Najma Khatun vs The State Of West Bengal

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 691
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 566/2024



NAJMA KHATUN & ORS. … PETITIONERS


VERSUS


THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

WITH

W.P.(C) NO. 651/2024, W.P.(C) NO.120/2025,
W.P.(C) NO.825/2024, W.P.(C) NO. 578/2024,
W.P.(C) D. NO.35840/2024, W.P.(C) D. NO.36427/2024,
W.P.(C) NO.826/2024, W.P.(C) NO.828/2024,
W.P.(C) NO.627/2024, W.P.(C) NO.121/2025,
W.P.(C) NO.557/2024, W.P.(C) NO.540/2024,
W.P.(C) NO.558/2024, W.P.(C) NO.108/2025,
W.P.(C) NO.109/2025, W.P.(C) NO.112/2025,
W.P.(C) NO.110/2025, W.P.(C) NO.111/2025,
W.P.(C) NO.618/2024, W.P.(C) NO.656/2024,
W.P.(C) NO.626/2024, W.P.(C) NO.634/2024,
W.P.(C) NO.663/2024, W.P.(C) NO.638/2024,
W.P.(C) NO.633/2024, W.P.(C) NO.653/2024,
W.P.(C) NO.616/2024, W.P.(C) NO.662/2024,
W.P.(C) NO.635/2024, W.P.(C) NO.827/2024,
W.P.(C) NO.641/2024, W.P.(C) NO.680/2024,
W.P.(C) NO.692/2024, W.P.(C) NO.679/2024,
W.P.(C) NO.682/2024, W.P.(C) NO.689/2024,
W.P.(C) NO.683/2024, W.P.(C) NO.106/2025,
W.P.(C) NO.107/2025, W.P.(C) NO.776/2024,
W.P.(C) NO.105/2025, W.P.(C) NO.734/2024,
W.P.(C) NO.814/2024, W.P.(C) NO.800/2024,
W.P.(C) D.NO.55256/2024, W.P.(C) D.NO.22974/2025,
W.P.(C) NO.958/2025, W.P.(C) D.NO.36144/2025

Signature Not Verified




Digitally signed by
MANIK KUMAR
Date: 2026.07.13
17:28:37 IST
Reason:
1

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. Re-filing delay condoned.
2. This batch of 49 (forty-nine) petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India, at the instance of petitioners numbering in excess of 350 (three
hundred fifty), are proposed to be decided by this common judgment and
order in light of the commonality of the facts involved and the questions
of law arising for decision.
3. Insofar as the identity of the petitioners are concerned, they claim to be
teachers and non-teaching staff of various madrasahs in the State of West
Bengal. The singular grievance expressed by these petitioners relate to
alleged deprivation of their legitimate service benefits by the respondents,
which include among others the State of West Bengal.
4. Multiple judicial proceedings preceded these writ petitions. The original
cause of dispute related to the vires of certain provisions of the West
1
Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008 . While the challenge to
the enactment attained finality by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Sk.
Mohd. Rafique v. Managing Committee, Contai Rahamania High
2
Madrasah , the present dispute stems from subsequent proceedings

1
MSC Act
2
(2020) 6 SCC 689
2

instituted to enforce this Court’s orders. For the purpose of deciding the
claims raised by the petitioners, it is necessary to bear in mind the
situation on the ground, legislative ordainments and subordinate
legislation, the trajectory of judicial proceedings including the verdicts
delivered over a period of time by this Court in proceedings arising in
different jurisdictions, orders passed on review and miscellaneous
applications as well as the report/observations of a 3-member
3
Committee constituted by this Court, while dealing with the claims of
each of the petitioners.
5. The undisputed facts are:
a. Regulation of madrasah education in the State of West Bengal by
an enactment is not of too distant an origin. The West Bengal Board of
Madrasah Education Act, 1994 was enacted to establish a Board of
4
Madrasah Education in West Bengal and to provide for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto. In terms of provisions contained in Section
38(2)(c) of the 1994 Act, the State Government after previous publication
in the Gazette framed the Management of Recognised Non-Government
5
Madrasahs (Aided and Un-aided) Rules, 2002 . The Management Rules,
inter alia , contained provisions for constitution of the Managing
Committees of the madrasahs, their powers and functions including the
power to appoint staff, both teaching and non-teaching, supersession, etc.

3
Committee
4
Madrasah Education Board
5
Management Rules
3

b. Prior to enactment of the MSC Act, the managing committees of
the madrasahs recognised by the Madrasah Education Board and the West
Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education, receiving financial
assistance from the State Government, were required to appoint teachers
on vacant sanctioned posts on the basis of recommendations made by the
relevant Regional School Service Commissions constituted under the West
6
Bengal School Service Commission Act, 1997 . Although Section 15 of the
SSC Act expressly excluded educational institutions established and
administered by a religious/linguistic minority from its coverage,
provisions of the SSC Act still applied to such madrasahs which were yet
to be formally recognised by the State Government as having been
established and administered by a religious minority [see Section 2(n)(iii)
of the SSC Act read with Section 15]. Payment of salary and allowances
could be released in favour of the appointees only upon approval of their
7
services by the District Inspector of Schools (Secondary Education)
concerned within whose jurisdiction the relevant madrasahs were located.
th
c. A notification came to be issued on 12 October, 2007 by the
Department of Minorities Development & Welfare and Madrasah Education
reciting that unless the State Government declares an institution as a
minority institution, the same cannot operate as such (i.e., as a minority
institution); and that this Court having held that the State Government is
the competent authority to verify and determine the minority status of an

