis
1. CS (Comm) 828/2022 was instituted by the appellant Kohinoor
Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd against the respondent Veda Seed Sciences
Pvt. Ltd, alleging infringement, by the respondent, of the appellant’s
registered trade marks. The respondent filed IA 2200/2023 under
1
Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 , contending
that this Court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the
suit. A learned Single Judge of this Court has allowed IA 2200/2023,
and has directed return of the plaint to the appellant for presentation
before the appropriate Court. The appellant is in appeal.
Facts
2. Inasmuch as an application under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC
has to be decided solely on the basis of the averments in the plaint,
read with the documents filed therewith, it would not be necessary to
refer to any of the pleadings before the learned Single Judge, except
1
“CPC”, hereinafter
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:03.12.2025
14:54:38
FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025 Page 3 of 69
the plaint instituted by the appellant.
3. The plaint
3.1 The appellant alleged, in its plaint, that by selling hybrid seeds,
under the marks “VEDA TADAAKHA GOLD BG II”, “VEDA
SADANAND GOLD BG II” and “VEDA BASANT GOLD BG II”,
the respondent was infringing the registered trade marks
TADAAKHA and SADANAND of the appellant and was also passing
off its products as the products of the appellant. The marks
TADAAKHA, SADANAND and BASANT of the appellant, and the
marks “VEDA TADAAKHA GOLD”, “VEDA SADANAND
GOLD” and “VEDA BASANT GOLD” were used for cotton hybrid
seeds.
3.2 The appellant asserted, in its plaint, thus:
(i) The appellant was in possession of necessary statutory
approvals to sell its cotton hybrid seeds in Madhya Pradesh,
South Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh,
Telangana and Karnataka.
(ii) The appellant was the proprietor of the registered word
marks TADAAKHA and SADANAND, in Class 31, for
2
agricultural seeds, w.e.f. 24 March 2014 and 4 April 2014
respectively, under Section 23 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
2
With effect from
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KUMAR
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(iii) The appellant had garnered enormous goodwill and
reputation in the marks TADAAKHA, SADANAND as well as
in the mark BASANT, though, in respect of the mark
BASANT, it had no registration under the Trade Marks Act.
(iv) The appellant had also incurred considerable expenses
towards promotion and advertising of its cotton hybrid seeds
under the aforesaid marks.
(v) On 3 March 2014, the appellant entered into a non-
exclusive co-Marketing Agreement with the respondent, which
was renewed annually, the last iteration of which was in the
form of Marketing Agreement dated 1 January 2022, which
remained valid till 31 December 2022. Under the Marketing
Agreement, the respondent was permitted to market and
distribute cotton hybrid seeds of the appellant under the
aforesaid trade marks SADANAND, TADAAKHA and
BASANT. Paras 18 to 23 of the plaint contain the following
assertions with respect to the Marketing Agreement:
“18. The Plaintiff had entered into a non-exclusive
comarketing arrangement with the Defendant on
03.03.2014, which was renewed annually, for the purpose
of marketing and distribution of five different cotton
hybrids being KSCH-207 BG II, KSCH-211 BG II, KSCH-
212 BG II, KSCH-232 BG II and KSCH-213 BG Il. The
arrangement was limited to the co-marking arrangement
only since the hybrid seeds were being produced only by
the Plaintiff to ensure quality control.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:03.12.2025
14:54:38
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19. The Marketing Agreement dated 01.01.2022
executed in New Delhi, is the latest iteration of this
arrangement which is valid up to 31.12.2022 ('Marketing
Agreement ').
Copies of the Marketing Agreements for the years
2018-19, 2019-20, 2020-21 and 2021-22 are
enclosed with the list of documents filed with the
plaint. The Plaintiff craves leave to produce the
earlier iterations of the agreement if the Court so
directs.
20. Under Clause 3 read with Recitals 2 and 3 of the
Marketing Agreement it was agreed that the Plaintiff would
produce, and the Defendant would market and distribute,
inter alia, the following cotton hybrid seeds under the
Plaintiffs Subject Marks:
KSCH-207 BG II cotton hybrid under the
a.
brand name of TADAAKHA®
b. KSCH-232 BG II cotton hybrid under the
brand name of SADANAND®
c. KSCH-212 BG II cotton hybrid under the
TM
brand name of BASANT
21. The Plaintiffs ownership of the Plaintiffs Subject
Marks, has been acknowledged by the Defendant in Clause
10(c) of the Marketing Agreement which states as
following:
“ 10. Packaging:
…
(c) VSSPL acknowledges and agrees that
KSFIPL is the owner of all trademarks and VSSPL
shall not misuse or misrepresent them in any
manner. Usage of the trade mark of KSFIPL by
VSSPL in conjunction with any other mark shall not
create any IPR rights of whatsoever nature in
favour of VSSPL and VSSPL shall not use any such
mark after the termination or expiry of this
agreement, or shall make any claim over such
marks.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
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22. Clause 10(b) of the Marketing Agreement requires
that the promotional materials for the Plaintiff's products
marketed by the Defendant shall be pre-approved by the
Plaintiff. It also obligated the Defendant to ensure that the
packaging clearly indicated that the relevant hybrid seed
had been developed, marketed, and packed by the Plaintiff
and that the Defendant is only the marketer. Further, under
Clause 10(d) of the Agreement, Defendant is required to
refrain from any act or omission which would in any
manner impair the Plaintiffs rights in above-mentioned
trademarks.
23. Under Clause 5 of the Marketing Agreement, the
Defendant explicitly undertook that it would not sell any
other hybrid seeds under the Plaintiff’s Subject Marks,
other than the five hybrids mentioned in the Marketing
Agreement. Clause 5 of the Marketing Agreement reads as
following:
“ VSSPL hereby agrees and undertakes that except
in respect of the Collon hybrid Seeds it shall not sell
any other hybrid seeds under the brand names
permitted under this Agreement.”
(vi) On 27 September 2022, the appellant wrote to the
respondent, stating that it did not intend to renew the Marketing
Agreement any further. Following this, on 1 October 2022, the
appellant wrote to its distributors, stating that w.e.f. the next
Kharif season of 2023, it would not be selling its cotton hybrid
seeds through the respondent but would be directly selling them
in the market. On 25 November 2022, the appellant sent a notice
of termination of the Marketing Agreement to the respondent in
terms of Clause 14(c) thereof.
(vii) In October 2022, the appellant learnt that the respondent
was promoting and accepting advance booking for the sale of
BG-II cotton hybrid seeds for the kharif season 2023 under the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
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14:54:38
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brands “VEDA TADAAKHA GOLD BG II”, “VEDA
SADANAND GOLD BG II” and “VEDA BASANT GOLD BG
II”. Copies of these advance bookings were received by the
appellant on WhatsApp from its traders/distributors.
(viii) The appellant, thereby, realized that the respondent was
using the marks “VEDA TADAAKHA GOLD BG II”, “VEDA
SADANAND GOLD BG II” and “VEDA BASANT GOLD BG
II” in relation to hybrids not manufactured by the appellant. This
use was, therefore, outside the permitted scope of the Marketing
Agreement between the appellant and the respondent. Use of the
appellant’s marks “TADAAKHA”, “SADANAND” and
“BASANT” for cotton hybrids which were not manufactured by
the appellant could not be regarded as permitted use of the marks
by the respondent and amounted, therefore, to infringement of
the appellant’s registered trademarks. In this context, it is
relevant to reproduce paras 28, 29 and 30 of the plaint, thus:
“28. The Plaintiff was immediately concerned with the
misuse of the Plaintiff's Subject Marks because, shockingly,
the Defendant was using the Plaintiff's Subject Marks in
relation to hybrids not produced by the Plaintiff and were
thus, outside the permitted scope of the Marketing
Agreement. …
29. The hybrids mentioned in the above promotional
material for advance bookings and the advance booking
forms, being GK-224 BG II, YSC H-369 BG II and GK-
238 BG II are not products of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff is
presently not aware of the provenance of these other
hybrids but verily believes that these other hybrids possess
very different characteristics from those of the Plaintiffs
hybrids.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:03.12.2025
14:54:38
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30. The inclusion of trademarks identical to the
Plaintiff’s Subject Marks i.e., 'TADAAKHA'® and
'SADANAND'® for the same goods in the same class,
outside the permitted use (outside the Marketing
agreement) amounts to statutory infringement of Plaintiff's
rights per se by the Defendant.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(ix) The use, by the respondent, of the asserted marks of the
appellant was deceptive and likely to cause market confusion.
The marks were being used on goods which were of the same
category, sold through the same channels of commerce and
targeting the same consumers. The use, by the respondent, of the
marks “TADAAKHA”, “SADANAND” and “BASANT” was
likely to induce the consumers who were largely illiterate
farmers, to purchase the respondent’s seeds believing an
association between the respondent and the appellant.
(x) The respondent had never been using the marks
“SADANAND” “TADAAKHA” or “BASANT”, before coming
into contact with the appellant. The appellant was the prior user
and adopter of the said marks. The use of the said marks by the
respondent, even after it came into contact with the appellant,
was only in the context of specified hybrid seeds covered by the
Marketing Agreement. There was no reason, therefore, for the
respondent to use the marks “SADANAND” “TADAAKHA”
and “BASANT” on products not produced by the appellant.
(xi) The respondent had also adopted an overall get-up and
packaging for its products which was the same as that adopted by
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:03.12.2025
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the appellant. This, too, indicated mala fides on the part of the
respondent, to ride on the goodwill and reputation of the
appellant.
(xii) The possibility of confusion was exacerbated by the fact
that the respondent was the co-marketer of the appellant’s
specified hybrids under the asserted marks for several years. Use
of the said marks by the respondent for products marketed by it
was therefore likely to confuse consumers into believing that
they were purchasing hybrids produced by the appellants.
(xiii) The use by the respondent of the marks “VEDA
TADAAKHA GOLD”, “VEDA SADANAND GOLD” and
“VEDA BASANT GOLD”, therefore, amounted to infringement
of the appellant’s registered trademarks “SADANAND” and
“TADAAKHA” and passing off of the respondent’s products as
the products of the appellant.
(xiv) The above assertions, beyond para 29, were contained in
paras 30 to 43 of the plaint, which read as under:
“30. The inclusion of trademarks identical to the
Plaintiff’s Subject Marks i.e., 'TADAAKHA'® and
'SADANAND'® for the same goods in the same class,
outside the permitted use (outside the Marketing
agreement) amounts to statutory infringement of Plaintiff's
rights per se by the Defendant.
31. The Defendant's inclusion of the Plaintiff's Subject
Marks is deceptive and is likely to cause significant
confusion in the market. The Defendant is using the
Plaintiff's Subject Marks on goods of the same category
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:03.12.2025
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sold through the same channels of commerce. The potential
consumers for the Defendant's product are farmers who
may not be literate and are not likely/able to read every
aspect of the packet before purchasing the product. They
are more likely to purchase seeds based on past
associations/experiences and therefore such use of the
Plaintiff's Subject Marks, whether with or without a prefix
and/or suffix, by the Defendant for its products is likely to
result in the consumer associating the products with those
of the Plaintiffs.
