Tilak Raj vs Comm. Of Police

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O.A. No. 828/2015

Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi

O.A. No. 828/2015

th
This the 29 day of September, 2026

Hon’ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon’ble Shri B. Anand, Member (A)

Tilak Raj,
Son of Sh. Prem Singh,
Aged about 41 years,
R/o H. No. D-15/1, Gali Budh Vihar,
Kondli, Delhi 110096
Aged 41 Years, Ex-ASI (Steno)
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. Ajesh Luthra, Mr. Samarth Luthra, Ms.
Meenu Sharma and Mr. Anshul Yadav)

Versus


1. Commissioner of Police,
PHQ, MSO Building,
IP Estate, New Delhi.

2. Joint Commissioner of Police,
(South Eastern Range)
PHQ, MSO Building,
IP Estate, New Delhi.

3. The Addl. Deputy Commissioner of Police,
(South District)
PS Hauz Khas, Delhi.
... Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. Archit Vasudeva)
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O R D E R (ORAL)

Hon’ble Shri B. Anand, Member (A)

1. The undisputed facts of the case are that the applicant, while
working as an ASI (Steno) working with the Delhi Police,
was proceeded against by way of an FIR No. 527/1998,
which was registered on 22.10.1998 under Section 498A,
307, 201, 354, and 34 of the IPC at Police Station
Kalyanpuri, Delhi. The allegations as contained in the
impugned order dated 26.12.2014 are as follows:-
“The allegations leading to the award of punishment
are that he was married to late Smt. Dayawati on
09.05.1997 according to Hindu rites and customs. On
21.10.1998, she was admitted to Lok Nayak Jai
Prakash Narain Hospital after having 100% burn
injuries. In her statement to Sh. Ravi Dadhich,
SDM/Preet Vihar on 22.10.1998, she stated that her
husband used top harass her and that he had
demanded Rs. 50,000/- on two occasions. He had
also demanded a car. He sprinkled Kerosene Oil on
her in presence of his parents and other family
member and his sister ignited the match stick. She
had further alleged that he used to beat her up,
threaten her and did not speak to her. Later, Smt.
Dayawanti succumbed succumbed her bur injuries on
26.10.1998.”
2. Consequent to the registration of the said FIR, the applicant
was placed under suspension on 22.10.1998. The said FIR
resulted in the conviction of the applicant on 12.07.2002 by
way of an order passed by the learned trial court. The
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applicant filed an appeal against the order of the trial court
before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. Vide order dated
26.07.2005, the sentence was suspended and it is stated that
the criminal appeal is still pending before the Hon'ble High
Court of Delhi at the time of writing of this judgment. The
applicant is aggrieved by the above action of the
respondents, who despite knowing about the learned trial
court's order dated 12.07.2002, waited for nearly a decade
and thereafter initiated disciplinary inquiry on 10.02.2012
in which the applicant had wholeheartedly participated and
the said disciplinary proceedings resulted in the dismissal of
the applicant on 06.01.2014. The applicant thereafter filed
an appeal, which was rejected by the appellate authority
vide its order dated 26.12.2014, which is the impugned
order in the present OA. Aggrieved by the action of the
respondents, the applicant has filed the present OA seeking
the following relief(s):-
“(a) Quash and set aside the impugned order placed
at Annexure A/1, Annexure A/2, Annexure A/3 and
Annexure A/4 and
(b) Direct the respondents to reinstate the applicant
all consequential benefits.
(c) Award costs of the proceedings.
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(d) Pass any other order/direction which this Hon’ble
Tribunal deem fit and proper in favour of the
applicant and against the respondents in the facts
and circumstances of the case.”
3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that by way of the
present OA, the applicant has challenged the order of the
disciplinary authority dated 06.01.2014 and the rejection
order of the appellate authority of his appeal dated
26.12.2014, on majorly three grounds, although he submits
that there are other supplementary grounds that he is
relying upon. However, at the time of submissions, he is
relying on the following three grounds, leaving the other
grounds open to the applicant.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the
respondents have invoked Rule 11(3) of the Delhi Police
(Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980, (hereinafter, referred
to as the ‘Rules’) for taking the departmental action against
the applicant leading to the dismissal. The said Rule 11 reads
as under:-
“ Rule 11. Punishment on judicial conviction.
(1) When a report is received from an official
source, e.g., a court or the prosecution agency, that a
subordinate rank has been convicted in a criminal
court of an offence, involving moral turpitude or on
charge of disorderly conduct in a state of
drunkenness or in any criminal case, the disciplinary
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authority shall consider the nature and gravity of the
offence and if in its opinion that the offence is such as
would render further retention of the convicted police
officer in service, prima facie undesirable, it may
forthwith make an order dismissing or removing him
from service without calling upon him to show cause
against the proposed action provided that no such
order shall be passed till such time the result of the
first appeal that may have been filed by such police
officer is known.

