M/S Eastman Cast And Forge Ltd. vs M/S Exact Developers And Promoters Pvt Ltd

Court
Delhi High Court

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgement reserved on: 06.11.2026
Judgement delivered on: 18.11.2026

+ CS(COMM) 205/2025

M/S EASTMAN CAST AND FORGE LTD. ……Plaintiff

versus

M/S EXACT DEVELOPERS & PROMOTORS PVT. LTD.
....Defendant


Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Plaintiff: Mr. Harish Malik and Mr. Kushal
Bhattacharjee, Advocates.

For the Defendants: Dr. Bipin K. Dwivedi, Mr. Ankit Aakash
Dwivedi and Mr. Abrar Ali, Advocates.

CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA
J U D G E M E N T
TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J.
I.A. 22162/2026 (U/o XIII-A, CPC seeking Summary Judgement)
1. The present application has been filed by the plaintiff under Order
XIII-A Rules 2 and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter
referred to as “CPC” ) seeking a summary judgement against the defendant.
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:-
2. The plaintiff claims to have booked six commercial units bearing
Unit Nos. 703, 704, 705, 710, 711, and 712 in the defendant’s project
named “The Ace”, situated at Manesar, Gurugram, in the year 2007. It is
claimed that the plaintiff had remitted the entire sale consideration
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amounting to Rs.4,07,81,000/- to the defendant. However, it is the case of
the plaintiff that the defendant failed to perform its part of the contract by
not handing over possession of the said units to the plaintiff within the
stipulated time.
3. Consequently, a Settlement Agreement dated 18.07.2023 is claimed
to have been executed between the parties at New Delhi. It is stated that in
terms of the said settlement agreement, the defendant admitted its failure to
perform its obligations within the stipulated time and agreed to refund the
entire principal amount of Rs.4,07,81,000/- to the plaintiff in five (5)
installments.
4. It is further the case of the plaintiff that the defendant failed to
honour the said settlement agreement and did not remit even a single
installment in favour of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff has
preferred the present suit on 27.02.2025 seeking recovery of an amount of
Rs.4,07,81,000/-, along with pendente lite and future interest @ 12% per
annum against the defendant.
5. The defendant is stated to have filed its written statement on
15.05.2025. It is the case of the plaintiff that the preliminary objections and
other defences raised by the defendant in its written statement are devoid of
any substantial reasoning and are completely sham, evasive and vague.
6. In view thereof, it is stated by the plaintiff that the defendant has no
real prospect of successfully defending the claim raised by the plaintiff.
Accordingly, the present application under Order XIII-A of the CPC is
being preferred by the plaintiff.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF:-
7. Mr. Harish Malik, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff submits

