Smt. Anu Singhal vs Sh. Arun Rastogi & Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
st
Date of decision: 31 AUGUST, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
# CNR No. DLHC010463832023
O.A. 166/2026
In
+ CS(OS) 751/2023 & I.A. 22983/2023, I.A. 42272/2024, I.A.
45549/2024, I.A. 5318/2025, I.A. 12664/2025, I.A. 17189/2026, O.A.
166/2026
SMT. ANU SINGHAL .....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Rohan Taneja, Mr. Lalit Kumar
and Mr. Raghav Kalra, Advocates
versus
SH. ARUN RASTOGI & ORS. .....Defendants
Through: Mr. Ajay Kohli and Ms Apoorva
Agarwal, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
O.A. 166/2026
1. The present Chamber Appeal under Chapter II Rule 5 of the Delhi
High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 (“ DHC OS Rules ”) has been filed
on behalf of the Plaintiff/Appellant challenging the Order dated 06.05.2026
passed by the learned Joint Registrar.
2. The Ld. Joint Registrar vide Order dated 06.05.2026 dismissed the
Application of the Plaintiff for taking on record the Affidavit of
admission/denial of the Plaintiff’s documents filed by the Defendant No.1.
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3. Shorn of unnecessary details, some basic facts which are necessary
for adjudication of the present Appeal are as follows:
a) Summons to the Defendants were issued in the instant Suit on
29.11.2023.
b) The Written Statement along with an Affidavit of
admission/denial on behalf of Defendant No.1 was taken on
record vide Order dated 19.03.2024.
c) Material on record indicates that though a Replication was filed on
behalf of the Plaintiff, however, as per the office noting, the same
was lying under objections. The same is recorded in the Order
dated 07.08.2024.
d) It is stated that an Application being I.A. No.43467/2024 under
Section 151 of the CPC was filed on behalf of the Defendant
No.1, seeking directions for not taking on record the Replication
along with Affidavit of admission/denial filed by the Plaintiff.
Notice was issued on the said Application on 25.10.2024. It is
stated that vide Order dated 10.02.2025, the said Application was
allowed and the learned Joint Registrar passed the following
Order:
“I.A. 43467/2024 (Application under Section 151
of CPC)
1. This application has been filed by defendant no.
1, seeking directions that replication be not taken
on record considering it has been filed after 45
days, extended period under the rules. Even
though the delay is of 5 days, the rules have to be
complied with, and there can be no dilution of the
same, as per decision of this Court in Ram Sarup
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Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani 2020 SCC Online Del
1355.
2. Accordingly, the application is allowed. The
replication will not be taken on record.
3. Applications stands disposed of.”
e) Thereafter an Application being I.A. No.6330/2026 under Section
151 of the CPC, was filed on behalf of the Plaintiff for taking on
record the Affidavit of admission/denial filed by the Plaintiff in
respect of the documents filed by the Defendant No.1.Notice was
issued to the Defendant No.1 vide Order dated 12.03.2026. The
aforesaid Application was dismissed by the learned Joint Registrar
vide Order dated 06.05.2026 observing that an Affidavit of
admission/denial of documents filed beyond 45 days cannot be
taken on record at all.
f) Being aggrieved by the said Order, the Plaintiff has filed the
present Chamber Appeal.
4. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff has submitted that the Replication
along with Affidavit of admission/denial was filed by the Plaintiff on
09.05.2024 vide Diary No.1456901/2024, with a delay of 5 days beyond the
prescribed period of 45 days. He submitted that the Affidavit of
admission/denial stands on an independent procedural footing and the
learned Joint Registrar failed to exercise discretion vested under Rule 7 of
the DHC OS Rules and Section 151 of the CPC. He further contends that the
learned Joint Registrar failed to appreciate that the Plaintiff was not seeking
permission to file a fresh Affidavit of admission/denial after expiry of the
prescribed period, but merely sought formal recognition and taking on
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record of an Affidavit which had already been filed along with the
Replication. He also contended that the Affidavit of admission/denial is a
procedural mechanism intended to narrow down the scope of controversy,
identify disputed documents and facilitate proper framing of issues.
5. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff has further submitted that the
learned Joint Registrar failed to consider that the present proceedings arise
out of a partition, inheritance and title dispute concerning a family estate and
substantive civil rights, rather than a commercial suit requiring rigid
procedural enforcement. Further, the procedural rules ought not to be
interpreted in a manner resulting in foreclosure of inheritance and
proprietary rights, particularly in family disputes where the Court is required
to adjudicate competing claims on merits.
6. He further submitted that the inherent powers preserved under Section
151 of the CPC are sufficiently wide to permit taking on record the Affidavit
of admission/denial in order to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse
of the process of the Court.
7. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the learned Joint
Registrar failed to consider the deeming fiction contained in Chapter VII of
the DHC OS Rules cannot be interpreted so rigidly, so as to deprive a party
of its valuable right to dispute documents, especially in a partition and
inheritance dispute involving substantive civil rights and disputed questions
of title and succession. He also submitted that Chapter VII Rule 7 of the
DHC OS Rules consciously omits the expression “but not thereafter”, which
clearly indicates that the timeline prescribed for filing the Affidavit of
admission/denial is directory and not mandatory, and therefore the
procedural discretion continues to vest in the Court to permit such filing.
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8. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff contended that the Order dated
10.02.2025 passed by this Court merely directed that the Replication filed by
the Plaintiff shall not be taken on record and did not contain any express or
implied direction rejecting the Affidavit of admission/denial or the
procedural compliances filed therewith. Further, he contended that the
Impugned Order passed by the learned Joint Registrar erroneously enlarges
the scope and effect of the Order dated 10.02.2025 beyond what was
expressly directed therein. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff placed reliance
on the following judgments: (i) Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC480 ; Desh
Raj v. Balkishan, (2020) 2 SCC 708 ; LouisDreyfus Company India Pvt. Ltd.
v. NutriliteAgro ProductsPvt. Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 278 .
9. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff also contended that the learned Joint
Registrar failed to appreciate that the reasons explaining the short delay
could not be specifically pleaded in the earlier Application due to
inadvertent omission and the same is now being pleaded in the present
Appeal.
10. Heard the Counsels for the Parties and perused the material on record.
11. Rule 5 of the Chapter VII of the DHC OS Rules mandates that the
replication ought to be filed within a period of 30 days from the filing of the
Written Statement, however, a further period of 15 days is granted for filing
of the replication provided that sufficient cause is given as to what prevented
the Plaintiff from filing the replication within the period of 30 days after the
service of the Written Statement. Rule 5 of the Chapter VII of the Rules is
being reproduced as under:-
“5. Replication. - The replication, if any, shall be
filed within 30 days of receipt of the written
statement. If the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff
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was prevented by sufficient cause for exceptional
and unavoidable reasons in filing the replication
within 30 days, it may extend the time for filing the
same by a further period not exceeding 15 days but
not thereafter. For such extension, the plaintiff
shall be burdened with costs, as deemed
appropriate. The replication shall not be taken on
record, unless such costs have been paid/
deposited. In case no replication is filed within the
extended time also, the Registrar shall forthwith
place the matter for appropriate orders before the
Court. An advance copy of the replication together
with legible copies of all documents in possession
and power of plaintiff, that it seeks to file along
with the replication, shall be served on the
defendant and the replication together with the
said documents shall not be accepted unless it
contains an endorsement of service signed by the
defendant/ his Advocate.”
12. Rule 6 of the Chapter VII of the DHC OS Rules states that along with
the replication, the Plaintiff has to file an Affidavit of admission/denial of
documents and without that the replication should not be taken on record.
Rule 6 of the Chapter VII of the Rules is being reproduced as under:-
“6. Affidavit of admission/ denial of documents with
replication. - Alongwith the replication, the plaintiff
shall also file an affidavit of admission/ denial of
documents filed by the defendant, without which the
replication shall not be taken on record.”
13. Rule 7 of the Chapter VII of the DHC OS Rules states that
irrespective of whether the Plaintiff filed the replication or not, the Plaintiff
is bound to file Affidavit of admission/denial of documents within the time
prescribed for filing of the replication and in case the Plaintiff fails to file
the said Affidavit, the documents filed by the Defendant shall be deemed to
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be admitted. Rule 7 of the Chapter VII of the Rules is being reproduced as
under:-
“7. Affidavit of admission/ denial of documents,
even if replication not filed. - Irrespective of
whether the plaintiff files the replication or not, the
plaintiff shall be bound to file affidavit of
admission/ denial of documents filed by the
defendant alongwith the written statement within
the time permissible for filing replication. In case
the plaintiff fails to file the said affidavit, the
documents filed by the defendant shall be deemed
to be admitted. The Court or the Registrar, as the
case be, shall exhibit documents admitted by the
parties.”