32. Further, undisputedly, the Plaintiff is a prior adopter
and user of SADANAND TADAAKHA and BASANT
Undisputedly, the Defendant's association with the
Plaintiff's Subject Marks is limited to that of a co-marketer
till date and that too only in the context of specified hybrid
seeds covered in the Marketing Agreement. The Defendant
was not selling any product using 'SADANAND',
"TADAAKHA', and 'BASANT as part of its branding
before becoming a co-marketer of the Plaintiff Thus, the
Defendant has no legitimate basis or reason to include
Plaintiff's Subject Marks 'SADANAND'®,
"TADAAKHA'®, and BASANT on products not produced
by the Plaintiff.
33. The mala fide nature of the Defendant's conduct and
the intent to free ride on the goodwill/reputation of the
Plaintiff is clear from the fact that the overall, get-up and
packaging of the Defendant's hybrids is the same as the
Plaintiff's products marketed by the Defendant.
34. It is submitted that the Defendant is using the
Impugned Marks on hybrids not produced by the Plaintiff
in a manner almost similar to the packaging used on the
Plaintiff's products. For example, the essential feature
'SADANAND', 'TADAAKHA' and BASANT™ are
prominently displayed in the same white and green colour
scheme.
35. With respect to the package of the Plaintiff's product
KSCH-232 BG II cotton hybrid and Defendant's product
GK-224 BG II cotton hybrid the image of the cotton ball
with leaf next to this name, the red banner on the right-hand
side of the front packaging, the partial image of the sun in
the background (light yellow colour rays in dark yellow
background), and even the back side of the packaging, are
all identical-looking.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
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36. With respect to the package of the Plaintiff's product
KSCH-207 BG II cotton hybrid and Defendant's product
VSCH-369 BG II cotton hybrid, the image of the cotton
ball with leaf next to this name, the red banner on the right-
hand side of the front packaging, the partial image of light-
green colour leaves woven into a basket in the background
with a dark-green/yellow wave pattern, and even the back
side of the packaging, are all identical-looking
37. With respect to the package of the Plaintiff's product
KSCH-212 BG II cotton hybrid and Defendant's product
GK-238 BG II cotton hybrid, the image of the cotton ball
with leaf next to this name, the red banner on the right-hand
side of the front packaging, the partial image of a cotton
field at the top and the orange sun in the background, and
even the back side of the packaging, are all identical-
looking.
38. It is evident that the Defendant's product has
identical packaging, colour range, material etc., used for
identical range of products. The look of the Defendant's
product, even from a distance, would give an unmistakable
impression of the Plaintiff's product. Such adoption of
identical-packaging is completely dishonest, and a malafide
attempt to take advantage of the hard-earned market
reputation built by the Plaintiff
39. Thus, the Defendant has clearly adopted the
Impugned Mark in bad faith under the same category and
identical range of products with full knowledge of the that
Plaintiff's Subject Marks exist and are well-known, and
with a singular purpose of making illicit gains by free
riding on the goodwill and reputation of the Plaintiff. Such
malafide use by the Defendant is likely to cause confusion
or an association amongst the customers or members of the
trade as to the origin of the said products and therefore
cannot be permitted. It is apparent that the Defendant
intends to take unfair benefit and advantage of the goodwill
associated with Plaintiff's Subject Marks to sell its other
hybrids.
40. The likelihood of confusion is even higher in the
present case because the Defendant has been the co-
marketer of Plaintiff's specified hybrids under the Plaintiff's
Subject Marks for many years. Therefore, when the
Plaintiff's Subject Marks are included in a product that is
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
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marketed by the Defendant, consumers are likely to be
deceived into believing that they are purchasing hybrids
produced by the Plaintiff.
41. This illegal conduct of the Defendant causes serious
and irreparable damages to the Plaintiffs reputation since
products not associated with the Plaintiff are being sold
using the Plaintiff's Subject Marks. There is an imminent
risk of serious and irreparable damage to the public because
one is dealing with genetically modified crops. Even though
the underlying technology may be the same, each hybrid
even if incorporating the same technology will have vastly
distinctive features, especially in the context of yield,
longevity, and susceptibility to pests et cetera. Thus, the
Defendant's mala fide intent to create an association
between some other products with the Plaintiffs
established products, can be potentially prejudicial to
cultivators and fanners. It is also likely to tarnish the
Plaintiffs reputation since the Defendant's products are not
produced by the Plaintiff or quality tested by the Plaintiff
Accordingly, the Defendant's conduct dilutes the Plaintiff's
Subject Marks in as much as it is taking away the
distinctive quality associated with the marks and/or is likely
to cause harm to the goodwill/reputation associated with
these marks.
42. In the interest of full disclosure, the Plaintiff had
applied for but had denied trade mark registration for
'BASANTH' on 29.04.2019 and for BASANT' on
26.09.2019. However, the Plaintiff subunits that this does
not detract from the Plaintiffs common law right to
TM.
BASANT’
43. Accordingly, a case of infringement and passing off
of the registered trademarks being 'SADANAND' bearing
no 2712050, and TADAAKHA®, bearing no. 2704422 is
established. In addition, a case of passing off has been
made out in the context of "SADANAND®,
TM.
TADAAKHA® and BASANT ”.
(xv) In paras 47 and 48 of the plaint, the appellant further
asserted thus:
“RESERVATION OF RIGHTS QUA OTHER CAUSES
OF ACTION
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KUMAR
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47. The present suit is limited to pursuing the statutory
remedy of trademark infringement and common law rights
with respect to passing off. The facts narrated may also give
rise to other causes of action in favour of the Plaintiff and
against the Defendant. The Plaintiff expressly reserves its
rights and remedies in this respect and out of abundant
caution, seeks leave of this Hon’ble Court to pursue such
other causes of action at an appropriate time through an
appropriate application.
48. In addition, and without prejudice, the Marketing
Agreement anyway expires on 31.12.2022. If the Defendant
fails to cure the breach of contract as specified in the
terminated notice dated 21.11.2022 within the stipulated
period of fifteen (15) days, the Marketing Agreement would
stand terminated even earlier. In either event, the Defendant
cannot sell Plaintiff’s hybrids thereafter. Any existing
packets of the Plaintiff’s hybrid seeds are to be returned to
the Plaintiff and the Defendant cannot use the Plaintiff’s
trademarks for selling Plaintiff’s hybrids or any other
product/hybrid for that matter. The Plaintiff expressly
reserves its rights and remedies in the event the Defendant
continues selling Plaintiff’s products or uses the Plaintiff’s
marks after the Marketing Agreement expires on
31.12.2022 or stands terminated earlier. Out of abundant
caution, the Plaintiff seeks leave of this Hon’ble Court to
pursue such other causes of action at an appropriate time
through an appropriate application.
The Plaintiff has not filed any other similar suit or petition
with respect to present cause of action before this Hon’ble
Court or any other court. The Plaintiff has never condoned
or acquiesced in the unlawful acts of the Defendant.”
(xvi) Paras 49 and 50 dealt with the cause of action and
jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the plaint, and read as
under:
“ CAUSE OF ACTION
49. The cause of action for the present suit arose in
October 2022 when the Plaintiff learnt that the Defendant
was using the Plaintiff’s Subject Marks to market and offer
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KUMAR
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for sale hybrids not produced by the Plaintiff. The cause of
action further arose in October 2022 when the Plaintiff
learned that the Defendant was offering for sale such
infringing products through very easily accessible online
marketplaces such as India Mart etc.
JURISDICTION
50. The present suit is a consolidated suit for
infringement and/or passing off three Plaintiff’s Subject
Marks, by the same Defendant, arising out of the same
course of transaction. This Hon’ble High Court has
jurisdiction to entertain the present suit under Section 134
3
(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 since the Plaintiff’s
registered address is within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble
Court, i.e., New Delhi, and the Plaintiff ordinarily carries
on business in New Delhi. The two registered marks
asserted in the present suit has been registered with the
Delhi Trademarks Registry. Further, the seed packets of the
impugned goods of the Defendant are available on various
e-commerce platforms like India Mart etc., which are
available for access within New Delhi, and in any event, are
dynamic websites that permits communication and
placement of orders. In addition, the relationship between
parties to the suit arises out of the Marketing Agreement
executed in New Delhi. As such, this Hon'ble High Court of
Delhi has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present suit.
The suit is valued beyond the minimum pecuniary
jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court and is also a commercial
suit within the meaning of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015.”
3.3 Predicated on these assertions, the appellant, in its plaint, sought
a decree of permanent injunction, restraining the respondent and all
3
134. Suit for infringement, etc. to be instituted before District Court . –
(1) No suit—
(a) for the infringement of a registered trade mark; or
(b) relating to any right in a registered trade mark; or
(c) for passing off arising out of the use by the defendant of any trade mark which
is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trade mark, whether registered or
unregistered,
shall be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit.
(2) For the purpose of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1), a “District Court having
jurisdiction” shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908) or any other law for the time being in force, include a District Court within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person
instituting the suit or proceeding, or, where there are more than one such persons any of them,
actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:03.12.2025
14:54:38
FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025 Page 15 of 69
others acting on the respondent’s behalf from using, in any manner,
the marks “TADAAKHA”, “SADANAND” and “BASANT”, with or
without any prefix or suffix, or any product or service, other than the
cotton hybrid seeds which were manufactured by the appellant under
the trademarks “TADAAKHA”, “SADANAND” and “BASANT”.
4. IA 20138/2022 under Order II Rule 2 of the CPC and order
dated 12 July 2023 passed therein
4.1 The appellant filed, with the plaint, IA 20138/2022 under Order
II Rule 2 of the CPC, which we deem appropriate to reproduce in
extenso , as it forms one of the main considerations in the passing of
the impugned judgment by the learned Single Judge:
“ The Plaintiff above-named, respectfully submits as follows:
1. The Plaintiff has instituted the captioned suit against the
Defendant, inter alia for permanent injunction restraining the
infringement and passing off of Plaintiff’s registered trademarks
'SADANAND' and 'TADAAKHA' and also passing off of
unregistered trademark 'BASANT'™, damages, etc. ("Plaintiffs
Subject Marks"). The Plaintiffs Subject Marks are used in relation
to seeds of cotton hybrids sold to Indian farmers. The Plaintiff has
credible apprehension that the Defendant in breach of the
Marketing Agreement is offering for sale and taking advance
bookings on certain other products, not envisaged under the said
agreement.
2. At the time of the institution of the present proceedings, the
Plaintiff is asserting exclusive rights to its registered trademarks
"SADANAND®' and 'TADAAKHA®' and its one unregistered
trademark 'BASANT'™. The Plaintiffs reserve their right under
Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to amend the plaint
and add claims for infringement of other trademarks/marks held
and used by the Plaintiff at a later and appropriate stage of the
present proceedings. Reliance in placed on paragraphs 4 7-48 of
the Plaint.
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3. As on the date of institution of the present lawsuit, the
Plaintiffs have asserted a claim of infringement and passing off of
'SADANAND®' and 'TADAAKHA®' and passing off its one
unregistered trademark 'BASANT'™. However, the said
trademarks are not the only trademarks which is apprehended to be
infringed/passed off by the Defendant. While infringement and/or
pas sing off any such other trademark amounts to a different cause
of action, out of abundant caution, through this application, the
Plaintiff seeks leave of this Hon'ble Court to bring appropriate
proceedings against the Defendant qua such other additional
trademarks/marks, which may also have been infringed/passed off
by the Defendant.