6
SSC Act
7
DIoS
4

educational institution for the purpose of Article 30(1) of the Constitution,
the State Government was satisfied about the antecedents of the
recognised madrasahs that are aided and guided by the prescribed
guidelines. Accordingly, the recognised and aided madrasahs in the State
of West Bengal were declared as minority institutions. The said notification
while stipulating that such madrasahs would continue to receive financial
assistance from the State Government and the reservation policy would
not be applicable in case of appointment of teachers and non-teaching
staff therein, also stipulated that “(S)election of teachers may continue to
be done by West Bengal School Service Commission through separate
panel” .
d. Close on the heels of such notification, the MSC Act was enacted
nd
and enforced with effect from 22 October, 2008. It was modelled on the
lines of the SSC Act. The MSC Act introduced the concept of selection for
appointment on vacant sanctioned posts of teachers and non-teaching
staff in the recognised and aided madrasahs through the aegis of an
8
expert body, viz. the Madrasah Service Commission . Section 8 laid down
the functions of the Commission; Section 9 provided that the manner and
scope of selection of persons for appointment to the posts of teachers in
the madrasahs shall be such as is prescribed; Section 10, a non-obstante
clause, ordained that the recommendation of the Commission is
mandatory; Section 11 warned that any appointment of a teacher made
on or after the commencement of the MSC Act in violation thereof would

8
Commission
5

have no effect in law; and Section 12 mandated the penalty that could
visit the Managing Committee, the Ad hoc Committee or the
Administrator, as the case may be, in case of refusal, failure or delay in
implementing the recommendations of the Commission.
e. A section of the members of the religious minority community
viewed such legislation as an intrusion on the right guaranteed to them
by Article 30 of the Constitution of India. Challenge was laid to the
provisions of Sections 8 and 10 to 12 of the MSC Act by institution of writ
9
proceedings titled Managing Committee, Contai Rahamania High
Madrasah v. State of West Bengal & ors. before the High Court at
10
Calcutta . A Single Judge of the High Court declared Sections 8, 10, 11
th
and 12 of the MSC Act as ultra vires , vide judgment and order dated 12
11
March, 2014 .
12
f. Three intra-court appeals preferred thereagainst before the
Division Bench by Sk. Mohd. Rafiq & others, the Secretary of the
Commission & another, and the State of West Bengal & others proved
th
abortive. The Division Bench by its judgment and order dated 9
13
December, 2015 concluded that the impugned legislation abrogated the
fundamental right of the minority community and, consequently, while
upholding the verdict of the Single Judge dismissed the appeals.

9
W.P. 20650 (W) of 2013
10
High Court
11
2014 SCC OnLine Cal 5787
12
AST 192/2014, AST 130/2014 and MAT 473 of 2014
13
2015 SCC OnLine Cal 10521
6

g. Prior to and post the said judgment and order of the Division Bench,
th
the State Government had issued two notifications dated 9 February,
14 th 15
OTIFICATION
2015 and 4 March, 2016 , respectively. While N -I laid down
“Recruitment procedure in the institutions exempted from recruitment
from West Bengal School Service Commission under Section 15(a)” ,
N OTIFICATION -II introduced “Recruitment Procedures for the non-
Government Recognised Aided Madrasahs (Primary, Junior High, High,
Higher Secondar and Senior), 2016” . These two notifications were
intended to regulate selection and appointment of teachers and non-
teaching staff.
h. In the aftermath of these developments, proceedings commenced
th
before this Court. The judgment and order dated 9 December, 2015 of
the Division Bench upon a challenge before this Court in a special leave
16
petition by Sk. Mohd. Rafiq and others, a coordinate Bench by its order
th
dated 14 March, 2016 stayed the operation thereof during the pendency
of such petition.
i. Numerous interim orders subsequently came to be passed on
applications filed in connection with prayers for release of salary and
allowances in favour of teachers and non-teaching staff who had been
recruited after the MSC Act was outlawed and before the stay was
granted. However, the order of stay was never vacated nor modified. In
th
fact, order dated 17 November, 2017 permitted the selection process by

14
N OTIFICATION -I
15
N OTIFICATION -II
16
SLP (C) No.6661 of 2016
7

the Commission to go on while restraining appointments unless otherwise
th
directed by this Court; whereas, by its subsequent order dated 17 May,
2018, this Court lifted the restraining order and permitted appointments
to be made from the merit list/panel of candidates prepared by the
Commission in connection with the recruitment process of 2014. The said
order, while restraining further recruitment process from being
undertaken in terms of the MSC Act, nonetheless, permitted appointment
of successful candidates from the process of 2013 subject to the
willingness of the madrasahs to employ them.
j. Orders also followed, directing payment of salary to those teachers
and non-teaching staff who had been appointed in the madrasahs after
Sections 8 and 10 to 12 of the MSC Act were declared ultra vires and prior
to grant of stay, as aforesaid.
k. Several contempt petitions came to be filed in the meanwhile,
alleging non-compliance with the orders directing release of payment.
Orders were made from time to time to release payments to those who
had the essential qualifications for appointment. Detailed reference to
these orders is considered unnecessary having regard to the issues
involved in these writ petitions.
l. Ultimately, a 2-Judge Bench speaking through Hon’ble U. U. Lalit,
J. (as the Chief Justice then was), upon considering several precedents in
the field including the Constitution Bench decision in T.M.A. Pai
17
Foundation v. State of Karnataka , set aside the judgment and order

17
(2002) 8 SCC 481
8

th
of the High Court under challenge per its judgment and order dated 6
January, 2020 in Sk. Mohd. Rafique (supra) . Relevant passages from
the same read as follows:
58. The regime put in place by the State Legislature thus ensures that the
Commission comprising of experts in the field would screen the talent all
across the State; will adopt a fair selection procedure and select the best
available talent purely on merit basis; and even while nominating, the
interest of the minority institution will also be given due weightage and taken
care of. The statutory provisions thus seek to achieve “excellence” in
education and also seek to promote the interest of the minority institutions.
The provisions satisfy the test as culled out in the decision of this Court in
T.M.A. Pai Foundation case.
59. In our considered view going by the principles laid down in the decision
in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case, the provisions concerned cannot, therefore, be
said to be transgressing the rights of the minority institutions. The selection
of the teachers and their nomination by the Commission constituted under
the provisions of the Commission Act, 2008 would satisfy the national interest
as well as the interest of the minority educational institutions and the said
provisions are not violative of the rights of the minority educational
institutions.
62. We, therefore, have no hesitation in going by the test culled out in T.M.A.
Pai Foundation and hold that the provisions of the Commission Act, 2008 are
not violative of the rights of the minority educational institutions on any
count.
63. In the premises, while allowing these appeals, we set aside the view
taken by the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and
dismiss Writ Petition No. 20650 (W) of 2013 and other connected matters.
We also hold Sections 8, 10, 11 and 12 of the Commission Act, 2008 to be
valid and constitutional.
64. In the end, we declare all nominations made by the Commission in
pursuance of the provisions of the Commission Act, 2008 to be valid and
operative. However, if after the disposal of the matters by the High Court any
appointments are made by the Madarsahs concerned, such appointments of
teachers shall be deemed to be valid for all purposes. But the Commission
shall hereafter be competent to select and nominate teachers to various
Madarsahs in accordance with the provisions of the Commission Act, 2008
and the Rules framed thereunder.
65. With the aforesaid observations these appeals are allowed. …