that the present application under Order XIII-A of the CPC has been
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preferred by the plaintiff having regard to the fact that the defendant has
made substantial admissions entitling the plaintiff to a summary decree.
According to him, the defendant has no prospects of succeeding in its
defence and the defence set up is moonshine and there is no requirement
for the suit to proceed for trial.
8. At the outset, learned counsel drew attention to para 4(k) of the
plaint whereby the plaintiff has made references and averments in respect
of the transactions between the parties indicating that the plaintiff company
had made a total payment of Rs.4,07,81,000/- in favour of the defendant
company on 08.10.2009. It is stated that receipts against each of the part
payments were also generated by the defendant.
9. He next referred to para 4(o) of the plaint where the averments in
respect of admission by the defendant company of its defaults with regard
to delay in handing over the possession and completion of the units were
stated. In the said paragraph, the plaintiff asserted that both the parties had
entered into an agreement for full and final settlement whereby the
defendant company had agreed to refund the total amount paid by the
plaintiff. It is stated that the said agreement was executed between the
parties in the office of the defendant company at Delhi. It is stated that as
per the said settlement agreement, the defendant company had agreed to
make the payment of the first instalment to the plaintiff on or before
31.07.2023. It is stated that despite such agreement, the defendant failed to
fulfil its commitment.
10. So far as the territorial jurisdiction of this Court is concerned,
learned counsel referred to para 10 of the plaint to submit that the necessary
territorial jurisdiction lies with this Court on account of the fact that the
Settlement Agreement dated 18.07.2023 regarding repayment of the sale
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consideration by the defendant company was executed in Delhi and the
present suit for recovery of the said amount described in the settlement
agreement has correctly been instituted in this Court.
11. In order to demonstrate the admissions by the defendant company as
also to substantiate the need for a summary judgement, learned counsel
referred to the written statement particularly, the corresponding paras 4(k)
and 4(o) of the plaint. So far as the reply to para 4(k) is concerned, the
corresponding para of the written statement only mentions that “the
contents of para (i - k)” are matter of record and need no reply. According
to learned counsel, the averments in para 4(k) of the plaint are deemed to
be admitted.
12. So far as para 4(o) of the plaint is concerned, though the defendant in
the corresponding para 4(o) of the written statement has denied the liability
of the defendant to pay a sum of Rs.4,07,81,000/- or the interest thereon,
however, has specifically admitted that in case, the defendant is unable to
collect funds for refund of the amount, the plaintiff would take possession
of the units booked by it. He further submitted that the defendant asserted
that it is holding and maintaining six (6) units of the plaintiff, which the
plaintiff can take possession of by making balance payment and holding
charges.
13. Learned counsel next referred to the Settlement Agreement dated
18.07.2023. By referring to Clauses 2, 4 and 5, learned counsel stoutly
contended that the admissions contained in those clauses would entitle the
plaintiff to a summary judgement under Order XIII-A of the CPC. He
would submit that having regard to the fact that the execution of the
Settlement Agreement dated 18.07.2023 has been admitted, the contents
whereof are also deemed to be admitted, in which case, according to the
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learned counsel, the plaintiff is entitled to a summary judgement without
the suit being put to trial. He would submit that the aforesaid submissions
when cumulatively considered clearly disclose that there are no real
prospects of the defendant being able to successfully defend the suit of the
plaintiff.
CONTENTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT:-
14. Dr. Bipin K. Dwivedi, learned counsel for the defendant vehemently
refuted the submissions and contentions urged on behalf of the plaintiff.
15. At the outset, learned counsel contended that this Court would not
have the territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the present matter inasmuch as
the Builder Buyer Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ BBA ’) which
was executed between the parties on 19.11.2007, and is the principal
document, confers exclusive jurisdiction upon competent Courts in
Gurugram, Haryana. In order to substantiate this contention, learned
counsel referred to Clause 62 of the BBA, which categorically excluded
jurisdiction of Courts other than at Gurugram from adjudicating or
entertaining any matter arising out of and/or concerning the
agreement/transaction directly as well as impliedly. He would contend that
once both parties have executed a document conferring exclusive
jurisdiction to Gurugram’s Courts, this Court could not exercise any
territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter.
16. For the aforesaid proposition, he relied on the judgement of the
Supreme Court in Rakesh Kumar Verma vs. HDFC Bank Ltd, 2025 INSC
473 , and Swastik Gases Pvt. Ltd. vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2013)
9 SCC 32 . Thus, according to the learned counsel, the mere mention of the
place i.e. Gurugram in the principal document i.e. BBA as a place of
jurisdiction, this Court is clearly excluded from exercising any territorial
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jurisdiction over the subject suit matter.
17. Another leg of the same argument of the learned counsel was to the
extent that even if this Court is inclined to take into consideration the
settlement agreement, the settlement agreement itself arises directly or
indirectly from the BBA, and thus, is a supplementary document which
would not govern the territorial jurisdiction issue. According to him, it is
only and only the BBA which confers jurisdiction on a Court situate in
Gurugram to the exclusion of all other Courts.
18. The other contention of the learned counsel was that the defendant
was not liable to make any payment to the plaintiff in case it is unable to
arrange for the funds in terms of the settlement agreement as an alternate
arrangement of the plaintiff taking over the possession of the six flats was
also agreed to between the parties. He would submit that the six flats are
ready to be given possession of. He would submit that there are other
purchasers who have now taken possession of 80% of the flats constructed
by the defendant. He would submit that the plaintiff can take possession of
these six (6) flats which are subject matter of the BBA even today and
without payment of any further charges.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION:-
19. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and also
perused the record and examined the judgements relied upon.
20. As to under what conditions, a Court can, under Order XIII-A of the
CPC, pass a summary judgment, is crystalised and no more res integra in
view of the judgement of the Supreme Court in Reliance Eminent
Trading and Commercial Pvt. Ltd. vs. Delhi Development Authority,
(2026) SCC OnLine SC 744 . The relevant paragraphs are quoted
hereunder:
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50. Coming back to the Order necessary for adjudication of the present
case, Rule 3 of Order XIII-A of the CPC provides that the Court, while
adjudicating an application for summary judgment, has to bear in mind
two things-
(i) the Court considers -
(a) whether the plaintiff has any real prospect of succeeding
on the claim or issue; or
(b) whether the defendant has any real prospect of successfully
defending the claim or issue; and
(ii) there is no other reason why the case or issue should be allowed to
go to trial.
51. This brings us to the expression ‘real prospect of success’, as used in
Rule 3 of Order XIII-A of the CPC. This phrase is, by its very nature,
self-explanatory and admits of no further interpretation. It postulates that
the likelihood of success must be real and substantial, as opposed to
being merely fanciful or speculative. In other words, the standard
envisages a degree of certainty higher than that of a claim which is
merely arguable. Accordingly, where the Court finds that a claim or
defence is so weak that it prima-facie discloses no reasonable prospect of
success, it is neither necessary nor desirable to subject the parties to the
rigours of a full-fledged trial. The provision, thus, empowers the Court to
arrest such proceedings at the threshold, thereby preventing undue
expenditure use of judicial time and resources. At the same time, the
provision reflects the broader obligation of the Court to ensure
expeditious delivery of justice. In this regard, reference can be made to
the decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal in Swain v.
Hillman, (2001) 1 All ER 91, which set the standard for summary
judgment under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 1998 of the United