4. Similarly, the conduct of the Defendant as pleaded in the
Plaint may also give rise to a separate cause of action of breach of
contract. On the date of the suit, a terminate notice dated
25.11.2022 has been issued and is presently within the 15-day cure
period. Out of abundant caution, through this application, the
Plaintiffs seeks leave of this Hon'ble Court to bring appropriate
proceedings against the Defendant qua such other cause of action.
5. Finally, the Marketing Agreement anyway expires on
31.12.2022. Further, if the Defendant fails to cure the breach of
contract as specified in the terminated notice dated 25.11.2022
within the stipulated period of fifteen (15) days, the Marketing
Agreement would stand terminated even earlier. In either event, the
Defendant cannot sell Plaintiffs hybrids thereafter. Any existing
packets of the Plaintiffs Hybrids are to be returned to the Plaintiff.
Nor can the Defendant use the Plaintiffs trademark for selling
Plaintiff's hybrids or any other product/hybrid for that matter. The
Plaintiff expressly reserves its rights and remedies in the event the
Defendant continues selling Plaintiffs products or uses the
Plaintiffs marks after the Marketing Agreement expires on
31.12.2022 or stands terminated earlier. Out of abundant caution,
seeks leave of this Hon'ble Court to pursue such other causes of
action at an appropriate time through an appropriate application.
6. The application is filed bona fide, and it would be in the
interests of justice if it is allowed by this Hon'ble Court. No
prejudice shall be caused to the Defendant if the present
application is allowed. However, grave injustice will be caused to
the Plaintiff if the said application is disallowed and it is prevented
from amending, adding claims in the present proceedings in the
manner as specified above.
PRAYER
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7. In light of above, the Plaintiff humbly prays that this
Hon'ble Court may be pleased to:
i. Grant leave to the Plaintiff to take appropriate
proceedings in respect of a claim for infringement/passing
off of additional trademarks/marks by the Defendant;
ii. Grant leave to the Plaintiff to take appropriate
proceedings in respect of a claim for breach of contract;
iii. Grant leave to the Plaintiff to take appropriate
proceedings in respect of a claim for infringement/passing
off after 31.12.2022 or the earlier termination of the
Marketing Agreement dated 01.01.2022; and
iv. Any other orders which this Hon’ble Court may
deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances.”
4.2 The aforesaid IA 20138/2022 was disposed of, by a learned
Single Judge of this Court, by the following order passed on 12 July
2023:
“ I.A.20138/2022 (u/O II Rule 2 CPC) in CS (COMM) 828/2022
3. This is an application under Order II Rule 2 CPC moved by
the Plaintiff to seek further reliefs in respect of additional
trademarks. The prayers in this application are as under:
“(i) Grant leave to the Plaintiff to take appropriate
proceedings in respect of a claim for infringement/passing
off of additional trademarks/marks by the Defendant;
(ii) Grant leave to the Plaintiff to take appropriate
proceedings in respect of a claim for breach of contract;
(iii) Grant leave to the Plaintiff to take appropriate
proceedings in respect of a claim for infringement/passing
off after 31.12.2022 or the earlier termination of the
Marketing Agreement dated 01.01.2022;”
4. Insofar as the prayer (i) is concerned, if there is any
infringement or passing off of other trademarks, the same would
constitute a fresh cause of action and the Plaintiff would have to
take steps for independent proceedings respect thereof.
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5. Insofar as the prayer (ii) for breach of contract is concerned,
leave is granted to the Plaintiff for seeking relief qua the breach of
contract, if maintainable, in accordance with law.
6. Insofar as the prayer (iii) is concerned, the same is not
pressed by Id. Counsel for the Plaintiff.
7. The application is disposed of in the above terms.”
5. The respondent moved IA 2200/2023 under Order VII Rule 10
of the CPC, alleging that this Court had no territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the suit and, therefore, praying that the plaint be returned for
presentation before the court having territorial jurisdiction. This is the
application which has been allowed by the impugned judgment dated
16 April 2025 passed by the learned Single Judge, against which the
present appeal has been filed.
6. Rival submissions before the learned Single Judge
6.1 The respondent, as the applicant in IA 2200/2023, contesting
the jurisdiction of this Court to territorially entertain the suit,
advanced the following submissions before the learned Single Judge:
(i) The pleadings in the plaint did not evince satisfaction of
the twin conditions of existence of a cause of action, or of the
place of business of the appellant being within the territorial
4
jurisdiction of this Court, as envisaged in Section 20 of the CPC
4
20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises .—Subject to the
limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction—
( a ) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the
commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally
works for gain; or
( b ) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement
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5
and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act. Reliance was
placed, in this context, on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
6 7
Indian Performing Rights Society v. Sanjay Dalia and of the
Division Bench of this Court in Ultra Home Construction v.
8
Purushottam Kumar Chaubey .
(ii) The appellant had subordinate/branch offices in Andhra
Pradesh and Telangana and its head office at New Delhi.
(iii) Under the Marketing Agreement, the respondent was
authorised to market and distribute the appellant’s products only
in Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh,
Telangana, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. As such, there was no
way in which the respondent could have targeted consumers in
Delhi. Nor did the plaint plead any dynamic effect of the alleged
of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain,
provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not
reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution;
or
( c ) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
*
Explanation .— A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India
or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place.
5
134. Suit for infringement, etc. to be instituted before District Court .—
(1) No suit—
(a) for the infringement of a registered trade mark; or
(b) relating to any right in a registered trade mark; or
(c) for passing off arising out of the use by the defendant of any trade mark which
is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trade mark, whether registered or
unregistered,
shall be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit.
(2) For the purpose of clauses ( a ) and ( b ) of sub-section (1), a “District Court having
jurisdiction” shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908) or any other law for the time being in force, include a District Court within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person
instituting the suit or proceeding, or, where there are more than one such persons any of them,
actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.
Explanation.— For the purposes of sub-section (2), “person” includes the registered proprietor
and the registered user.
6
( 2015) 10 SCC 161
7
“IPRS” hereinafter
8
227 (2016) DLT 320 (DB)
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infringement on the part of the respondent, having been felt in
Delhi.
(iv) The respondent did not have any license, under the Seeds
(Control) Order, 1983, to sell the seeds in Delhi. As such, the
respondent’s products were not, and could not be, sold in Delhi.
(v) Apropos the appellant’s contention that the respondent’s
products were available on the IndiaMart e-commerce platform,
the respondent was not registered with IndiaMart and had not put
up its products for sale on the said platform. Nor was it the
appellant’s case that there was any actual sale of purchase of the
respondent’s products on IndiaMart. The mere fact that the
respondent’s products may have been available for sale on the
IndiaMart e-commerce platform could not, in these
circumstances, clothe this Court with jurisdiction to entertain the
suit. Reliance was placed, in this context, on the judgment of the
Division Bench of this Court in Banyan Tree Holding v. A
9
Murali Krishna Reddy .
(vi) The suit had been filed before expiry of the Marketing
Agreement. As such, the suit was a simpliciter suit for
infringement and passing off and was not for enforcing any rights
under the Marketing Agreement. The Marketing Agreement, and
its execution, therefore, did not constitute any part of the cause of
action for instituting the suit.
9
2010 (42) PTC 361 (Del)
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6.2 In response to the respondent’s challenge to the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the suit, the appellant contended
thus:
(i) The appellant’s principal place of business was Delhi. It
ordinarily carried on business in Delhi.
(ii) The asserted marks were registered in Delhi.
(iii) Once the registered office of the appellant was in Delhi,
the infringement suit instituted by it was maintainable before
this Court. Reliance was placed, for this purpose, on the
judgments of the Division Benches of this Court in Provident
10
Housing v. Central Park Estates , and CP Century Hardware
11
v. Skywood Interior Solutions .
(iv) The appellant had its principal office as well as
subordinate offices. Jurisdiction could not be limited to the
Court within whose jurisdiction the subordinate office was
located, even in terms of Section 20 of the CPC.
(v) The pleaded cause of action in the plaint arose within the
jurisdiction of this Court.
(vi) The Marketing Agreement, which was a critical part of
the cause of action for the plaint, was executed at Delhi. The
10
AIR 2022 Del 242
11
2024 (99) PTC 67
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plea of infringement was also based on violation of the
Marketing Agreement.
(vii) The respondent had placed orders for hybrid seeds on the
appellant, which were invoiced in Delhi. Where an infringement
suit was filed during the currency of the permitted user
agreement, use of the marks by the defendant in breach of such
agreement amounted to infringement.
(viii) The respondent’s seeds were available on e-commerce
platforms such as IndiaMart, which were accessible within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The mere listing of the
respondent’s products on the IndiaMart platform was by itself
sufficient to clothe this Court with territorial jurisdiction in the
matter. Reliance was placed, for this purpose, on the judgments
12
of this Court in Marico Limited v. Mukesh Kumar and
13
Shakthi Fashion v. Burberry Limited .
(ix) In violation of the Marketing Agreement, the respondent
was infringing the appellant’s proprietorial rights as it was
collecting advance amounts. Evidence of such collections was
available in the form of advance bookings forms and WhatsApp
screenshots filed with the plaint. This infringement was taking
place in multiple jurisdictions, including the jurisdiction of this
Court.
12
2018 (76) PTC 168
13
291 (2022) DLT 128
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The Impugned Judgment
7. Re. registration of asserted trade marks within jurisdiction of
this Court
The learned Single Judge has, in the impugned order, identified three
issues as arising for consideration but has, before doing so, rejected
the contention of the appellant that this Court has territorial
jurisdiction in the matter, as the asserted trade marks were registered
in Delhi. In rejecting this contention, the learned Single Judge has
placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dhodha
14
House v. S K Maingi . The findings of the learned Single Judge on
this aspect are contained in paras 17 and 18 of the impugned
judgment, which read thus:
“17. Before I proceed to address these issues, I may deal with
the contention of the plaintiff that the jurisdiction of this Court is
premised on the fact that the trademark registration in respect of
the subject marks were obtained by the plaintiff in Delhi. This
contention is completely contrary to the observations of the
Supreme Court in Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi.
18. In Dhodha House (Supra) , the Supreme Court has
categorically held that cause of action arises only when a registered
trademark is in use and not when the application is filed for
registration of a trademark. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim
jurisdiction on the basis that its marks were registered in Delhi.”
8. Issues identified by learned Single Judge as arising for
consideration
Having rejected the aforesaid reliance, placed by the appellant on the
fact that the asserted trademarks SADANAND and TADAAKHA had
14
(2006) 9 SCC 41
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been registered in Delhi, the learned Single Judge has proceeded, in
Para 19 of the impugned judgment, to identify the following issues as
arising for consideration:
“i. Whether the cause of action of filing the present suit is also
based on the Marketing Agreement between the parties?
ii. Whether there is any cause of action in the present suit,
including the listing of the infringing products on India Mart, for
filing the present suit in this Court?
iii. If there is no cause of action arising in the present case
within territorial jurisdiction of this Court, can jurisdiction be made
out on the basis of plaintiff having its head office in Delhi, even
though it has a subordinate office at the place where cause of
action has arisen?”
