M/S Eg Communications Pvt Ltd & Ors vs Election Commission Of India & Ors
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on : 04.05.2026
Judgment delivered on : 19.06.2026
Judgment uploaded on : As per Digital Signature~
+ LPA 16/2020 CM APPLs. 1359/2020, 21664/2024, 26156/2024,
502/2025, 1924/2025
M/S EG COMMUNICATIONS PVT LTD & ORS .....APPELLANTS
versus
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA & ORS .....RESPONDENTS
Advocates who appeared in this case
For the Appellants : Mr.Ashish Mohan, Sr. Advocate with Mr.
Akshit Mago and Mr Auritro Mukherjee,
Advocates.
For the Respondents : Mr. Sanjay Vashishtha, SC for Election
Commission of India with Mr Siddhartha
Goswami, Mr Krish Bhatia, Mr Aditya
Sachdeva, Advocates.
Mr. Devvrat Yadav, Advocate for UOI.
Mr. Tarun Johri, Mr. Ankur Gupta and Mr.
Vishwajeet Tyagi Advocates for R3/DMRC.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
JUDGMENT
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J.
1. The present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed against the
Judgment dated 09.01.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)
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No.12073/2019 dismissing the writ petition filed by the Appellants.
2. At the outset, we may narrate a brief factual background of the
controversy as laid out in the appeal. The Appellants are companies
registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and pursuant to
some tenders issued by the Respondent No. 3/Delhi Metro Rail Corporation
(DMRC) from time to time for grant of advertising rights in the DMRC, the
Appellants bid for and were awarded contracts for advertising on metro
trains on various lines for different types of advertisement, i.e., inside trains,
outside trains, outside civil structures, etc. On 07.10.2008, vide
communication bearing No. 3/7/2008/JS-II, the Respondent No.1/Election
Commission of India revised the guidelines and instructions pertaining to
the prevention of defacement of property and other campaign-related items.
The Respondent No.1 circulated a comprehensive set of guidelines with
respect to defacement of property which, inter alia , stated as under:
“4 (c) If there is specifically earmarked place provided for
displaying advertisement in a public place, e.g. bill boards,
hoardings etc. and if such space is already let out to any
agency for further allocation to individual clients, the
District Election Officer through the equitable opportunity
to have access to such advertisement space for election
related advertisements during the election period.”
3. By way of memorandum dated 15.10.2013, the Respondent No. 3, on
the basis of the revised guidelines, clarified the position as regards
advertisement rights of political parties on commercially authorized sites
and stated as under:
“It is clarified that while the Delhi Prevention of
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Defacement Act stipulates that no defacement of Public or
private property (in public view) shall be allowed, there is
no ban on political party putting up their advertisements on
commercially authorised sites. Instructions may be issued to
all the field functionaries including Flying Squads, SHOs
etc. that advertisement material from such authorised sites
may not be removed.”
4. The Respondent No.3, on the basis of the aforesaid memorandum
dated 15.10.2013 and upon a query raised by the Appellant No.1, vide letter
bearing No. CEO/MCC/102(7)Pt.1/2013/739 dated 31.10.2013, had clarified
as under:
“With reference to your letter dated 29.10.2013, on the
subject cited above, it is informed that this office has
already issued a Memorandum dated 15.10.2013 (copy
enclosed) wherein, it has been clarified that there is no ban
on political party putting up their advertisements on
commercially authorised sites”
5. The Respondent No.2/ Chief Electoral Officer, Government of
National Capital Territory of Delhi vide memorandum bearing No.
F.CEO/MCC/Misc/108-12 dated 23.03.2019, while relying upon paragraph
4(c) of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), further fortified its stand by
clarifying that political parties have the right to advertise at commercially
authorized sites. Further, to ensure that no other provision of the MCC was
violated, it was stated that political parties may, however, be asked to keep
detailed and complete expenditure records accounting for such
advertisements. On 10.04.2019, vide letter bearing F.No. CEO/MCC
CELL/47/2019/564, the Respondent No.2 informed the Respondent No.3
that it is in receipt of a complaint that advertisements containing the photos
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of Shri Narendra Modi and Shri Arvind Kejriwal are installed in Delhi metro
trains and stations when the MCC was in force. By way of letter dated
11.04.2019, the Respondent No.3, in response, stated that the political
advertisements were put as per the provisions of the MCC on a commercial
basis. The Respondent No. 2, by way of letter dated 17.04.2019, sought
specific clarifications as to what are the guidelines of the DMRC for
allowing of political advertisements when the MCC is in force, and whether
the same has been featured in the said agreements with the advertising
agency.