(2) If such police officer is acquitted on second
appeal or revision, he shall be reinstated in service
from the date of dismissal or removal and may be
proceeded against departmentally.

(3) In cases where the dismissal or removal from
service of the convicted police officer is not considered
necessary, the disciplinary authority may examine
the judgment and take such departmental action as it
may deem proper.

(4) When a police officer is convicted judicially and
consequently dismissed or removed from service, and
it is desired to ensure that the officer dismissed or
removed shall not be re-employed elsewhere, a full
descriptive roll with particulars of punishments, shall
be sent for publication in the Delhi Police Gazette.”
5. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that when the
respondents passed the order, which has been the subject
matter of his conviction in the aforesaid case FIR, for any
related departmental punishment against him, the
respondents were having the jurisdiction only and only
under the provisions of Rule 11 of the Rules. Further, for the
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sake of clarity, he has argued that in view of the provisions
of Rule 11(3), the respondents should have initiated any
departmental action against the applicant only if they were
of the view that dismissal or removal from service of the
applicant on his being convicted was not found necessary,
whereas in the present case, from the initiation of the
departmental action itself it is apparent that the same was
initiated for inflicting major penalty, which includes
dismissal and removal, as defined under Rule 5 and 6 of the
Rules. Learned counsel for the applicant has further
emphasized that other than Rule 11 there is no provision
under the said Rules for inflicting any departmental
punishment upon the applicant in the given facts and
circumstances of the case. He has argued that it has not
been the case of the respondents that the respondents have
come to a conclusion that no removal or dismissal was
necessary to be inflicted upon the applicant. There was no
occasion for the respondents to initiate any departmental
proceedings, less to talk about inflicting orders of penalty.
At best in view of the conviction, the respondents could have
considered the case of the applicant under other provisions
which might have been akin to Article 311(2) of the
Constitution of India. In support of his arguments, he has
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placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court
of Delhi in W.P.(C) No. 1044/2008 dated 04.12.2008 titled
“Commissioner of Police Headquarter ITO, New
Delhi Versus Shri Brij Pal Singh”. The paragraphs 19
to 22 of the said judgment read as under:-
“19. Learned Additional Solicitor General then posed
the question: What is the Petitioner expected to do
until the decision is rendered in the first appeal? In
our opinion, the Petitioner is at liberty to take either
of the three steps: (i) take back the police officer in
service (which is wholly unlikely and purely
hypothetical); (ii) it can treat the police officer as
being under suspension, which was his status during
the pendency of the criminal trial; or (iii) it can
initiate departmental action against the convicted
police officer under Rule 11(3) of the Rules. The
Tribunal has directed the Petitioner to exercise the
second option, namely, to treat all the convicted
police officers as being under suspension other than
those who are actually undergoing imprisonment.
We are of the opinion that this direction is perfectly
reasonable and continues the status quo that existed
during the pendency of the criminal trial. Of course,
this cannot and does not prohibit the Petitioner from
simultaneously initiating departmental action under
Rule 11(3) of the Rules.
20. There are, therefore, two viable options that the
Petitioner may resort to and it is not as if dismissal or
removal of the convicted police officer is the only
remedy that is available to the Petitioner, more
particularly in the face of the proviso to Rule 11(1) of
the Rules.
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21. We may note that the Petitioner is not entirely
helpless as is sought to be projected by the learned
Additional Solicitor General. There is a gap period
between the date of the sentence and the filing of the
first appeal. While we do not express any opinion in
this regard, it may be possible for the Petitioner (in
an appropriate case) to use this gap period to pass an
order of dismissal or removal from service by
exercising powers under Clause (a) of the second
proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. But, if
this gap period is not made use of by the Petitioner
then, it will have to await the decision of the first
appeal filed by the convicted police officer by the
appellate Court. An escape valve has been provided
by the statute, but we do not express any opinion at
all about its utility, since that question does not arise
for our consideration.
22. To sum up, on a plain reading of the proviso to
Rule 11(1) of the Rules, we find no error having been
committed by the Tribunal in taking the view that it
did.”
6. The second limb of the argument of the learned counsel for
the applicant is that the respondents while passing the
impugned orders of penalty have adopted a pick and choose
policy and they have passed the impugned order arbitrarily
inasmuch as in similar circumstances when another person,
namely, Ex-HC Dinesh Kumar was found involved in a
criminal case registered under FIR No. 314/2000 under
Section 498A/304B/34 of the IPC registered at PS Sarai
Rohilla on 01.09.2000, was convicted by the trial court vide
order/judgment dated 23.07.2004, was sentenced to
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undergo a rigorous punishment of ten years and to pay a
fine of Rs. 5000/-, considering the statutory appeal and
taking into account the provisions of Rule 11 of the Rules,
the appellate authority set aside the order passed by the
disciplinary authority vide appellate order dated 02.07.2014
(a copy of which has been annexed by the applicant with the
statutory appeal) and while considering the said appeal, the
appellate authority vide the impugned appellate order has
given a finding that in the present case they have not
resorted to the Rule 11 of the Rules but without referring to
any provisions of the Rules under which they have got the
jurisdiction and competence to pass the impugned orders.
7. The third argument that the learned counsel for the
applicant makes is that the prosecution witnesses relied
upon by the inquiry officer are all non-independent
witnesses. In order to buttress his claim, he has relied upon
the following paragraphs of the inquiry officer’s report:-
“5.PW-5 Shri Ravi Dadhich, the then SDM/Preet Vihar
has proved that on 22, October, 1998 he was posted as
SDM, Preet Vihar and after receiving information about
admission of a lady namer Ms. Dayawati, he visited the
LNJP Hospital and after obtaining opinion of doctor,
recorded the statement of Ms. Dayawati. In her statement
she had alleged demand of dowry and other articles and
also alleged that her in-laws had put kerosene oil and
burnt her and as a result she got severe burn (injury) and
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was admitted to the Hospital. He also visited the site of
incidence on the same day. He recalled that in this matter
he had given a statement as a witness in the case titled
State Vs Shri Tilak Raj. A copy of the same may be
obtained from the court records.
6. DW-2 and DW-4 have stated that while SDM/Preet
Vihar recorded the statement of Smt. Dayawati, her
parents were present there and she was stating as per the
advice of her parents. These witnesses have not been
examined in the court and they could not come forward in
the trial proceedings, hence their depositions do not have
waight.
7. DW-1 and DW-3 have withdrawn their statement on
30.4.2013 stating that they do not want to defend ASI
(Steno) Tilak Raj in this case.
8. DW-5 is a doctor who conducted the post-mortem
report of Smt. Dayawati who stated that there were no
injuries on the body of deceased Dayawati.”
8. Learned counsel for the applicant states that the evidence
rendered by these witnesses, who even go to the extent of
stating that, the deceased Smt. Dayawati while giving her
dying declaration was coached by the parents who had
advised her regarding the statement to be given to the
Police. He also stated that there were no injuries on the
body of Smt. Dayawati as reported by the doctor who
conducted the post mortem and led his evidence as defense
witness 5. Yet the inquiry officer has chosen to disregard all
these aspects and gone ahead to prove that the allegations
against the applicant as proved beyond doubt.
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9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents,
who has vehemently opposed the contentions of the learned
counsel for the applicant submits that the respondents have
not taken action against the applicant under Rule 11 of the
Rules. He submits that they have taken action against the
applicant by invoking the powers vested under Rule 5 and 6