9. Findings of learned Single Judge
9.1 The learned Single Judge has, thereafter, proceeded to returned
his findings on each of these issues, thus:
(i) Re. Issue 1 – whether the cause of action for filing the
suit was also based on the Marketing Agreement?
(a) Para 49 of the plaint, which dealt with cause of
action, made no reference whatsoever to the Marketing
Agreement even though, in para 50 of the plaint, it was
stated that the relationship between the parties to the
plaint also arose out of the Marketing Agreement.
(b) Para 47 of the plaint acknowledged that the suit
was limited to infringement and passing off. In fact, the
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appellant had sought leave of the Court to pursue other
causes of action at the appropriate time via an appropriate
application.
(c) In para 48 of the plaint, the appellant reserved his
rights to take appropriate action in case the respondent
continued to sell the appellant’s products or use the
appellant’s product market after the expiry of the
Marketing Agreement on 31 December 2022, or if the
Marketing Agreement was terminated earlier.
(d) In furtherance of the aforesaid assertions in the
plaint, the appellant had filed IA 20138/2022 under Order
II Rule 2 of the CPC. In the said application, the
appellant had specifically stated that the conduct of the
respondent would give rise to a separate cause of action
and, therefore, sought leave to bring proceedings against
the respondent qua such other cause of action.
(e) The said IA 20138/2022 was disposed of, by this
Court, granting leave to the appellant to take appropriate
proceedings in respect of the claim for breach of contract.
(f) Thus, it was clear that the suit was not premised on
any cause of action which was based on the Marketing
Agreement or any breach thereof.
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(ii) Re. Issue 2 – whether there was any cause of action in the
suit which included listing of the infringement products on
IndiaMart?
(a) There was no averment, in the plaint, that the
respondent was selling its products in Delhi. No
document evincing any sale of the respondent’s product
in Delhi had been filed with the plaint.
(b) The only averment was that the respondent’s
products were available on e-commerce platforms like
IndiaMart, which were accessible in Delhi. However, no
details were given of sales of the respondent’s products
on any e-commerce platform other than IndiaMart. The
only other e-commerce platform sale of the respondent
was in the form of a third party listing of the respondent’s
product on the platform Kalgudi.
(c) The dealer info sheets and order forms of the
respondent indicated that the respondent was carrying out
its business only in Telangana, Andhra Pradesh and
Karnataka and not in Delhi.
(d) The IndiaMart listing was not made by the
respondent or at its instance, but by one Shiva Agro
Agency in Karnataka. There was no allegation, in the
plaint, that Shiva Agro Agency was delivering its
products in Delhi. Nor did the listing of the respondent’s
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products on IndiaMart by Shiva Agro Agency offer that
the respondent’s products could be delivered at Delhi.
(e) The listing on the Kalgudi platform was also by
one Bhavani Seeds Centre in Andhra Pradesh. The plaint
did not assert that Bhavani Seeds Centre was selling
goods in Delhi.
(f) In these circumstances, there was no case for
invoking the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, within
the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in
Banyan Tree Holdings . The learned Single Judge culled
out the following tests as emerging from the decision in
Banyan Tree Holdings :
“i. Mere accessibility of the defendant’s
website in Delhi would not enable this Court to
exercise jurisdiction.
ii. A passive website, not specifically targeting
audience in the forum state would not vest the Court
with jurisdiction.
iii. The jurisdiction would not get attracted
merely on the basis of interactivity of the website
which is accessible in the forum state. It would have
to be shown that the website is specifically targeting
viewers in the forum state for commercial
transactions.
iv. For the purposes of passing off or an
infringement action, the plaintiff would have to
show that the defendant had an intention to
conclude a commercial transaction with the user of
the website.
v. The plaintiff must necessarily plead and
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show prima facie that the specific targeting of the
forum state by the defendant resulted in injury or
harm to the plaintiff within the forum state.”
There were no averments in the plaint evincing
satisfaction of the afore-noted criteria emerging from the
decision in Banyan Tree Holdings . It was not the case
of the appellant that the respondent has its own website
over which it was selling its products. The listings on
IndiaMart and Kalgudi were by third parties and the
respondent could not be held responsible in that regard.
(g) There was no pleading or document which
indicated any communication having been made with the
respondent or placing of any orders, from Delhi, for the
respondent’s products.
(h) There was no pleading, in the plaint, of the
respondent having purposefully engaged in commercial
activity in Delhi by targeting customers within the
jurisdiction of this Court, or having any intention to do
so.
(i) There was no pleading, in the plaint, of the
appellant having felt the dynamic effect of the
respondent’s sales at Delhi.
(j) The decision in Marico was distinguishable. Para
66 of the judgment in that case clearly noted that the
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goods of the defendant were sold in stores located within
the jurisdiction of this Court. Besides, the order was a
prima facie order in Order XXXIX proceedings.
(k) The judgment in Shakthi Fashion was also
distinguishable, as the IndiaMart listing in that case had
the same address as the defendant.
(l) The decisions in Marico and Shakthi Fashion
could not be read as permitting jurisdiction to be invoked
solely on the basis of listing of the defendant’s products
on e-commerce platforms.
(iii) Re: Issue 3 – if no part of the cause of action arose within
the jurisdiction of this Court, whether jurisdiction could be
exercised because the appellant has its head office in Delhi,
even though the cause of action has arisen within the
jurisdiction of the High Court where the subordinate office of
the appellant is located?
(a) The issue stood covered by para 14 of the
judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Ultra
Home Construction which, in turn, relied on and
interpreted IPRS , and read thus:
“14. It is evident from the above observations that
the interpretation given to the expression "carries on
business" in the context of a defendant under section
20 of the Code has also been employed in the
context of a plaintiff under the said sections 134(2)
and 62(2). Thus, in addition to the places where
suits could be filed under section 20 of the Code, the
plaintiff can also institute a suit under the Trade
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Marks Act, 1999 and the Copyright Act, 1957, as
the case may be, by taking advantage of the
provisions of section 134(2) or section 62(2),
respectively. Both the latter provisions are in pari
materia . Under these provisions four situations can
be contemplated in the context of the plaintiff being
a corporation (which includes a company). First of
all, is the case where the plaintiff has a sole office.
In such a case, even if the cause of action has arisen
at a different place, the plaintiff can institute a suit
at the place of the sole office. Next is the case where
the plaintiff has a principal office at one place and a
subordinate or branch office at another place and the
cause of action has arisen at the place of the
principal office. In such a case, the plaintiff may sue
at the place of the principal office but cannot sue at
the place of the subordinate office. The third case is
where the plaintiff has a principal office at one
place and the cause of action has arisen at the place
where its subordinate office is located. In this
eventuality, the plaintiff would be deemed to carry
on business at the place of his subordinate office
and not at the place of the principal office. Thus, the
plaintiff could sue at the place of the subordinate
office and cannot sue (under the scheme of the
provisions of section 134(2) and 62(2)) at the place
of the principal office. The fourth case is where the
cause of action neither arises at the place of the
principal office nor at the place of the subordinate
office but at some other place. In this case, the
plaintiff would be deemed to carry on business at
the place of its principal office and not at the place
of the subordinate office. And, consequently, it
could institute a suit at the place of its principal
office but not at the place of its subordinate office.
All these four cases are set out in the table below for
greater clarity:
S.
No.
Place of
Plaintiff’s
Principal
Office
(Sole
office in
S.No.1)
Place of
Plaintiff’s
Subordinate
Branch
Office
Place
where
cause
of
action
arose
Place where
plaintiff can
additionally
sue under
Section 134(2)
and section 62
(2)
1 A -- C A
2 A B A A
3 A B B B
4 A B C A
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15. The present case falls under S. No. 3 in the
above table. The appellant/plaintiff has its principal
office in Delhi (place A). Its subordinate office is at
Deogarh, Jharkhand (place B) where it runs one of
its hotels (Amrapali Clarks Inn), albeit in
collaboration with Clarks Inn hotels. The alleged
cause of action has accrued at Deogarh, Jharkhand
(place B). Therefore, the appellant/plaintiff could, in
respect of the alleged cause of action in this suit,
institute a suit against the defendants at Deogarh,
Jharkhand (place B) but not in Delhi. Thus, the
conclusion arrived at by the learned single judge
that this court did not have the territorial jurisdiction
to entertain the suit cannot be faulted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The facts of the present case squarely attracted the third
category of cases envisaged in para 14 of Ultra Home
Construction , in which, though the appellant had its
principal office in New Delhi, no part of the cause of
action had arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court and
the entire cause of action had arisen outside it. In such a
case, it was not open to the appellant to invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court to institute the suit, in view of
para 14 of Ultra Home Construction .
(b) Another Division Bench of this Court had, in
15
Radico Khaitan v . Nakshatra Distilleries & Breweries ,
followed Ultra Home Construction .
(c) The conclusion of the learned Single Judge on this
issue, as contained in para 70 of the impugned judgment,
15
2023 (94) PTC 402
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reads thus:
“70. In the present case, even though the head
office of the plaintiff is located in Delhi, no part of
the cause of action has arisen in Delhi. The cause of
action appears to have arisen at place(s) where the
plaintiff has its subordinate office(s). Hence,
applying the principles of Sanjay Dalia (Supra) and
Ultra Home (Supra) in the present case, the plaintiff
cannot maintain this suit in Delhi.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the appellant has
instituted the present appeal.
11. We have heard Mr. Saurav Agarwal, learned Counsel for the
appellant and Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the
respondent, at length. Learned Counsel have also submitted their
written submissions.
Rival Contentions of learned Counsel before this Court
12. Submissions of Mr. Saurav Agarwal for the appellant
Mr. Saurav Agarwal, appearing for the appellant, advanced the
following contentions:
(i) Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act independently
entitles the appellant to institute the suit at the place of its
principal place of business, which was New Delhi.
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(ii) The Marketing Agreement was also executed in Delhi.
(iii) The learned Single Judge had read paras of the plaint in
isolation, without engaging in a holistic reading of the plaint or
appreciating the reliance, in the plaint, on the Marketing
Agreement as part of the bundle of facts on the basis of which
the appellant was alleging infringement and passing off.
(iv) The fact that the listings on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi
platforms were put up by third parties was irrelevant to the
aspect of territorial jurisdiction. Even the possibility of
concluding a commercial transaction, for purchasing the
allegedly infringing goods across the platform, was sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on this Court, as held by the Division Bench
of this Court in World Wide Wrestling Entertainment v.
16
Reshma Collection .
(v) Moreover, it had been specifically pleaded in the plaint
that the infringing products of the respondent were available on
e-commerce platforms accessible within the jurisdiction of this
Court and that these platforms were dynamic websites which
permitted communication and placement of orders. These
factors have consistently been held to be sufficient to clothe this
Court with jurisdiction, as held in Shakthi Fashion and
Marico .
16
2014 (60) PTC 452 (DB)
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(vi) The learned Single Judge had erred in ignoring the fact
that the infringing products of the respondent were available for
purchase on the IndiaMart platform. The identity of the person
who may have directed listing of the products on the platform
was irrelevant. What mattered, especially for the purposes of
Order VII Rule 10, was that the products were available for
purchase, in Delhi, across the said platform. In fact, across the
Kalgudi platform, product could be purchased pan-India.