m. This Court’s order, allowing the appeal on the terms noted above,
wiped out the declaration of invalidity of the MSC Act.
n. Closure of the appellate proceedings, triggered by the challenge to
the MSC Act, did not bring about a quietus to the controversy. Rather, it
9

was quickly followed by initiation of petitions alleging contempt of the
directions made in Sk. Mohd. Rafique (supra). The contempt petitions
came to be decided by a 2-Judge Bench, presided over by Hon’ble S.
Ravindra Bhat, J. (as His Lordship then was), vide its judgment and order
18
in Snehasis Giri v. Subhasis Mitra . Having regard to the claims and
counter-claims of the parties, the Bench proceeded to pass the following
order:
18. Accordingly, this Court exercising its powers under Article 142 hereby
constitutes a Committee headed by Justice Debi Prasad Dey, retired Judge,
Calcutta High Court. The Committee shall also consist of a Principal Secretary
ranking officer of the IAS, who had served in the West Bengal cadre and
stationed in Kolkata with experience in the Higher Education Department as
well as a retired Registrar of one of the State Universities in West Bengal,
residing in Kolkata. The State Government shall nominate the members other
than the Chairman. The Committee is requested to consider the claims of the
petitioner, keeping in mind the following:
( a ) Whether the madrasa or its managing committee was recognised by the
State Government on the date on which the appointment was made?
( b ) Whether such appointments were made, of candidates who possessed
the requisite prescribed qualifications and fulfilled the experience and other
eligible conditions stipulated for the post concerned?
( c ) Whether such an appointment was made by following the recruitment
procedure indicated in the Kolkata Gazette Notification dated 11-3-2015 (No.
93-SE/S/10R-14/2013-9-2-2015) and in Kolkata Gazette Notification dated
4-3-2016 (No. 486-MD/O/2M-11/2016)?

( d ) Whether the appointments were made against vacancies that existed and
whether the vacancies conformed to the staffing pattern for the
institution/madrasas concerned?
( e ) Whether after the appointments were made, the persons appointed
actually worked on their respective posts?
( f ) Whether the appointments were actually made on the date of the
appointment letter, or were backdated?
19. *
20. Ms Madhumita Bhattacharjee submitted that all necessary cooperation
would be extended by the State Government, which is directed to provide
infrastructure, and the necessary staff to the committee to complete its task.
The State Government is directed to notify the Committee, within four weeks
from today, and give appropriate publicity to those interested to seek
verification of their claim. Such publicity shall be through appropriate
advertisement in newspapers, both in English and in Bengali. In addition, the
notification shall also be placed on the website of the State Government’s
Minority Affairs & Madrasah Education Department, Nabanna, Howrah. The

18
(2023) 18 SCC 529
10

notification shall indicate the time within which representations can be made.
It is open to those claiming benefit, as well as those likely to be affected by
the report, to represent to the committee, within the time stipulated. The
committee shall also consider a suitable and practicable method of giving
hearing to those interested.

o. Disposal of the contempt petition on the above terms resulted in a
deluge of applications being filed before this Court to have the same
19
reversed. First, an application seeking modification of the order dated
nd
2 February, 2023 in Snehasis Giri (supra) was filed by a group of
nd
candidates. On 22 August, 2023, the said application was dismissed as
withdrawn with liberty to apply for review of the said order. Next, a
20
petition seeking review of the order in Snehasis Giri (supra) was filed
th
by a group of candidates which came to be rejected by circulation on 7
21
February, 2024. This was followed by miscellaneous applications seeking
modification/clarification. These applications stood disposed of by orders
nd
dated 22 March, 2024 with direction to the respondents for disclosure of
the report of the Committee by uploading it on the website to enable the
aggrieved candidates to take appropriate steps in accordance with law.
p. Meanwhile, the State had proceeded in the manner directed by this
Court by nominating the members of the Committee other than the
Chairman. Notifications were issued inviting claims. The Committee
having examined the individual claims of a little less than 500 (five
hundred) claimants (teacher and non-teaching staff) prepared a report
with its observations in respect of each and every claimant. Not a single

19
M.A. No.1694 of 2023
20
RP (C) No. 264 of 2024
21
M.A. Nos.580-85 of 2024
11

teacher or non-teaching staff could substantiate his/her claim before the
Committee of being validly appointed, resulting in rejection of such claims.
q. Thoroughly dissatisfied with the findings returned by the
Committee, a spate of writ petitions came to be instituted before this
Court. These were listed before different Benches. Orders were passed,
th th
inter alia , on 30 August, 2024 and 9 May, 2025 directing that
employment of the petitioners may not be disturbed until further orders
and the petitioners who are discharging duty should be paid salary,
respectively.
r. Ideally, the Registry ought to have listed all the writ petitions before
th
a common Bench. An order dated 18 August, 2025 passed by us
expressed serious concern noticing listing of different writ petitions before
different Benches.
s. Finally, all the writ petitions, upon consolidation, were placed before
us and preliminary hearings conducted. What was observed in course
th
thereof is captured in our order dated 19 November, 2025, inter alia ,
reading as follows:
6. On an earlier occasion, noticing the deficiency in the pleadings, we had
requested advocates-on-record for the petitioners to project before us the
ten most glaring cases where the petitioners despite creditworthiness of their
claims might have been meted out injustice by the Committee. No such
exercise appears to have been undertaken.
7. We once again grant liberty to the advocates-on-record appearing on
behalf of the petitioners to identify cases of not more than ten teachers and
five non-teaching staff who have been grossly wronged, to persuade us to
hold that the Committee was unjustified in spurning their claims. While
projecting the cases of these ten teachers and five non-teaching staff, we
require answers, preferably on affidavits, to the following questions:

(i) Whether on the dates the petitioners were appointed in the
concerned Madrasahs (the names may be disclosed), as claimed,
12

such Madrasahs enjoyed valid recognition granted by the West
2
Board of Madrasah Education ?
(ii) Whether the Managing Committees of the concerned Madrasahs,
where the petitioners claim to have been appointed, were valid
Managing Committees in the sense that the same were duly
constituted in accordance with the Management Rules and had the
imprimatur of the Madrasah Education Board?
Subject to answers to the aforesaid two questions being in the affirmative:
(iii) What is the educational qualification of the petitioner and on which
post in which Madrasah was he/she appointed?
(iv) What was the staff pattern of the concerned Madrasah in question
(both teaching and non-teaching staff) as on date the selection
process was initiated and appointment of the petitioner made either
as teacher or non-teaching staff?
(v) Whether the permission of the relevant District Inspector of Schools
was required for initiating the selection process? If no, why? If yes,
was it sought and obtained by the Managing Committees prior to
initiating the process of selection?
(vi) Whether the petitioners applied in response to any advertisement?
If yes, where was the advertisement published?
(vii) What is the nature of competition and the test/examination that the
petitioners faced prior to appointment?
(viii) Whether the Managing Committees, with their own
recommendations and the recommendations of the Selection
Committee constituted for the purpose, had forwarded all papers
together with the panel/merit list to the District Inspector for
approval?
(ix) Whether the District Inspector had approved such panel/merit list
leading to appointment?
(x) Whether the service of the petitioner, upon appointment, (sic, has
been) approved by the District Inspector?

8. Any other information that the petitioners would wish to disclose,
relevant for a decision on the writ petitions, is permitted to be disclosed.

9. Additionally, the petitioners who wish to furnish answers to the above
questions may extract the specific observation by which the Committee had
spurned their claims.

10. Having regard to the submission of Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior
counsel, we also direct that such of the petitioners on whose behalf
submissions are proposed to be advanced on the next date by furnishing
particulars on the above ten questions must also disclose on affidavits
whether they have instituted any previous proceedings before this Court or
before the High Court and the fate of such proceedings.

13

11. The advocates-on-record for the petitioners may intimate the Court
Master / Registry which out of these writ petitions are at the instance of the
teaching staff and which are at the instance of the non-teaching staff. On the
next date, the writ petitions filed by the teachers shall be listed together,
followed by the writ petitions filed by the non-teaching staff.

12. If any of the writ petitions the petitioners are both teaching and non-
teaching staff, the particulars thereof shall also be provided so that same
may be listed separately.

13. We request the advocates-on-record for the petitioners to also furnish
the particulars to the advocates-on-record for the State, the Madrasah
Education Board and the West Bengal Madrasah Commission at least 72 hours
in advance of the next date of hearing.

14. Re-list the writ petitions on 17th December, 2025, as the first item in
the list, marked ‘part-heard’.

6. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, affidavits/compilations have been placed
on record by both the parties.
22
7.
On behalf of the petitioners, the claims of (i) Raj Kumar Bag , (ii) Md.
23 24 25
Saidul Islam , (iii) Sahana Khatun , (iv) Md. Abdur Rahman Gazi , (v)
26 27
Md. Mahamudur Rahman Laskar , (vi) Salma Sultana , (vii) Shikha
28 29 30
Khatun , (viii) Rajiun Kasfima (ix) Md. Eliyas , and (x) Kazi Md. Jahirul
31
Hassan were screened and projected before us as the ten most glaring
cases of gross injustice meted out to them by the Committee and
followingly, by the State. In addition to the 10 (ten) noted above, the

22 th
4 petitioner in WP (C) No.557 of 2024
23 nd
2 petitioner in WP (C) No.616 of 2024
24 nd
2 petitioner in WP (C) No.641 of 2024
25 nd
2 petitioner in WP (C) No.653 of 2024
26 nd
2 petitioner in WP (C) No.662 of 2024
27 st
1 petitioner in WP (C) No.689 of 2024
28 nd
2 petitioner in WP (C) No.800 of 2024
29 th
25 petitioner in WP (C) No.800 of 2024
30 st
1 petitioner in WP (C) No.814 of 2024
31 th
38 petitioner in WP (C) No.105 of 2025
14

32 33
claims of Sk. Saifuddin , Sk. Mosaddek Hossain and Md. Mir Mosarraf
34
Hossain have also been put forward which too would be considered.
8.
In opposition, the respondents have placed a counter-compilation
detailing therein particulars to demonstrate that the claims of the said
teachers and non-teaching staff are wholly without any basis and that the
writ petitions deserve outright dismissal.
9. We have had the able assistance of Mr. Salman Khurshid, Ms. Maninder
Acharya, Mr. Devdutt Kamat, Mr. Pijush Kanti Roy, learned senior counsel,
and Mr. Biswaroop Bhattacharya and Ms. Srija Choudhury, learned
counsel, who addressed us on behalf of the petitioners, apart from others.
Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, Mr. Raju Ramchandran and Mr. M. R. Shamshad,
learned senior counsel appearing for the respective Article 12 authorities
also duly assisted us.
10. The common grievance running through the arguments of learned senior
counsel/counsel for the petitioners is that this Court had constituted the
Committee, headed by a former Judge of the High Court, to verify claims
and recommend genuine cases for acceptance. The Committee, however,
has rejected all claims across the board. Such wholesale rejection is not
an exercise to verify claims but a colourable exercise of power. The report,
including the observations made/findings recorded, without an individual
assessment of all the claims is not what this Court had required. Non-
application of mind is writ large and the Committee’s findings suffer from

