SANJAY SINGH vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
- Court
- Chhattisgarh High Court
<div> 1<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16809</b><br /> <br /> <br /> 2026:CGHC:16809<br /> <b>NAFR </b><br /> <b>HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR</b><br /> <b>CRMP No. 1003 of 2021</b><br /> <b>1 -</b> Sanjay Singh S/o Late Sant Bahadur Singh, Aged About 36 Years <br /> House No. 5/2, Street No. 12, Maitri Kunj, Risali, Bhilai, Tahsil And <br /> District Durg Chhattisgarh<br /> <b>2 -</b> Rajesh Singh, S/o Late Sant Bahadur Singh, Aged About 38 Years <br /> House No. 5/2, Street No. 12, Maitri Kunj, Risali, Bhilai, Tahsil And <br /> District Durg Chhattisgarh<br /> <b>3 -</b> Smt. Preeti Singh W/o Rajesh Singh, Aged About 37 Years House <br /> No. 5/2, Street No. 12, Maitri Kunj, Risali, Bhilai, Tahsil And District Durg <br /> Chhattisgarh<br /> <b>... Petitioner(s)</b> <br /> <b>versus</b><br /> <b>1 - </b> State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, P.S. <br /> Mahila Thana, Durg, District Durg Chhattisgarh<br /> <b>2 -</b> Smt. Sandhya Singh W/o Sanjay Singh Aged About 29 Years Village <br /> Jora Tarai, Post Dundera, P.S. Utai, Tahsil And District Durg <br /> Chhattisgarh<br /> <b>... Respondent(s) </b><br /> For Petitioner(s) <b>:</b> Mr.M.P.S.Bhatia, Advocate <br /> For Respondent <br /> <b>:</b><br /> Mr.Priyank Rathi, Government Advocate <br /> No.1/State <br /> For Respondent <br /> <b>:</b><br /> Mr.Sameer Oraon, Advocate <br /> No.2<br /><br /> 2<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16809</b><br /> <b> Hon’ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice</b><br /> <b> Hon’ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge</b><br /> <b> </b> <b>Order</b> <b> on Board</b> <b> </b> <b> </b><br /> <b>Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice</b><br /> <b>13/04/2026</b><br /> Heard Mr.M.P.S.Bhatia, learned counsel for the petitioners as well <br /> <b>1.</b><br /> as Mr.Priyank Rathi, learned Government Advocate appearing for <br /> respondent No.1/State and Mr.Sameer Oraon, learned counsel <br /> appearing for respondent No.2. <br /> By this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal <br /> <b>2.</b><br /> Procedure, 1973, the petitioners have prayed for the following <br /> relief(s):<br /> <i>“It is, therefore, most respectfully and humbly prayed </i><br /> <i>that the Hon'ble High Court may most kindly be pleased </i><br /> <i>to allow the petition and may quash the impugned FIR </i><br /> <i>dated 03.08.2021 (Ann, A-11) registered as Crime No. </i><br /> <i>64/2021 lodged at P.S. Mahila Thana, Durg District Durg </i><br /> <i>by the complainant/respondent No. 2 against the </i><br /> <i>applicants u/S. 498-A/34 of IPC and its consequences, </i><br /> <i>in the interest of justice.”</i><br /> <b>3.</b> The facts, in brief, as projected by the petitioners are that the <br /> marriage between petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 2 was <br /> solemnized on 28.04.2016 at Bhilai as per Hindu rites. Petitioner <br /> Nos. 2 and 3 are the elder brother and sister-in-law of petitioner <br /> No. 1. Soon after marriage, respondent No. 2 behaved cruelly <br /> and left the matrimonial home on 02.06.2016. She briefly returned <br /> between 25.10.2016 and 11.11.2016. Thus, she stayed with <br /><br /> 3<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16809</b><br /> petitioner No. 1 for less than two months in total. On 11.02.2017, <br /> respondent No. 2 visited petitioner No. 1’s workplace in Delhi <br /> without intimation, causing mental stress. Due to her conduct, <br /> petitioner No. 1 suffered psychiatric illness and was hospitalized <br /> from 21.05.2017 to 16.06.2017. Since then, the parties have been <br /> living separately. Petitioner No.1 filed a petition for divorce under <br /> Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act in 2018. During counseling <br /> proceedings in 2018, respondent No. 2 admitted the dispute, <br /> expressed unwillingness to live with petitioner No. 1, and a <br /> settlement for mutual divorce with payment of ₹5,00,000 was <br /> arrived at. However, she failed to honor the settlement. In her <br /> written statement, respondent No. 2 did not deny that she had <br /> been living separately since May 2017. Despite this, respondent <br /> No. 2 lodged an FIR dated 03.08.2021 under Section 498-A/34 <br /> IPC making false allegations, including that she resided with <br /> petitioner No. 1 till 2020, which is contrary to records and her <br /> earlier statements. The petition filed by petitioner No.1 under <br /> Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act in 2018 was allowed by the <br /> Second Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Durg in Civil Suit <br /> No.355/2018 and decree of divorce was granted in favour of <br /> petitioner No.1 vide judgment and decree dated 17.01.2022 on <br /> the ground of cruelty committed by respondent No.2. As such, the <br /> FIR is false, malicious, and filed with the intent to harass the <br /> applicants amid ongoing matrimonial litigation and continuation of <br /><br /> 4<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16809</b><br /> proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIR would amount to <br /> abuse of process of law and cause grave injustice.