Dr. M.K. Ravi Varma Etc. Etc. vs National Institute Of Technology .

Court
Supreme Court

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 1080

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8329-8336 OF 2016


DR. M.K. RAVI VARMA ETC. ETC. …APPELLANTS


VS.


NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS



J U D G M E N T


DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. A judgment and order of reversal is under challenge in this appeal by
nd
special leave, granted on 22 August, 2016. A Single Judge of the
1
High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam , vide a judgment and order dated
th 2
26 November, 2014, allowed a writ petition of the appellants along
3 4
with two other writ petitions . While hearing writ appeals , presented
by the National Institute of Technology through its Registrar and its
Director, a Division Bench of the High Court allowed the same by its
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
Date: 2026.10.05
16:27:27 IST
Reason:

1
High Court
2
WP (C) No.13256 of 2013 (F)
3
WP (C) No. 27461 of 2013 and WP (C) No. 4317 of 2014
4
WA Nos. 721, 722, 725 and 1047 of 2015
1

th 5
judgment and order dated 13 November, 2015 . Appellants have
taken exception to it.
2. We are now called upon to decide which of the two views – that of
the Single Judge or the Division Bench – is correct.
3. Facts leading to the writ petitions have been noted by the Single
Judge as well as by the Division Bench in their respective judgments
and orders in detail; hence, the same are not repeated to avoid
prolixity.
4. The issue relates to grant of Academic Grade Pay to the appellants,
who were Lecturers/Assistant Professors. After financial benefits
following such grant were extended to the appellants on or about
October, 2009, the same were withdrawn in January, 2010 on the
ground that the appellants had not put in the requisite years of
service. Thus, the short and simple question emerging for an answer
is, whether financial benefits which were extended to a class of
teachers voluntarily by the respondents and without any
misrepresentation or fraud or fault at the end of such teachers could
be withdrawn.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants, by referring to the
decisions of coordinate Benches of this Court in State of Punjab and
6
Ors. v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and Ors. and Thomas
7
Daniel v. State of Kerala and Ors. , has strenuously contended

5
impugned judgment
6
(2015) 4 SCC 334
7
2022 INSC 498
2

that the appellants’ case is covered by clause (v) of paragraph 18 of
the former decision and, therefore, no recovery ought to have been
made once financial benefits flowing from the grant of Academic
Grade Pay were released to them.
6. Respondents are not called upon to answer.
7. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) (supra), upon referring to Syed
8
Abdul Qadir v. State of Bihar which in turn relied on various
9
precedents including Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana , Shyam
10
Babu Verma Ors. v. Union of India , Col. B. J. Akkara v. Govt.
11
of India and other decisions, held as follows:
“18. It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship which
would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments
have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their
entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the decisions referred to
hereinabove, we may, as a ready reference, summarise the following
few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be
impermissible in law:
( i ) Recovery from the employees belonging to Class III and Class IV
service (or Group C and Group D service).
( ii ) Recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are
due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery.
( iii ) Recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has
been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of
recovery is issued.
( iv ) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been
required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid
accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to
work against an inferior post.
( v ) In any other case, where the court arrives at the conclusion, that
recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or
arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable
balance of the employer's right to recover.”

8
(2009) 3 SCC 475
9
1995 Supp (1) SCC 18
10
(1994) 2 SCC 521
11
(2006) 11 SCC 709
3

The appeals were thereafter disposed of noting as follows:
“19. We are informed by the learned counsel representing the
appellant State of Punjab, that all the cases in this bunch of appeals,
would undisputedly fall within the first four categories delineated
hereinabove. In the appeals referred to above, therefore, the
impugned orders passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
(quashing the order of recovery), shall be deemed to have been
upheld, for the reasons recorded above.”

8. Importantly, the coordinate Bench decision in Rafiq Masih (White
Washer) (supra) has a prior history and, therefore, cannot be seen
in isolation.
9. A previous coordinate Bench in Chandi Prasad Uniyal and Ors. v.
12
State of Uttarakhand and Ors. had made the following pertinent
observations:
“ 8. We are of the considered view, after going through the various
judgments cited at the Bar, that this Court has not laid down any
principle of law that only if there is misrepresentation or fraud on the
part of the recipients of the money in getting the excess pay, the
amount paid due to irregular/wrong fixation of pay be recovered.
*
13. We are not convinced that this Court in various judgments
referred to hereinbefore has laid down any proposition of law that
only if the State or its officials establish that there was
misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the recipients of the excess
pay, then only the amount paid could be recovered. On the other
hand, most of the cases referred to hereinbefore turned on the
peculiar facts and circumstances of those cases either because the
recipients had retired or were on the verge of retirement or were
occupying lower posts in the administrative hierarchy.
14. We are concerned with the excess payment of public money
which is often described as “taxpayers' money” which belongs neither
to the officers who have effected overpayment nor to the recipients.
We fail to see why the concept of fraud or misrepresentation is being
brought in in such situations. The question to be asked is whether
excess money has been paid or not, may be due to a bona fide
mistake. Possibly, effecting excess payment of public money by the
government officers may be due to various reasons like negligence,
carelessness, collusion, favouritism, etc. because money in such
situation does not belong to the payer or the payee. Situations may
also arise where both the payer and the payee are at fault, then the