14. A combined reading of Rules 5, 6 & 7 of Chapter VII indicates the
timeline for filing replication, and make it clear that replication has to be
accompanied by an affidavit of admission/denial of documents filed by the
Defendant and whether or not replication is filed, an affidavit of
admission/denial has to be filed, failing which documents filed by the
Defendant along with the Written Statement shall be deemed to be admitted.
Rule 6 also indicates that without an affidavit of admission/denial the
replication will not be taken on record. However, a combined reading of
Rules 5, 6 & 7 does not indicate that there is a timeline fixed for filing an
affidavit of admission/denial of documents by the Plaintiff. The timeline is
only fixed for filing replication and without an affidavit of admission/denial,
the replication is not to be taken on record. Further, Rule 7 provides that
without a replication, an affidavit of admission/denial can be filed.
15. A perusal of the Rule 7 and Rule 5 of the Chapter VII of the DHC OS
Rules indicates that though for filing of the replication there is an embargo,
which does not permit the Court to condone any delay beyond the maximum
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period of 45 days. There is no such embargo mentioned in Rule 7. The
expression “but not thereafter” mentioned in Rule 5, is absent in Rule 7,
meaning thereby, the power under Rule 5 has not been expressly excluded.
16. Attention is also drawn to Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the DHC OS
Rules which deals with the extension of time for filing the Written statement
which is being reproduced as under:-
“4. Extension of time for filing written statement. - If the
Court is satisfied that the defendant was prevented by
sufficient cause for exceptional and unavoidable reasons
in filing the written statement within 30 days, it may
extend the time for filing the same by a further period not
exceeding 90 days, but not thereafter. For such extension
of time, the party in delay shall be burdened with costs as
deemed appropriate. The written statement shall not be
taken on record unless such costs have been paid/
deposited. In case the defendant fails to file the affidavit
of admission/ denial of documents filed by the plaintiff,
the documents filed by the plaintiff shall be deemed to be
admitted. In case, no written statement is filed within the
extended time also, the Registrar may pass orders for
closing the right to file the written statement.”
17. A perusal of Rule 4 indicates that it deals with both the time for filing
of the Written Statement and also with the Affidavit of admission/denial of
documents. There is no separate Rule for filing of the Affidavit of
admission/denial of documents by the Defendants along with the written
statement, unlike Rule 7 which deals only with the Affidavit of
admission/denial to be filed by the Plaintiff. Whereas, Rule 4 as a whole
would mean that there is no power to condone the delay in filing Affidavit
of admission/denial of documents beyond the maximum period prescribed
which is total in 120 days. This embargo is absent in case of replication.
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18. Material on record indicates that since the replication has been filed
beyond the maximum permissible period of 45 days, the learned Joint
Registrar vide Order dated 10.02.2025 placing reliance on a judgment
passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Ram Sarup Lugani v. Nirmal
Lugani, 2020 SCC Online Del 1353 refused to take the replication on
record.
19. It is pertinent to mention that along with the replication, the Plaintiff
had filed an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents filed by the
Defendants.
20. The raison d‟être given in Ram Sarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani
( supra ) by which the Division Bench of this Court has expressly excluded
the power to condone the delay under the Limitation Act, 1963 can be
construed from the following paragraphs:-
“ “ 14 . The term “The Court” and “Registrar” have
been defined in Rule 4 that is a part of Chapter I of the
Rules. On a reading of Rule 5 it is clear that the
replication, if any, should be filed within a period of 30
days from the date of receipt of the written statement.
The word “shall” used in the said Rule postulates that
the replication must be filed within 30 days of the
receipt of the written statement. The Registrar does not
have the power to condone any delay beyond 30 days.
