Girishbhai Natwarlal Patel vs Gautam Punjabhai Palkhiwala (Dead) By Lrs
- Court
- Supreme Court
2026 INSC 1177
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 14017-14018 of 2026
[Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 29178-29179 of 2024]
GIRISHBHAI NATWARLAL PATEL …Appellant
Versus
GAUTAM PUNJABHAI PALKHIWALA (DEAD)
BY LRS & ORS. …Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VISHAL ANAND
Date: 2026.10.30
14:19:26 IST
Reason:
J.B. PARDIWALA, J.:
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:
INDEX
A. PROCEDURAL BACKDROP OF THE MATTER: ...................... 3
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES (ALONG WITH
THEIR CORRESPONDING FACTUAL MATRIX): ......................... 9
(i) Submissions on behalf of the Appellant: ............................... 9
(ii) Submissions on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 9: ........ 19
C. ISSUES: 31
.............................................................................................
D. ANALYSIS: ....................................................................................... 32
(i) Whether the ex parte ad interim injunction granted vide
impugned Oral order dated 02.04.2024, restraining the
appellant from dealing with the subject land, and in continuing
the same by judgement and order dated 14.08.2024 is
sustainable in law :- ........................................................... 32
(ii) Whether leave to appeal could have been granted to the original
applicants/Respondent nos. 1-9, considering that they were
Page 1 of 67
not parties to the original suit which culminated in the consent
decree sought to be appealed against? ................................ 37
a. Whether a stranger to a consent decree can maintain an
appeal under Section 96 r/w Order XXIII Rule 3 & Rule 3A
of the CPC, 1908? ............................................................... 37
b. Principles governing the grant of leave to appeal:
............ 51
(iii) Whether the condonation of delay of 11 years was valid? .... 62
E. CONCLUSION: ............................................................................. 65
Page 2 of 67
1. Leave granted.
2. Since the issues raised in the above captioned appeals are the
same, the parties are also same and the challenge is also to the
self-same judgment and order passed by the High Court, those
were taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed
of by this common judgment and order.
A. PROCEDURAL BACKDROP OF THE MATTER:
3. The present appeals arise from (i) the Order dated 02.04.2024
in C.A. No. 1408/2024 whereby the High Court granted an ex
parte ad interim injunction against the appellant herein; and
(ii) the Judgment dated 14.08.2024 passed in C.A. No.
1408/2024 with C.A. No. 1608/2024 in F/First Appeal No.
7226 of 2024 whereby the High Court condoned a delay of
11 years and granted the Respondent Nos. 1-9 herein, Leave
to Appeal against the consent decree dated 29.04.2013 passed
in the Original Civil Suit No. 322 of 2012 , instituted for
specific performance of contract.
Page 3 of 67
4. By the aforesaid ex parte ad interim order, the High Court
restrained the appellant/Girish Natwarlal Patel, and any
person acting on his behalf from entering upon the subject suit
property and/or selling, transferring, mortgaging, leasing,
creating third-party rights or encumbrances in respect thereof,
or otherwise dealing with the property in any manner
whatsoever, until the next date of hearing. The injunction was
granted with a view to preventing multiplicity of proceedings
pending the decision of the appeal.
5. As the appellant/Girish Natwarlal Patel was not a party to the
proceedings at the time the aforesaid ex parte ad interim order
was passed, the High Court Registry had issued him a writ of
the Civil Application for Leave to Appeal, thereby informing him
of the injunction granted against him. When the matter was
next listed on 02.05.2024, an adjournment was granted at the
request of Ms. Vanu Nanavaty, the learned counsel who stated
that she had received instructions to appear on behalf of Girish
Natwarlal Patel, but the interim relief granted earlier was
ordered to be continued. On 18.8.2024, when the matter came
Page 4 of 67
up for hearing, the High Court asked the Registry to notify all
Civil Applications and place them on file for hearing.
6. The matter was thereafter listed on 01.07.2024, 09.07.2024,
18.07.2024, 22.07.2024, respectively and heard inter partes,
with the interim relief being continued in the meantime. The
matter was eventually argued at length on 25.07.2024, when
the parties advanced extensive submissions on the grant of ex
parte ad interim relief, the condonation of delay and the
application seeking leave to appeal, following which, it was
reserved for orders.
7. On 31.07.2024, the matter was taken up again for clarification
of certain aspects of the written submissions tendered by the
learned counsel for the appellant. Finally, on 14.08.2024, the
High Court pronounced the Judgment in the Civil Application
for Leave to Appeal, whereby it confirmed the interim relief
granted by the order dated 02.04.2024, allowed the application
seeking condonation of delay and granted the leave to appeal.
Page 5 of 67
8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the appellant has preferred
the present SLPs, seeking to challenge the grant of the ex parte
ad interim injunction, the condonation of delay of 11 years in
seeking leave to appeal, and the grant of such leave to those
who were not parties to the consent decree.
9. For ease of reference, the description of the parties before this
Court, the High Court and the Trial Court, is tabulated
respectively, as follows:
Before the
Before the
Trial Court
Before this
High Court
in
Court
Civil Suit no.
322 of 2012
Not a party
(when the
Oral Order
dated
02.04.2026
was passed;
However, he
was issued a
writ of civil
application
and had
thereafter
Girishbhai Natwarlal
Appellant
Not a party
Patel
Page 6 of 67
appeared
before the
High Court
through his
counsel
versus
Gautam Punjabhai
Respondent
Applicant
Not a party
Palkhiwala
No. 1
No. 1
Varsha Vikrambhai
Respondent
Applicant
Not a party
Palkhiwala
No. 2
No. 2
Saurin Vikrambhai
Respondent
Applicant
Not a party
Palkhiwala
No. 3
No. 3
Sujal Vikrambhai
Respondent
Applicant
Not a party
Palkhiwala
No. 4
No. 4
Respondent
Applicant
Sejal Rikeen Dalal
Not a party
No. 5
No. 5
Samir Anilbhai
Respondent
Applicant
Not a party
Palkhiwala
No. 6
No. 6
Mira Jagatbhal
Respondent
Applicant
Not a party
Palkhiwala
No. 7
No. 7
Respondent
Applicant
Anar Urvish Thakersky
Not a party
No. 8
No. 8
Akash Jagatbhai
Respondent
Applicant
Not a party
Palkhiwala
No. 9
No. 9
Geetagram Cooperative
Respondent
Respondent
Plaintiff in
Housing Society
no. 10
no. 1
Regular Civil
Page 7 of 67
suit no. 322
of 2012
Manjulaben Ganpatbhai
Patel
Respondent
Respondent
Defendant
Widow of Ganpatbhai
no. 11
no. 2
No. 1
Patel
Bharatbhai Ganpatbhai
Respondent
Respondent
Defendant
Patel
no. 12
no. 3
No.2
Respondent
Respondent
Defendant
Rita Ganpatbhai Patel
no. 13
no. 4
No. 3
Shobhaben Rajnibhai
Patel
Respondent
Respondent
(Legal heir of Rajnibhai
no. 14
no. 5.1
Patel)
Parth Rajnibhai Patel
Defendant
Respondent
Respondent
(Legal heir of Rajnibhai
No. 4
no. 15
no. 5.2
Patel)
Krunal (Krushant)
Rajnibhai Patel
Respondent
Respondent
(Legal heir of Rajnibhai
no. 16
no. 5.3
Patel)
10. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be
referred to by their respective status before this Court, unless
otherwise indicated.