6. In response to the letter dated 17.04.2019, the Respondent No. 3 vide
letter dated 18.04.2019, confirmed that its guidelines allow political
advertisements while the MCC is in force. However, no advertisements of
any political party violating the MCC are allowed. It was also confirmed that
the above aspects feature in the agreements with the advertising agencies.
7. The Respondent No. 1, vide letter dated 29.12.2015, banned the use of
public/civil structures owned by Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) for
political advertisements during the period of the MCC.
8. The Respondent No. 2 thereafter, vide communication dated
08.05.2019 addressed to Respondent No. 1, summarized the position as
regards the complaint received by it on 08.04.2019 and the steps taken
thereafter. It was pointed out that there is a clause in the policy, and also in
the license agreements entered into with the advertising agencies by the
Respondent No. 3, which allows political advertisements on commercial
sites. The Respondent No. 2 also stated that the instructions issued by
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Election Commission of India are silent for cases where there are already
specific clauses in the agreements, as well as in the policy of the concerned
PSU, allowing political advertisements.
9. Despite this position, the Respondent No. 1 proceeded to issue a letter
dated 13.06.2019, the relevant portion whereof reads as under:
“You are therefore, requested to advise Delhi Metro to
insert appropriate clause to the following effect in the main
part of contract with advertisement agencies, immediately,
in terms of para 12.3.4 of the MCC Manual 2019 and in
accordance with the Commission's instructions dated
29.12.2015 referred to above so as to avoid complaints
about political advertisements on their premises which will
affect the level playing field during elections in future:
“No political advertisement shall be displayed/posted at
the space provided on lease for commercial
advertisement during the period of Model Code of
Conduct. If there is any political advertisement in the
provided space, the same shall be removed immediately
on enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct.”
10. By way of letter dated 20.06.2019, the Respondent No. 2 requested
the Respondent No. 3 to comply with the directions of the Respondent No. 1
Commission. In response, the Respondent No. 3, vide letter dated
12.07.2019 addressed to the Respondent No. 2 stated that the instructions
issued by Respondent No. 1 vide letter dated 29.12.2015 were purely for
those PSUs which either do not have commercial sites or have commercial
sites where their agreement with the advertising agency does not have a
clause in relation to political advertisements. It was also pointed out that the
license agreements only have a standard clause in relation to political
advertisements during the period of the MCC, and the contracts were
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awarded under the mandate of the President of India under the provisions of
the Metro Railways (Operation and Maintenance) Act, 2002. Therefore,
Respondent No. 3 requested the Respondent No. 2 to consider and review
the decision regarding the incorporation of the impugned clause.
11. The Respondent No. 2, vide letter dated 19.08.2019, directed the
Respondent No. 3 DMRC to insert the impugned clause in terms of the
directions of the Respondent No. 1, and to ensure compliance thereof by
31.08.2019.
12. In compliance with the letter dated 19.08.2019, the Respondent No. 3
on 26.08.2019, proceeded to substitute/insert the following clause in the
license agreements:
“No political advertisement shall be displayed/posted at the
space provided on lease for commercial advertisement
during the period of Model Code of Conduct. If there is any
political advertisement in the provided space, the same shall
be removed immediately on enforcement of the Model Code
of Conduct.”
13. The Appellant No. 1, vide representation dated 05.09.2019,
highlighted the relevant clause of the license agreement permitting political
advertisements to be displayed at metro stations/trains. It also highlighted
the fact that it had participated in the tender process for securing long-term
licenses for advertising rights, which are mostly for a period of 10 years,
taking into account the substantial potential earnings from political
advertisements during elections (four to five elections in 10 years) and had
even accordingly structured/constructed their bids. The relevant clause in the
license agreement is in terms with Clause 12.3.2 of the MCC, thus ensuring
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that the provisions in the license agreement permitting political
advertisements are in conformity with the MCC.
14. On receipt of the representations of the Appellant No.1 and others,
the Respondent No. 3, vide letter dated 23.09.2019, took up the matter with
the Respondent No. 2, raising the concerns of the advertisement agencies
with regard to the inclusion of the impugned clause in the license
agreements.
15. In the meantime, the Respondent No. 1, vide letter bearing No.
437/Terr/DL-HP/NS-II/2019 dated 01.10.2019, clarified that there is no ban
on the use of bus queue shelters and other media for campaigning by
political parties and candidates during the enforcement of the MCC, if such
sites are earmarked for advertisement purposes.