32 th
15 petitioner in WP (C) No.557 of 2024
33 th
18 petitioner in WP (C) No.653 of 2024
34
sole petitioner in WP (C) No.651 of 2024
15

the vice of arbitrariness, are opposed to principles of fair play and justice,
and violates the petitioners’ rights protected under Articles 14, 16 and 21
of the Constitution of India. Being unworthy of credence, it was urged that
the Committee’s report be excluded from consideration and each of the
claims of the petitioners be considered on its own merits and granted.
11. Per contra , it has vehemently been contended on behalf of the
respondents that the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners
lack substance. The Committee was constituted to determine the veracity
of the claims. Its remit was factual. The mandate was clear: recommend
for acceptance only those cases which were above board. Significantly,
after examining the material placed before it and upon assessment of all
individual cases, the Committee did not find a single claim worthy of
recommendation. Having found no claim to have been substantiated, the
Committee had no other option but to reject each and every claim. The
scope of judicial review of such fact-finding exercise is limited and the
present challenge being nothing but a second round of litigation on
concluded facts, it was asserted that no interference in exercise of high
prerogative writ jurisdiction under Article 32 is warranted.
12. Having heard the parties, the dispute seems to lie in a narrow compass.
The Committee was set up to filter claims. Parties were put on notice and
those petitioners who presented themselves before the Committee were
heard. A painstaking exercise was undertaken by the Committee, which
revealed that not a single claim met the threshold of a valid appointment.
No claim was found to be genuine on individual assessment, and the
16

rejection was on merits and not on technicalities. Petitioners, who suffered
rejection of their claims upon due consideration, now seek to reagitate

issues of fact which have been settled by the Committee.
13. We are conscious that absent manifest perversity in the findings of the
Committee, the judicial review court ought to stay at a distance. However,
considering that this is the Court of last resort and that there has been
protracted litigation since 2014, as a very special case, we were a bit
indulgent. Accordingly, we proceeded to treat these writ petitions
essentially as appeals against the findings of fact recorded by the
Committee subject to the rider that not every claim would be considered.
Instead of a random choice, which we could have made, we extended due
opportunity to the advocates for the aggrieved petitioners to screen and
project inter se the glaring instances of gross injustice and to demonstrate
infringement of their legal rights for the same to be remedied.
14.
Such screening and selection having been made, at this stage we are
tasked to consider and examine the claims of only those (13) thirteen
petitioners named above and to conclude whether there is any ring of
truth in their claims that they were validly appointed by the respective
Managing Committees of various recognised aided madrasahs between
the dates of rendering of the judgment by the Single Judge of the High
Court in Managing Committee, Contai Rahamania High Madrasah
(supra) [declaring Sections 8 and 10 to 12 of the MSC Act ultra vires
Article 30 of the Constitution] and pronouncement of the judgment by this
Court in Sk. Mohd. Rafique (supra) [declaring that the MSC Act does not
17

infringe any right of the minority in the State of West Bengal]. If the
examination reveals truth, legitimacy and justification in what the
petitioners assert, they would most certainly be entitled to have their
services approved on the premise that they were appointed in the
OTIFICATION
interregnum in terms of the provisions contained either in N -I
or N OTIFICATION -II, referred to above, and also other consequential
benefits flowing from such appointment. Also, a positive finding could
open the gates for the others for their claims to be individually examined.
However, if not a single claim is found genuine out of the selected few to
be considered, closure of the proceedings once and for all would be the
obvious consequence.
15. Prior to looking into the claims of the screened individual petitioners, we
need to deal with an argument advanced by Mr. Roy which, however, no
other learned senior counsel/counsel appearing for the other petitioners
35
advanced. Referring to an observation made in paragraph 64 of this
Court’s decision in Sk. Mohd. Rafique (supra), Mr. Roy contended that
the whole exercise undertaken by the Committee was unnecessary since
all appointments made, after the decision of the Single Judge in Contai
Rahamania High Madrasah (supra), have to be treated as valid for all
purposes. Rights of the petitioners had crystallised in pursuance of the
binding directions of this Court and, therefore, he submitted that it was

35
…, if after the disposal of the matters by the High Court any appointments are made by
the Madarsahs concerned, such appointments of teachers shall be deemed to be valid for
all purposes.
18

too late in the day for the respondents to deny the petitioners the benefits
of the same.
16. The same contention was urged by Mr. Roy before the coordinate Bench
deciding Snehasis Giri (supra). Such contention was negatived in the
following words:
8. In para 64, the Court in Mohd. Rafique case declared the nominations by
the Commission in pursuance of the provisions of the Act as valid, and the
appointments made, after disposal of the matters by the High Court as
deemed to be valid for all purpose. However, there is no discussion with
respect to whether the court had applied its mind as to how the madrasas
had proceeded to appoint teachers as teaching/non-teaching staff. Also there
is no discussion regarding rules/regulations, applicable circulars and
guidelines in terms of which aided and unaided recognised institutions could
make appointments, having regard to the standard of education required and
the requisite experience; whether a transparent method was followed;
whether the madrasa concerned was recognised one or not; whether the
committee or body selecting the individual was constituted in accordance with
the rules and regulations, etc. The argument of the respondent/alleged
contemnors that there ought to be an exercise of verification, therefore,
appears to be merited and substantial.
*
11. In the present case too, this Court is of the opinion that the respondents’
stand that without verification of the petitioners’ appointment and whether
the procedures prescribed were duly followed in respect of matters such as
fulfilling eligibility conditions (essential qualifications and relevant
experience); availability of vacancy; staff pattern in respect of madrasas
where recognition was granted and if so for what period; whether the
institution was aided and recognised or not or recognised and non-aided, and
if so for what duration; whether a duly empowered selection body or bodies
considered the candidature of the claimant before he/she was appointed and
whether the committee or body selecting the individual/claimant was
constituted in accordance with the rules or guidelines, etc. is justified. In
these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that further proceedings
cannot be continued as no determination can be made unless there is a due
verification in regard to the employment of each of the petitioners.
*