Page 8 of 67
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES (ALONG WITH
THEIR CORRESPONDING FACTUAL MATRIX):
11. Since the facts of the case are inextricably intertwined with the
rival submissions advanced by the parties, the factual
narrative is set out in conjunction with their respective
submissions.
(i) Submissions on behalf of the Appellant:
12. Mr. Anshin H. Desai, the learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant/Girishbhai Natwarlal Patel submitted that the
High Court committed an egregious error of law in granting an
ex parte ad interim injunction against the present appellant on
the basis of a proposed draft amendment to the application and
by granting Leave to Appeal, condoning an inordinate delay of
11 years.
13. The learned Senior Counsel argued that an appeal under
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is not
maintainable against a consent decree and that someone who
is not a party to the compromise decree, cannot get a cause of
Page 9 of 67
action to challenge the validity of the same. He placed reliance
on this Court’s judgment in Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh
Sing (Dead) through legal heirs and representatives
[2020(6) SCC 639] Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder
and
Singh [2006 (5) SCC 566] and R. Janakiammal v. S.K.
Kumarasamy [(2021) 9 SCC 114].
14. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the ex parte
ad interim injunction could not have been granted on the basis
of a proposed draft amendment presented in the Application
for Leave to Appeal. To substantiate his argument, he referred
to this Court’s observation in Acqua Borewell Pvt. Ltd. v.
Swayam Prabha & Others [2022 (15) SCC 511] , wherein it
was held that “ No injunction can be granted without impleading
and without granting opportunity of hearing to parties when
parties have right, title and interest in the property and when
they are directly affected by the interim injunction ”. He also
referred to this Court’s observation in Kishorsinh Ratansinh
Jadeja v. Maruti Corporation & others [2009 (11) SCC
229] , wherein it was observed that “ interim order affecting third
Page 10 of 67
party rights in their absence when they are not parties to the
proceedings cannot be sustained. ”
15. He further submitted that the continuation of the ad interim
injunction against the appellant, without him having been
impleaded as a party, is prejudicial to his interests. He
contended that, until the impleadment application is heard
and the appellant was afforded an opportunity to put forth his
case, restraining him on the basis of a proposed draft
amendment to the application for leave to appeal, was legally
unsustainable. Accordingly, he submitted that the ad interim
injunction ought to have been vacated in the interest of justice.
16. With respect to the issue of condonation of delay, the learned
Senior Counsel submitted that the impugned oral order dated
02.04.2024 is legally unsustainable because the High Court
had granted an ex parte ad interim injunction even before
deciding the application for condonation of delay. The Civil
Application for Condonation of Delay was allowed only
subsequently, vide the impugned order dated 14.08.2024. He
further contended that the High Court committed an error in
Page 11 of 67
condoning the delay mechanically, without any exchange of
pleadings on this issue, despite the inordinate delay of 11 years
and the absence of any satisfactory explanation therefor. In
support of this submission, he placed reliance on the decisions
of this Court in Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR [2024 SCC OnLine SC 489],
Postmaster General v. Living Media Limited [ 2012 (3) SCC
563] , Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. GIDC
[2010 (5) SCC 459], Lanka Venkateswarlu by Lrs v. State
of Andhra Pradesh [2011 (4) SCC 363], and Pundlik Jalam
Patil by Lrs v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium
Project and another [2008 (17) SCC 448].
17. The learned senior counsel further contended that the
Respondent Nos. 1-9 respectively, lacked locus standi to
maintain the appeal before the High Court. He submitted that
even if Punajalal Mohanbhai HUF were considered to be the
aggrieved party, the HUF was a distinct legal entity, separate
from the Respondent Nos. 1-9. Accordingly, he argued that
leave to appeal ought not to have been granted at the instance
Page 12 of 67
of the Respondent Nos. 1-9, who could not have maintained
the appeal in their individual capacity when the HUF itself was
the alleged aggrieved party.
18. The following is the appellant’s version of the factual matrix,
as submitted by the learned senior counsel:
i. The original owner Purshottambhai Punjabhai had
executed a sale deed dated 29.08.1975 in favour of Vikram
Punja Palkhiwala, pursuant to which Mutation Entry no.
3106 had been recorded in the revenue records.
ii. On 10.06.1980, Mutation Entry no. 4018 was recorded in
the name of Punjalal Mohanbhai HUF in respect of the
subject land. However, the said entry no. 4018 was
allegedly cancelled on 16.08.1980, on the basis of
objections raised by Vikrambhai Palkhiwala himself and
his other brother. They had allegedly contended that the
property had been purchased by Vikram Palkhiwala in his
individual capacity and therefore, could not be treated as
belonging to the Punjalal Mohanlal HUF. Accordingly, the
Page 13 of 67
mutation entry no. 4018 itself reflects that it was cancelled
in 1980.
iii. The mutation entry no. 4018 stood cancelled from
16.08.1980 until 20.11.1997, i.e. for a period of about 17
years. During this period, two significant developments
took place:
i. On 16.03.1993, the Dy. Collector, passed an order in
Ganot (Tenancy) Appeal no. 116 of 1990. The order
stipulated that, if both the seller and the purchaser
agree, the land would be restored to its original
position within 3 months, failing which it would vest
in the government. This order of 16.03.1993 was
recorded vide revenue entry no. 6624 dated
29.03.1993. It is in view of this order dated
29.03.1993 that the name of the original owner
Purshottambhai Punjabhai came to be reflected in
the Village Form Nos. 7 & 12 for the subject land.
ii. On 11.09.1996, the heirs of Purshottambhai
Punjabhai executed a registered agreement to sell the
Page 14 of 67
subject land in favour of Respondent no.
10/Geetagram Society.
iv. On 20.11.1997, Revenue Entry no. 7597 was entered in
the revenue records, recording the order of the Mamlatdar
in RTS Appeal no. 7 of 1997. By the said order, Mutation
Entry no. 4018 was approved, and the name of the HUF
was re-entered in the revenue records, subject to the
outcome of all pending civil proceedings.
v. In May 2012, Respondent No.10/Geetamgram Society
through its chairman one Mr. Ramesh Patel, instituted the
Civil Suit no. 322 of 2012, against the heirs of Purshottam
Punjabhai, praying for specific performance of the
registered agreement to sell dated 11.09.1996 or grant of
damages/compensation.
vi. On 29.04.2013, a compromise pursis is filed in the Civil
Suit no. 322 of 2012, signed by the defendants/heirs of
Purshottam Punjabhai/Respondent nos. 11-16, and by
the Plaintiff/Geetagram Society/Respondent no. 10.
Pursuant to the the compromise pursis, a consent decree
Page 15 of 67
was passed on 29.04.2013 itself, whereby, it was agreed
by all parties to grant specific performance of the
agreement to sell in favour of Geetagram Society.
Thereafter, this consent decree got recorded in the revenue
records.
vii. On 26.11.2020, Execution Application no. 725 of 202 was
filed by the plaintiff/Respondent no. 10/Geetagram
Society, seeking execution of the consent decree dated
29.04.2013.
viii. On 18.06.2022, a registered sale deed came to be executed
by the Court Commissioner, in favour of the
appellant/Girish Natwarlal Patel, with the
plaintiff/Respondent no. 10/Geetagram Society as the
confirming party. Entry no. 5327 came to be mutated in
the revenue records with regard to this sale transaction,
and that is how the name of the appellant got reflected in
the revenue records corresponding to the subject land.