16. The Respondent No. 3 DMRC, vide letter dated 03.10.2019,
informed the Appellants that it is not agreeable with the representations
seeking concession in the license fee. It further went on to state that the
newly implemented clause is in force and applicable to all advertisement
contracts under it.
17. Aggrieved by the above, the Appellants filed the writ petition, which
was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment.
18. Mr. Ashish Mohan, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants has
submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in not considering and
appreciating that the Respondent No. 1 has acted in an arbitrary,
discriminatory, illegal, and unreasonable manner in violation of Article 14
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of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as on the one hand it has banned
political advertisements from being displayed in metro stations and trains,
but on the other hand, by letter dated 01.10.2019, it clarified that there is no
ban on the use of bus queue shelters, etc., for media campaigns by political
parties and candidates during the operation of the MCC, if such sites are
earmarked for advertisement purposes.
19. Mr. Mohan further submitted that the classification created by the
Respondent No. 1 while issuing the letter dated 13.06.2019 is patently
discriminatory as there is no intelligible differentia in restricting
advertisement by political parties at commercially available and authorized
spaces under the license agreements. At the same time, it is clear that the
Appellants are permitted to advertise at public places such as bus queue
shelters if such sites are earmarked for advertisement during the operation of
the MCC and the same has been clarified vide its letter dated 01.10.2019
issued by the Respondent No. 1, which distinction is artificial and without
any basis. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Budhan Choudhary v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191 , wherein the twin
test of reasonableness was laid down. It is stated that the action of
Respondent No. 1 fails the test of reasonable classification under Article 14
of the Constitution of India, and that the Respondents are liable for acting in
a mala fide manner, adopting a discriminatory stand in their actions, and
unilaterally including the impugned clause in the license agreements.
20. He has relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Bijoe
Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., (1986) 3 SCC 615 and
Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers Union & Ors. v. Municipal Corporation,
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Greater Mumbai & Ors., (2014) 1 SCC 490 , to contend that any law which
may be made under Clauses (2) and (6) of Article 19 to regulate the exercise
of the right to the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) and (g) must be
‘a law’ having statutory force and not a mere executive or departmental
instruction.
21. The case of the Appellants is that the letter dated 13.06.2019 does not
have any statutory basis and, therefore, does not constitute ‘a law’ under
Clause (6) of Article 19 and, therefore, cannot be the foundation for any
action aimed at curtailing the fundamental rights of the Appellants under
Article 19(1)(g) to carry out trade or business.
22. The learned Senior Counsel has also contended that even the method
and manner of inclusion of the impugned clause in the license agreement by
way of letter dated 26.08.2019 was unilateral and without consent, thus
rendering it improper, unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary, and as such, it is liable
to be set aside.
23. According to him, the learned Single Judge also erred in not
appreciating that the actions of the Respondents are contrary to their own
stand, as is evident from memoranda dated 15.10.2013 and 23.03.2019, and
also letters dated 07.10.2008 and 31.10.2013, which show that there was
never a ban on political parties putting up advertisements on commercially
authorized sites.
24. He also stated that the instructions of the Respondent No. 1 dated
29.12.2015, based on which the letter dated 13.06.2019 was issued by it, in
fact runs contrary to the impugned clauses. The relevant part of the
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instructions dated 29.12.2015 reads as under:
“In case there is no specific provision in the by-laws of
PSUs or in their agreements with tire advertisement
agencies to whom they let out space for advertisement for
prohibiting display of political advertisement, PSUs may be
instructed to add a para in their commercial agreements
with commercial agencies/companies while providing space
on lease to the advertisement agency for placing
commercial advertisements that "No political advertisement
shall be displayed/pasted at the space provided on lease for
commercial advertisement like airports, railway stations.
Inter State/Local Bus Stands, Govt. transportation post
offices. Government hospitals/ dispensaries etc. (except on
main highways, main roads etc.) during the period of Model
Code of Conduct. If there is any political advertisement in
the provided space, the same shall be removed immediately
on enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct.”
25. It is stated that the above stipulation is in stark contrast to the
concerned clause that is now being sought to be included by way of letter
dated 26.08.2019.