Kingdom. In this case, it was held that the power of summary judgment is
to be exercised where it is just and expedient to do so, enabling parties to
know their legal position without being compelled to endure a trial .
52. The question then arises regarding the scope of enquiry under Order
XIII-A of the CPC. At one end of spectrum, it is to follow the test laid out
in Wenlock v. Moloney, [1965] 1 WLR 1238, wherein the English Court
of Appeal adopted rigid standard to state that:—
“… this summary jurisdiction of the court was never intended to
be exercised by a minute and protracted examination of the
documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the plaintiff
really has a cause of action. To do that is to usurp the position of the
trial judge, and to produce a trial of the case is chambers, on
affidavits only, without discovery and without oral evidence tested by
cross-examination in the ordinary way. This seems to me to be an
abuse of the inherent power of the court and not a proper exercise of
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that power.”
53. A less stringent standard was adopted in William and Humbert Ltd. v.
W & H Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd., [1986] A.C. 368, wherein the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit observed that a
Court should, as a general rule, decline to proceed with the argument
unless it not only harbours doubts about the soundness of the pleadings
but, in addition, is satisfied that striking out will obviate the necessity for
a trial or will substantially reduce the burden of preparing for the trial or
the burden of the trial itself.
54. In Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and company of the
Bank of England, [2001] UKHL 16, the House of Lords was considering
a suit for damages against the Bank of England for misfeasance in public
office arising from collapse of Bank of Credit and Commerce
International SA. While considering the application of the defendant for
summary judgment, it was held that:—
“ 95. I would approach that further question in this way. The method by
which issues of fact are tried in our courts is well settled. After the
normal processes of discovery and interrogatories have been completed,
the parties are allowed to lead their evidence so that the trial judge can
determine where the truth lies in the light of that evidence. To that rule
there are some well-recognised exceptions. For example, it may be clear
as a matter of law at the outset that even if a party were to succeed in
proving all the facts that he offers to prove he will not be entitled to the
remedy that he seeks. In that event a trial of the facts would be a waste of
time and money, and it is proper that the action should be taken out of
court as soon as possible. In other cases it may be possible to say with
confidence before trial that the factual basis for the claim is fanciful
because it is entirely without substance. It may be clear beyond question
that the statement of facts is contradicted by all the documents or other
material on which it is based. The simpler the case the easier it is likely
to take that view and resort to what is properly called summary
judgment. But more complex cases are unlikely to be capable of being
resolved in that way without conducting a mini-trial on the documents
without discovery and without oral evidence. As Lord Woolf said in
Swain v. Hillman, at p 95, that is not the object of the rule. It is designed
to deal with cases that are not fit for trial at all.”
55. Closer to the home, various High Courts have rendered their
opinions primarily on a cautionary note in adjudicating summary
judgments, which have been held to be applicable in exceptional cases.
Reference in this regard can be made to Bright Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v.
MJ Bizcraft LLP, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 6394 and Su-kam Power
Systems Ltd. v. Mr. Kunwer Sachdev, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10764.
56. If a case before the Court gives rise to a neat point of law or
construction, and if the Court is satisfied that it has all evidences
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necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the
parties have had an adequate opportunity to address their arguments; it
should grasp the nettle and decide the same. While it is simply not
enough for the defendant to argue that something may come up in trial,
at the same time the defendant has to show from the documents available
on record, or portray that such evidence likely exists and can be expected
to be made available during the trial.
57. There is no gainsaying that the Court ought not to conduct a mini-
trial in this regard, rather take the statements and facts on the face, until
any contemporaneous document indicates otherwise. In doing so, the
Court ought to not only take into account the evidence actually available
on the record, but also the evidence that can be reasonably be expected
to be available in the process of trial.
58. It may not be out of context to note that the use of summary judgment
will not be against the interest of justice if it will lead to a fair and just
result, and serve the goals of timeliness, affordability and proportionality
in light of the litigation as a whole.
59. Therefore, while considering an application for summary judgment
under Order XIII-A of the CPC, the following non-exhaustive guidelines
have to be complied-
(i) That the procedural mandate under Order XIII-A, CPC be strictly
complied.
(ii) The Court should consider,
(a) Whether Plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim
or issue; or
(b) Whether the defendant has no real prospect of successfully
defending the claim or issue; and
(iii) The Court should also consider whether there is no other reason
why the case or issue(s) should be allowed to go to trial.
(iv) While ascertaining above, the Court does not have to take
everything on the face value, but it must also not conduct a mini trial
at the same time.
(v) That the Court has to differentiate between a cause of
action/defence respectively, which is real as opposed to fanciful
prospect.
(vi) That the Court ought to grasp the nettle, when dealing with the
summary judgment applications to decide short points of law and
interpretations.
(vii) The Court must take into account not only the evidence before it
but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be
led/available at the trial.
(viii) That the Court's usage of power under Order XIII-A, CPC is
exceptional as it cuts short the process of trial and ought to be
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exercised where oral evidence and full trial is not required.
(ix) In order to ascertain the need for full trial over summary
judgment, the Court has to see whether, in the interest of justice, it is
more suited to conduct trial to -
(a) Weigh the evidence,
(b) Evaluate the credibility of a deponents,
(c) Draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
21. The learned Division Bench of this Court in Bright Enterprises Pvt.
Ltd. vs. M.J. Bizraft, 2017 SCC Online Del 6394 had enumerated the
procedural stipulations to be followed in an application seeking summary
judgement and the reply thereto. The learned Division Bench stated that the
decision to pass a summary judgement without recording oral evidence are
exceptional in nature to the ordinary course of a suit, and thus, the
stipulations must be strictly construed. The relevant paragraphs i.e. paras
22 and 23 are extracted hereunder:
“22. The provisions relating to summary judgment which enables courts
to decide claims pertaining to commercial disputes without recording
oral evidence are exceptional in nature and out of the ordinary course
which a normal suit has to follow. In such an eventuality, it is essential
that the stipulations are followed scrupulously otherwise it may result in
gross injustice. As pointed out above, a specific period of time has been
provided during which an application for summary judgment can be
made. That period begins upon the service of summons on the defendant
and ends upon the court framing issues in the suit. Even if we were to
accept, which we do not, the argument of the respondents that the Court
had suo moto powers to deliver summary judgment without there being
any application, those powers also would have to be exercised during
this window, that is, after service of summons on the defendant and prior
to framing of issues. In addition to this, we also reiterate that, in our
view, a summary judgment under Order XIIIA CPC is not permissible
without there being an appropriate application for summary judgment.
The contents of an application for summary judgment are also stipulated
in Rule 4 of Order XIIIA. The application is required to precisely
disclose all material facts and identify the point of law, if any. In the
event, the applicant seeks to rely on any documentary evidence, the
applicant must include such documentary evidence in its application and
identify the relevant content of such documentary evidence on which the
applicant relies. The application must also state the reason why there are
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no real prospects of succeeding or defending the claim, as the case may
be.