14. It is thus, apparent, that if this Court were to pronounce upon the merits
of the respondents’ position, it would necessarily have to consider the facts
of each case, and decide whether the stand of the alleged contemnors —
wherever a decision adverse to the petitioners is taken, is correct on its
merits. That exercise, plainly is not admissible in proper exercise of contempt
jurisdiction.
19

15. The above observations would have ordinarily been conclusive and
dispositive of the present petitions. However, this Court is conscious of the
fact that the process of verification undertaken by the State would result in
further delay and may lead to multifarious litigation, spelling uncertainty to
individuals and members of staff of madrasas who were appointed after
following all norms and procedures.
(emphasis ours)

17. It is, therefore, clear as day that the observation made in paragraph 64
of Sk. Mohd. Rafique (supra), relied on by Mr. Roy, was duly considered
in Snehasis Giri (supra) and bearing in mind the factors referred to in
the extracted passages, further directions were issued regarding
constitution of the Committee for verification of the claims. On the point
as to whether the appointments are valid or not, the directions in
Snehasis Giri (supra) constitute the binding directions which each party
to the lis is now bound to follow. Building a case placing reliance on the
said observation in paragraph 64 of Sk. Mohd. Rafique (supra), in the
changed circumstances, is like building on sand; to rest a claim on such
observation is to mistake a whisper for authority. We, thus, have no
hesitation in rejecting this argument of Mr. Roy as misconceived.
18. We also record having heard Mr. Ahmadi make a specific submission.
According to him, Md. Saidul Islam, Sahana Khatun, Salma Sultana, Md.
th
Eliyas and Kazi Md. Jahirul Hassan were admittedly appointed after 14
March, 2016, i.e., after this Court had stayed the judgment and order
th
dated 9 December, 2015 of the Division Bench. He contended that
though several interim orders were made directing payment of salary to
staff appointed immediately after Sections 8 and 10 to 12 of the MSC Act
was struck down by the Single Bench, no further appointment could have
20

been made in terms of N OTIFICATION -II, which replaced N OTIFICATION -I qua
madrasahs, without the express permission of this Court after such stay
was granted. We shall deal with this argument at a later stage of this
judgment.
OTIFICATION OTIFICATION
19. Since either N -I or N -II was required to be followed
by the Managing Committees of the recognised and aided madrasahs, it
would be worthwhile to note the relevant clauses therefrom which would
have a bearing on our process of decision making.
20. Clauses 4, 5, 7 and 14 of N OTIFICATION -I read as follows:
“4. The appointment shall be made against a clear vacancy in
permanent/additional post duly sanctioned by the competent authority.
5. The appointment shall be given after selection from eligible candidates
through open advertisement of the vacancy in at least two State-level
dailies, one of them should be in English, in order to satisfy the provision
of equality of opportunity as enshrined in Art. 16 of the Constitution of
India.
7. The school authority will constitute a Selection Committee for recruitment
of a candidate, against an approved post maintaining pupil-teacher ratio,
at least 3 months before the scheduled date of Interview/Written Test
and the same is to be communicated to the office of the District Inspector
of Schools (SE) concerned and the Director of School Education, West
Bengal with post sanctioning memo, cause of the occurrence of the
vacancy, no litigation certificate in respect of the vacancy and the validity
of the Managing Committee.
14. The Head of the Institution and/or the Secretary of the School Managing
Committee shall be personally/jointly liable if any appointment is made
on the basis of panel prepared by the school authority by way of illegal
and irregular procedure or panel prepared against any unauthorised
vacancy not duly approved by the competent authority. Government shall
not bear any financial liability of such illegal or irregular appointment and
the District Inspector of Schools (SE) concerned shall not be bound to
accord approval or give any cognisance to such illegal appointment.”

21. Clauses 4, 5 and 17 of N OTIFICATION -II, on the other hand, are to the
following effect:
“4. Publication of Employment Notifications
21

(1) The appointment of teaching and non-teaching staff including the post
of Head Master/Head Mistress/Superintendent shall take place after
selection from the eligible candidates obtained through open
advertisement as per Annexure-I in at least two State-level dailies, of
which one will be in Bengali, in order to satisfy the provision of equality
of opportunity as enshrined in Article 16 of the Constitution of India.
(2) The Madrasah Managing Committee shall submit a prayer to the
concerned District Inspector of Schools for approval of service of the
candidate appointed through open advertisement for filing up the vacant
post of teaching and non-teaching staff including the post of Head
Master/Head Mistress/Superintendent as per Annexure II .
5. Selection Committee - The appointment shall be made by the Madrasah
Managing Committee which will frame the norms and selection
procedure, at least three months before the Written Test and Interview
of the appointment in question and the same is to be communicated to
the office of the District Inspector of Schools (PE)/(SE)/Additional District
Inspector of Schools (PE)/(SE) concerned and the Director of Madrasah
Education, West Bengal. The Madrasah Managing Committee shall also
constitute a selection committee for this purpose and intimate the same
to the concerned Inspector of Schools.
17. Statutory obligation
(1) The State Government in the Minority Affairs & Madrasah Education
Department or the Director of Madrasah Education or the District
Inspector of Schools (PE)/(SE) concerned shall not take any financial
responsibility for any appointment, if made in violation of these
Procedures.
(2) Recruitment procedure initiated before this notification, shall be
completed as per provisions of the Order No 93-SE/S/10R-14/2013 dated
9.2.15 of the School Education Department.”

