AYUBBHAI ISMAILBHAI SIPAI vs STATE OF GUJARAT
- Court
- Gujarat High Court
R/CR.A/934/2012 (GJHC240435972012) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 934 of 2012
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
√
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AYUBBHAI ISMAILBHAI SIPAI
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MS MAMTA R VYAS(994) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
HCLS COMMITTEE(4998) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2,3
MR PK SHUKLA(1056) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2,3
MS JYOTI BHATT APP for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
Date : 31/08/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. The appellant – original complainant has preferred this appeal
under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against
th
the judgment and order dated 09.02.2012 passed by the learned 7
(Ad-hoc) Additional Sessions Judge, Junagadh (hereinafter be referred
to as “the trial Court”) in Sessions Case No. 26 of 2010, whereby the
trial Court has acquitted the original accused (respondents herein)
from the offences punishable under Sections 306, 114 etc of the
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Indian Penal Code.
2. Short facts of the prosecution case are that the appellant had
married to one Shabana before eight years and out of the said
wedlock, Shabana delivered a son namely Moinuddin. It is alleged that
respondent No.2 and 3 are the father and mother of the wife
(Shabana) of the appellant and they were against the marriage of
their daughter and they tried to separate Shabana from the appellant
by taking divorce. It is alleged that the wife of the appellant was
happy with the appellant and she had requested her parents not to
interfere with her marriage life. It is alleged that respondents No.2
and 3 were adamant and did not want to stay their daughter with the
appellant and, therefore, they quarreled with appellant and Shabana
and filed a false complaint against the appellant. That in past,
Shabana herself had lodged a complaint before the “A” Division Police
Station, Junagadh against respondents No.2 and 3. It is further alleged
that because of mental pressure, Shabana went to the house of her
parents and requested them not to interfere in her family but at that
time there was exchange of hot words between them and Shabana
was very much depressed and, therefore, she committed suicide by
pouring kerosene and ignited herself. Hence, a complaint was lodged
by the appellant - complainant before “A” Division Police Station for
the aforesaid offences. The police prepared panchnama of the scene
of offence and after preparing the arrest panchnama, the accused
came to be arrested. On completion of investigation, charge sheet
was submitted into the Court of learned J.M.F.C.
2.1 The charge against the accused came to be framed by the trial
Court for the aforesaid offences against the accused. On being
explained it to them, the accused have denied having committed any
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offence. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and pleaded for
trial and hence, the case was tried by the trial Court.
3. It appears from the records that to prove the case, the
prosecution has examined the witnesses and in addition to this, the
prosecution has also produced the following documentary evidence.
4. After closure of the evidence, the statements of the accused
under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 have been
recorded wherein they denied of having committed any offence and
have stated that they are innocent.
5. After hearing both sides and considering the evidence on
records, the trial Court by impugned judgment and order has
acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled against them.
6. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment
and order of acquittal the appellant has preferred this appeal.
7. Heard Ms.Mamta Vyas, learned counsel for the appellant –
original complainant, Ms.Jyoti Bhatt, learned Additional Public
Prosecutor for the respondent – State of Gujarat and Mr.P. K. Shukla,
learned counsel for the respondents – accused at length.
8. Ms.Vyas, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has
submitted the same facts which are narrated in the memo of appeal
and has also submitted that the prosecution has examined witnesses
and produced documentary evidence, despite this fact, the trial Court
has not considered the same in its true and proper perspective in
passing the judgment and order of acquittal. Ms.Vyas, learned
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counsel, while referring to the entire oral as well as documentary
evidence, has assailed the impugned judgment and order and
submitted that the trial Court has not taken into consideration the
evidence connecting the accused to the alleged offence in its proper
perspective and even the prosecution has been able to prove the
charges levelled against the accused.
8.1 While referring to the evidence of the witnesses and the
material collected against the accused, Ms.Vyas, learned counsel has
submitted that the prosecution has established the case against the
accused by examining the witnesses, who have supported the case of
the prosecution, however, the trial Court has discarded and
disbelieved the evidence of these witnesses. She has submitted that
the witnesses have fully supported the case of the prosecution,
however, the trial Court has not appreciated the same and passed the
judgment and order of acquittal which is illegal and unjust.