26. He has submitted that the learned Single Judge did not consider that
the Appellants had participated in the tender process for securing long-term
licenses for advertising rights, which are mostly for a period of 10 years,
taking into account potential substantial earnings from political
advertisements, i.e., expecting around four to five elections in 10 years, and
had constructed their bids accordingly. The impugned action of the
Respondents will have significant business and financial implications for not
only the Appellants but also for the Respondent No.2, inasmuch as by
banning political advertisements at metro stations/trains, it will be in breach
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of the license agreements as executed between the parties.
27. He submitted that during the course of this appeal, the Respondent
No, 1 issued a circular dated 02.01.2024 conveying “ consolidated
instructions in suppression of all instructions issued earlier ”, which is
inherently contradictory and vague. This is evident from a bare perusal of
the circular, which states display of political advertisement during the MCC
would be prohibited. However, the circular, under Section VII, further states
that political advertisement during MCC shall be expressly permitted till the
time “ all political parties and candidates get equitable opportunity to have
access to advertisement space ”.
28. In any case, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi vide circular dated
03.04.2024 and the Delhi Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation
vide circular dated 05.04.2024 have permitted the display of political
advertisements during the MCC on licensed public spaces.
29. Mr. Mohan submitted that in view of the above, the actions of the
Respondents are in violation of Articles 19(1)(g) and Article 14 of the
Constitution, and they are liable to be set aside.
30. Mr. Sanjay Vashishtha, learned Standing Counsel for the Election
Commission of India, submitted that on 29.12.2015, the Respondent No. 1
notified Instruction No.21 directing PSUs, including the Respondent No. 3
DMRC, to incorporate clauses in their agreements that restrict political
advertisements during the period in which the MCC is in force. On the basis
of this instruction, the impugned letters were issued. The said clause reads as
under:
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“No political advertisement shall be displayed/pasted at the
space provided on lease for commercial advertisement in
the provided space, the same shall be removed immediately
on enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct.”
31. He stated that the learned Single Judge rightly rejected the challenge
to the impugned letters for the following reasons:
a) The impugned letters have been issued in consonance with the MCC.
b) The restrictions imposed under the impugned letters are for a limited
period during which the MCC is in force.
c) The impugned letters only restrict the display of political
advertisements, while the Appellants are free to display all other
advertisements.
d) The restrictions imposed are narrowly tailored in furtherance of a
laudable State aim and are therefore valid.
e) Without prejudice, under-inclusiveness, if any, in the impugned
letters does not violate Article 14.
32. Mr. Vashishtha has submitted that the grievance of the Appellants
arises from a contractual dispute which is beyond the scope of writ
jurisdiction. The contention of the Appellants that the inclusion of the
impugned clause in the license agreement between the Appellants and the
Respondent No. 3 is a unilateral novation of the license agreement and
contrary to law, is clearly a contractual dispute and beyond the writ
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The license
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agreement stipulates that any disputes between the parties arising from the
agreements are subject to resolution by arbitration. Therefore, the Appellants
ought to exercise their alternative remedies for resolution of their
grievances. In any event, Respondent No. 1 is not a party to this license
agreement and therefore has no privity of contract with the Appellants.
33. It is his case that the Respondent No. 1-Election Commission of India
is entrusted with sui generis powers under Article 324 of the Constitution to
issue instructions having the force of law. The Supreme Court in a catena of
judgments has held that Article 324 of the Constitution is a plenary
provision, under which the Commission is empowered to issue directions or
to take actions in matters that are linked to elections and are otherwise not
governed by any statute enacted by the Parliament or State legislatures. In
fact, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Association for Democratic
Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294 , and S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil
Nadu, (2013) 9 SCC 659 , had directed the Respondent No. 1 to pass
directions and frame guidelines in exercise of such plenary powers. In the
absence of any statute governing political advertisements during the election
period, the instructions came to be issued by the Respondent No. 1 to ensure
a level playing field. The impugned letters have been passed on the basis of
this instruction. Clearly, both the instructions and the impugned letters
issued by the Respondent No.1 under Article 324 of the Constitution, have
the force of law, and are binding.
34. He has also stated that under the license agreements, the Appellants
have undertaken to comply with the MCC while displaying advertisements.
The instructions and the consequent impugned letters have been issued by
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the Respondent No.1 to ensure compliance with the MCC. The Appellants
cannot be permitted to reprobate from their contractual obligations under the
license agreements, which is now being sought to be done by them through
this appeal.