22. Let us now test the substance of the petitioners’ claims as projected
before us by learned senior counsel/counsel. Each of the claims is
proposed to be dealt sequentially, as per names appearing in the
compilation chart provided by Mr. Ahmadi. While the findings returned by
the Committee qua each of the petitioners deserve to be accorded due
weight, our hands are not tied by its findings; an independent assessment
by us is intended in the interest of justice to satisfy our conscience and to
set the controversy at rest.
22

23. No. 1 – Raj Kumar Bag:
th
a). It is claimed by this petitioner that he was appointed on 20
January, 2016 as an Assistant Teacher to teach Environmental
36
Science/Studies in Gimageria Welfare High Madrasah (H.S.), Contai,
district Purba Medinipur.
b). In course of hearing, it transpired that there was no valid Managing
Committee in existence on the date this petitioner came to be appointed.
An Ad hoc Managing Committee (constituted by a Division Bench of the
th
High Court vide its interim order dated 17 June, 2014 and since
th
continued by the final order dated 24 July, 2014, passed in an intra-
37
court appeal ) was functional and it had appointed this petitioner. It is
noted that the Division Bench had restricted the functioning of such Ad
hoc Managing Committee to “day-to-day administration” of GWH
Madrasah.
c). Question that arises is, whether a process of appointment is
comprehended within the meaning of “day-to-day administration” which
the Ad hoc Managing Committee was only authorised to carry on, in the
given facts and circumstances as noted by the Division Bench in its two
orders?
d). In normal parlance, day-to-day administration encompasses
routine academic, administrative and financial functions necessary for
smooth running of the educational institution, such as conduct of classes

36
GWH Madrasah
37
MAT 943 of 2014
23

and examinations, observance of student and staff discipline, upkeep of
records and maintenance of campus, correspondence with authorities,
collection of fees, if any, payment of salaries to staff appointed on
sanctioned posts, sanction of routine leave for such staff, incurring petty
expenses, etc. but would exclude major policy matters such as infra-
structure development, creation of posts, prescription of pay scales or
recruitment to permanent vacancies, etc. All of these involve substantial
financial implications and policy choices, which lie beyond the ambit of
day-to-day administration.
e). Notably, the Ad hoc Managing Committee was not authorised by
the Division Bench to take any policy decision or to incur expenditure
other than what was required to run the day-to-day administration of
GWH Madrasah. Payment of salary and allowances to a newly appointed
teacher would necessarily involve substantial expenditure, which
obviously is not comprehended within the meaning of day-to-day
administration and was also not permitted. In the absence of express
authorisation, the argument of Mr. Kamat that the Ad hoc Managing
Committee did have the authority and competence to appoint this
petitioner defies logic and prudence.
f). Mr. Kamat, however, sought to draw support for the validity of the
recruitment process by referring to Rule 2(d) of the Management Rules.
According to him, Rule 2(d) defines appointing authority of a madrasah
to include an Ad hoc Managing Committee; ergo , in appointing this
petitioner the Ad hoc Managing Committee did not commit any illegality.
24

g). Support drawn by Mr. Kamat from Rule 2(d) of the Management
Rules is inconsequential as the said rule has no application to the facts
before us. Rule 8 of the Management Rules provide for supersession of a
Managing Committee by the Madrasah Education Board in certain
circumstances. An Ad hoc Managing Committee referred to in Rule 2(d)
would mean such a committee as the Madrasah Education Board may
appoint (as and when the situation therefor arises, to exercise the powers
and perform the functions of the Managing Committee) in exercise of
power conferred by and in terms of the provisions contained in Rule
8(1)(iii) of the Management Rules. An Ad hoc Managing Committee
appointed by the Court cannot, thus, be equated with an Ad hoc Managing
Committee appointed by the Madrasah Education Board. While the Ad hoc
Managing Committee appointed by the Madrasah Education Board can
exercise all the powers and perform all the functions of the Managing
Committee which has been superseded, the powers of the Court
appointed Ad hoc Managing Committee are limited by the very terms of
the Court’s order. The argument based on Rule 2(d) is, therefore,
overruled.
h). Assuming for a moment that Mr. Kamat’s argument of the Ad hoc
Managing Committee having the requisite authority to appoint this
petitioner has merit and could be accepted, yet, we find the Ad hoc
OTIFICATION
Managing Committee to be remiss in not following N -I to the
th th
tee. In terms of the orders dated 17 June, 2014 and 24 July, 2014 of
the Division Bench, the Additional District Inspector of Schools, Contai
25

was a member of the Ad hoc Managing Committee. He submitted a report
before the Committee that the rules of recruitment as per N OTIFICATION -I
OTIFICATION
were not followed. As per clause 7 of N -I, several steps had to
be initiated and communicated to the Director of School Education, West
38
Bengal and the DIoS concerned with relevant documents. We have not
been shown from the writ petition or any other affidavit filed in Court by
this petitioner that there was due observance of clause 7.
OTIFICATION
i). N -I does not specifically refer to the judgment and order
th
dated 12 March, 2014 of the Single Judge, yet, we cannot ignore that
the said notification was issued close on the heels of such judgment. The
very strict standards of selection for appointment that the MSC Act
envisaged, though no longer applicable in the manner as mandated
because of judicial intervention by the High Court, did neither vest the
Government in the School Education Department with any authority to
dilute the standards nor did it attempt to do so. A strict standard was
nevertheless sought to be maintained with the only change being the
identity of the selector: instead of the Commission, it became the
Managing Committee. Therefore, to accept the contention that the
provision should be read as directory would result in dilution of standards
which was neither intended nor permissible, since it would have the effect
of defeating the object of ensuring merit-based selection. We, thus, reject
Mr. Kamat’s contention that the requirement should be read as directory
and not as mandatory.

38
DSE, WB
26

j). Raj Kumar Bag’s claim of a valid appointment, thus, has to fail.
24. No.2 – Md. Saidul Islam:
a). This petitioner claimed that he was appointed as an Assistant
th
Teacher on 19 December, 2019 to teach History in Margram High
th
Madrasah (H.S.), district Birbhum pursuant whereto he joined on 26
December, 2019. Such appointment was preceded by his response to an
th
advertisement dated 27 October, 2018, participation in a written
rd
examination on 3 November, 2019 and appearance for an interview on
th
5 November, 2019.
b). The Committee made detailed observations as to why it did not
consider Md. Saidul Islam to have been validly appointed.
rd
c). It is noted that vide Office Memorandum dated 3 November, 2008
39
of the Director of Madrasah Education, West Bengal , 3 (three) additional
posts of Assistant Teacher were sanctioned for Margram High Madrasah.
One of these was a post in Social Science group. The said office
memorandum made it clear that the additional posts had to be retained
within 3 (three) years by submitting proposal for retention together with
requisite documents. However, no appointment on the additional post of
Assistant Teacher in Social Science group was made within 3 (three) years
rd
of 3 November, 2008; hence, no proposal for retention of such post was
forwarded within the stipulated period and it is reasonable to infer that
the sanction lapsed. It was on such non-existent post that this petitioner
came to be appointed. We have recorded these findings based on our