(vii) The enunciation of the law, in para 14 of Ultra Home
Construction , to the extent that if the Plaintiff had a registered
office and a subordinate office, and the cause of action had
arisen entirely within the jurisdiction of the Court within which
the subordinate office was situated, the Plaintiff could not sue in
the Court which had jurisdiction over the principal office, was
incorrect. Alternatively, this proposition would be in conflict
with the law laid down by a coordinate Division Bench in
Provident Housing , which specifically allows the Plaintiff to
sue in Delhi, solely because the registered office of the Plaintiff
was situated in Delhi.
(viii) In fact, the judgment of the Supreme Court in IPRS
required the plaintiff to sue in that Court which had jurisdiction
over his principal place of business. That right could not,
therefore, be divested.
(ix) Paras 56, 57 and 70 of the impugned judgment
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considered material outside the plaint, which was impermissible
while adjudicating an application under Order VII Rule 10 of
the CPC. Among other assertions in the written statement,
which had been relied upon by the learned Single Judge, was
the allegation that the appellant had subordinate offices in
Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, which were not disclosed in the
plaint.
(x) Moreover, the impugned judgment also rejected, as
incorrect, certain assertions in the plaint, on the basis of what
was stated in the written statement of the respondent. This was
impermissible while adjudicating an application under Order
VII Rule 10 of the CPC.
(xi) The ratio of para 14 of Ultra Home Constructions was
invoked following a finding that the cause of action “appeared”
to have arisen “at places where the appellant had its subordinate
office(s).” The impugned judgment did not identify the location
of the place where such subordinate office was situated.
(xii) In the plaint, the only such subordinate office of the
respondent, which had been identified, was at Medchal,
Telangana. The plaint did not, however, identify any part of the
cause of action as having arisen at the said office. Nor was there
any finding in the impugned judgment to the effect that all or
any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of
the Medchal office of the respondent.
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(xiii) At the highest, therefore, the issue of whether any part of
the cause of action had arisen at any subordinate office of the
respondent was a matter for trial, which could not constitute the
basis to return the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC.
(xiv) The learned Single Judge had erred in relying, in an
isolated fashion, on the paras of the plaint which dealt with
cause of action and jurisdiction. The absence of any reference to
the Marketing Agreement in para 50 of the plaint did not, ipso
facto , imply that this Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on
the lis .
(xv) Attention was invited to the various assertions and
averments in the plaint which were dependent on the Marketing
Agreement executed between the appellant and respondent. In
view of the said assertions, the learned Single Judge was clearly
in error in holding that the suit was not premised on any cause
of action based on the Marketing Agreement or the breach
thereof.
(xvi) Reservation of rights to sue separately for breach of the
Marketing Agreement did not in any manner indicate that the
execution of the Marketing Agreement was not part of the cause
of action for the claim in the present suit. Breach of the
Marketing Agreement was one of the specific grounds urged by
the appellant to plead its case of infringement and passing off.
Use of the appellants’ asserted trade marks in terms of the
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Marketing Agreement constituted permitted use within the
17
meaning of Section 2(r) of the Trade Marks Act. To succeed
in a claim for infringement of passing off, therefore, it was
necessary for the appellant to allege and establish that the
respondent’s use of the infringing trade marks was in breach of
the covenants of the Marketing Agreement. This was especially
so as the suit had been instituted during the currency of the
Marketing Agreement. In fact, the Marketing Agreement was a
common factor for the plea of infringement/passing off as well
as for any other claim for breach of contract which the appellant
might choose to pursue. The reliance, by the learned Single
Judge, on the application filed by the appellant under Order II
Rule 2 of the CPC, and the grant of leave to the appellant in
terms of the prayers in the said application, by this Court was,
therefore, misplaced.
(xvii) Inasmuch as the Marketing Agreement had been executed
in Delhi, part of the cause of action arose within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court.
13. Submissions of Mr. Raj Shekhar Rao for the respondent
Responding to the submissions of Mr. Agarwal, Mr. Rajshekhar Rao,
17
(r) “permitted use”, in relation to a registered trade mark, means the use of trade mark—
*
(ii) by a person other than the registered proprietor and registered user in relation to goods or
services—
*
(c) by consent of such registered proprietor in a written agreement;
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appearing for the respondent, advanced the following contentions:
(i) What was required to be ascertained was whether any
part of the cause of action, which formed the basis for
instituting the suit, arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this
Court.
(ii) If no cause of action arose at the registered office of the
plaintiff, the right to institute the suit before the Court having
jurisdiction over such registered office, otherwise available
under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act was taken away,
as held by the Supreme Court in IPRS .
(iii) The law declared in IPRS was further clarified by the
Division Bench of this Court in Ultra Home Construction
which held that, if no part of the cause of action arose within the
principal or registered office of the plaintiff, and the entire
cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the subordinate
office of the plaintiff, the suit would necessarily have to be
instituted before the Court having jurisdiction over such
subordinate office.
(iv) A bare perusal of the plaint, read with the documents
filed therewith, demonstrated that no part of the cause of action
in the present case has arisen within the jurisdiction of this
Court.
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(v) On the contrary, the documents filed by the appellant
established that it has a subordinate office in Telangana, where
the Marketing Agreement was performed. The cause of action,
therefore, arose within the jurisdiction of the branch office of
the appellant at Telangana.
(vi) The fact that the appellant had a branch office at
Medchal, Telangana, was clear from the invoices filed by the
appellant with its plaint.
(vii) As the invoices filed by the appellant with the plaint
reflected the subordinate office of the appellant as being at
Medchal, Telangana, Mr. Agarwal was not correct in his
contention that the learned Single Judge had relied on
averments outside the plaint in paras 56, 57 and 70 of the
impugned judgment.
(viii) The learned Single Judge was also justified in holding
that the Marketing Agreement did not constitute any part of the
cause of action for instituting the plaint. Though the Marketing
Agreement was mentioned as a basis for the transactional
relationship of the parties, the plaint did not advert to the
Marketing Agreement as the basis for the cause of action on
which it was founded.
(ix) Rather, breach of the Marketing Agreement constituted a
separate cause of action, for which the appellant had expressly
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reserved its rights.
(x) The actual claim of infringement and passing off was not
based on the breach of the Marketing Agreement. The learned
Single Judge was correct in his finding, therefore, that the suit
was not premised on any cause of action based on the
Marketing Agreement or the breach thereof.
(xi) The appellant had failed to show how the alleged breach
of the Marketing Agreement had necessarily to be proved by the
appellant in order to support its right to an injunction on the
ground of infringement and passing off.
(xii) In fact, the Marketing Agreement specifically recorded
that the appellant had a license to sell the seeds only in the
States of Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra
Pradesh, Telangana, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, which did not
include Delhi.
(xiii) The appellant had also failed to establish any proof of
sales of its products or of the allegedly infringing products in
Delhi.
(xiv) In so far as the listing of the allegedly infringing products
of the respondent on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi e-commerce
platform was concerned, while the appellant had referred to the
possibility of concluding the sale transaction over the said
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platforms, the appellant had failed to demonstrate even a
solitary sale concluded thereby, either by itself or through a
third party.
(xv) The documents filed by the appellant, too, did not
disclose any dynamic effect of the listing of the respondent’s
products on IndiaMart and Kalgudi or interactivity in Delhi.
Moreover, the listing of the respondent’s products on the
IndiaMart and Kalgudi platforms did not belong to the
respondent but had been put up by a third party.
(xvi) The listing did not show any option for placing an order
for delivery of the goods at Delhi.
(xvii) In these circumstances, the reliance by the appellant on
the listing of the allegedly infringing products of the respondent
on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites was contrary to the law
laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Banyan Tree
Holding .
(xviii) The appellant did not produce even a single document
before the learned Single Judge evidencing specific targeting,
by the respondent of the market in Delhi.
(xix) The averments in the plaint even when read on a demurer
did not satisfy the criterion of purposeful availment of the
jurisdiction of this Court or, of the dynamic effect of the sales of
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the respondent’s products being felt within such jurisdiction.
(xx) The fact that no such dynamic effect could be felt was
also clear from the fact that in accordance with the licences held
by it, the respondent could not have sold its products in Delhi.
(xxi) The decision in World Wrestling Entertainment was
against the appellant as in the said decision, this Court had ruled
that mere accessibility of a website and broadcasting in a
specific place was insufficient to vest jurisdiction.
Analysis
14. Issue
14.1 The only issue for consideration is whether the learned Single
Judge was correct in holding that this Court does not have territorial
jurisdiction to entertain the suit and, thereby, in allowing the
respondent’s application under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC.
14.2 It is elementary that if the suit would lie within the jurisdiction
of this Court on any one ground, the suit would be maintainable
before this Court.
15. The impugned judgment in a nutshell
15.1 The learned Single Judge has held the suit not to be
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maintainable before this Court on the following four grounds:
(i) The registration of the trade marks asserted by the
appellant in Delhi could not clothe this Court with jurisdiction,
in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Dhodha
House .
(ii) The Marketing Agreement did not form any part of the
cause of action for filing the suit. As such, the fact that the
Marketing Agreement had been executed in New Delhi could
not clothe this Court with jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
(iii) The listing of the infringing products of the respondent
on the Indiamart and Kalgudi e-commerce platforms did not
clothe this Court with jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
(iv) As no part of the cause of action had arisen within the
jurisdiction of this Court, and the entire cause of action appears
to have arisen within the jurisdiction of Courts within whose
jurisdiction the appellant’s subordinate office was situated, the
suit could not be instituted before this Court, in view of the law
declared in Ultra Home Construction.
15.2 Apart from the question of whether the learned Single Judge
was correct in his findings on the above issues, we are also required to
address the objection, of Mr. Agarwal, that the learned Single Judge
relied on material outside the plaint, which was impermissible under
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Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC.
16. We proceed to address these issues seriatim .
17. Whether the impugned judgment is correct in holding that the
registration of the asserted trade marks of the appellant in Delhi would
not confer jurisdiction on this Court
17.1 The learned Single Judge has ruled against the appellant, on this
issue, relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dhodha
House .
17.2 We are unable to sustain this finding.
17.3 The Supreme Court, in Dhodha House , decided two appeals,
i.e., Civil Appeal No.6248/1997 ( Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi ) and
Civil Appeal No.16/1999 ( Patel Field Marshal Industries and Ors. v.
P.M. Diesel Ltd. ). Of these, the decision in Civil Appeal
No.6248/1997 is not of relevance for our purpose.
17.4 In paras 17 and 18 of the impugned judgment, the learned
Single Judge has placed reliance on the exposition of law, in Dhodha
House, to the effect that the cause of action, to institute an
infringement suit, arises only where when a registered trademark is
used and not “ when the application is filed for registration of a
trademark.” In thus paraphrasing the ratio decidendi of Dhodha
House , the learned Single Judge is correct.
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17.5 Where the learned Single Judge has erred, in our opinion, is in
his failing to note that the appellant was not invoking the jurisdiction
of this Court because its application for registration of the asserted
marks, was filed within the jurisdiction of this Court, but because the
asserted marks were registered within such jurisdiction.