19. Having set out the aforesaid chronology of events, the learned
Senior Counsel submitted that the Respondent Nos. 1-9
Page 16 of 67
respectively had suppressed a material and relevant fact,
namely, that it was during the aforementioned 17 year period
between 1980 and 1997 that the name of the original owner
Purshottam Punja was entered in the revenue records in 1993
and that the registered agreement to sell the subject land had
been executed by the Respondent nos. 11-16/heirs of
Purshottam Punja, in favour of the Respondent no.
10/Geetagram Society. The learned senior counsel further
submitted that although the issue of suppression of this
material fact had been specifically raised before the High
Court, yet the High Court failed to consider or address the
same in its impugned order.
20. Refuting the allegation that the appellant had committed fraud
in collusion with the Respondent Nos. 10-16, the learned
senior counsel submitted that the compromise decree had
been drawn up in accordance with due procedure and that all
the defendants therein had individually signed the compromise
pursis. He further pointed out that the compromise pursis
expressly recorded the defendants’ agreement to execute one
Page 17 of 67
or more sale deeds, as required by the plaintiff/Geetagram
Society. Pursuant to the compromise decree, it was during the
execution proceedings that the Court Commissioner executed
the sale deed dated 18.06.2022 in favour of the
appellant/Girish Natwarlal Patel. The learned counsel further
submitted that no provision of law prohibited the execution of
a sale deed through a Court Commissioner, pursuant to a
compromise decree between the original owners and the
society, in favour of an office-bearer of the society. He therefore
contended that the mere fact that the appellant may or may
not have been an office-bearer of Geetagram Society was not,
by itself, determinative of the validity of the transaction or any
proof of collusion.
21. He further submitted that the Respondent Nos. 1-9 have only
challenged the consent decree dated 29.04.2013, without any
challenge to the execution proceedings or the sale deed dated
18.06.2022. Thus, he argued that in the absence of any
challenge to the execution proceedings or the sale deed dated
Page 18 of 67
18.06.2022, the reliefs sought against the appellant were not
maintainable.
22. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned senior
counsel prayed that there being merit in his appeals, those
may be allowed and the impugned orders be set aside.
(ii) Submissions on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 9:
23. Mr. Mihir J. Thakore & Ms. Megha Jani, the learned senior
counsel appearing for the Respondent Nos. 1 to 9, submitted
that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to
have been committed by the High Court in passing the
impugned orders, warranting any interference by this Court.
24. The learned senior counsel set out the following chronology of
events to substantiate his arguments and claims:
i. One Shri Purshottam Punjabhai, the predecessor of the
Respondent Nos. 11-16), had sold the subject land to one
Shri Vikram Punjabhai Palkhiwala, the predecessor of the
Respondent Nos. 1-9, by a registered sale deed dated
29.08.1975. This sale transaction was recorded in the
Page 19 of 67
revenue records vide Mutation Entry no. 3106 dated
06.11.1975 , which was certified on 14.02.1076.
ii. Between 1987 to 1997, certain proceedings were initiated
under the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1948. However, these proceedings eventually culminated
in the Order dated 14.02.1994, passed by the Mamlatdar-
Agricultural Tribunal in Tenancy Case No. 150 of 1991,
whereby the transfer dated 29.08.1975 in favour of Vikram
Punjabhai Palkhiwala was held to be valid, having been
effected between agriculturists. Consequently, the
proceedings initiated under the Act of 1948 were dropped,
and the transfer in favour of Vikram Punjabhai Palkhiwala
was upheld.
iii. Thereafter, Entry No. 7017 was posted in Village Form No.
6 Hakk Patrak , and certified on 04.03.1995, recording the
order dated 14.02.1994 and reflecting the name of Vikram
Punjabhai Palkhiwala in the revenue records pertaining to
the subject land.
iv. The original seller, Shri Purshottam Punjabhai died on
11.03.1995.
Page 20 of 67
v. Subsequently, on 20.11.1997, Mutation Entry no. 7597
was posted in the revenue records in respect of the subject
land, along with certain other parcels of land, reflecting
the same as part of the Punjabhai Mohanbhai HUF
(hereinafter, the “ HUF ”). The HUF’s name was thus
entered in place of Vikram Punjabhai Palkhiwala, whose
name had previously appeared in the revenue records
pertaining to the subject land. The Respondent nos. 1-9
are members of the HUF. The entry was certified on
15.01.1998.
vi. It was in 2023, while ascertaining the status of the revenue
records that the Respondent Nos. 1-9 were surprised to
come across certain documents, including Form 8A, Form
No. 7 and Form No. 12, which reflected the name of the
appellant/Mr. Girish, as the ‘ Occupant’ of the subject land
in place of the HUF. Soon thereafter, between 04.11.2023-
09.02.2024, the Respondent nos. 1-9 undertook steps to
gather information regarding the relevant mutation entries
and the details of the purported transactions which had
ensued in the meanwhile.
Page 21 of 67
vii. On 28.02.2024, the Respondent nos. 1-9 filed the First
Appeal, challenging the consent decree dated 29.04.2013
and its subsequent proceedings, alleging that those had
been obtained by fraud and collusion. Along with the First
Appeal, they simultaneously filed Civil Applications
seeking Leave to Appeal, Condonation of Delay, ad interim
relief, impleadment of Mr. Girish, and permission to
adduce additional evidence.
viii. On 20.03.2024, the Civil Application for Leave to Appeal
was listed before the High Court. However, the Civil
Application for Condonation of Delay was not on record,
purportedly in view of certain orders of the High Court,
including those passed in CA No. 1 of 2015 in F/FA no.
337 of 2015. Yet, on 21.03.2024, the Respondent Nos. 1-
9 sought permission from the High Court to file and
circulate the CA for Condonation of Delay.
ix. On the same day, i.e. 21.03.2024, the Respondent Nos. 1-
9 received documents in response to an RTI application
which showed a close connection and commonality
between the Respondent no. 10/ Geetagram Society and
Page 22 of 67
the appellant/Mr. Girish. Some of these documents
allegedly also established that the appellant was the
Chairman of Geetagram Society, at least in 2002-2003.
The aforesaid documents were brought on record by an
Additional Affidavit dated 21.03.2024.
x. Between 22.03.2024 & 26.03.2024, the Civil Applications
were listed on board but could not be taken up for hearing.
xi. On 02.04.2024, relying upon the Additional Affidavit dated
21.03.2024, which purportedly demonstrated a direct link
between Geetagram Society and Mr. Girish, the
Respondent Nos. 1-9 moved a Draft Amendment to add a
prayer seeking interim orders against Mr. Girish, and
against any third party operating through him, inter alia
restraining him from entering, transferring or creating
third-party rights over the subject land.
xii. On 02.05.2024, Mr. Girish, appeared before the High
Court through his counsel and sought an adjournment.
xiii. On 18.06.2024, the High Court directed the Registry to
notify all the Civil Applications and place them on record
for hearing.
Page 23 of 67
xiv. On 01.07.2024, 09.07.2024, 18.07.2024 and 22.07.2024,
respectively, the First Appeal and connected applications
were listed and heard inter partes.
xv. On 31.07.2024, in view of the submissions filed by Mr.