23. Rule 4(2) of Order XIIIA also requires that where a hearing for
summary judgment is fixed, the respondent must be given at least thirty
days' notice of the date fixed for the hearing and the claim that is
proposed to be decided by the Court at such hearing. Rule 4(3) of Order
XIIIA makes provision which enables the respondents to file a reply
within the stipulated time addressing the matters set forth in clauses (a)
to (f) of the said sub-rule. In particular, the reply of the respondent ought
to precisely disclose all the material facts and identify the point of law, if
any, and the reasons why the relief sought by the applicant for summary
judgment should not be granted. Just as in the case of the applicant, the
respondent is also given the opportunity to rely upon documentary
evidence in its reply which must be included in the reply and the relevant
content identified. The respondent's reply is also required to give reason
as to why there are real prospects of succeeding on the claim or
defending the claim, as the case may be. Importantly, the reply must also
concisely state the issues that should be framed for trial and that it must
identify what further evidence would be brought on record at trial that
could not be brought on record at the stage of summary judgment. The
reply should also state as to why in the light of the evidence or material
on record, if any, the Court should not proceed to summary judgment.”
22. It is in the aforesaid principle of law that has been succinctly laid
down that this Court would now proceed to examine the issue on merits.
23. The plaintiff has instituted the present suit for recovery of a sum of