<br /> <b>4.</b> Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned FIR <br /> dated 03.08.2021 registered under Section 498-A/34 IPC is wholly <br /> false, malicious and an abuse of the process of law. It is submitted <br /> that the marriage between petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 2 <br /> was solemnized on 28.04.2016; however, respondent No. 2 left <br /> the matrimonial home within a short span and, in total, resided <br /> with petitioner No. 1 for less than two months. Since May 2017, <br /> the parties have been living separately. It is further submitted that <br /> due to the conduct of respondent No. 2, petitioner No. 1 suffered <br /> severe mental stress and was hospitalized for psychiatric <br /> treatment. Thereafter, petitioner No. 1 initiated divorce <br /> proceedings under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act in the <br /> year 2018. Learned counsel submits that during counseling <br /> proceedings, respondent No. 2 categorically expressed her <br /> unwillingness to reside with petitioner No. 1 and a settlement for <br /> mutual divorce was arrived at, which she subsequently failed to <br /> honor. Even in her written statement filed in 2019, respondent No. <br /> 2 did not deny that she had been living separately since May <br /> 2017. It is further contended that the competent Family Court, <br /> Durg, after appreciating the evidence on record, has already <br /> granted a decree of divorce in favour of petitioner No. 1 vide <br /> judgment and decree dated 17.01.2022 on the ground of cruelty <br /> committed by respondent No. 2. Learned counsel submits that <br /><br /> 5<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16809</b><br /> despite these admitted and established facts, respondent No. 2 <br /> lodged the impugned FIR in the year 2021 containing patently <br /> false allegations, including that she resided with petitioner No. 1 <br /> till 2020, which is contrary to the record and her own earlier <br /> statements. It is thus argued that the impugned FIR has been <br /> lodged with an ulterior motive to harass the petitioners and to <br /> wreak vengeance in view of the matrimonial dispute and divorce <br /> proceedings. Therefore, it is submitted that the continuation of <br /> criminal proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIR would amount <br /> to gross abuse of the process of law and would cause grave <br /> injustice to the petitioners. In view of the above, it is prayed that <br /> this Court may kindly quash the impugned FIR and all <br /> consequential proceedings in the interest of justice.<br /> On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent <br /> <b>5.</b><br /> No.2 opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the <br /> petitioners, however, does not dispute the fact that divorce has <br /> taken place between petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 and <br /> also admitted that no appeal was filed against the decree of <br /> divorce passed by the Family Court. <br /> <b>6.</b> We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the <br /> documents appended with petition. <br /> <b>7.</b> In the matter of <b><i>Geeta Mehrotra and another v. State of Uttar </i></b><br /> <b><i>1</i></b><br /> <b><i>Pradesh and another</i></b> , the Supreme Court has held that casual <br /> reference to the family member of the husband in FIR as co-<br /> 1<br /> (2012) 10 SCC 741<br /><br /> 6<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16809</b><br /> accused particularly when there is no specific allegation and <br /> complaint did not disclose their active involvement. It was held <br /> that cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections <br /> 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC would not be justified as <br /> cognizance would result in abuse of judicial process. <br /> <b>8.</b> In the matter of <b><i>K. Subba Rao and others v. State of Telangana </i></b><br /> <b><i>represented by its Secretary, Department of Home and </i></b><br /> <i>2</i><br /> <b><i>others</i></b> the Supreme Court delineated the duty of the criminal <br /> Courts while proceeding against relatives of victim's husband and <br /> held that the Court should be careful in proceeding against distant <br /> relatives in crime pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry <br /> deaths and further held that relatives of husband should not be <br /> roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations, unless specific <br /> instances of their involvement in offences are made out. <br /> In the matter of <b><i>Rashmi Chopra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and </i></b><br /> <b>9.