8.2 Ms.Vyas, learned counsel has submitted that it is settled legal
position that the evidence of a single witness is sufficient for
conviction if the same is reliable and trustworthy and in the present
case, though the evidence of all the witnesses are reliable and
trustworthy, without any cogent reason, the trial Court has
disbelieved and discarded the evidence of the witnesses.
8.3 Ms.Vyas, learned counsel has further submitted that the
impugned judgment of acquittal is contrary to the evidence on record,
based on erroneous appreciation of material evidence, and has
resulted in a miscarriage of justice and the findings recorded by the
learned Trial Court are perverse and unsustainable in law, thereby
calling for interference by this Court in the exercise of its appellate
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jurisdiction. She has also submitted that the learned Trial Court has
materially erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove its
case beyond reasonable doubt and the findings recorded by the trial
Court were therefore perverse, illegal, and contrary to the evidence
on record.
8.4 While referring to the judgment and order of acquittal and the
evidence of the witnesses, Ms.Vyas, learned counsel has further
submitted that the deceased married to the complainant before about
five years and during the said wedlock, deceased delivered a son and
after the marriage, the deceased was staying happily with the
complainant and in-laws’ as they are residing in the same vicinity and
after some time, the accused along with other family members
pressurized Shabana to take divorce from the complainant, due to
which a quarrel took place between the complainant and the accused
and other family members. Ms.Vyas, learned counsel has also
submitted that prior to the date of incident before about one year, the
deceased had lodged the private complaint wherein she alleged that
the parental pressurized the deceased to take divorce from the
complainant and due to which the quarrel took place, however, it was
not proceeded further. She has submitted that the consistent stand of
the complainant and the witnesses that the deceased was under
compelling circumstances and tremendous pressure from the accused
and other family members the deceased committed suicide. She has
submitted that the deceased was taken to the hospital where she was
admitted as an indoor patient and her statement was recorded by the
concerned Police Officer and her dying declaration was also recorded
by the Executive Magistrate, wherein, she categorically stated that
she was harassed and subjected to mental cruelty by the accused and
pressurized to take divorce from the complainant. She has submitted
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that since, the deceased denied and not accepted such suggestion of
the accused, the accused subjected mental and physical cruelty to the
deceased, due to which, she committed suicide.
8.5 Ms.Vyas, learned counsel has also submitted that though there
was an ample evidence led by the prosecution of P.W.5 Ismailbhai
Razakbhai Kureshi and P.W.6 Shakilbhai Rahimbhai Kureshi, who were
the independent witnesses and the prosecution has proved the
charge levelled against the accused, however, the trial Court has not
considered the evidence of these witnesses and passed the impugned
judgment and order which is unjust and illegal. She has submitted
that Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act relates to recording of
dying declaration and as per the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, the trial Court ought to have considered the said evidence in its
true and proper perspective and the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra
reported in (2002) 6 SCC 710 the trial Court ought to have
considered the evidence, however, the same has not been done.
8.6 According to Ms.Vyas, learned counsel, the trial Court ought to
have convicted the accused and ought to have imposed necessary
sentence. She has prayed to allow the present appeal and to quash
and set aside the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.
9. Ms.Bhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted
that the State of Gujarat has not preferred an appeal against the
judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. Ms.Bhatt,
learned Additional Public Prosecutor has supported the finding
recorded by the trial Court and submitted that appropriate order may
be passed.
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10. Per contra, Mr.Shukla, learned counsel for the respondents –
accused has supported the impugned judgment and order and has
submitted that the trial Court has not committed any error of law and
fact in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against them.
He has submitted that the ingredients of the offence alleged against
the accused are not proved beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore,
the trial Court has rightly acquitted the accused as the complainant
has failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused. Learned
counsel for the respondents has also submitted that there is no iota of
evidence to connect the accused with the alleged crime in question.
Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the evidence
led by the prosecution suffers from material contradictions, omissions,
and inconsistencies, which create serious doubt about the veracity of
the prosecution case and the prosecution has failed to establish the
essential ingredients of the alleged offences and has not produced
reliable, trustworthy, and corroborative evidence connecting the
respondent with the commission of the alleged offence. Learned
counsel for the respondents has submitted that it is a settled principle
of criminal jurisprudence that the presumption of innocence in favour
of an accused is further strengthened by an order of acquittal. It is
submitted that unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are
shown to be perverse, illegal, or contrary to the evidence on record,
the Appellate Court should be slow in interfering with an order of
acquittal. It is submitted that the appellant has failed to point out any
infirmity, illegality, perversity, or misreading of evidence in the
impugned judgment and order and the findings recorded by the
learned trial Court are based upon proper appreciation of the
evidence and settled legal principles. Learned counsel for the
respondents has submitted that the appeal being meritless deserves
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to be dismissed and the impugned judgment and order of acquittal
deserves to be confirmed.
10.1 Mr.Shukla, learned counsel has submitted that the prosecution
has miserably failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused
as basic ingredients of Sections 306, 114 of the IPC is not proved as
ingredient of Section 107 of the IPC is referred and relied upon.
Section 107 of the IPC reads as under:-
“ 107. Abetment of a thing .—A person abets the doing of
a thing, who—
First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an
act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that
conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission,
the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation,
or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is
bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or
attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to
instigate the doing of that thing.
Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of
the commission of an act, does anything in order to
facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates
the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that
act.”
10.2 Mr.Shukla, learned counsel has submitted that merely referring
the evidence in a nature of dying declaration, where the deceased
sustained 98% burn injury and, therefore, under such circumstances,
whether the statement of the deceased is possible to be recorded by
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the Executive Magistrate or not as referred and relied upon by the
learned counsel for the appellant.
11. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the trial Court, the questions arise for determination are as
under:-
(1) whether the trial Court has rightly justified in passing the
judgment and order of acquittal.
(2) whether the trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence
led by the prosecution in recording the reasons.
(3) whether the trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence
led by the prosecution in its true and proper spirit.
(4) while interpreting the provision of Section 32 of the Evidence
Act more particularly relating to the dying declaration, whether
the trial Court has failed to appreciate the important piece of
evidence i.e. dying declaration of the deceased recorded by
the Executive Magistrate.
(5) whether there is any illegality, irregularity and perversity in
the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.
12. Considering the aforesaid submissions and aspects, this Court is
first required to examine the fact of the case. That the story put
forward by the prosecution is required to be looked into. That on
20.09.2009 at about 9.30 hours the deceased committed suicide at
her matrimonial home by pouring kerosene and ignited herself, who
sustained 98% burn injury on her body and immediately she was
taken to the civil hospital where the police has recorded the
statement in the form of FIR and the Executive Magistrate has
recorded the dying declaration under Section 32 of the Indian
Evidence Act.
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13. Looking to the contents of the dying declaration, it appears that
the deceased has alleged that her parents and other family members
were pressurizing her to take divorce from the complainant, for which
before about one year, the complaint came to be lodged by the
deceased against her parents and other family members in a form of
private complaint before the concerned Executive Magistrate. The
said complaint was not proceeded further by the Executive
Magistrate. Even because of the aforesaid reason and tremendous
pressure the deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene and
ignited herself, which was the statement of the deceased made
before the Executive Magistrate. On perusal of the history recorded by
the doctor, it appears that the deceased stated that she was under
frustration. The deceased was not given any name of the accused
before the doctor who recorded the history, which was the evidence
of P.W.3 – Dr. Arjun Gorabhai Rathod (Exhibit 22). In his cross-
examination, this witness has specifically admitted that when the
injured shifted to the hospital, she was in semi conscious condition,
who gave the history wherein she stated that “ she tired of her life and
burned by it . Under the circumstances, now this Court reads the
evidence in a nature of dying declaration recorded by the Executive
Magistrate, it seems that the deceased has given the names of the
accused and because of the pressure of the accused, she committed
suicide. That the complainant along with the deceased, prior to the
date of incident i.e. on 19.09.2009 went to the house of the accused,
where, the quarrel took place and hit an iron rod on the head of the
sister-in-law by the complainant, for which, an FIR was lodged against
the complainant and in respect of that the case is pending before the
concerned Court. Thereafter, there was no evidence put forward by
the prosecution that the accused aver reached to the house of the
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deceased. That soon before the death, the incident in a nature as
referred by the complainant himself that on 19.09.2009, he along with
his wife went to the house of the father-in-law where quarrel was
picked up wherein he hit the iron pipe on the head of sister-in-law, for
which the complaint was registered by the sister-in-law and the
complainant is facing a charge for the alleged incident. Now, the
emphasis upon the earlier complaint made by the deceased before
about a year qua harassment and pressure, in between a year, there
was no evidence come forth as to whether the accused have
pressurized or given any mental or physical torture to the deceased or
not.