35. That apart, he submitted that the restriction imposed by the impugned
letters is partial, reasonable, and is only applicable for the limited period in
which the MCC is in force. In any event, the Appellants are free to display
non-political advertisements even during the MCC period. The restriction is
not total, but reasonable and does not violate Article 19(1)(a) and (g) of the
Constitution.
36. Mr. Vashishtha has contested the submission on behalf of the learned
Senior Counsel for the Appellants that there is no reasonable classification
between metro stations/trains, and bus queue shelters. He stated that the
submission is contrary to the settled position of law that classification needs
to be exact or guided by a precise formula, and does not require scientific
exclusion or inclusion. Bus queue shelters are located on public roads, and
the advertisement spaces provided in such shelters are similarly placed to the
advertisement hoardings on public roads. These do not per se fall within the
definition of government buildings. Metro stations/trains and bus queue
shelters are therefore entirely distinct, as perceived by the public at large.
37. It is contended that the under-inclusiveness in the impugned letters
does not in any way violate Article 14 of the Constitution. It is settled law
that a statute providing for under-inclusion would not ordinarily be held to
be invalid under Article 14. Mere under-inclusion does not mean a denial of
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equal protection of laws. In fact, infringement of Article 14 is not attracted
in cases where under-inclusiveness is marginal. It is open to the lawmaker to
remedy parts of a mischief or to recognize degrees of evil and strike at the
harm where it is most acute. Reliance in this regard is placed on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Superintendent and
Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Girish Kumar Navalakha, (1975) 4
SCC 754 . He stated that the Court, when faced with the issue of under-
inclusion, ought not to force the legislature to address a large-scale problem
in a single stroke without leaving room for phased implementation, or to
apply different remedies to different evils in the same field. This is for the
reason that Article 14 of the Constitution does not require an authority like
the Election Commission of India to extend its regulations to all cases within
its reach, or regulate them in the same manner.
38. Mr. Tarun Johri, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 3/DMRC
has submitted that there is no reasonable basis for the Respondent No. 1 to
ban political advertisements inside metro trains/stations, but to allow the
same on highways and main roads etc. As such, the letter dated 13.06.2019
of the Respondent No. 1 is in violation of Article 14 and Article 19 of the
Constitution of India. However, the Respondent No.3 being a PSU, is bound
to comply with the directions of the Respondent No. 1, and as such issued
the impugned letter dated 26.08.2019. Clause 12.1 of the licence agreements
mandates the Appellants to comply with all governing laws. He has also
stated that the Respondent No. 3 had never suggested or assured the
Appellants of any financial benefits or profits from the display of political
advertisements during elections in the tender conditions, and as such had no
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knowledge of the Appellants’ assumptions or financial model for submission
of their bids.
39. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record, the only issue that arises for consideration is whether the learned
Single Judge is justified in dismissing the writ petition filed by the
Appellants challenging the letter dated 13.06.2019 issued by the Respondent
No. 1. A consequential prayer sought by the Appellants is that the
Respondents be restrained from interfering with the lawful business of the
Appellants pursuant to their respective licence agreements.
40. There is no dispute that the Appellants have participated in the tender
process and secured long term licences for advertising rights for a period of
ten years. The licence agreements were entered into by the Appellants No. 1
to 4 on 25.03.2019, 16.10.2015, 15.10.2018 and 15.10.2013 respectively. It
was the case of the Appellants that they had submitted their tenders taking
into account the potential substantial earnings from political advertisements
during the election period and considering that there are 4-5 elections in the
span of ten years. The Respondent No. 1 had issued directions to the
Respondent No. 2 to advise the Respondent No.3 to insert an appropriate
clause in the contract with the Appellants, inter alia, that no political
advertisement shall be displayed/pasted at the space provided on lease for
commercial advertisement during the period of operation of the MCC. If
there were any existing political advertisement in the provided space, the
same were directed to be removed immediately on the enforcement of the
MCC.
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41. Before we deal with the submissions as canvassed by Mr. Mohan, it is
relevant to note that the learned Single Judge after referring to Clause 12.3
of the MCC relating to the restrictions on use of public properties for
political advertisement, while dismissing the petition, had inter alia, held the
following:-
i) The Appellants are merely service providers, who had entered
into contracts with the Respondent No. 3 and hired the
commercial spaces for displaying of the advertisement of third
parties. As such, no fundamental right of freedom of speech or
expression of the Appellants is affected;
ii) Even the freedom to carry out trade or business is also not
curtailed as the Appellants are within their rights to display
advertisements which are not political on the available spaces
during the operation of the MCC;
iii) The restriction on political advertisements is only for a limited
period of around one month when the MCC is in operation and
since 4-5 elections would be held during the span of ten years,
the restriction is only for a limited period of 4-5 months in
total;
iv) The restrictions are not unreasonable keeping in view the object
sought to be achieved by the impugned directions, i.e., free, fair
and transparent elections; and
v) The interest of the Appellants is purely commercial in nature
and between the commercial interest of the Appellants and
larger public interest for holding the free, fair and transparent
elections, the balance clearly tilts in favour of the latter.