Girish, which referred to certain revenue entries that had
not been placed on record, the Court relisted the matter
for clarification. The matter was thereafter reserved for
orders.
xvi. On 14.08.2024, the High Court passed the impugned
order, confirming the order dated 02.04.2024, condoning
the delay and granting the Leave to Appeal to Respondent
Nos. 1-9.
25. The learned senior counsel submitted that the original seller
Shri Purshottam Punjabhai had divested himself of all rights,
title and interest in the subject land upon executing the
registered sale deed dated 29.08.1975 in favour of Vikram
Punjabhai Palkhiwala. Consequently, his legal heirs had no
subsisting rights over the subject land and therefore, they
could not have validly executed the subsequent agreement to
Page 24 of 67
sell dated 11.09.1996 in favour of the Respondent No.
10/Geetagram Society.
26. The learned senior counsel vehemently contended that the
2012 suit for specific performance, which culminated in the
consent decree dated 29.04.2013, was nothing but a collusive
and fraudulent suit, instituted to deprive the HUF of its rightful
ownership. He argued that Mr. Girish ultimately became the
beneficiary of the consent decree, through his role in
representing the original defendants and subsequent
acquisition of the subject land. To support his contention, he
relied upon the following circumstances, which allegedly
demonstrate the ex facie fraudulent and collusive nature of the
proceedings:
i. Complete commonality of representation and alleged
collusion between the parties: On 22.03.2012, about a
month and half before the aforesaid suit for specific
performance was filed, the heirs of Purshottam Punjabhai
executed a power of attorney in favour of the appellant/Mr.
Girish. Acting in that capacity of Power-of-attorney holder,
Page 25 of 67
Mr. Girish filed a Vakalatnama on behalf of the said heirs,
who were arrayed as defendants in the suit. Thus, the very
person who subsequently became the beneficiary of the
transaction, was also representing the defendants against
whom the specific performance was sought. The learned
counsel relied upon this commonality of representation,
coupled with the subsequent events, to contend that the
proceedings were not genuinely adversarial in nature, but
were in fact fraudulent and collusive in nature.
ii. Unexplained delay in instituting the suit for specific
performance: The Suit for specific performance was
instituted in 2012, nearly sixteen years after the
agreement to sell of 1996, which was the subject matter of
the suit.
iii. Expeditious disposal by consent : The suit was thereafter
disposed of on the basis of a compromise pursis,
culminating in the consent decree dated 29.04.2013 in
favour of Geetagram Society.
iv. Prolonged inaction in enforcing the decree, followed
by transfer in favour of the appellant : No execution
Page 26 of 67
petition was filed for approximately seven years after the
passing of the consent decree. It was only in 2020, that
Geetagram Society instituted Execution Petition No. 725
of 2020. Subsequently, a sale deed dated 18.06.2022 was
executed in favour of Mr. Girish, with Geetagram Society
joining as a confirming party. Thereafter, Mutation Entry
No. 5327 was posted on 22.03.2023 and certified on
20.04.2023, recording the sale in favour of Mr. Girish.
v. The appellant’s association with Geetagram Society as
its Chairman : On 21.03.2024, Respondent nos. 1-9
received documents pursuant to their RTI application,
which according to the learned counsel, revealed Mr.
Girish’s close association with Geetagram Society,
including his alleged position as its Chairman during
2002-2003.
vi. Non-appearance of the original parties to the suit,
before this Court, as a circumstance indicative of
collusion: The learned senior counsel further submitted
that the absence of appearance on behalf of Geetagram
Society and the Respondent Nos. 11-16, stated to be the
Page 27 of 67
successors of the original seller, Purshottam Punjabhai,
was also a circumstance warranting consideration in
assessing the allegation of collusion between the appellant
and the original defendants.
27. With respect to the Application for condonation of delay, the
learned senior counsel submitted that the Registry had
returned the application on the ground that in view of various
orders passed by the High Court of Gujarat, an application for
condonation of delay is not required when the challenge is by
a non-party to the suit on the ground of the decree being
fraudulent and collusive. However, the Civil Application for
Condonation of Delay was subsequently permitted to be filed
and was circulated after a special mention was made in that
regard.
28. In response to the appellant’s contention that the High Court
had erred in continuing the ex parte ad interim injunction, the
learned senior counsel submitted that the appellant’s objection
had been extensively heard by the High Court over several
dates, for approximately 6-7 hours. It was only thereafter that
Page 28 of 67
the High Court had passed the second impugned order dated
14.08.2024, confirming the injunction granted by the first
impugned order dated 02.04.2024.
29. The learned senior counsel submitted that the impugned
orders were only interlocutory in nature, granting leave to
appeal to the Respondent Nos. 1-9, and restraining the
appellant from dealing with the subject land during the
pendency of the First Appeal. The main issue regarding the title
over the subject land is still pending consideration before the
High Court in the First Appeal and the connected Civil
Applications, and hence, the impugned orders do not warrant
any interference at this stage.
30. He further submitted that the Respondent Nos. 1-9 have
established a strong prima facie case and that the balance of
convenience lies in their favour. He contended that unless the
appellant is restrained in the manner as directed in the
impugned order, from creating third-party rights in respect of
the subject land and from deriving benefits from the alleged
fraud and collusion, the appellant would cause irreparable loss
Page 29 of 67
to the Respondent Nos. 1-9 and give rise to further litigation
and multiplicity of proceedings.
31. Relying upon the judgment of this Court in H. Anjanappa and
others v. A. Prabhakar [2025 SCC OnLine SC 183] , the
learned senior counsel submitted that the Respondent nos. 1-
9 squarely fall within the category of aggrieved persons
recognised therein, and were therefore, entitled to the leave to
appeal granted by the High Court.
32. He also alleged that even after the order dated 14.08.2024 had
been passed, the appellant attempted to alter the nature of the
subject land by putting up construction thereon, which fact
was brought on record by the Respondent Nos. 1-9 by filing an
Additional Affidavit dated 23.09.2024.
33. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned senior
counsel prayed that there being no merit in the present
appeals, those may be dismissed.
Page 30 of 67
C. ISSUES:
34. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the following
questions fall for our consideration:
i. Whether the High Court committed any error in granting
the impugned order dated 02.04.2024, restraining the
appellant from dealing with the subject land, and in
continuing the same by judgement and order dated
14.08.2024?
ii. Whether leave to appeal could have been granted to the
original applicants/Respondent nos. 1-9, considering that
they were not parties to the original suit which culminated
in the consent decree sought to be appealed against?
iii. Whether the condonation of delay of 11 years in preferring
the appeal was justified?
Page 31 of 67
D. ANALYSIS:
35. At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the scope of the
present proceedings. The present proceedings before us are
limited to determining the legality and validity of the impugned
order granting leave to appeal, the legality of the order
condoning the delay, and the sustainability of the ad interim
injunction granted against the appellant. The scope of the
present proceedings before us do not extend to adjudicating
upon the merits of the appeal sought to be preferred against
the consent decree. Consequently, our examination of the
allegations of fraud and collusion, as well as the circumstances
surrounding the passing of the consent decree, and any
observation made in this regard, should not be construed as
conclusive findings on the merits of the appeal.
