Sri Subhajit Sutradhar vs Smt. Tanuja Sarkar and Anr.
- Court
- Tripura High Court
TRHC010015992026 2026:THC:1345-DB
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
IA No.01/2026 in/and Mat. App. No.18 of 2026
Sri Subhajit Sutradhar, S/o: Billa Mangal Sutradhar, R/o: East Dukli, P.O.:
East Pratapgarh, P.S.: East Agartala, Agartala, West Tripura, Pin: 799004.
……… Appellant/Applicant (s).
V E R S U S
1. Smt. Tanuja Sarkar, W/o: Sri Subhajit Sutradhar, D/o: Amrit Lal Sarkar of
Resident of Jogendranagar, Shib Mandir Para, P.O.: Aralia, P.S.: East
Agartala, Agartala, West Tripura, Pin: 799004.
2. Sri Suraj Nama, S/o: Swapan Nama (Abu) of West Dukli, P.S.: A.D. Nagar,
Agartala, West Tripura.
……… Respondent(s).
For Appellant/Applicant (s) : Mr. Dibyendu Sarkar, Advocate.
For Respondent(s) : None
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
CAV reserved on : 09.09.2026.
Judgment delivered on : 24.09.2026
Whether fit for reporting : NO
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(Biswajit Palit, J)
This application has been filed by the appellant/applicant under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 171
days in filing the connected appeal challenging the judgment and order dt.
06.12.2025 passed by the Learned Judge, Family Court, Agartala, West
Tripura District in connection with Case No.T.S. (DIV) 169 of 2023.
2. Heard Learned Counsel, Mr. Dibyendu Sarkar appearing on
behalf of the appellant/applicant. None appeared on behalf of the respondents
since no notice has been issued upon them.
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3. Taking part in the hearing, Learned Counsel for the
appellant/applicant submitted that in preferring the connected appeal there was
a total delay of 261 days from the date of delivery of impugned judgment and
order on 06.12.2025 and out of the total delay, the appellant/applicant will get
statutory period of 90 days for preferring appeal under Section 28(4) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 read with Section 19 of Family Courts Act.
4. Learned Counsel further submitted that for getting certified copy
of the impugned judgment and order there was a delay of 79 days, which
needs to be exempted. It was submitted that the appellant/applicant applied for
certified copy of 30.04.2026 and it was made available and delivered on
18.07.2026.
5. Learned Counsel further submitted that the original engaged
counsel for the appellant/applicant who conducted the case before the Learned
Trial Court did not inform the appellant/applicant that the divorce petition was
dismissed on 06.12.2025. The appellant/applicant being a layman could not
gather any information regarding the fate of the proceeding pending before the
Learned Judge, Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura, resulting which the
delay was caused. According to Learned Counsel for the appellant/applicant
the delay was unintentional which may kindly be condoned.
6. It was further submitted that the Learned Trial Court, in the
impugned judgment and order, observed that the present appellant/applicant
had failed to provide maintenance to the respondent despite the order of the
Court and accordingly, dismissed the suit filed by the appellant/applicant.
Learned Counsel for the appellant/applicant, summing up the submissions,
urged for setting aside the impugned judgment and order and to give an
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opportunity to the present appellant/applicant to deposit the arrear
maintenance amounts for payment to the respondent through the Court.
7. We have perused the impugned judgment and order.
8. The order was passed on 06.12.2025 by the Learned Trial Court.
The period of limitation is 90 days as per law. The appellant/applicant during
that period did not submit any prayer to the Learned Trial Court for issuing
certified copy rather he applied for certified copy on 30.04.2026 which was
delivered to him on 18.07.2026.
9. It is surprising that as to how the appellant/applicant could not
know regarding the judgment and order passed by the Learned Trial Court.
The contention of the appellant/applicant that his engaged counsel did not
inform him anything about the judgment and order during that period appears
to be baseless and not convincing.
10. In the opinion of this Court, it was the duty of the
appellant/applicant to know about the result of the proceeding of the case filed
by him before the Learned Trial Court.
11. On bare perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the
Learned Trial Court further it appears to us that the appellant/applicant
deliberately disobeyed the order of the Court for making payment of
maintenance as ordered on 16.01.2024 in Civil Misc. 60 of 2023. Even the
appellant/applicant failed to pay the cost imposed upon him by the Court.
Furthermore, in Civil Misc. (GC) 07/2020 on 20.09.2023, he himself admitted
that he was living with his second wife. So, finally, Learned Trial Court
dismissed the suit filed by the appellant/applicant.
12. In a case of this nature, it is the duty of the applicant to explain
day to day delay. The present appellant/applicant, save and except mentioning
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some dates and the fact of ignorance of judgment, could not place any other
materials before this Court to consider the application for condonation of
delay. Thus, it appears that there was lack of due diligence on the part of the
appellant/applicant in preferring the appeal on time.
1
13. In Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr. , at para Nos.31
and 32, Hon’ble the Supreme Court observed as under:
“31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to
first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main
matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by
the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or
stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main
matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasised in several cases
that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity.
The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of
causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the
respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable
grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement
for condoning the delay remains unmet.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. Similarly, in H. Guruswamy & Ors. v. A. Krishnaiah since
2
deceased by Lrs. , at para Nos.16 and 17, Hon’ble the Supreme Court
observed as under:
“16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the
court must take into consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of
the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for
which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a
party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits
because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be
non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he
cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be
preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering
the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the
bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant
1
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1093
2
2025 SCC OnLine SC 54
Page 5 of 5
and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court
may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay.
17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a
technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the
principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court
should keep the „Sword of Damocles‟ hanging over the head of a
litigant for an indefinite period of time.”
15. It is the settled position that the law of limitation is based on
public policy and principles of equity. The power under Section 5 of
Limitation Act, 1963 is a discretionary power and it may not be exercised if
the delay is attributed to the elements of negligence, carelessness and lack of
due diligence on the part of the appellant/applicant.
16. Here, in the case at hand, the appellant/applicant at the time of
hearing could not project any grounds before this Court to consider the
application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal.
17. Having considered the facts and circumstance of the case, we are
not at all satisfied with the explanations as offered by the appellant/applicant
in the application for condonation of delay of 171 days in preferring the
connected appeal.
18. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay filed by the
appellant/applicant is rejected. Consequently, the connected appeal is also
dismissed.
All pending application(s), shall stand closed.
(BISWAJIT PALIT, J) (M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO, CJ)
Snigdha
SNIGDHA
DAS
Digitally signed by
SNIGDHA DAS
Date: 2026.09.25
13:57:36 +05'30'