17.6 Dhodha House holds, unexceptionably, that a mere filing of an
application for registration does not give rise to a cause of action for
infringement. The registration of a trademark, on the other hand,
18
unquestionably does. This is apparent from Section 28(1) of the
Trade Marks Act which confers, on the proprietor of a validly
registered trademark, both the right to exclusively use the said
trademark as well as for remedies against infringement of the mark.
Infringement, throughout Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act,
presupposes registration of the infringed trade mark, as each sub-
section of Section 29 commences with the words “A registered trade
mark is infringed …”
17.7 There can, therefore, be no infringement of an unregistered
trade mark. The very first criterion to be satisfied for a case of
infringement to sustain is that the infringed mark is registered. The
expression “cause of action” is defined, classically, as the bundle of
facts which the plaintiff would have to prove to succeed in the
19
action. Alternatively, it is defined as “every fact which, if traversed,
18
28. Rights conferred by registration . –
(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the registration of a trade mark shall, if valid,
give to the registered proprietor of the trade mark the exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in
relation to the goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered and to obtain relief
in respect of infringement of the trade mark in the manner provided by this Act.
19
Refer Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh, (1977) 1 SCC 791, A.V.M. Sales Corporation v. Anuradha
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it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his
20
right to a judgement of the court” . Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd v.
21
Union of India comprehensively defined the expression “cause of
action”, thus:
“6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts
which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute
the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It
has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that
every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court.
Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not
proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would
be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For
every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or
the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily.”
Viewed thus, it is obvious that the registration of the asserted mark is
an indispensable part of the right to sue for infringement, and to
succeed in the suit. If the defendant traverses the assertion of the
plaintiff that the mark is registered, the plaintiff would have to prove
the fact. The registration of the asserted mark is, therefore, in a way
the sine qua non for maintaining an infringement action.
17.8 Among the remedies available against infringement, of a
registered trademark is, moreover, the remedy of injunction, as per
22
Section 135(1) of the Trade Marks Act. The mere registration of a
trademark, therefore, confers, on the proprietor of the registered
Chemicals (P) Ltd, (2012) 2 SCC 315
20
Refer State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties, (1985) 3 SCC 217, ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu,
(1994) 4 SCC 711, Blook Dekor Ltd v. Subhash Himatlal Desai, (1994) 6 SCC 322
21
(2004) 6 SCC 254
22
135. Relief in suits for infringement or for passing off . –
(1) The relief which a court may grant in any suit for infringement or for passing off referred
to in Section 134 includes injunction (subject to such terms, if any, as the court thinks fit) and at the
option of the plaintiff, either damages or an account of profits, together with or without any order
for the delivery-up of the infringing labels and marks for destruction or erasure.
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trademark, the right to obtain an injunction, where the trademark is
infringed. The registration of the trademark, therefore, unquestionably
constitutes not just a part, but an indispensable part of the cause of
action for an infringement suit.
17.9 The learned Single Judge, in holding that the registration of the
asserted trademarks of the appellant in Delhi did not constitute part of
the cause of action to institute the suit has, therefore, ruled contrary to
Section 28(1) of the Trade Marks Act.
17.10 Dhodha House does not exposit any such proposition. What it
holds is that territorial jurisdiction cannot be vested in a Court merely
because the advertisement of the application filed by the plaintiff
seeking registration of the asserted marks was within such
jurisdiction. In this context, it is relevant to extract paras 30 and 31 of
the decision in Dhodha House , thus:
“30. The said decision has no application in the instant case for
more than one reason. For the purpose of registration of a trade
mark, an application must be filed in the branch office of the
Registrar of Trade Marks. It is not in dispute that under Section
5(3) of the 1958 Act, the Central Government has issued a
notification in the Official Gazette defining the territorial limits
within which an office of the Trade Marks Registry may exercise
its functions. The office of the Trade Marks Registry at New Delhi
exercises jurisdiction over the States of Haryana, Himachal
Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh
and the Union Territory of Chandigarh and the National Capital
Territory of Delhi. Whereas in Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi no
such application has been filed, admittedly in Patel Field Marshal
Industries v. P.M. Diesels Ltd. the Delhi office has no jurisdiction
as parties are residents of Rajkot and an application was filed by
the appellant for registration of its trade mark at Bombay. If an
objection is to be filed, the same has to be filed at Bombay. An
advertisement by itself in a journal or a paper would not confer
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jurisdiction upon a court , as would be evident from the following
observations of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas
Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu :
“Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO claims that a part of
the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the
Calcutta High Court because it became aware of the
advertisement in Calcutta, it submitted its bid or tender
from Calcutta and made representations demanding justice
from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer.
The advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should
be submitted to EIL at New Delhi; that those would be
scrutinised at New Delhi and that a final decision whether
or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken
at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract work
was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore,
merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and
submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations
from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts
forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the
mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and
received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an
integral part of the cause of action.”
31. A cause of action will arise only when a registered trade
mark is used and not when an application is filed for registration
of the trade mark . In a given case, an application for grant of
registration certificate may or may not be allowed. The person in
whose favour a registration certificate has already been granted
( sic ) indisputably will have an opportunity to oppose the same by
filing an application before the Registrar, who has the requisite
jurisdiction to determine the said question. In other words, a suit
may lie where an infringement of trade mark or copyright takes
place but a cause of action for filing the suit would not arise within
the jurisdiction of the court only because an advertisement has
been issued in the Trade Marks Journal or any other journal,
notifying the factum of filing of such an application .”
(Emphasis supplied)
17.11 Thus, even in Dhodha House , the application for registration of
the trademark was filed at Bombay. The advertisement, advertising the
filing of the application, was, inter alia , issued in Delhi. It was on the
ground that the advertisement of the application was also issued in
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Delhi that the jurisdiction of this Court was sought to be invoked. The
Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the advertisement of the
filing of the application for registration of the mark, was also issued in
Delhi, when the application itself was filed in Bombay, could not
confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain the suit.
17.12 The appellant, in the present case, never sought to invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court on the ground that the application for
registration of the asserted trade marks was advertised within the
jurisdiction of this Court, but that the registrations were granted by the
Trade Mark Office at Delhi.
17.13 The Supreme Court has clearly held, in para 31 of Dhodha
House , that the suit would lie where infringement of the trademark
takes place. Infringement of trademark, per definition, is dependent on
the registration of the mark. Thus, in para 31, the decision in Dhodha
House in fact emphasizes the jurisdiction of the Court where the
asserted mark is registered to entertain an infringement action. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that the fact that the marks asserted by the
appellant in the present case were registered within the jurisdiction of
this Court was by itself a factor which entitled the appellants to
institute the suit before this Court. The learned Single Judge, in our
considered opinion, is not correct in having held otherwise.
18. Whether the Marketing Agreement formed part of the cause of
action for instituting the suit and, therefore, whether the suit was
amenable to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court
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18.1 The finding, of the learned Single Judge, that the Marketing
Agreement dated 1 January 2022 executed between the appellant and
the respondent did not form part of cause of action in the suit is, to our
mind, clearly fallacious. The learned Single Judge has extensively
relied, in arriving at this finding, on the fact that the appellant had
moved IA 20138/2022 under Order II Rule 2 of the CPC, seeking
leave to separately sue the respondent for breach of the Marketing
Agreement and that leave, as sought, had been granted by a learned
Single Judge of this Court by order dated 12 July 2023. The learned
Single Judge has also relied on the fact that, in paras 49 and 50 of the
plaint, which dealt with cause of action and jurisdiction, there is no
reference to the Marketing Agreement.
18.2 We are not able to concur with the learned Single Judge on any
of these findings.
18.3 Firstly, a bare reading of the plaint makes it clear that the
plaintiff had asserted, at more points than one, that the manner of use,
by the respondent, of the infringing marks, was in breach of the
Marketing Agreement executed between the appellant and the
respondent. Inter alia , these assertions are to be found in paras 28 to
30 of the plaint, which already stand reproduced in para 3.2(viii)
supra .
18.4 Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, in its various sub-sections,
defines “infringement”. Each sub-section commences with the words,
“A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a
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registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use … ”
Ergo, infringement has necessarily to be by a person who has no
authority to use the allegedly infringing mark either as its registered
proprietor or by way of permitted user . A person who uses the mark as
a permitted user cannot, therefore, be an infringer of the mark.
18.5 It is for this reason that the appellant has specifically asserted,
in the plaint, that the user of the infringing mark by the respondent
was in breach of the Marketing Agreement and the extent to which the
respondent had been permitted to use the appellant’s mark thereunder.
User of the appellant’s mark in breach of the Marketing Agreement
was, therefore, specifically alleged in the plaint, to buttress the
assertion that the respondent was not using the infringing mark as a
permitted user within the meaning of Section 29 of the Trade Marks
Act.
18.6 The learned Single Judge has failed to take stock of these
assertions in the plaint, which more than amply demonstrate that the
Marketing Agreement, and its covenants, constitute an essential part
of the cause of action on which the plaint is based.
18.7 Once the Marketing Agreement and its covenants constitute a
part of the cause of action on which the plaint is based, courts having
jurisdiction over the place of execution of the Marketing Agreement
would ipso facto have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the suit. On the
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aspect of cause of action founded on breach of a contract, the Supreme
23
Court has held, in A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd v. A.P. Agencies , thus:
“15. In the matter of a contract there may arise causes of action
of various kinds. In a suit for damages for breach of contract the
cause of action consists of the making of the contract, and of its
breach, so that the suit may be filed either at the place where the
contract was made or at the place where it should have been
performed and the breach occurred. The making of the contract is
part of the cause of action . A suit on a contract, therefore, can be
filed at the place where it was made . The determination of the
place where the contract was made is part of the law of contract.”
(Emphasis supplied)
24
In a similar vein, Prakash Kaur v. K.G. Ringshia holds that “in
cases where cause of action consist of breach of contract, a suit can
be filed at the place where contract is made or to be performed and
also where breach occurs.”
18.8 As the plaint of the appellant was premised on the ground that
the use, by the respondent, of the allegedly infringing marks breached
the Marketing Agreement between them, the Marketing Agreement
constituted part of the cause of action on which the suit was based
and, therefore, this Court, being the Court within whose jurisdiction
the Marketing Agreement was admittedly executed, would be
possessed of territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit and adjudicate
on the lis .
19. Re. availability of the respondent’s products on e-commerce
websites
23
(1989) 2 SCC 163
24
MANU/DE/2036/2007
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19.1 One of the grounds on which the appellant asserted that this
Court has territorial jurisdiction in the matter, was that the
respondent’s products are available on e-commerce websites, which
can be accessed in Delhi. The learned Single Judge has observed that
there are only two e-commerce websites to which specific allusion is
to be found in the plaint, which are IndiaMart and Kalgudi.
19.2 The impugned judgment holds that availability of the
respondent’s marks on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites could not
confer jurisdiction on this Court, as the listings of the products on the
IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites was not at the instance of the
respondent, but at the instance of some third parties.
19.3 The learned Single Judge has also relied on the judgment of the
Division Bench of this Court in Banyan Tree Holding to hold that as
there was no evidence of any orders having been placed on IndiaMart
or Kalgudi for purchasing the allegedly infringing products of the
respondent, the listing of the said products on the said platforms could
not constitute a basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction.