14. On perusal of the cross-examination of P.W.5, being neighbour
and friend of the complainant, upon whom, learned counsel for the
appellant has heavily relied upon, the fact reveals that time and again
the complainant picked up the quarrel with the accused and, the
dispute was going on between the complainant and the accused. In
the cross-examination, the P.W.5 has stated as under:-
“The quarrel took place husband of the Shabana and the
accused for three to four times. He was not present when
the quarrel took place the day before the incident. It is not
true that a quarrel took place inside the house of the
accused the day before the incident. He knew that a
complaint came to be filed against the complainant Ayub
for bearing the sister of Shabana.
He went to funeral of Shabana . It is true that the dead body
of Shabana was removed from the house of the accused. It
was not removed from the complainant Ayub’s house. It is
true that Ayub was staying in a rented house next to his at
the time of the incident. It is true that in his reply to the
police, a complaint was filed against Shabana’s family and
she had no money to get the from, so Shabana poured
kerosene on herself and set fie. He deposed that the police
did not record his statement as per his say. It is true that
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Rashidaben W/o. Muhammad Onkha Ismail, Aminaben
Firozbhai, Ayeshaben Ashrafbhai resided in the vicinity of
the accused. It is not true that he was giving false
testimony because he was a friend of the complainant.
15. On perusal of the evidence of P.W.6, it appears that in his cross-
examination, he has stated as under:-
“He was present at the the scene of the incident when the
quarrel took place the day before the incident. It is true
that the day before the incident, the complainant Ayub and
accused had quarreled. He was not aware that at that
time, the complainant Ayub hit the sister of Shabana
namely Rashida on the head with a pipe and a case was
lodged against him. It is not true that Ayub did not treat
Shabana well, so they used to quarrel. It is not true that he
was giving a one sided false testimony because he was the
friend of the complainant. It is true that after Shabana
passed away, he went to her cremation and this cremation
was taken out of the house of the accused.”
16. In light of the evidence of the independent witnesses, it
emerges that P.W.6 deposed that it is true that the day before the
incident, the complainant Ayub and accused had quarreled. He was
not aware that at that time, the complainant Ayub hit the sister of
Shabana namely Rashida on the head with a pipe and a case was
lodged against him.
17. On perusal of the evidence of P.W.8 Girdharbhai Mohanbhai
Makwana (Exhibit 33) and P.W.9 Dilipbhai Gokalbhai Dabhi (Exhibit
43), it appears that they have specifically stated that though the
incident occurred on 20.09.2009, the complainant had not lodged an
FIR but had approached the concerned police authority by way of
making representation and, thereafter, he lodged the private
complaint before the concerned Magistrate against the accused
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including the accused. During the course of investigation, the police
has not found any substance in the allegation qua four accused, out of
six accused and, therefore, they have filed the charge-sheet only
against respondents No.2 and 3. Now, from the evidence of two police
officers, the fact reveals that the dead body, after performing
postmortem, was handed over to the complainant, but he has refused
to accept the same and, therefore, the dead body was accepted by
the family members of the deceased i.e. accused and they performed
post death rituals at their residence only.