</b><br /> <b><i>3</i></b><br /> <b><i>Another</i></b> , it has been held by the Supreme Court relying upon the <br /> principle of law laid down in <b><i>State of Haryana and others v. </i></b><br /> 4<br /> <b><i>Bhajan Lal and others</i></b> that criminal proceedings can be allowed <br /> to proceed only when a <i>prima facie</i> offence is disclosed and <br /> further held that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which <br /> cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of <br /> oppression or harassment and the High Court should not hesitate <br /> 2<br /> (2018) 14 SCC 452<br /> 3<br /> 2019 SCC OnLine SC 620<br /> 4<br /> 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335<br /><br /> 7<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16809</b><br /> in exercising the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings if the <br /> proceedings deserve to be quashed in line of parameters laid <br /> down by the Supreme Court in <b><i>Bhajan Lal</i></b> <b> </b> (supra) and further <br /> held that in absence of specific allegation regarding anyone of the <br /> accused except common and general allegations against <br /> everyone, no offence under Section 498A IPC is made out and <br /> quashed the charges for offence under Section 498A of the IPC <br /> being covered by category seven as enumerated in <b><i>Bhajan Lal </i></b><br /> (supra) by holding as under:- <br /> <i>“24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint </i><br /> <i>pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A </i><br /> <i>perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations </i><br /> <i>against the appellants for offence under Section 498A </i><br /> <i>and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. </i><br /> <i>No specific incident dates or details of any incident has </i><br /> <i>been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having </i><br /> <i>been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated by </i><br /> <i>Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where Vanshika </i><br /> <i>participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few </i><br /> <i>months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint </i><br /> <i>has been filed in the Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh </i><br /> <i>Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The </i><br /> <i>sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of </i><br /> <i>the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under </i><br /> <i>Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed </i><br /> <i>as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of </i><br /> <i>Michigan by Nayan Chopra.</i><br /> <i>25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one </i><br /> <i>of the applicants except common general allegation </i><br /><br /> 8<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16809</b><br /> <i>against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the </i><br /> <i>daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of </i><br /> <i>one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, </i><br /> <i>namely, father, mother, brother, mother’s sister and </i><br /> <i>husband of mother’s sister have been roped in clearly </i><br /> <i>indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. </i><br /> <i>was filed with a view to harass the applicants.....”</i><br /> <b>10.</b> The Apex Court, in <b><i>Payal Sharma v. State of Punjab & Another </i></b><br /> {Cr.A. No. 4773/2024, decided on 26.11.2024} had, relying on the <br /> decision in <b><i>Geeta Mehrotra </i></b> (supra), <b><i>Kahkashan Kausar @ </i></b><br /> <b><i>Sonam & Others v. State of Bihar & Others </i></b> {(2022) 6 SCC <br /> 599}, <b><i>Bhajan Lal </i></b> (supra), and <b><i>Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra </i></b><br /> <b><i>Pradesh & Another </i></b> {(2013) 10 SCC 591}, had quashed the FIR <br /> and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom. <br /> Very recently, the Apex Court, in <b><i>Dara Lakshmi Narayan & </i></b><br /> <b>11.</b><br /> <b><i>Others v. State of Telangana & Another </i></b> {Cr.A. No. 5199 of <br /> 2024, decided on 10.12.2024}, has observed as under:<br /> “ <i>25. A mere reference to the names of family members in </i><br /> <i>a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, </i><br /> <i>without specific allegations indicating their active </i><br /> <i>involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-</i><br /> <i>recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that </i><br /> <i>there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of </i><br /> <i>the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of </i><br /> <i>a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping </i><br /> <i>accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or </i><br /> <i>particularised allegations cannot form the basis for </i><br /> <i>criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in </i><br /><br /> 9<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16809</b><br /> <i>such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the </i><br /> <i>legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of </i><br /> <i>innocent family members. In the present case, appellant </i><br /> <i>Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of </i><br /> <i>appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and </i><br /> <i>have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant </i><br /> <i>No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be </i><br /> <i>dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be </i><br /> <i>an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of </i><br /> <i>specific allegations made against each of them.