The permission to condone the delay beyond the period
of 30 days, lies with the court. If the court is satisfied
that the plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause or
for exceptional and unavoidable reasons from filing
the replication within 30 days, it may extend the time
for filing the same by a further period not exceeding 15
days with a suffix appended to the Rule stating, “but
not thereafter”. The phrase “but not thereafter”
mentioned in the Rule indicates that the intention of the
rule making authority was not to permit any
replication to be entertained beyond a total period of
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45 days. If any other interpretation is given to the said
Rule, then the words “but not thereafter”, will become
otiose.
15 . This is not the first time that the phrase, “but not
thereafter” have been used in the statute. The said
preemptory words have been used in other provisions
that have come up for interpretation before the
Supreme Court. In Union of India v. Popular
Construction Co., reported as (2001) 8 SCC 470, the
words “but not thereafter” were used in relation to the
power of the court to condone the delay in challenging
the award beyond the period prescribed under Section
34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and
the Supreme Court observed as below:—
“12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the
1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are “but
not thereafter” used in the proviso to sub-section
(3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to
an express exclusion within the meaning of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would
therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that
Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To
hold that the court could entertain an application
to set aside the award beyond the extended period
under the proviso, would render the phrase “but
not thereafter” wholly otiose. No principle of
interpretation would justify such a result.
16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that
recourse to a court against an arbitral award may
be made only by an application for setting aside
such award “in accordance with” sub-section (2)
and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to
grounds for setting aside an award and is not
relevant for our purposes. But an application filed
beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-
section (3) would not be an application “in
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accordance with” that sub-section. Consequently
by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court
against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond
the period prescribed. The importance of the
period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by
the provisions of Section 36 which provide that
“where the time for making an application to
set aside the arbitral award under Section 34
has expired … the award shall be enforced
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in
the same manner as if it were a decree of the
court”.
This is a significant departure from the provisions
of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act,
after the time to set aside the award expired, the
court was required to “proceed to pronounce
judgment according to the award, and upon the
judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow”
(Section 17). Now the consequence of the time
expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that
the award becomes immediately enforceable
without any further act of the court. If there were
any residual doubt on the interpretation of the
language used in Section 34, the scheme of the
1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of
curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion
of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act.” (emphasis supplied)
16 . In Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central
Excise, Jamshedpur, reported as (2008) 3 SCC 70, on
interpreting Section 35 of the Central Excise Act,
which contains similar provisions, the Supreme Court
has observed as under:
“8. The Commissioner of Central Excise(appeals)
as also the Tribunal being creatures of statute are
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not vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay
beyond the permissible period provided under the
statute. The period up to which the prayer for
condonation can be accepted is statutorily
provided. It was submitted that the logic of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short
“the Limitation Act”) can be available for
condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section
35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to
be preferred within three months from the date of
communication to him of the decision of order.
However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from
presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period
of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within
a further period of 30 days. In other words, this
clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed
within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further
30 days time can be granted by the appellate
authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to
sub-section(1) of Section 35 makes the position
crystal clear that the appellate authority has no
power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond
the period of 30 days. The language used makes
the position clear that the legislature intended the
appellate authority to entertain the appeal by
condoning delay only up to 30 days after the
expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for
preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete
exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The
Commissioner and the High Court were therefore
justified in holding that there was no power to
condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days'
period.”(emphasis supplied)
17 . After referring to the above decision, in
Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v.
Hongo India Private Limited, reported as (2009) 5
SCC 791, the Supreme Court went on to observe as
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under:
“30. In the earlier part of our order, we have
adverted to Chapter VI-A of the Act which
provides for appeals and revisions to various
authorities. Though Parliament has specifically
provided an additional period of 30 days in the
case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent
about the number of days if there is sufficient
cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate
Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in
the case of revision by the Central Government
has been provided. However, in the case of an
appeal to the High Court under Section 35-G and
reference application to the High Court under
Section 35-H, Parliament has provided only 180
days and no further period for filing an appeal
and making reference to the High Court is
mentioned in the Act.
X X X X
32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in
Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes
the position clear that an appeal and reference to
the High Court should be made within 180 days
only from the date of communication of the
decision or order. In other words, the language
used in other provisions makes the position clear
that the legislature intended the appellate
authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the
delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days
which is the preliminary limitation period for
preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause
condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause
after the prescribed period, there is complete
exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The
High Court was, therefore, justified in holding
that there was no power to condone the delay
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after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.