42. The submission of Mr. Mohan is primarily on the violation of Article
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14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as on the one hand, the
Respondents have banned political advertisements from being displayed on
metro stations and trains, but on the other hand, vide letter dated 01.10.2019,
clarified that there is no ban on the use of bus queue shelters and other
media for campaigning by political parties during the enforcement of the
MCC. The answer of Mr. Vashishtha to this is primarily that there cannot be
any comparison between bus stations/queue shelters and metro
stations/trains inasmuch as bus stations/queue shelters are located on public
roads and the advertisement spaces provided therein are similar to billboards
on public roads. We agree with this submission of Mr. Vashishtha.
43. That apart, metro trains/stations are exclusively identified with the
government and as noted by the learned Single Judge, the restrictions put on
metro trains/stations are with a view that political advertisements must not
be identified with the government.
44. In any case, even the fact that advertisements have been allowed in
bus stations/queue shelters would not help the case of the Appellants as
Article 12.3.1 of the MCC specifically restricts political advertisements on
public properties including bus stands. In other words, by attempting to rely
on political advertisements in bus stations/queue shelters, the Appellants are
seeking negative equality, which cannot be granted.
45. The plea of Mr. Mohan that the restrictions violate Article 19(1) (a)
and (g) of the Constitution of India, is also not impressive for the simple
reason there is no total restriction put on the Appellants in carrying out their
business. They are free to display advertisements that are not political in
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nature, even during operation of the MCC. Ban on display of political
advertisements, that too for a limited time, does not mean that the
Appellants have been restricted from displaying any advertisements. As
such, the plea that there is a violation of Article 19(1) (a) and (g) of the
Constitution of India, is unmerited.
46. Another submission of Mr. Mohan is that the impugned restrictions
are in violation of Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India, as any
regulation of the right to freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) and for
that matter (g) must be through a law having a statutory force and not mere
any executive or departmental instructions. On this, Mr.Vashishtha has
stated that the Respondent No.1 is entrusted by Article 324 of the
Constitution of India with sui generis plenary powers to issue instructions
which shall have the force of law, in matters connected to elections which
are not otherwise governed by statutes. He relied upon the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the cases of Association for Democratic Reforms (supra)
and S. Subramaniam Balaji (supra) wherein the Supreme Court has
directed the Election Commission of India to pass directions and frame
guidelines in exercise of the plenary powers of the Commission in cases
where there is absence of statutes. According to him, in the absence of any
statute governing political advertisements during the election period,
instructions were issued by the Respondent No. 1 to ensure a level playing
field. The impugned letters have been passed on the basis of such
instructions. The submission that the instructions and impugned letters
having been issued by the Respondent No. 1 in exercise of the power under
Article 324 of the Constitution, shall have the force of law and are binding,
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP
SHARMA
Signing Date:19.06.2026
17:17:38
LPA 16/2020 Page 19 of 20
is appealing.
47. Mr. Mohan has relied upon the judgments in the cases of Budhan
Choudhary (supra), Bijoe Emmanuel (supra) and Maharashtra Ekta
Hawkers Union (supra) in support of his submissions. We find that the
impugned instructions and letters adequately satisfy the requirements set out
in the judgments.
48. At this stage, we also note that the licence agreements entered into by
the Appellants No. 2 and 4 on 16.10.2015 and 15.10.2013 respectively have
expired at the end of the contractual period of 10 years. The licence
agreements entered into by the Appellants No.1 and 3 are ending on
25.03.2029 and 15.10.2028 respectively and it is not the case of the
appellants that elections are due in Delhi before the said dates for them to
participate, if the directions are set aside.
49. Keeping in view the totality of facts, and our discussion above, no
interference is called for with the impugned judgment.
50. The appeal is bereft of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. The
pending applications are disposed of as infructuous.
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J
JUNE 19, 2026 /Rt
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP
SHARMA
Signing Date:19.06.2026
17:17:38
LPA 16/2020 Page 20 of 20