(i) Whether the ex parte ad interim injunction granted vide
impugned order dated 02.04.2024, restraining the
appellant from dealing with the subject land, and in
continuing the same by judgement and order dated
14.08.2024 is sustainable in law:-
Page 32 of 67
36. The High Court, vide its impugned order dated 02.04.2024 had
issued an ex parte ad interim injunction against the appellant.
Subsequently, after hearing the appellant as well as the
Respondent nos. 1-9, the High Court confirmed the order of
injunction during pendency of the appeal, granted the
application for leave to appeal, and condoned the delay in
preferring the appeal.
37. We are of the considered opinion that the High Court
committed no error, not to speak of any error of law, in granting
the ad interim injunction sought by the Respondent Nos. 1-9
against the appellant.
38. Prima facie , the circumstances surrounding the transaction
raise serious questions as to the manner in which the
appellant ultimately claims to have acquired the subject land.
Serious doubts arise, at this stage, as to whether the legal heirs
of Purshottam Punjabhai possessed a subsisting right or title
capable of being conveyed. It further appears, prima facie , that
the appellant had acted under a power of attorney executed by
the original defendants, namely, the legal heirs of Purshottam
Page 33 of 67
Punjabhai, while also having close links with the functioning
of the original plaintiff Geetagram Society, having purportedly
served as its Chairman for some period during 2002-2003.
Hence, the allegation that the appellant was closely connected
with both the sides and ultimately became the beneficiary of
the consent decree by securing a sale deed in his favour
assumes significance. While these circumstances may not, by
themselves conclusively establish fraud or collusion, those do
furnish sufficient basis, at this interlocutory stage, for the
apprehension that the transactions warrant judicial scrutiny.
39. With respect to the contention advanced on behalf of the
appellant that the ex parte ad interim injunction could not have
been granted prior to deciding the application for grant of leave
to appeal and the application for condonation of delay, we are
of the considered view that the High Court was justified in
granting interim protection, having regard to the peculiar
procedural circumstances arising from the sequence of events
in the present case. Neither the Respondent nos. 1-9, nor the
appellant, was a party to the suit from which the appeal arises.
Page 34 of 67
Although the Respondent nos. 1-9 had filed an impleadment
application simultaneously with the application seeking leave
to appeal, yet the impleadment application could have been
heard only after the original applicants themselves had made
good their case for leave to appeal. Had the Respondent nos.
1-9 been required to await the adjudication of the application
for leave to appeal, followed by the application for
impleadment, before seeking interim protection, the subject
land might, in the meantime, have been alienated,
encumbered, or otherwise dealt with in a manner prejudicial
to their asserted rights and detrimental to the effective
adjudication of the dispute. This apprehension was not merely
speculative but warranted serious consideration in light of the
prima facie circumstances surrounding the consent decree, the
execution proceedings, the appellant’s role under the power of
attorney, and his association with the original plaintiff.
40. We may also observe that the injunction initially granted by
the High Court on 02.04.2024 was ex parte and ad interim in
nature. However, the matter did not rest at that stage. The
Page 35 of 67
appellant was subsequently afforded an opportunity of being
heard, and the High Court considered the rival submissions
before deciding, by its judgment and order dated 14.08.2024,
to continue the interim protection. The continuation of the
injunction was thus not an automatic perpetuation of the ex
parte order, but followed by a hearing at which the appellant
had the opportunity to contest the relief sought against him.
This subsequent hearing is a material consideration in
assessing the sustainability of the ad interim injunction,
particularly when viewed alongside the prima facie
circumstances warranting preservation of the subject land
pending adjudication of the matter before the High Court.
41. In such circumstances referred to above, the High Court
cannot be faulted for considering immediate interim protection
necessary to preserve the subject matter of the dispute pending
consideration of the matter before it.
Page 36 of 67
(ii) Whether leave to appeal could have been granted to the
original applicants/Respondent nos. 1-9, considering that
they were not parties to the original suit which culminated
in the consent decree sought to be appealed against?
42. Having examined the sustainability of the interim injunction,
we now turn to the question whether the High Court was
justified in granting leave to appeal to the Respondent Nos. 1-
9.
a. Whether a stranger to a consent decree can maintain an
appeal under Section 96 r/w Order XXIII Rule 3 & Rule 3A
of the CPC, 1908?
43. In the matter before us, the leave to appeal has been sought
against a consent decree by a stranger to the original suit.
Hence, one of the primary contentions raised by the appellant
herein is that an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, is not maintainable against a consent decree
and that someone who is not a party to the compromise decree,
cannot get a cause of action to challenge the validity of the
same. In this regard, reliance has been placed on this Court’s
judgment in Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Sing (Dead)
Page 37 of 67
through legal heirs and representatives [2020(6) SCC 639]
and Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh [2006 (5) SCC
566] and R. Janakiammal v. S.K. Kumarasamy [(2021) 9
SCC 114]
. However, we are of the considered view that such
an argument put forward by the appellant is thoroughly
misplaced. We would like to clarify the position of law in this
regard.
44. In order to address the appellant’s contention which is based
on Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with
Order XXIII Rule 3 & 3A, we are hereby reproducing the
relevant provisions for ease of reference.
45. Section 96(3) of the CPC, 1908, reads thus:
“ 96. Appeal from original decree.—
*
(3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court
with the consent of parties. ”
46. Order XXIII Rule 3 & Rule 3A, respectively, read thus:
“ ORDER XXIII : Withdrawal and Adjustment of Suits
Page 38 of 67
*
3. Compromise of suit. —Where it is proved to the
satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted
wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in
writing and signed by the parties, or where the defendant
satisfied the plaintiff in respect to the whole or any part of
the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such
agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and
shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it
relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-
matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the
same as the subject-matter of the suit:
Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied
by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been
arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no
adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding
the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded,
thinks fit to grant such adjournment.
Explanation.— An agreement or compromise which is void
or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872),
shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this
rule.
Page 39 of 67
3A. Bar to suit. —No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on
the ground that the compromise on which the decree is
based was not lawful.”
47. A conjoint reading of Section 96(3) of the CPC, 1908 with Order
XXIII Rule 3 & Rule 3A thereof, makes it clear that the
statutory bar on an appeal against a consent decree, and the
estoppel arising therefrom, are founded upon the binding effect
of the compromise between the parties thereto. The legislative
scheme seeks to ensure finality to lawful compromises and to
prevent parties who have consented to a decree from
subsequently resiling from their agreement through collateral
proceedings. The statutory bar, however, cannot be
mechanically invoked to defeat the right of a person who was
not a party to the compromise and who asserts an independent
legal interest prejudicially affected by the decree. The
distinction between a party seeking to avoid a compromise to
which he has consented and a non-party seeking to challenge
a decree on the ground that it prejudicially affects his
independent rights is, therefore, material.
Page 40 of 67
48. In this regard, the following observations of this Court in
Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi [1992 SCC OnLine SC 541] ,
are relevant:
“ 9. […] When Section 96(3) bars an appeal against decree
passed with the consent of parties, it implies that such
decree is valid and binding on the parties unless set
aside by the procedure prescribed or available to the
parties. One such remedy available was by filing the appeal
under Order 43, Rule 1(m). If the order recording the
compromise was set aside, there was no necessity or
occasion to file an appeal against the decree. Similarly, a
suit used to be filed for setting aside such decree on the
ground that the decree is based on an invalid and illegal
compromise not binding on the plaintiff of the second suit.