X X X X
35. It was contended before us that the words
“expressly excluded” would mean that there must
be an express reference made in the special or
local law to the specific provisions of the
Limitation Act of which the operation is to be
excluded. In this regard, we have to see the
scheme of the special law which here in this case
is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the
remedy provided therein is such that the
legislature intended it to be a complete code by
itself which alone should govern the several
matters provided by it. If, on an examination of
the relevant provisions, it is clear that the
provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein
cannot be called in aid to supplement the
provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that
even in a case where the special law does not
exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act by an express reference, it would
nonetheless be open to the court to examine
whether and to what extent, the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their operation.
In other words, the applicability of the provisions
of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged
not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the
provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to
filing of reference application to the High Court.”
(emphasis supplied)
18 . We may also profitably refer to Bengal Chemists
and Druggists Association v. Kalyan Chowdhury,
reported as (2018) 3 SCC 41, where while examining
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the provisions of the Companies Act, the Supreme
Court made the following observations:
“3. Before coming to the judgments of this Court,
it is important to first set out Section 421(3) and
Section 433 of the Act. These provisions read as
follows:
“421. Appeal from orders of Tribunal.—(1)-
(2) *
(3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall
be filed within a period of forty-five days
from the date on which a copy of the order of
the Tribunal is made available to the person
aggrieved and shall be in such form, and
accompanied by such fees, as may be
prescribed:
Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may
entertain an appeal after the expiry of the
said period of forty-five days from the date
aforesaid, but within a further period not
exceeding forty-five days, if it is satisfied that
the appellant was prevented by sufficient
cause from filing the appeal within that
period. …
*
433. Limitation.—The provisions of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) shall, as
far as may be, apply to proceedings or
appeals before the Tribunal or the Appellate
Tribunal, as the case may be.”
4. A cursory reading of Section 421(3) makes it
clear that the proviso provides a period of
limitation different from that provided in the
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Limitation Act, and also provides a further period
not exceeding 45 days only if it is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from
filing the appeal within that period. Section 433
obviously cannot come to the aid of the appellant
because the provisions of the Limitation Act only
apply “as far as may be”. In a case like the
present, where there is a special provision
contained in Section 421(3) proviso, Section 5 of
the Limitation Act obviously cannot apply.
5. Another very important aspect of the case is
that 45 days is the period of limitation, and a
further period not exceeding 45 days is provided
only if sufficient cause is made out for filing the
appeal within the extended period. According to
us, this is a peremptory provision, which will
otherwise be rendered completely ineffective, if
we were to accept the argument of the learned
counsel for the appellant. If we were to accept
such argument, it would mean that
notwithstanding that the further period of 45 days
had elapsed, the Appellate Tribunal may, if the
facts so warrant, condone the delay. This would
be to render otiose the second time-limit of 45
days, which, as has been pointed out by us above,
is peremptory in nature.” (emphasis supplied)
19 . In P. Radhabai v. P. Ashok Kumar, reported as
(2019) 13 SCC 445, while construing the phrase, “but
not thereafter” used in the proviso to sub section (3) of
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Concilliation Act, the
Supreme Court held thus:
“32.4. The limitation provision in Section 34(3)
also provides for condonation of delay. Unlike
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay can only
be condoned for 30 days on showing sufficient
cause. The crucial phrase “but not thereafter”
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reveals the legislative intent to fix an outer
boundary period for challenging an award.
X X X X
33.2. The proviso to Section 34(3) enables a court
to entertain an application to challenge an award
after the three months' period is expired, but only
within an additional period of thirty dates, “but
not thereafter”. The use of the phrase “but not
thereafter” shows that the 120 days' period is the
outer boundary for challenging an award. If
Section 17 were to be applied, the outer boundary
for challenging an award could go beyond 120
days. The phrase “but not thereafter” would be
rendered redundant and otiose. This Court has
consistently taken this view that the words “but
not thereafter” in the proviso of Section 34(3) of
the Arbitration Act are of a mandatory nature,
and couched in negative terms, which leaves no
room for doubt. (State of H.P. v. Himachal
Techno Engineers [State of H.P. v. Himachal
Techno Engineers, (2010) 12 SCC 210 : (2010) 4
SCC (Civ) 605], Assam Urban Water Supply &
SewerageBoard v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd.
[Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board
v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC
624 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831] and Anilkumar
Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel
[Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra
Jinabhai Patel, (2018) 15 SCC 178 : (2019) 1
SCC (Civ) 141].)
34. In our view, the aforesaid inconsistencies with
the language of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration
Act tantamount to an “express exclusion” of
Section 17 of the Limitation Act.” (emphasis
supplied)
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20 . In New India Assurance Company Limited v. Hili
Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited, reported
as (2020) 5 SCC 757, the issue before the Supreme
Court was whether Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 that provides for the
respondent/opposite party to file its response to the
complaint within 30 days or such extended period, not
extending 15 days, should be read as mandatory or
directory i.e. whether the District Forum would have
the power to extend the time for filing the response
beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days.
The Supreme Court has answered the said question in
the following words:
“20. The legislature in its wisdom has provided
for filing of complaint or appeals beyond the
period specified under the relevant provisions of
the Act and Regulations, if there is sufficient
cause given by the party, which has to be to the
satisfaction of the authority concerned. No such
discretion has been provided for under Section
13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act for filing
a response to the complaint beyond the extended
period of 45 days (30 days plus 15 days). Had the
legislature not wanted to make such provision
mandatory but only directory, the provision for
further extension of the period for filing the
response beyond 45 days would have been
provided, as has been provided for in the cases of
filing of complaint and appeals. To carve out an
exception in a specific provision of the statute is
not within the jurisdiction of the courts, and if it is
so done, it would amount to legislating or
inserting a provision into the statute, which is not
permissible.
X X X X
25. The contention of the learned counsel for the
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respondent is that by not leaving a discretion with
the District Forum for extending the period of
limitation for filing the response before it by the
opposite party, grave injustice would be caused as
there could be circumstances beyond the control
of the opposite party because of which the
opposite party may not be able to file the response
within the period of 30 days or the extended
period of 15 days. In our view, if the law so
provides, the same has to be strictly complied, so
as to achieve the object of the statute. It is well
settled that law prevails over equity, as equity can
only supplement the law, and not supplant it.
X X X X
27. It is thus settled law that where the provision
of the Act is clear and unambiguous, it has no
scope for any interpretation on equitable
ground.” (emphasis supplied)
21 . A conspectus of the decisions referred to above
leaves no manner of doubt that where ever the phrase
“but not thereafter” has been used in a provision for
setting a deadline, the intention of the legislature is to
treat the same as a preemptory provision. Thus, if Rule
15 of the DHC Rules mandates filing of a replication
within a period of 30 days reckoned from the date of
receipt of the written statement, with an additional
period of 15 days provided and that too only if the
court is satisfied that the plaintiff has been able to
demonstrate that it was prevented to do so by sufficient
cause or for exceptional and unavoidable reasons, can
the time for filing the replication be extended for a
further period not exceeding 15 days in any event, with
costs imposed on the plaintiff. The critical phrase “but
not thereafter” used in Rule 15 must be understood to
mean that even the court cannot extend the period for
filing the replication beyond the outer limit of 45 days
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provided in the DHC Rules. Upon expiry of the said
period, the plaintiff's right to file the replication would
stand extinguished. Any other meaning sought to be
bestowed on the above provision, would make the
words “but not thereafter”, inconsequential.
22 . The next contention of Mr. Mehta that the words
“the Registrar shall forthwith place the matter for
appropriate orders before the court” used in Rule 5 of
the DHC Rules indicates that the court would still have
the power to accept a replication filed beyond a period
of 45 days, is also untenable. The Supreme Court has
emphasized that the answer to the problem as to
whether a statutory provision is mandatory or is
directory in nature, lies in the intention of the law
maker, as expressed in the law itself. The words
“replication, if any, shall be filed within 30 days of the
receipt of the written statement” and further, the words
“further period not exceeding 15 days, but not
thereafter” used in Rule 5 will lose its entire meaning
if we accept the submission made on behalf of the
appellants that even if the timeline for filing the
replication cannot be extended by the Registrar, there
is no such embargo placed on the court.