Rs.4,07,81,000/- alongwith pendente lite and future interest @ 12% p.a.
predicated on the Settlement Agreement dated 18.07.2023. It may also be
noted that the parties do not dispute that the settlement agreement was
executed on account of failure of the defendant to handover six (6) units
which were to be constructed by the defendant. The defendant also does not
dispute that a sum of Rs.4,07,81,000/- was also paid by the plaintiff
towards the said six (6) units of commercial space. It is also not disputed
that a BBA was executed between the parties for the purposes of
construction of commercial space by the defendant out of which six (6)
units were to be handed over to the plaintiff within twenty-four (24)
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months from the date of the BBA i.e. or approval of completion building
plans by the Competent Authority, whichever is later.
24. Clause 62 of the BBA confers exclusive jurisdiction to the Courts at
Gurugram. This position is not disputed by the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court in Swastik Gases (supra) had authoritatively pronounced that in case
a contract between parties refers/mentions a particular place for
jurisdiction, axiomatically, that place alone, to the exclusion of others,
would have the necessary territorial jurisdiction to decide and adjudicate a
dispute which may arise out of the said contract. Clearly, there is no quarrel
with the said proposition.
25. Though learned counsel for the defendant made a valiant effort to
emphasize that BBA being the principal document would govern the
jurisdiction clause between the parties as encapsulated in Clause 62 of the
BBA, what is fundamental to be examined is the relief sought by the
plaintiff. It is nobody’s case that the plaintiff is seeking specific
performance of the BBA in which case the jurisdiction of this Court would
stand excluded. Undoubtedly, the settlement agreement, no doubt, is on
account of frustration of the plaintiff of not being handed over the six (6)
units as assured in the BBA, yet it is the terms of the settlement agreement
i.e., the recovery of Rs.4,07,81,000/- that too, without interest as stipulated
therein, is what the plaintiff seeks in the present suit.
26. To the assertion of the plaintiff in para 4(o) of the plaint regarding
the execution of the settlement agreement, the defendant in its
corresponding para 4(o) of the written statement has not denied the
execution of the said settlement agreement. In fact, the defendant has
concocted a story that in case the defendant is unable to arrange for the
funds for the refund of the aforesaid sum, the plaintiff would take
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possession of the units booked by it. Two things precisely fall from the
aforesaid statement. One, that the execution of the settlement agreement is
admitted, and two, the submission of an alternate arrangement of the
plaintiff accepting six (6) units in default of refund is completely contrary
to the recitals of the settlement agreement itself.
27. So far as the issue of territorial jurisdiction is concerned, having
regard to the fact that the settlement agreement is admitted, it can be safely
inferred that the same was executed in Delhi, which too, is not denied.
Undeniably, the plaintiff is only seeking recovery of the money as
stipulated and contemplated in the settlement agreement independent of the
BBA. Thus, the submission that BBA is the principal document and Clause
62 of the BBA would govern the jurisdiction, may not be entirely correct.
Resultantly, having regard to the fact that a part of cause of action i.e., the
execution of the Settlement Agreement dated 18.07.2023 in Delhi as also
the fact that the defendant itself is located in Delhi, would clearly, under
the provisions of Section 20 (c) of the CPC, confer requisite territorial
jurisdiction upon this Court to adjudicate the suit.
28. The defendant has, in its written statement, particularly para 4(o)
stated that it was the understanding between the parties at the time of
signing of the agreement that in the event the defendant is not in a position
to arrange for the funds, the plaintiff would take possession of the units
booked by them. This stand was emphatically urged by the learned counsel
for the defendant as an alternate to the refund of the sum of
Rs.4,07,81,000/- to substantiate the stand that the matter would require
trial.
29. Ordinarily, the aforesaid submission, possibly could have propelled