But after the amendments which have been introduced,
neither an appeal against the order recording the
compromise nor remedy by way of filing a suit is available
in cases covered by Rule 3-A of Order 23. As such a right
has been given under Rule 1-A(2) of Order 43 to a party,
who challenges the recording of the compromise, to question
the validity thereof while preferring an appeal against the
decree. Section 96(3) of the Code shall not be a bar to such
an appeal because Section 96(3) is applicable to cases
Page 41 of 67
where the factum of compromise or agreement is not in
dispute.”
(Emphasis supplied)
49. The position was once again elucidated by this Court in
Pushna Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh [(2006)5 SCC 566],
wherein this Court summarised the legal consequences flowing
from the amended provisions of Order XXIII, including the bar
under Section 96(3) of the CPC,1908 and the estoppel arising
from a consent decree. The relevant observation of this Court
in Pushna Devi (Supra) reads thus:
“17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions
of Order 23 can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree
having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3)
CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court
recording the compromise (or refusing to record a
compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1
Order 43.
Page 42 of 67
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a
compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was
not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.
(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is
valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which
passed the consent decree, by an order on an application
under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a
consent decree to avoid such consent decree
, is to
approach the court which recorded the compromise and
made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was
no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the
compromise will itself consider and decide the question as
to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so
because a consent decree is nothing but contract between
parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court.
The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the
validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is
made. The second defendant, who challenged the consent
compromise decree was fully aware of this position as she
filed an application for setting aside the consent decree on
21-8-2001 by alleging that there was no valid compromise
in accordance with law. Significantly, none of the other
defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasons best
Page 43 of 67
known to herself, the second defendant within a few days
thereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and chose
not to pursue the application filed before the court which
passed the consent decree. Such an appeal by the second
defendant was not maintainable, having regard to the
express bar contained in Section 96(3) of the Code.”
(Emphasis supplied)
50. The scope and object of Order XXII Rule 3 & 3A of the
CPC,1908 were also considered by this Court in R. Rajanna
v. S.R. Venkataswamy and Other [2014 (15) SCC 471] ,
wherein it was observed as follows:
“11. It is manifest from a plain reading of the above that in
terms of the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 where one party
alleges and the other denies adjustment or
satisfaction of any suit by a lawful agreement or
compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the Court
before whom such question is raised, shall decide the same.
What is important is that in terms of Explanation to Order
23 Rule 3, the agreement or compromise shall not be
deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule if
the same is void or voidable under the Contract Act, 1872.
It follows that in every case where the question arises
Page 44 of 67
whether or not there has been a lawful agreement or
compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the
question whether the agreement or compromise is
lawful has to be determined by the court concerned.
What is lawful will in turn depend upon whether the
allegations suggest any infirmity in the compromise and the
decree that would make the same void or voidable under
the Contract Act. More importantly, Order 23 Rule 3-A
clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that
the compromise on which the decree is based was not
lawful. This implies that no sooner a question relating to
lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before
the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such
agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court
alone who can examine and determine that question. The
court cannot direct the parties to file a separate suit on the
subject for no such suit will lie in view of the provisions of
Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. That is precisely what has
happened in the case at hand. When the appellant filed OS
No. 5326 of 2005 to challenge the validity of the compromise
decree, the court before whom the suit came up rejected the
plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the application made
by the respondents holding that such a suit was barred by
the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. Having thus got
the plaint rejected, the defendants (respondents herein)
could hardly be heard to argue that the plaintiff (appellant
Page 45 of 67
herein) ought to pursue his remedy against the compromise
decree in pursuance of OS No. 5326 of 2005 and if the plaint
in the suit has been rejected to pursue his remedy against
such rejection before a higher court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
51. The aforesaid references to this Court’s observations in
Banwari Lal (Supra) , Pushpa Devi (Supra) and R. Rajanna
(Supra) , respectively, must, however, be understood in their
proper context. When this Court in Pushpa Devi (Supra)
observes that “ No appeal is maintainable against a consent
decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section
96(3) CPC.” , it has to be read with the qualifier that the
statement had been made with respect to the remedies
available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such a consent
decree, i.e. the observation relates only to the rights of those
who were parties to the compromise agreement. Hence, the
appellant’s reliance on these authorities in the present fact
scenario is misplaced because the original
applicants/Respondent Nos. 1-9 were not parties to the
Page 46 of 67
consent decree and hence cannot be brought under the scope
of Section 96 of the CPC, 1908 read with Order XXIII Rule 3 or
Rule 3A, thereof.
52. Moreover, the reliance placed by the appellant on the decision
of this Court in Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh (D) Thr.
LRs & Ors. [ 2020 INSC 385] , is also misplaced. In that case,
the appellant therein had acquired the subject property during
the pendency of the title suit which culminated in the consent
decree. His claim to the property was, therefore, derived
through a party to the original proceedings, and he was
consequently bound by the legal consequences flowing from
the compromise decree. Hence, when the appellant therein was
tracing his title to the suit property through one of the parties
to the suit, he was barred from instituting a separate suit
challenging the compromise decree, under Order XXIII Rule 3A
of the CPC, 1908. However, in sharp contrast, in the matter
before us, the Respondent nos. 1-9 are complete strangers to
the consent decree and do not even trace their claim through
any of the parties to the consent decree sought to be
Page 47 of 67
challenged. Moreover, unlike the facts in Triloki Nath (Supra)
there were no pending litigation between the Respondent nos.
1-9 and the parties to the suit. Therefore, due to the
distinctiveness of the factual scenario, no parallel can be
drawn between the two cases. Hence, the decision in Triloki
Nath (Supra) cannot be mechanically applied to desist the
Respondent nos. 1-9 from seeking leave to appeal against the
consent decree they were strangers to.
53. Thus, it follows that a person who was neither a party to the
original proceedings nor a party to the compromise cannot,
merely by virtue of the decree having been passed with the
consent of others, be deemed to have consented to it or be
precluded from asserting an independent right allegedly
prejudiced thereby. A stranger to a compromise decree cannot
be said to be barred under Section 96(3) read Order XXIII Rule
3 & Rule 3A of the CPC, 1908, since the scope and import of
these provisions are limited to the parties to the compromise
and act as an estoppel only with respect to them.
Page 48 of 67
54. At the same time, non-party status does not confer an
unrestricted right of appeal. Such a person must prima facie
demonstrate that the impugned decree prejudicially affects his
rights or interests and must obtain leave of the appellate court
in accordance with the settled principles governing appeals by
persons who were not parties to the original proceedings.
Accordingly, the question that falls for our consideration is
whether the Respondent nos. 1-9 have prima facie
demonstrated that they have a legally cognisable interest in the
subject land, and that the consent decree prejudicially affects
their interest, so as to warrant the grant of leave to appeal.
55. To summarise this sub-issue, an appeal under Section 96 of
the CPC, 1908, may be preferred by any of the following
persons:
i. Any party to the suit adversely affected by the decree or if
such party is dead, by his legal representative.
ii. Any transferee of the interest of such party, so far as such
interest is concerned, is bound by the decree.