19.4 The decision in Banyan Tree Holding
25
19.4.1 Banyan Tree Holding , the plaintiff before the Division Bench
of this Court in the said case, sued the defendants for having used the
mark “BANYAN TREE RETREAT” with a device of a Banyan Tree
which, according to BTH, infringed its registered trademark. The
25
“BTH” hereinafter
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Division Bench notes, in para 5 of its judgment, the recital, in the
judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court on the aspect of
territorial jurisdiction, as pleaded by BTH, thus:
“5. The learned single Judge has, in the referral order dated
11.8.2008, noticed that the plaintiff has in para 30 of the plaint
claimed that this Court has the territorial jurisdiction under Section
20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) to entertain the
suit. According to the Plaintiff the Defendants solicit business
through use of the impugned mark “BANYAN TREE RETREAT”
and the Banyan device in Delhi. It is stated that “the Defendants
have presence in Delhi through their website http:
//www.makprojects.com/banyantree.htm which is accessible in
Delhi.” It is further contended that “the said website is not a
passive website. It not only provides contact information but also
seeks feedback and inputs from its customers through an
interactive web-page.” Further, the Plaintiff submits that the
services of the Defendants are being offered to the customers in
Delhi “also because of the ubiquity, universality and utility of the
features of the Internet and the World Wide Web and hence the
cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court.”
19.4.2 The Division Bench formulated three questions as arising
before it for consideration, of which the first two are relevant, and
may be reproduced thus:
“(i) For the purposes of a passing off action, or an infringement
action where the Plaintiff is not carrying on business within the
jurisdiction of a court, in what circumstances can it be said that the
hosting of a universally accessible website by the Defendants lends
jurisdiction to such Court where such suit is filed (“the forum
court”)?
(ii) In a passing off or infringement action, where the defendant
is sought to be sued on the basis that its website is accessible in the
forum state, what is the extent of the burden on the Plaintiff to
prima facie establish that the forum court has jurisdiction to
entertain the suit?”
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19.4.3 The Division Bench observed, at the outset of its discussion,
that the suit before it was not one for infringement, but for passing off.
It observed that, if the suit was one for infringement, this Court would
in any event have territorial jurisdiction in the matter, in view of
Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, as BTH was carrying on
business within the jurisdiction of this Court. In a case of passing off,
however, Section 134 would not be applicable and jurisdiction would
have to vest in the Court in terms of Section 20 of the CPC.
19.4.4 The defendants before this Court were situated at Hyderabad.
As such, Section 20(a) would not apply. BTH sought to invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court on the basis of Section 20(c) of the CPC,
contending that, as the defendants had an interactive website which
could be accessed within the jurisdiction of this Court, this Court had
jurisdiction in the matter.
19.4.5 The Division Bench of this Court embarked on an exhaustive
analysis of the entire law relating to territorial jurisdiction in the case
of e-commerce, in this country as well as across the globe. Following
the said analysis, questions (i) and (ii) as framed by it were answered
thus, by the Division Bench:
“42. This Court holds that jurisdiction of the forum court does
not get attracted merely on the basis of interactivity of the website
which is accessible in the forum state. The degree of the
interactivity apart, the nature of the activity permissible and
whether it results in a commercial transaction has to be examined.
For the ‘effects’ test to apply, the Plaintiff must necessarily plead
and show prima facie that the specific targeting of the forum state
by the Defendant resulted in an injury or harm to the Plaintiff
within the forum state. For the purposes of a passing off or an
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infringement action (where the plaintiff is not located within the
jurisdiction of the court), the injurious effect on the Plaintiff's
business, goodwill or reputation within the forum state as a result
of the Defendant's website being accessed in the forum state would
have to be shown. Naturally therefore, this would require the
presence of the Plaintiff in the forum state and not merely the
possibility of such presence in the future. Secondly, to show that
an injurious effect has been felt by the Plaintiff it would have to be
shown that viewers in the forum state were specifically targeted .
Therefore the ‘effects’ test would have to be applied in conjunction
with the “sliding scale” test to determine if the forum court has
jurisdiction to try a suit concerning internet based disputes.
43. The question no. (i) is accordingly answered.
Question (ii) : In a passing off or infringement action, where the
defendant is sought to be sued on the basis that its website is
accessible in the forum state, what is the extent of the burden on
the Plaintiff to prima facie establish that the forum court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit?
44. This brings us to the question as to the extent of burden of
proof on the Plaintiff to prima facie show that the Defendant has
purposefully availed of the jurisdiction of this court. In the present
case, it is argued that by enabling customers to go on the website
and get a copy of its brochure and make enquiries, the Defendant
must be held to have purposefully availed of the jurisdiction of this
court. The question that arises is for the purposes of Section 20 (c)
CPC, in such circumstances, is what is the extent of the burden on
the Plaintiff to show prima facie that a part of the cause of action
arose within the jurisdiction of the forum court.
45. This court holds that in order to prima facie establish that
the Defendant purposefully availed of the jurisdiction of this court,
the Plaintiff would have to show that the Defendant engaged in
some commercial activity in the forum State by targeting its
website specifically at customers within that State . This is
26
consistent with the law laid down in Cybersell and reiterated later
27
in Toys R Us . It is also consistent with the application of the
‘tighter’ version of the ‘effects’ test which is ‘targeting’. In any
action for passing off or infringement, it would have to be shown
that the Defendant by using its mark intended to pass off its goods
as that of the Plaintiff's. A mere hosting of a website which can be
accessible from anyone from within the jurisdiction of the court is
not sufficient for this purpose. Also a mere posting of an
26
Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 130 F. 3d 414 (1997)
27
Toys “R” US v. Step Two, 318 F. 3d 446 (2003)
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advertisement by the Defendant depicting its mark on a passive
website which does not enable the Defendant to enter into any
commercial transaction with the viewer in the forum state cannot
satisfy the requirement of giving rise to a cause of action in the
forum state. Even an interactive website, which is not shown to be
specifically targeted at viewers in the forum state for commercial
transactions, will not result in the court of the forum state having
jurisdiction. In sum, for the purposes of Section 20 (c) CPC, in
order to show that some part of the cause of action has arisen in the
forum state by the use of the internet by the Defendant, the
Plaintiff will have to show prima facie that the said website,
whether euphemistically termed as “passive plus” or “interactive”
was specifically targeted at viewers in the forum state for
commercial transactions. The Plaintiff would have to plead this
and produce material to prima facie show that some commercial
transaction using the website was entered into by the Defendant
with a user of its website within the forum state and that the
specific targeting of the forum state by the Defendant resulted in
an injury or harm to the Plaintiff within the forum state . Question
no. (ii) is answered accordingly.”
(Emphasis supplied)
19.4.6 The learned Single Judge is, therefore, correct in his view that,
as per the law declared in Banyan Tree Holding , the mere existence
of an interactive website of the defendant, accessible within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court, would not be sufficient for the suit
to be maintainable here. It would additionally have to be shown that
some commercial transaction was concluded within the jurisdiction of
this Court.
19.5 The decision in World Wrestling Entertainment
19.5.1 Banyan Tree Holding was, however, subsequently diluted to an
extent by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in World
Wrestling Entertainment .
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19.5.2 World Wrestling Entertainment was a case which involved
Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. The plaintiff World Wide
28
Wrestling Entertainment sought to invoke the jurisdiction of this
Court on the ground that it “carried on business” within the
jurisdiction of this Court. In other words, WWE pressed into service
Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act. Banyan Tree Holding was
cited against the stand of the WWE.
19.5.3 The Division Bench proceeded to answer this issue thus :
“23. Let us now apply these principles to the type of transaction
over the internet, which we have explained above. The website of
the appellant/plaintiff refers to various goods and services. It is not
an offer but an invitation to an offer, just as a menu in a restaurant.
The invitation, if accepted by a customer in Delhi, becomes an
offer made by the customer in Delhi for purchasing the goods
“advertised” on the website of the appellant/plaintiff. When,
through the mode of the software and the browser, the transaction
is confirmed and payment is made to the appellant/plaintiff
through its website, the appellant/plaintiff accepts the offer of the
customer at Delhi. Since the transaction between the two takes
place instantaneously, the acceptance by the appellant/plaintiff is
instantaneously communicated to its customer through the internet
at Delhi. Therefore, in such a case, part of the cause of action
would arise in Delhi.
29
21. But, we are not concerned with the question of cause of
action between the appellant/plaintiff and its customers in Delhi
because the defendants are not such customers and they are, in any
event, all residents of Mumbai. What we are examining is whether
the third condition specified in Dhodha House (supra) is satisfied
or not. In other words, if the contracts and/or transactions entered
into between the appellant/plaintiff on the one hand and its
customers are being concluded in Delhi, can it not be said that the
essential part of the business of the appellant/plaintiff, insofar as its
transactions with customers in Delhi are concerned, takes place in
Delhi? The offers are made by customers at Delhi. The offers are
subject to confirmation/acceptance of the appellant/plaintiff
28
“WWE” hereinafter
29
(as numbered in the SCC OnLine copy of the judgment)
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through its website. The money would emanate or be paid from
Delhi. Can it not then be considered that the appellant/plaintiff is,
to a certain extent, carrying on business at Delhi? In our view, it
would be so. Because of the advancements in technology and the
rapid growth of new models of conducting business over the
internet, it is possible for an entity to have a virtual presence in a
place which is located at a distance from the place where it has a
physical presence. The availability of transactions through the
website at a particular place is virtually the same thing as a seller
having shops in that place in the physical world. Let us assume for
the sake of argument that the appellant/plaintiff had a shop in
Delhi from where it sold its various goods and services. In that
case, it could not be denied that the plaintiff carried on business in
Delhi. This is apart from the fact that the appellant/plaintiff may
also have been regarded as having voluntarily resided in Delhi.
When the shop in the ‘physical sense’ is replaced by the ‘virtual’
shop because of the advancement of technology, in our view, it
cannot be said that the appellant/plaintiff would not carry on
business in Delhi.
22. Therefore, in our view, although the learned Single Judge
had made a correct reference to the decision of the Supreme Court
30
in the case of Bhagwan Goverdhandas Kedia (supra) , the full
ramifications of that decision were not perceived by him. When the
two decisions of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Goverdhandas
Kedia (supra) and Dhodha House (supra) are considered in the
manner indicated above, it would appear that, on the averments
made by the appellant/plaintiff in the plaint, the Delhi High court
would, on a demurrer, have jurisdiction to entertain the suit
inasmuch as the appellant/plaintiff would be regarded as carrying
on business in Delhi within the meaning of the expression under
Section 134(2) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 and Section 62(2) of
the Copyright Act, 1957. Consequently, the learned Single Judge
ought not to have returned the plaint under Order 7 Rule 10 CPC.
As a result, the impugned order is set aside and the suit is restored
to its original number and the same be placed before the Roster
Bench for further steps therein on 28.10.2014, in the first instance.
This, however, would not preclude the defendants from raising the
plea of jurisdiction on facts which, if raised, could be considered
by the court based on the evidence and upon the law explained
above. The appeal is allowed, as above.”