the Court to deem it fit that the suit proceed to trial rather than pass a
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summary judgement. However, in the present case, it does not appear so.
30. This is for the reason that the stand taken by the defendant as noted
above in para 4(o) of its written statement is clearly contrary to the written
document admitted by the parties and is on record. It would be appropriate
to extract the Settlement Agreement dated 18.07.2023 in its entirety
including the handwritten note at the end of such document, hereunder:



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31. Manifestly, there is no clause in the settlement agreement which
refers to any alternate arrangement other than the stipulation mentioned in
Clauses 2, 4 and 5 of the settlement agreement. It is trite that the
documentary evidence excludes the oral. In view of the settled proposition
of law, the submission of an alternate arrangement, that too oral, cannot be
considered and is rejected.
32. As to whether the plaintiff has any real prospects of succeeding on
the claim; whether the defendant has any real prospects of successfully
defending the claim or that there is no other reason why the case or issue
should be allowed to go to trial, the aforesaid analysis and observations
impel this Court to rule on the affirmative on the first and third issues noted
above and equally hold that in the given circumstances, the defendant has
no real prospects of successfully defending the claim.
33. The only issue which arises in this case is in respect of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to recovery of sum of Rs.4,07,81,000/- from the
defendant as contemplated in the Settlement Agreement dated 18.07.2023.
That the plaintiff has paid a sum of Rs.4,07,81,000/- is not denied by the
defendant rather admitted in para 4(i) of the written statement; that the
parties had entered into and executed a Settlement Agreement dated
18.07.2023 is admitted; that the terms and conditions of the settlement
agreement too are not denied except for a concocted alternative
arrangement which has been rejected above.
34. In view of the above findings of facts, it is the considered opinion of
this Court that the principles governing an application under Order XIII-A
of the CPC as laid down by the Supreme Court in Reliance Eminent
Trading (supra) and the learned Division Bench of this Court in Bright
Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (supra) , are fully met in the present case.
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35. Clearly, the parties need not be put to trial since the only issue
arising between them has been found to be in favour of the plaintiff.
Moreover, the cumulative and harmonious consideration of the defence set
up by the defendant, propels this Court to form an opinion that the defence
is moonshine or a mirage.
36. In that view of the matter, the application under Order XIII-A is
allowed and a summary judgement in favour of the plaintiff and against the
defendant for a sum of Rs.4,07,81,000/- is passed alongwith pendente lite
and future interest with effect from 18.07.2023 @ 9% p.a. in favour of the
plaintiff.
37. Decree sheet be drawn up.
38. The present suit is disposed of alongwith all the pending
applications, if any.

TUSHAR RAO GEDELA
(JUDGE)
NOVEMBER 18, 2026

rl

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:34:50
CS(COMM) 205/2025 Page 17 of 17