12
(2012) 8 SCC 417
4

mistake is mutual. Payments are being effected in many situations
without any authority of law and payments have been received by
the recipients also without any authority of law. Any amount
paid/received without the authority of law can always be recovered
barring few exceptions of extreme hardships but not as a matter of
right, in such situations law implies an obligation on the payee to
repay the money, otherwise it would amount to unjust enrichment.”

10. Another coordinate Bench, in Rakesh Kumar v. State of
13
Haryana , upon noticing the aforesaid observations in Chandi
Prasad Uniyal (supra) made the following order of reference:
“In view of an apparent difference of views expressed on the one
hand in Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India : (1994) 2 SCC 521
and Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana 1995 Supp (1) SCC 18; and on
the other hand in Chandi Prasad Uniyal v. State of Uttarakhand :
(2012) 8 SCC 417, we are of the view that the remaining special
leave petitions should be placed before a Bench of three Judges. The
Registry is accordingly directed to place the file of the remaining
special leave petitions before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India
for taking instructions for the constitution of a Bench of three Judges,
to adjudicate upon the present controversy.”

11. The reference was ultimately answered by a 3-Judge Bench of this
14
Court in State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih . While holding that there
was no conflict in the views expressed in Sahib Ram (supra) and
Shyam Babu (supra) on the one hand and Chandi Prasad Uniyal
(supra) on the other, it was emphatically observed as follows:
“8. In our view, the law laid down in Chandi Prasad Uniyal case :
(2012) 8 SCC 417, no way conflicts with the observations made by
this Court in the other two cases. In those decisions, directions were
issued in exercise of the powers of this Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution, but in the subsequent decision this Court under Article
136 of the Constitution, in laying down the law had dismissed the
petition of the employee. This Court in a number of cases had battled
with tracing the contours of the provision in Articles 136 and 142 of
the Constitution of India. Distinctively, although the words employed
under the two aforesaid provisions speak of the powers of this Court,
the former vest a plenary jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in the

13
(2014) 8 SCC 892
14
(2014) 8 SCC 883
5

matter of entertaining and hearing of appeals by granting special
leave against any judgment or order made by a court or tribunal in
any cause or matter. The powers are plenary to the extent that they
are paramount to the limitations under the specific provisions for
appeal contained in the Constitution or other laws. Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, on the other hand is a step ahead of the powers
envisaged under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. It is the
exercise of jurisdiction to pass such enforceable decree or order as is
necessary for doing “complete justice” in any cause or matter.”
(emphasis ours)

12. What logically follows from a bare reading of the above passage is
that Chandi Prasad Uniyal (supra) was held to have declared the
law in exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution, which we understand would be binding on all courts
under Article 141; whereas Sahib Ram (supra) and Shyam Babu
(supra) were held to be decisions where this Court had invoked
powers under Article 142 thereof.
13. Despite the line of decisions following Sahib Ram (supra) and
Shyam Babu (supra) being held by the 3-Judge Bench to be
decisions invoking Article 142 of the Constitution which, according to
us, do not have the efficacy of a binding precedent, the coordinate
Bench in Rafiq Masih (White Washer) (supra) did not apply the
law laid down in Chandi Prasad Uniyal (supra) and preferred to
abide by the course of action adopted in Sahib Ram (supra), Shyam
Babu (supra) and Syed Abdul Qadir (supra).
14. We have also found that Thomas Daniel (supra) neither considers
Chandi Prasad Uniyal (supra) nor the 3-Judge Bench decision in
Rafiq Masih (supra).
6

15. Curiously, not a single precedent has remarked on the applicability of
15
Section 72 of the Contract Act, 1872; however, without referring to
it, we find that the ratio of Chandi Prasad Uniyal (supra) draws
inspiration from it.
16. It is farthest from our mind to cast any shadow of doubt on either of
the two decisions of the coordinate Benches in Rafiq Masih (White
Washer) (supra) and Thomas Daniel (supra). The above discussion
is necessitated only for the purpose of highlighting that the law,
perhaps, has not developed on correct lines. Be that as it may, while
considering the present appeal, we are not required to be guided by
either of the aforesaid two decisions, in view of the stark factual
distinction and the able guidance that can be drawn from another
subsequent decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court in High
16
Court of Punjab & Haryana v. Jagdev Singh .
17. In Jagdev Singh (supra), the coordinate Bench considered
paragraph 18 of Rafiq Masih (White Washer) (supra), extracted
above, and explained the legal position as follows:
“11. The principle enunciated in Proposition ( ii ) above cannot apply
to a situation such as in the present case. In the present case, the
officer to whom the payment was made in the first instance was
clearly placed on notice that any payment found to have been made
in excess would be required to be refunded. The officer furnished an
undertaking while opting for the revised pay scale. He is bound by
the undertaking.”