Page 49 of 67
iii. No person unless he is a party to the suit, is entitled to
appeal under this Section. But a person who is not a party
to the suit, may prefer an appeal with leave of the appellant
court and such leave should be granted if he would be
aggrieved, prejudicially affected by the judgment or if it
would be binding on him as res judicata under
Explanation 6 to Section 11 of the CPC, 1908. A person
who is not a party to the decree or order may with the leave
of the Court prefer an appeal from such decree or order if
he is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is
prejudicially affected by it. As a rule, leave to appeal will
not be refused to a person who might have been made ex
nominee a party.
iv. Whether a party is adversely affected by a decree is a
question of fact to be determined in each case according
to its peculiar circumstances.
Page 50 of 67
b. Principles governing the grant of leave to appeal:
56. At this stage, we consider it apposite to clarify that the fact that
the consent decree under challenge was passed on the basis of
a compromise does not, by itself, render the application for
leave to appeal by a non-party subject to any distinct or more
restrictive test. As we have already clarified in our discussion
hereinabove, the bar under Section 96(3) of the CPC, 1908,
read with Order XXIII Rules 3 and 3A thereof, cannot be
invoked to preclude a person who was neither a party to the
original proceedings nor a party to the compromise from
seeking leave to appeal against a compromise decree which
allegedly prejudicially affects his independent legal rights or
interests. Such an applicant seeking leave to appeal cannot be
bound by the estoppel arising from the compromise merely
because the decree was passed with the consent of others.
Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal must be
examined in accordance with the same settled principles that
govern an application by a non-party seeking to challenge an
ordinary decree passed upon adjudication. The decisive
Page 51 of 67
consideration remains whether the applicant has
demonstrated a legally cognisable interest that is prejudicially
affected by the impugned decree so as to warrant the exercise
of the appellate court’s discretion in granting leave. The fact
that the decree in question is a consent decree neither
dispenses with this requirement nor, in itself, constitutes a bar
to the grant of leave.
57. Having clarified the above position, we now turn to the
principles governing the grant of leave to appeal to a person
who was not a party to the original proceedings. In this regard,
the observations rendered by a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in V.N. Krishna Murthy and Another v. Ravikumar
and others [(2020) 9 SCC 501] , is of utmost relevance. This
Court in V.N. Krishna Murthy (Supra) observed that
applicants seeking leave to appeal, must demonstrate that they
are prejudicially or adversely affected by the decree in
question, or that any of their legal rights stand jeopardised, so
as to bring them within the ambit of the expression “aggrieved
person”, in order to entitle them to maintain an appeal against
Page 52 of 67
the decree. The relevant observation of this Court in V.N.
Krishna Murthy (Supra) , reads thus:
“15. Sections 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provide for preferring an appeal from any original decree or
from decree in appeal, respectively. The aforesaid
provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who
can file an appeal. However, it is a settled legal
proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to
file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies
the Court that he falls within the category of
aggrieved persons. It is only where a judgment and
decree prejudicially affects a person who is not party
to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the
leave of the appellate court. Reference be made to the
observation of this Court in Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha
Properties (P) Ltd. [Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties
(P) Ltd., (1970) 3 SCC 573] : (SCC p. 575, para 3)
“3. … It is well settled that a person who is not a
party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the
leave of the appellate court and such leave
should be granted if he would be prejudicially
affected by the judgment .”
16. This Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh [State of
Punjab v. Amar Singh, (1974) 2 SCC 70] while dealing with
Page 53 of 67
the maintainability of appeal by a person who is not party
to a suit has observed thus: (SCC p. 104, para 83)
“83. Firstly, there is a catena of authorities which,
following the dictum of Lindley, L.J., Securities
Insurance Co., In re [Securities Insurance Co., In re,
(1894) 2 Ch 410 (CA)] have laid down the rule that
a person who is not a party to a decree or order
may with the leave of the Court, prefer an appeal
from such decree or order if he is either bound
by the order or is aggrieved by it or is
prejudicially affected by it .”
17. In Baldev Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma [Baldev
Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma, (2003) 1 SCC 34], this
Court held that an appeal under Section 96 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908, would be maintainable only at the
instance of a person aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the
judgment and decree. While dealing with the concept of
person aggrieved, it was observed in para 15 as under:
(SCC pp. 39-40)
person aggrieved to file an appeal
“15. … A must
be one whose right is affected by reason of the
judgment and decree sought to be impugned.”
18. In A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P. [A. Subash Babu v.
State of A.P., (2011) 7 SCC 616: (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 851:
Page 54 of 67
(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 267] this Court held as under: (SCC pp.
628-29, para 25)
“25. … The expression “ aggrieved person ” denotes
an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be
confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and
comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning
depends on diverse, variable factors such as the
content and intent of the statute of which the
contravention is alleged, the specific
circumstances of the case, the nature and the
extent of the complainant's interest and the
nature and the extent of the prejudice or injury
suffered by the complainant .”
19. The expression “person aggrieved” does not include a
person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary
injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily be
one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or
jeopardised (vide Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance
Co. of New York [Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance
Co. of New York, (1974) 2 SCC 387] and State of Rajasthan
v. Union of India [State of Rajasthan v. Union of India,
(1977) 3 SCC 592]).
20. In K. Ponnalagu Ammani v. State of Madras [K.
Ponnalagu Ammani v. State of Madras, 1952 SCC OnLine
Mad 300 : (1953) 66 LW 136], this Court laid down the test
to find out when it would be proper to grant leave to appeal
Page 55 of 67
to a person not a party to a proceeding against the decree
or judgment passed in such proceedings in the following
words: (SCC OnLine Mad)
“Now, what is the test to find out when it would be
proper to grant leave to appeal to a person not a
party to a proceeding against the decree or
judgment in such proceedings? We think it would
be improper to grant leave to appeal to every person
who may in some remote or indirect way be
prejudicially affected by a decree or judgment. We
think that ordinarily leave to appeal should be granted
to persons who, though not parties to the proceedings,
would be bound by the decree or judgment in that
proceeding and who would be precluded from
attacking its correctness in other proceedings.”
(Emphasis supplied)
58. Thus, it is well settled that leave to appeal cannot be granted
as a matter of course to every person who may be remotely or
indirectly affected by a judgment or decree. The applicant must
demonstrate that the impugned judgment or decree
prejudicially affects his rights or interests so as to warrant the
exercise of the appellate court’s discretion in his favour. The
relevant consideration is whether the applicant is a person
aggrieved by the impugned judgment or decree, having regard
Page 56 of 67
to the nature of his interest and the prejudice occasioned
thereby. The principles governing the grant of leave to appeal
to a person who was not a party to the original proceedings
H.
have been succinctly summarised by this Court in
Anjanappa v. A. Prabhakar [2025 INSC 121] (wherein one
of us, J.B. Pardiwala, J. was part of the Bench), the relevant
paragraphs of which read thus:
The principles governing the grant of leave to
“43.
appeal may be summarised as under :
i. Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC respectively provide
for preferring an appeal from an original decree or
decree in appeal respectively;
ii. The said provisions do not enumerate the categories of
persons who can file an appeal;
iii. However, it a settled legal proposition that a stranger
cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any
proceedings unless he satisfies the court that he falls
within the category of an aggrieved person;
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iv. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially
affects a person who is not a party to the proceedings,
he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the court;
v. A person aggrieved, to file an appeal, must be one
whose right is affected by reason of the judgment and
decree sought to be impugned;
vi. The expression “person aggrieved” does not include a
person who suffers from a psychological or an
imaginary injury;
vii. It would be improper to grant leave to appeal to every
person who may in some remote or indirect way be
prejudicially affected by a decree or judgment; and
viii. Ordinarily leave to appeal should be granted to
persons who, though not parties to the proceedings,
would be bound by the decree or judgment in that
proceeding and who would be precluded from
attacking its correctness in other proceedings.”