19.5.4 The existence of a website of the plaintiff, over which a
commercial transaction could be concluded was, therefore, regarded
30
Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. Girdharilal Parshottamdas & Co., AIR 1966 SC 543
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by the Division Bench in World Wrestling Entertainment as
sufficient to amount to “carrying on a business” by WWE within the
jurisdiction of this Court. The actual conclusion of a transaction was,
therefore, no longer indispensable, after World Wrestling
Entertainment .
19.5.5 World Wrestling Entertainment undoubtedly is not an
authority for understanding the expression “cause of action” as
contained in Section 20(c) of the CPC. However, it is an authority for
the understanding of the expression “carries on business” in an era in
which business is considerably carried on over e-commerce websites.
The Division Bench has held, in World Wrestling Entertainment ,
that, even if the website of the plaintiff was interactive and one over
which a commercial transaction could be concluded, that would
suffice to constitute “carrying on of business by the plaintiff”, as, in
the e-commerce universe, every place where the website of an entity
would be accessible for the purpose of concluding a commercial
transaction would amount to a place where the entity has a market
place. If, therefore, WWE had a website over which commercial
transactions could be concluded at Delhi, it was equivalent to WWE
having a brick and mortar store in Delhi, resulting in this Court having
territorial jurisdiction in the matter. Thus, the requirement of actual
concluding of a commercial transaction over the website stands
diluted in World Wrestling Entertainment .
19.6 Section 20(a) of the CPC permit a plaintiff to sue a defendant
wherever the defendant carries on business . The law declared by this
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Court in World Wrestling Entertainment with respect to the carrying
on business by the plaintiff, in an e-commerce regime, for the
purpose of Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, would equally
apply to carrying on a business by the defendant for the purpose of
Section 20(a) of the CPC. Wherever, therefore, the defendant would
have an interactive website, over which a commercial transaction
could be concluded, any Court having jurisdiction over every place
where this could be done would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
19.7 But then, submits Mr. Raj Shekhar Rao, there is no interactive
website of the respondent, over or across which the allegedly
infringing goods could be purchased at Delhi. At least, the plaint
does not so aver. The placement of the goods for sale over e-
commerce websites by third parties, without the concurrence or
authorization of the respondent, tacit or express, could not create a
cause of action for the appellant, for the purposes of territorial
jurisdiction.
19.8 The submission is unquestionably weighty. After all, the tort
of infringement is not infringer innocent. Section 29 of the Trade
Marks Act envisages infringement only vis-à-vis an infringer, who
must be using the infringing marks without proprietorial or
permissive right to do so. The finding of the learned Single Judge
that, if the respondent has nothing to do with the listing of the
allegedly infringing products on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites,
the respondent cannot be held to account therefor is, therefore, prima
facie correct.
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19.9 Where, however, the learned Single Judge, in our considered
opinion, has erred on this issue is in the observation, in para 42 of the
impugned judgment, that the listing of the products on the IndiaMart
and Kalgudi websites was not at the instance of the respondent. In so
observing, the learned Single Judge, in our considered opinion, failed
to realize the fact that the issue before him was the right of the
appellant to sue . Insofar as the appellant was concerned, the
allegedly infringing goods were available, for sale and purchase,
across e-commerce websites, over which a transaction could be
concluded within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of this Court.
There is no admission, in the plaint, that the listing of the products on
the IndianMart or Kalgudi websites was not at the instance of the
respondent. It would be for the respondent to so aver, and that
averment, which could emerge at the earliest in the respondent’s
written statement, could not be considered while examining the
aspect of territorial jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 10, which has
to be limited to the assertions in the plaint. At the highest, therefore,
the issue of whether the respondent had anything to do with the
listing of the allegedly infringing goods over the IndiaMart or
Kalgudi websites would be a matter of trial. Arguendo, if the
appellant were able to establish, in trial, that the entities who placed
the respondent’s goods for sale and purchase on the IndiaMart and
Kalgudi websites did so at the instance of the respondent, or with its
knowledge, the respondent might still be answerable therefor.
19.10 That the goods were, in fact, available for purchase across the
IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites, is not disputed. That the goods
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could be purchased across the said websites within the jurisdiction of
this Court, is equally not disputed. Whether the respondent, directly
or indirectly, was involved in the said listings, is, at best, a matter of
trial. The learned Single Judge could not, therefore, have held that
the appellant could not sue the respondent in this Court, even when
the allegedly infringing goods could be purchased, across the
IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites, within its jurisdiction, on the
premise that the respondent was innocent of the listings.
19.11 For the purposes of an application under Order VII Rule 10 of
the CPC, these assertions, in the absence of anything to the contrary
either in the plaint or in the documents filed with the plaint, had to be
treated as correct.
19.12 The assertion that the allegedly infringing goods of the
respondent were available on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites,
and that orders could be placed on these websites within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court were, therefore, sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on this Court to adjudicate on the suit.
19.13 We are in agreement with Mr. Agarwal that the issue of
whether the listings on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi e-commerce
platforms, of the allegedly infringing goods of the respondent, for
sale, were at the instance of the respondent or of some other party, is
extraneous to the aspect of territorial jurisdiction. Once the
infringing goods were available for sale, the tort of infringement,
which predicates use of the infringed mark, or a mark which is
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deceptively similar thereto, for trade, stood committed. The suit,
seeking relief thereagainst, could be filed before every Court having
territorial jurisdiction over the situs of sale of such goods. World
Wrestling Entertainment extends, in a case of e-commerce, the situs
to include every place where a commercial transaction could be
concluded and the goods bought or sold. Every Court having
jurisdiction over such place can, therefore, adjudicate on the aspect of
infringement, or passing off. The decision of the learned Single
Judge is clearly contrary to this principle.
19.14 There is no dispute about the fact that the allegedly infringing
products of the respondent were available on IndiaMart and Kalgudi.
It was specifically asserted, in the plaint, that the IndiaMart and
Kalgudi websites were accessible in Delhi. In paras 49 and 50 of the
plaint, it was further specifically pleaded that, as orders could be
placed across these websites, the dynamic effect of the availability of
the respondent’s goods on the said e-market platforms was felt within
the jurisdiction of this Court.
19.15 The findings of the learned Single Judge with respect to the
listing of the products on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi platforms is
also, therefore, not sustainable in law.
20. The Ultra Home Construction principle, and reliance thereon
20.1 The learned Single Judge has further relied on para 14 of the
judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Ultra Home
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Construction to hold that, as the respondent has subordinate offices
in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, and no part of the cause of action
has arisen within Delhi, this Court could not exercise territorial
jurisdiction in the matter. The situation, according to the learned
Single Judge is covered by the third category of cases envisaged in
para 14 of Ultra Home Construction.
20.2 It is true that, in para 14 of Ultra Home Construction , the
Division Bench of this Court has held that, if the principal place of
business of the plaintiff is situated at place A, and the subordinate
office of the plaintiff is at place B, and no part of the cause of action
has arisen at A, the entire cause of action having arisen at B, the
plaintiff has necessarily to sue the defendant before the Court having
territorial jurisdiction over place B, and could not sue the defendant
at place A.
20.3 We need not delve too deep into this aspect, as, in our view, a
substantial part of the cause of action in the present case does arise
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, because (i) the
asserted trade marks of the appellant stand registered within the
jurisdiction of this Court, (ii) the Marketing Agreement was executed
at Delhi and (iii) the allegedly infringing goods of the respondent are
available for sale and purchase, across e-commerce websites, at
Delhi. As such, no occasion arises to invoke the Ultra Home
Construction doctrine.
20.4 In our view, therefore, the appellant’s right to sue the
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respondent before this Court does not stand divested by the law
declared in Ultra Home Construction. We are constrained to hold
that the learned Single Judge was in error in deciding otherwise.
20.5 With greatest respect to the learned Authors of the judgment of
the Division Bench in Ultra Home Construction , we have some
reservations regarding the correctness of this proposition, as
exposited in para 14 of the said decision. To our mind, Section 134 of
the Trade Marks Act confers an absolute right on a plaintiff to sue the
defendant at the place where the plaintiff has its principal office of
business. To hold that, even if the plaintiff has its principal office of
business at place A, it has to sue the defendant at place B where it has
its subordinate office of business, because the cause of action has
arisen at place B, would, in our view, be re-writing Section 134 of the
Trade Marks Act, which a Court cannot do.
21. Re. the plea that learned Single Judge relied on material
outside the plaint
21.1 Mr. Agarwal has also sought to contend that the learned Single
Judge has, in paras 56, 57 and 70 of the impugned judgment, relied
on material outside the plaint and documents filed therewith, and has,
therefore, traversed the limits of Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC.
21.2 Paras 56, 57 and 70 of the impugned judgment read thus:
“56. The Plaintiff has filed the present suit stating that its
registered office is in Delhi and that is enough to best jurisdiction
in this Court. Per contra, it has been contended on behalf of the
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defendant that since Plaintiff has subordinate offices at places
where the cause of action has arisen, jurisdiction cannot be claimed
on the basis of location of plaintiff’s head office, where no cause
of action has arisen.
57. It has correctly been pointed out on behalf of the defendant
that Plaintiff has failed to disclose in the plaint that Plaintiff also
has subordinate offices elsewhere in India including a subordinate
office in Telangana, where the defendant is based. Invoices filed
with the plaint (pages 159-185 of the Plaintiff documents filed
along with the plaint and pages 18-28 of the additional documents
filed by the Plaintiff along with the plaint) clearly suggest that the
Plaintiff has a branch office at Medchal, State of Telangana. This
position is also not disputed by the Plaintiff.
*
70. In the present case, even though the head office of the
Plaintiff is located in Delhi, no part of the cause of action has
arisen in Delhi. The cause of action appears to have arisen at
place(s) where the Plaintiff has its subordinate office(s). Hence,
applying the principles of Sanjay Dalia (supra) and Ultra Home
(supra) in the present case, the Plaintiff cannot maintain this suit in
Delhi.”
21.3 We cannot agree with Mr. Agarwal that, in returning these
observations and findings, the learned Single Judge has travelled
beyond the plaint and the documents filed therewith. The learned
Single Judge has nearly recorded the contention of the Respondent
regarding suppression, by the Appellant, of the existence of a
subordinate office of the Appellant outside Delhi, in Telangana. In
prima facie accepting the said submission, the learned Single Judge
has relied on invoices filed with the plaint. He was entitled to do so.
21.4 We, therefore, do not accept Mr. Agarwal’s contention that the
learned Single Judge has erred in relying on material outside the
plaint, and the documents filed therewith, while passing the
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impugned judgment.
Conclusion
22. For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that the plaint, as
instituted by the appellant, was maintainable before this Court. The
learned Single Judge has, in our considered opinion, erred in holding
otherwise.
23. The impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge,
adjudicating IA 2200/2023 filed by the respondent under Order VII
Rule 10 of the CPC, is not, therefore, in our view, sustainable on
facts or in law. It is accordingly quashed and set aside.
24. Resultantly, IA 2200/2023 filed by the respondent would also
stand dismissed. The suit itself would stand restored to the file of the
learned Single Judge for further proceedings in accordance with law.
25. The appeal stands allowed in the aforesaid terms with no order
as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
DECEMBER 3, 2025
AR/DSN/AKY/YG
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:03.12.2025
14:54:38
FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025 Page 69 of 69