15
Liability of person to whom money is paid, or thing delivered, by mistake or
under coercion .-A person to whom money has been paid, or anything delivered, by
mistake or under coercion, must repay or return it.
16
(2016) 14 SCC 267
7

18. Respondents, as appellants before the Division Bench of the High
Court, had placed Exhibit R2(c) which contained an undertaking given
by the appellants conveying their willingness to permit recovery of
such amounts in the event that the pay fixation was found to be
erroneous. It was, thus, contended that the respondents had merely
corrected the mistake in accordance with the entitlement of the
appellants under the applicable rules.
19. The contention was accepted by the Division Bench in the impugned
judgment. While placing reliance on Chandi Prasad Uniyal (supra),
it was held as follows:
“32. Apex court was considering a batch of cases relating to
recovery and re-fixation of pay of teachers in rectification of mistakes
th th
occurred while implementing the 5 and 6 pay commission orders.
Apex court while upholding the same, held that unjust enrichment
cannot be permitted. It is also pertinent to note that petitioners were
not required to perform any additional duties on account of the
placement as Associate Professors. Admittedly the petitioners have
given their undertaking Ext R2(c) expressing their willingness for re-
fixation of pay, refund of excess pay etc., as and when any mistake
was detected, as in the cases considered by the apex court. The case
of the petitioners do not come under that of exceptional categories.
However we are of the view that fairness in action required that a
notice was issued to them, before effecting re-fixation and recovery
as well as de-designation.
33. Now that the reasons for re-fixation are already made known
to petitioners and their contentions are already in the pleadings
before this court, we do not think that issuance of a notice will serve
any purpose, especially when we have found that they were not
entitled to any benefits as originally granted. Moreover the
petitioners approached this court only in 2012, much after the re-
fixation of pay and recovery were effected in early 2010. At this stage
therefore we are not directing the appellants to undertake the empty
formality of issuing notice or opportunity of hearing to petitioners.”


20. It is, therefore, clear that a mistake was committed in extending
financial benefits to the appellants; and this was immediately
8

withdrawn upon detection of such mistake. Such recovery of the
amounts paid by mistake to the appellants, in view of the
undertakings given by them, did not warrant interference by the
Single Judge in exercise of writ jurisdiction and the Division Bench
appears to be right in its interdiction.
21. Much emphasis has been placed by learned counsel for the appellants
on the letter addressed by the Director (T), Government of India,
Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of Higher
Education, to the Directors of all the National Institutes of Technology
dated … (sic) March, 2013.
22. Sub-paragraph 4 of the last paragraph of such letter reads as follows:
“iv) The benefits already given would not be recovered from the
academic staff of the Institutes as directed by the Hon’ble Court and
also as per NIT Councils decision.”

23. Since the recovery had already been effected from the appellants two
years prior to the institution of their writ petition before the writ court,
the aforesaid instruction would be of no avail.
24. Insofar as the circumstance of hardship canvassed by learned counsel
for the appellants is concerned, we need to observe that no such case
had been pleaded in the writ petition. In any event, whether recovery
of money would result in hardship has to be determined on the facts
of each particular case. After all, we cannot presently conceive of a
situation where recovery of money from the recipient would not cause
hardship. However, for instance, if it is pleaded and proved to the
satisfaction of the writ court that entirety of the excess payment
9

received by the employee has since been spent towards medical
treatment and that the employee concerned would face immense
hardship in returning such excess payment, or if the same were
recovered from him through initiation of appropriate proceedings, in
a deserving case the Court would be justified in quashing the notice
seeking recovery or refund. This would also be subject to the
employee satisfying the Court that the excess payment was not
received on account of any misrepresentation or fraud on his part.
Since no such case exists here, the contention is rejected.
25. Significantly, the appellants have not contended before us that they
were, as of right, entitled to the financial benefits flowing from the
grant of Academic Grade Pay and that the same was erroneously
withdrawn.
26. The appeals are, therefore, without merit and, accordingly, stand
dismissed.
27. Connected applications, if any, shall stand closed.
28. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.


………………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)



..……….……………………J.
(SHEEL NAGU)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 23, 2026.
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