(Emphasis supplied)
59. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, the question that arises is whether the original
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applicants/Respondent Nos. 1-9 though not parties to the
original suit or the compromise agreement culminating in the
decree dated 29.04.2013, can be regarded as ‘aggrieved
persons’, entitled to seek leave to appeal against the said
consent decree. The answer to this question must turn on the
nature of legal interest asserted by them, the prejudice alleged
to have been occasioned by the decree, and the circumstances
in which the decree came to be passed and subsequently acted
upon. At this stage, the inquiry is not whether the claim of the
Respondent nos. 1-9 to the subject land would ultimately be
sustainable, but whether the material placed on record
discloses an interest allegedly prejudiced by the decree,
sufficient to warrant its examination in appeal.
60. It is not in dispute that Purshottambhai Punjabhai executed a
sale deed dated 29.08.1975 in favour of Vikram Punja
Palkhiwala in respect of the subject land, pursuant to which
Revenue Entry No. 3106 was posted on 06.11.1975. The
parties, however, are at considerable variance regarding the
subsequent course of events, and rely upon different mutation
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entries and related documents in support of their respective
claims. Although mutation entries, by themselves, do not
confer or establish title, the material relied upon by the
Respondent Nos. 1-9 cannot, at this stage, be dismissed as
disclosing no more than an imaginary or remote interest in the
subject land. The sequence of events and the documents relied
upon by them furnish a sufficient basis for examining whether
the consent decree has prejudicially affected their asserted
rights.
61. Few circumstances assume significance in this regard. The
suit for specific performance was instituted in 2012 on the
basis of an agreement to sell dated 11.09.1996 which
culminated in the consent decree dated 29.04.2013 in favour
of Geetagram Society. The decree was not put into execution
until 2020, and the sale deed in favour of the appellant came
to be executed on 18.06.2022, with Geetagram Society joining
as a confirming party. It is further alleged that, on 22.03.2012,
the heirs of the original seller had executed a power of attorney
in favour of the appellant, who thereafter acted on their behalf
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in the proceedings culminating in the consent decree from
which he ultimately derived the benefit of the conveyance. The
alleged non-appearance of Geetagram Society and the
Respondent Nos. 11-16 in the proceedings before the High
Court, as well as before this Court, is an additional
circumstance which, when considered alongside the other
material, cannot be wholly disregarded while assessing
whether the allegations warrant appellate scrutiny. These
circumstances do not, by themselves, establish fraud or
collusion; they do, however, reinforce the conclusion that the
grievance raised by the Respondent Nos. 1-9 is not so tenuous
as to foreclose their access to the appellate process at the
threshold.
62. Considered cumulatively, the material on record establishes,
for the limited purpose of determining their entitlement to seek
leave, that the Respondent Nos. 1-9 have asserted a legally
cognisable interest which may be prejudicially affected by the
consent decree. The fact that they were not parties to the
original suit or to the compromise does not, by itself, disentitle
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them from seeking leave to appeal where the decree is alleged
to impinge upon their independent rights. We are, therefore,
satisfied that the High Court was justified in granting leave to
appeal to the Respondent Nos. 1-9. This conclusion is confined
to their standing to challenge the decree and the need for
appellate scrutiny; it shall not be construed as an expression
of opinion on the ultimate merits of their claim to the subject
land or on the truth of the allegations of fraud and collusion,
which must be determined in accordance with law.
(iii) Whether the condonation of delay of 11 years was valid?
63. We shall now consider whether the High Court committed any
error in condoning the delay in preferring the appeal. The
principal objection raised on behalf of the appellant is that the
appeal was instituted after an inordinate delay of
approximately eleven years from the date of the consent decree.
In our view, however, the mere computation of the period
between the passing of the consent decree on 29.04.2013 and
the institution of the appeal cannot, by itself, furnish a
complete answer to the question of condonation. The
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Respondent Nos. 1-9 were neither parties to the original suit
nor participants in the compromise on the basis of which the
decree came to be passed. In such circumstances, it would be
erroneous to proceed on the assumption that they had
knowledge of the decree from the date of its passing, or that
the entire intervening period must necessarily be reckoned
against them without examining when and in what
circumstances they acquired, or could reasonably have
acquired, knowledge of the proceedings and the prejudice
allegedly occasioned thereby.
64. The material placed before the High Court indicates that the
Respondent Nos. 1-9 claim to have become aware of the
alteration in the revenue records and the consequential
assertion of rights over the subject land in or around August
2023, whereupon they began taking steps to ascertain the
circumstances in which such alteration had occurred and the
basis on which the appellant claimed rights over the land. They
further rely upon information obtained through the RTI
process, including a response received on 21.03.2024, which,
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according to them, shed further light on the circumstances
surrounding the transaction. The significance of these events
lies not in whether every allegation made by the Respondent
Nos. 1-9 is ultimately established, but in the fact that the
record discloses an explanation for their not having challenged
the decree at an earlier stage, together with steps taken by
them upon acquiring information which they considered
material to their claim.
65. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court committed
no error in condoning the delay. The period elapsed since the
passing of the consent decree had to be considered alongside
the applicants’ status as non-parties, their explanation as to
when they acquired knowledge of the decree and the steps
taken by them thereafter. The order of condonation does not
determine the merits of their claim or validate the allegations
made by them; it merely permits those issues to be examined
in the appellate proceedings. Accordingly, the challenge to the
order condoning the delay is rejected.
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E. CONCLUSION:
66. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that:
(i) the ex parte ad interim injunction granted by the High
Court on 02.04.2024, and continued by the subsequent
judgment dated 14.08.2024, does not warrant
interference;
(ii) the High Court was justified in granting leave to appeal to
the Respondent Nos. 1-9, having regard to the legally
cognisable interest asserted by them and the potential
prejudice alleged to have been occasioned by the consent
decree; and
(iii) the High Court committed no error in condoning the delay
in preferring the appeal, in view of the explanation
assigned by the Respondent Nos. 1-9 and the steps taken
by them upon acquiring knowledge of the alteration in the
revenue records and the consent decree being its basis.
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67. We reiterate that our final conclusions are confined to the
questions examined herein and shall not be construed as an
expression of final opinion on the ultimate merits of the rival
claims to the subject land or the allegations of fraud and
collusion, which remain open for consideration in accordance
with law.
68. Therefore, in the overall view of the matter, we are convinced
that no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to
have been committed by the High Court in passing either the
impugned order dated 02.04.2024, or the impugned judgment
and order dated 14.08.2024.
69. Thus, the appeals before us fail and are hereby dismissed.
70. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of accordingly.
71. Having regard to the nature of the litigation, we request the
High Court to take up the main appeal for final hearing and to
see to it that the same is heard and disposed of within a period
of three months from today.
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72. Registry shall forward one copy of this judgment to the High
Court of Gujarat.
............................. J.
(J.B. Pardiwala)
............................. J.
(K. Vinod Chandran)
New Delhi;
th
30 October, 2026.
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