18. For consideration and appreciation of evidence in the nature of
dying declaration, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had issued the
principles in the case of Irfan alias Naka Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh reported in AIR 2023 SC 4129 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court
has, while dealing general principles, observed in para – 62 as under:-
“62. There is no hard and fast rule for determining when a
dying declaration should be accepted; the duty of the Court
is to decide this question in the facts and surrounding
circumstances of the case and be fully convinced of the
truthfulness of the same. Certain factors below reproduced
can be considered to determine the same, however, they
will only affect the weight of the dying declaration and not
its admissibility: -
(i) Whether the person making the statement was in
expectation of death?
(ii) Whether the dying declaration was made at the earliest
opportunity? "Rule of First Opportunity"
(iii) Whether there is any reasonable suspicion to believe
the dying declaration was put in the mouth of the dying
person?
(iv) Whether the dying declaration was a product of
prompting, tutoring or leading at the instance of police or
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any interested party?
(v) Whether the statement was not recorded properly?
(vi) Whether, the dying declarant had opportunity to clearly
observe the incident?
(vii) Whether, the dying declaration has been consistent
throughout?
(viii) Whether, the dying declaration in itself is a
manifestation / fiction of the dying persons imagination of
what he thinks transpired?
(ix) Whether, the dying declaration was itself voluntary?
(x) In case of multiple dying declarations, whether, the first
one inspires truth and consistent with the other dying
declaration?
(xi) Whether, as per the injuries, it would have been
impossible for the deceased to make a dying
declaration?”
19. Considering the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of (1) Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarth reported in
(2001) 9 SCC 618, (2) State of Gujarat Vs. Bhaveshbhai Manilalbhai
Patel reported in 2025 (2) GLR 923, (3) Ram Pyarey Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh reported in (2025) 6 SCC 820, (4) State of Gujarat Vs. Haji
Haroon Meman reported in 2026 (0) JX (Guj) 105, (5) State of Gujarat
Vs. Ashwinbhai Naginbhai Tandel reported in 2025 (0) JX(Guj) 357 and
(6) Gangula Mohan Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in
(2010) 1 SCC 750, the present appeal being meritless deserves to be
dismissed.
20. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an Appellate Court
has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence
upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate
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Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption
of their innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the trial Court.
21. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while
exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the
Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of
acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some
manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived
at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be
characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the
Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the
judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court
has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the
conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has
committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence
on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such
circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just
decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether
the accused are connected with the commission of the crime with
which they are charged.
22. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex
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Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka
reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly paragraph Nos. 42
and 43, which was subsequently re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and
another , reported in [2022] 3 SCC 471 , wherein, the Hon’ble Apex
Court has enunciated the general principles in case of acquittal, more
particularly in paragraph No. 26 the general principles are set out by
the Hon’ble Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble
Apex Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs.
State of Karnataka , reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 = (2024) 8
SCC 149 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the similar issue,
more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to 40. Hence, we are in
complete agreement with the findings recorded by the trial Court.
23. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of
Karnataka , reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169 , wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20 and 21 as under:-
“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the
general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa
and others vs. State of Karnataka , regarding the power of
the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a
judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus:
“42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an
appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and
compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very
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R/CR.A/934/2012 (GJHC240435972012) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring
mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers
of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of
language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate
court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of
the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in
case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of
the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is
available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of
law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not
disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar , a three-Judge
Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential
for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly
indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for
discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able
to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was
further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it
would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a
contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is
absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds
it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their
testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the
jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this
light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing
with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos.
1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered
judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the
benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.”
24. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly appears
that there is no credible evidence to connect the present accused with
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R/CR.A/934/2012 (GJHC240435972012) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
the alleged crime and the evidence on record is not so convincing to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the
alleged crime. Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted on the
evidence on record.
25. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it clearly
transpires that the trial Court has not committed any error of fact and
law in appreciating the evidence on record and in acquitting the
accused from the charges levelled against them. Even on re-
appreciation of the evidence, it clearly transpires that the prosecution
has miserably failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the above, I am of the opinion
that the trial Court has not committed any error of facts and law in
passing the impugned judgment and order and there is no any
illegality and infirmity found in the judgment and order and the appeal
being meritless deserves to be dismissed.
26. In view of the above, the present appeal is devoid of merits and
it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed. The
impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is
hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and
proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.
(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
V.R. PANCHAL
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