of the Rules which narrates the various punishments and
the authorities competent to award them. He submits that
the action taken against the applicant is not in excess of the
power conferred on them vide the above two rules inasmuch
as the authority which has imposed the punishment of
dismissal on 06.01.2014 is an Officer of the rank of Deputy
Commissioner of Police. He submits that in the above
circumstances, the action taken by the respondents is
perfectly in order. However, he submits that he has not
come across any rules under which the present
departmental inquiry was initiated, of course, the penalty
inflicted upon the applicant finds place in the provisions of
Rule 5 of the Rules. He invites our attention to the specific
assertion of the respondents in the counter reply as well as
the findings of the appellate authority that the respondents
have not acted in light of the provision of Rule 11(1) of the
Rules.
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10. We have considered the submissions made by the
learned counsels for the parties and with their assistance we
have gone through the pleadings available on record.
11. We find force in the submissions of the learned counsel for
the applicant inasmuch as the respondents have taken
nearly a decade in initiating the disciplinary inquiry,
especially, when it was known to them that the applicant
was convicted on 12.07.2002 and only the sentence has been
suspended by the Hon’ble High Court and there was nothing
preventing them from initiating inquiry against the
applicant during the intervening period and they did not
take any action. Even if it is presumed that they did not take
action subsequent to the conviction of the applicant in light
of the provision of the un-amended Rule 11(1) of the Rules,
there is no explanation furnished by the respondents as to
what has prevented them to initiate action after the
amendment of the provisions of Rule 11 of the Rules vide the
notification dated 30.11.2011. And, if at all, they have
initiated action in the year 2012, in light of the amendment
of 30.11.2011 qua Rule 11(1) of the Rules, we fail to
understand that how they could have initiated the action for
inflicting the penalty without considering the provisions of
Rule 11(3) of the Rules.
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12. It is worth noting that despite the applicant having brought
to the notice of the appellate authority this fact in his
statutory appeal, by referring to the case of aforesaid Ex-HC
Mr. Dinesh Kumar, the appellate authority has though
stated in the impugned order that the departmental action
and order has not been passed in view of the provision of
Rule 11, however, it has not been stated by the respondents
either in the impugned orders or in the counter reply and
despite opportunity to them, even during the course of
hearing that under which provision they have initiated the
inquiry and inflicted the penalty provided under provisions
of Rule 5 and 6 of the Rules. So far as the argument
advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents that
the punishment has been in the light of Rule 5 and 6 of the
Rules, it is admitted position that such provisions of Rule 5
and 6 define the punishments as to which are the major and
minor penalties and the provisions of Rule 5 and 6 are the
procedures of rules for inflicting the penalty. It is also not
the case of the respondents that the impugned penalty has
been inflicted by invoking the provisions of Article 311 of the
Constitution of India and/or any other provision akin to
that.
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13. In the light of the aforesaid, we are of the considered view
that the O.A. deserves to be allowed and the same is,
accordingly, allowed with the following directions:-
i. The impugned orders dated 26.12.2014 (Annexure
A/1), 06.01.2014 (Annexure A/2), 10.02.2012
(Annexure A/4) and the inquiry officer’s report
(Annexure A/3) are set aside.
ii. The applicant shall be entitled for all consequential
benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and
instructions on the subject.
iii. The aforesaid directions shall be complied with by the
respondents as expeditiously as possible and
preferably within six weeks from the date of receipt of
a certified copy of this order.
iv. The respondents shall be at liberty to initiate action
and/or pass order depending upon the fate of the
criminal appeal referred to hereinabove.
14. There shall be no order as to costs.




(B. Anand) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)

/dd /

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