23 . The court must start with the assumption that every
word used in a statute, has been well thought out and
inserted with a specific purpose and ordinarily, the
court must not deviate from what is expressly stated
therein. The period granted for filing the replication
under Rule 15 of the DHC Rules is only 30 days and on
expiry of 30 days, the court can only condone a delay
which does not exceed 15 days over and above 30 days
and that too on the condition that the plaintiff is able to
offer adequate and sufficient reasons explaining as to
why the replication could not be filed within 30 days.
As observed earlier, since the terms „Court‟ and
„Registrar‟ have been defined in the DHC Rules, Rule
5 requires that the court alone can extend the time to
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file the replication beyond the period of 30 days from
the date of receipt of the written statement. Even the
discretion vested in the court for granting extension of
time is hedged with conditions and the outer limit
prescribed is 15 days. If the replication is not filed
within the extended time granted, the Registrar is
required to place the matter back before the court for
closing the right of the plaintiff to file the replication.
24 . A reading of the relevant provisions of the DHC
Rules shows that it is a special provision within the
meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act (for
short „the Act‟), that contemplates that where any
special or local law prescribes a time limit that is
different from the one provided for under the
Limitation Act, 1963, then Section 4 to Section 14 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 would be expressly excluded.
It is well settled that even in a case where the special
law does not exclude the provisions of Section 4 to
Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by an express
provision or reference, then too, if it is clear from the
mandate or the language of the statute, the scheme of
the special law will exclude the application of Section
4 to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (Ref :
Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra,
reported as (1974) 2 SCC 133).
25 . It is equally well settled that when the provision of
a law/statute prescribes specific provisions, then those
provisions cannot be sidestepped or circumvented by
seeking to invoke the inherent powers of the court
under the statute. The principles required to be
followed for regulating the inherent powers of the
court in the context of applying the provisions of
Section 151 CPC, have been highlighted in State of
Uttar Pradesh v. Roshan Singh, reported as (2008) 2
SCC 488, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as
under:
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“7. The principles which regulate the exercise of
inherent powers by a court have been highlighted
in many cases. In matters with which the Code of
Civil Procedure does not deal with, the court will
exercise its inherent power to do justice between
the parties which is warranted under the
circumstances and which the necessities of the
case require. If there are specific provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure dealing with the
particular topic and they expressly or by
necessary implication exhaust the scope of the
powers of the court or the jurisdiction that may be
exercised in relation to a matter, the inherent
powers of the court cannot be invoked in order to
cut across the powers conferred by the Code of
Civil Procedure. The inherent powers of the court
are not to be used for the benefit of a litigant who
has a remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure.
Similar is the position vis-à-vis other statutes.
8. The object of Section 151 CPC is to supplement
and not to replace the remedies provided for in
the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 151 CPC
will not be available when there is alternative
remedy and the same is accepted to be a well-
settled ratio of law. The operative field of power
being thus restricted, the same cannot be risen to
inherent power. The inherent powers of the court
are in addition to the powers specifically
conferred on it. If there are express provisions
covering a particular topic, such power cannot be
exercised in that regard. The section confers on
the court power of making such orders as may be
necessary for the ends of justice of the court.
Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked when there is
express provision even under which the relief can
be claimed by the aggrieved party. The power can
only be invoked to supplement the provisions of
the Code and not to override or evade other
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express provisions. The position is not different so
far as the other statutes are concerned.
Undisputedly, an aggrieved person is not
remediless under the Act.”(emphasis supplied)
28 . In our opinion, reliance placed by Mr. Mehta on
Desh Raj (supra), is also misplaced. No doubt, the
Supreme Court has held that a reading of proviso 2
appended to Rule 1 of Order VIII would show that the
said Rule is only directory and not mandatory,
ultimately the Supreme Court has refused to condone
the delay in that case. In fact, the said decision is not
applicable to the facts of this case for the reason that
in the said judgment, there was no occasion to deal
with the scope and effect of Rule 5 of Chapter VII of
the DHC Rules. In any event, the DHC Rules will have
an overriding effect on the CPC. Notably the Code
does not provide for filing of any replication. Order VI,
Rule 1 describes “pleadings” to mean plaint or written
statement. It is the Delhi High Court (Original Side)
Rules, 2018 that provides a time limit for filing the
replication and since the said Rules regulate the
procedure, the same will have to prevail over the Code.
We are in complete agreement with the view taken by
the Division Bench of this court in DDA v. K.R.