</i><br /> <i>26. In fact, in the instant case, the first appellant and his </i><br /> <i>wife i.e. the second respondent herein resided at </i><br /> <i>Jollarpeta, Tamil Nadu where he was working in </i><br /> <i>Southern Railways. They were married in the year 2015 </i><br /> <i>and soon thereafter in the years 2016 and 2017, the </i><br /> <i>second respondent gave birth to two children. Therefore, </i><br /> <i>it cannot be believed that there was any harassment for </i><br /> <i>dowry during the said period or that there was any </i><br /> <i>matrimonial discord. Further, the second respondent in </i><br /> <i>response to the missing complaint filed by the first </i><br /> <i>appellant herein on 05.10.2021 addressed a letter dated </i><br /> <i>11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, </i><br /> <i>Thirupathur Sub Division requesting for closure of the </i><br /> <i>said complaint as she had stated that she had left the </i><br /> <i>matrimonial home on her own accord owing to a quarrel </i><br /> <i>with the appellant No.1 because of one Govindan with </i><br /> <i>whom the second respondent was in contact over </i><br /> <i>telephone for a period of ten days. She had also </i><br /> <i>admitted that she would not repeat such acts in future. In </i><br /> <i>the above conspectus of facts, we find that the </i><br /> <i>allegations of the second respondent against the </i><br /> <i>appellants herein are too far-fetched and are not </i><br /> <i>believable. </i><br /><br /> 10<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16809</b><br /> <i>27. xxx</i> <i>xxx</i> <i>xxx</i><br /> <i>28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of </i><br /> <i>an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a </i><br /> <i>woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift </i><br /> <i>intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as </i><br /> <i>there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes </i><br /> <i>across the country, accompanied by growing discord and </i><br /> <i>tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, </i><br /> <i>there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions </i><br /> <i>like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing </i><br /> <i>personal vendetta against the husband and his family by </i><br /> <i>a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during </i><br /> <i>matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the </i><br /> <i>misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for </i><br /> <i>use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. </i><br /> <i>Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of </i><br /> <i>the IPC against the husband and his family in order to </i><br /> <i>seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a </i><br /> <i>wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, </i><br /> <i>cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his </i><br /> <i>family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against </i><br /> <i>them. </i><br /> <i>29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman </i><br /> <i>who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been </i><br /> <i>contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should </i><br /> <i>remain silent and forbear herself from making a </i><br /> <i>complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is </i><br /> <i>not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we </i><br /> <i>should not encourage a case like as in the present one, </i><br /> <i>where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of </i><br /> <i>marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the </i><br /> <i>second respondent herein, a complaint under Section </i><br /><br /> 11<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16809</b><br /> <i>498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the </i><br /> <i>insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the </i><br /> <i>protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the </i><br /> <i>matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand </i><br /> <i>for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. </i><br /> <i>However, sometimes it is misused as in the present </i><br /> <i>case. </i><br /> <i>30. In the above context, this Court in G.V. Rao vs. </i><br /> <i>L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 observed as follows: </i><br /> <i>“12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial </i><br /> <i>disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred </i><br /> <i>ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable </i><br /> <i>the young couple to settle down in life and live </i><br /> <i>peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly </i><br /> <i>erupt which often assume serious proportions </i><br /> <i>resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which </i><br /> <i>elders of the family are also involved with the result </i><br /> <i>that those who could have counselled and brought </i><br /> <i>about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their </i><br /> <i>being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There </i><br /> <i>are many other reasons which need not be </i><br /> <i>mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial </i><br /> <i>litigation so that the parties may ponder over their </i><br /> <i>defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by </i><br /> <i>mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court </i><br /> <i>of law where it takes years and years to conclude </i><br /> <i>and in that process the parties lose their “young” </i><br /> <i>days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.” </i><br /> <i>31. Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta vs. State of </i><br /> <i>Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667 held that the courts have to </i><br /> <i>be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these </i><br /> <i>complaints and must take pragmatic realities into </i><br /><br /> 12<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16809</b><br /> <i>consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The </i><br /> <i>allegations of harassment by the husband’s close </i><br /> <i>relatives who had been living in different cities and never </i><br /> <i>visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant </i><br /> <i>resided would have an entirely different complexion. The </i><br /> <i>allegations of the complainant are required to be </i><br /> <i>scrutinized with great care and circumspection</i> .<br /> <i>32. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned </i><br /> <i>FIR No.82 of 2022 filed by respondent No.2 was initiated </i><br /> <i>with ulterior motives to settle personal scores and </i><br /> <i>grudges against appellant No.1 and his family members </i><br /> <i>i.e., appellant Nos.2 to 6 herein. Hence, the present case </i><br /> <i>at hand falls within category (7) of illustrative parameters </i><br /> <i>highlighted in Bhajan Lal. Therefore, the High Court, in </i><br /> <i>the present case, erred in not exercising the powers </i><br /> <i>available to it under Section 482 CrPC and thereby failed </i><br /> <i>to prevent abuse of the Court’s process by continuing the </i><br /> <i>criminal prosecution against the appellants.</i> ” <br /> Observing the aforesaid, the Apex Court quashed the FIR, the <br /> charge sheet and the consequential criminal proceedings pending <br /> before the learned trial Court.<br /> <b>12.</b> In the complaint so made, the complainant has only made <br /> omnibus and general allegations against the petitioners without <br /> being full particulars about date and place that all the petitioners <br /> including the husband treated her with cruelty for bringing ten <br /> lakhs rupees and Honda City Car. There is no specific allegation <br /> regarding anyone of the petitioners except common and general <br /> allegations against all the petitioners that they have demanded <br /> cash amount.<br /><br /> 13<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16809</b><br /> <b>13.</b> Considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the <br /> parties, material available on record, perusing the FIR in which no <br /> specific allegations have been made and only bald and omnibus <br /> allegations have been made against the petitioners and the fact <br /> that the petition filed by petitioner No.1 under Section 13 of the <br /> Hindu Marriage Act in 2018 was allowed by the Second Additional <br /> Principal Judge, Family Court, Durg in Civil Suit No.355/2018 and <br /> decree of divorce was granted in favour of petitioner No.1 vide <br /> judgment and decree dated 17.01.2022 on the ground of cruelty <br /> committed by respondent No.2 and also considering the fact that <br /> no appeal was filed by respondent No.2 against the said decree, <br /> we are of the considered opinion that prima-facie no offence <br /> under Section 498A/34 of the IPC is made out for prosecuting the <br /> petitioners. <br /> <b>14.</b> As a fallout and consequence of the above-stated legal analysis, <br /> FIR in Crime No.64/2021 registered at Police Station Mahila <br /> Thana, Durg, District Durg for offence under Section 498A/34 of <br /> the IPC against the petitioners is hereby quashed.<br /> The petition under Section 482 CrPC is <b>allowed</b> to the extent <br /> <b>15.</b><br /> indicated hereinabove. No cost(s).<br /> Sd/- Sd/-<br /> (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)<br /> <b>JUDGE</b> <b>CHIEF JUSTICE</b><br /> Bablu</div>