Builders (P) Ltd., reported as (2005) 81 DRJ 708 and
relied on in HTIL Corporation, B.V v. Ajay Kohli,
reported as (2006) 90 DRJ 410, where it was observed
as under:
“6. The question as to whether the CPC or the
Original Side Rules will apply was considered by
a Division Bench of this court in the recent case
of DDA v. K.R. Builders P. Ltd., (2005) 81 DRJ
708 (DB). The finding of the Division Bench
supported the view of the learned defence counsel
that suits filed on the original side of this court
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would be governed by the rules framed by the
High Court to the exclusion of the provisions of
the CPC wherever the field is occupied by these
Rules and that this court has the power to extend
the time for filing the written statement even
beyond 90 days. However, the Division Bench
also clarified that Rule 3, as it then stood, of
Chapter IV of the Delhi High Court (Original
Side Rules) does not contemplate unending
extensions to be granted on the asking. Rule 3
provided as under:
“3. Extension of time for filing written
statement.— Ordinarily, not more than one
extension of time shall be granted to the
defendant for filing a written statement
provided that a second or any further
extension may be granted only on an
application made in writing setting forth
sufficient grounds for such extension and
supported, if so required, by an affidavit.”
7. The Division Bench pointed out that as per the
rule quoted above, only one extension of time was
to be granted for filing written statement and that
the second or further extension may be granted
only on an application made in writing setting
forth sufficient grounds. It was also pointed out
that the expression „any further extension‟ in this
proviso does not contemplate unending extensions
on the asking and that „any further extension‟
should receive a restricted interpretation. The
situation has now changed since the Delhi High
Court (Original Side Rules) have also been
amended. The amendment which has taken effect
on 9.1.2006 is now as under:
“3. Extension of time for filing written
statement.— Where the defendant fails to file
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written statement within the period of 30
days as stated in Rule 2(ii) he shall be
allowed to file the same on such other day as
may be specified by the Court on an
application made in writing setting forth
sufficient ground for such extension and
supported, if so required, by an affidavit but
such day shall not be later than 90 days from
the service of summons.”
8. In view of this amendment, the Delhi High Court
(Original Side Rules) give the same time schedule for
filing a written statement. Written statement, therefore,
can be filed within 30 days and thereafter on sufficient
ground for such extension being shown on an affidavit
but such extension shall not be later than 90 days from
the date of service.”(emphasis supplied)”
21. As stated earlier, the expression “but not thereafter” is absent from
Rule 7 and therefore, the power to condone the delay in filing an Affidavit
of admission/denial of documents, is kept intact. It must be understood that
the consequences of not filing an Affidavit of admission/denial of
documents, is admission of the documents filed along with the Written
Statement which means that the Defendant does not need to prove any of
these documents. Putting a timeline to file the affidavit of admission/denial
of documents without having the power to condone the delay would be
against the principles of natural justice, wherein, the Defendant without
proving these documents would be able to get the plaint rejected without
proving his contentions.
22. Keeping in mind the distinction in Rule 4 which deals with the
Written Statement and the Affidavit of admission/denial of documents and
Rule 5 and Rule 7 which deals with the replication separately and the
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Affidavit of admission/denial of documents separately, this Court is of the
opinion that both cannot be equated alike.
23. In view of the aforesaid, this Court has the power to condone the
delay of 5 days.
24. Since, there is no separate Application filed by the Plaintiff for
condoning the delay in curing the defects, the matter is therefore, remanded
back to the learned Joint Registrar to consider as to whether the delay in
curing the defects in filing the Affidavit of admission/denial of documents,
can be condoned or not.
25. The Plaintiff is permitted to file an Application explaining the delay
in curing the defects to bring the Affidavit of admission/denial of documents
on record.
26. Accordingly, with the aforesaid observations the present Appeal is
allowed and the Order dated 06.05.2026 passed by the learned Joint
Registrar is set aside.
27. List before the learned Joint Registrar on 30.10.2026.
CS(OS) 751/2023 & I.A. 22983/2023, I.A. 42272/2024, I.A. 45549/2024,
I.A. 5318/2025, I.A. 12664/2025, I.A. 17189/2026, O.A. 166/2026
List before the Court on 26.11.2026.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
AUGUST 31, 2026
Prateek/JR
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