39
DME, WB
27

appreciation of the documents forming part of the affidavit of this
th
petitioner dated 14 December, 2025 (particularly pages 208 and 203-
204).
d). Mr. Kamat could not satisfactorily explain how this petitioner could
at all be appointed on a non-existent post. Although it was argued on
behalf of the respondents that there have been breaches of the guiding
norms, it is not considered necessary to examine that aspect in light of
the finding that we have reached, i.e., no appointment could have been
offered without there being a sanctioned post.
e). We, therefore, see no reason to hold that Md. Saidul Islam has been
subjected to any injustice.
25. No. 3 – Sahana Khatun:
th
a). This petitioner claimed that she was appointed on 8 February,
2015 as an Assistant Teacher in English in Hasnecha Islamia Siddiquia
40
Senior Madrasah , Birlapur, district South 24 Parganas.
b). The educational qualifications of this petitioner would reveal that
she graduated in the Bachelor of Arts examination from Vidyasagar
University with 34% marks and the Master of Arts examination from the
same university with 42.7% marks. Though the Committee observed that
she fell short of the required percentage (50%), we see no such
stipulation in Annexure-II of N OTIFICATION -I. To that extent, the Committee
must be held to have erred.

40
HISS Madrasah
28

c). However, where this petitioner’s claim is found to falter is that the
Managing Committee of HISS Madrasah failed to comply with clauses 5
OTIFICATION
and 7 of N -I. Neither were advertisements issued inviting
applications as required nor was the DSE, WB and/or the DIoS concerned
kept informed of the process.
d). In the absence of any vested or accrued legal right, Sahana Khatun
lacks the locus to maintain the writ petition.
26. No. 4 – Md. Abdur Rahman Gazi:
a). This petitioner claimed that he was appointed as an Assistant
th
Teacher on 27 February, 2016 to teach Geography in Sundarbon Hazi
41
Moffijaddin Towsel Ali Amjedia High Madrasah , district North 24
Parganas.
th
b). From the affidavit dated 14 December, 2025 filed by this
petitioner, it appears to be the admitted case that he responded to a public
th
notice dated 17 December, 2015 issued by the Managing Committee of
SHMTAAH Madrasah. There is no evidence of any advertisement published
in two State-level dailies, as required by clause 5 of N OTIFICATION -I. There
is also no evidence of compliance with clause 7 thereof.
c). In such circumstances, the claim of Md. Abdur Rahman Gazi of
being validly appointed is untenable.
27. No. 5 – Md. Mahmadur Rahman Laskar:
a). Mr. Khurshid argued this petitioner’s case claiming that he was
th
appointed as an Assistant Teacher on 28 January, 2016 to teach

41
SHMTAAH Madrasah
29

Kamil/Theology in Chhayani Islamia Senior Madrasah, Bamanpukur,
district North 24 Parganas.
b). During arguments, it came to light that a fair and transparent
recruitment process was not followed in terms of N OTIFICATION -I, which
laid down the guiding principle. No advertisement was issued, and this
petitioner did not possess the requisite qualification for an appointment.
Faced with such a situation, Mr. Khurshid prayed for invocation of Article
142 of the Constitution.
c). Article 142 does not run on a single track. Doing complete justice
is not a mechanical exercise; it is contextual in the sense that interests of
all concerned deserve consideration. Protecting the service of an ineligible
teacher cannot be at the cost of the future of students. We regret, Article
142 cannot be invoked in such a case.
d). The claim of Md. Mahamudur Rahman Laskar is, thus, absolutely
without any substance or merit.
28. No.6 – Salma Sultana:
th
a). This petitioner claimed that she was appointed on 14 November,
2019 as an Assistant Teacher to teach Geography in Enayatpur
42
Rameswarpur Siddiquia Asrafia Senior Madrasah , district South 24
Parganas.
th
b). Vide communication dated 26 August, 2014, the Madrasah
Education Board reconstituted the Managing Committee of the said
madrasah and extended its life for a period of 3 (three) years with effect

42
ERSA Sr. Madrasah
30

th th
from 6 June, 2014. Subsequently, the life was further extended till 30
November, 2017. It appears that challenging a show cause notice seeking
explanation for not reconstituting the Managing Committee of ERSA Sr.
Madrasah, the High Court’s writ jurisdiction was invoked by Md. Ruhulla
43 st
Gazi, the Secretary of the said madrasah . An interim order dated 31
August, 2017 passed by the High Court reveals that it was dealing with
the case of a Managing Committee of an unnamed madrasah whose life
had expired in May, 2016. This observation obviously could not have
related to ERSA Sr. Madrasah because if the communications on record
are true and correct, the Managing Committee of ERSA Sr. Madrasah had
life until end of November, 2017. It has not been explained to us why, in
the first place, the writ petition by Md. Ruhulla Gazi was necessitated
when the life of the Managing Committee of ERSA Sr. Madrasah was yet
to expire. Be that as it may, it is further revealed that having regard to
conclusion of submission on behalf of the writ petitioners before it and the
Advocate General being in the midst of his arguments, the High Court
protected the day-to-day functioning of the erstwhile Managing
Committee. Recording that the Managing Committee in the eye of law was
defunct but was de facto continuing to function, the High Court restrained
the Madrasah Education Board from taking any coercive measures during
the pendency of the writ petition; however, monthly statements of
accounts were directed to be filed with such board. The writ petition, we

43
W.P. No.11856(W) of 2017 and connected matters
31

were informed and as per our search on the website of the High Court, is
still pending.
c). Certain additional facts, placed on record by this petitioner, now
deserve notice and deliberation. As noted, the judgment in Civil Appeal
No.5808 of 2017 [ Sk. Mohd. Rafique (supra)] and connected matters
th
was pronounced on 6 January, 2020. The coordinate Bench, however,
th
had reserved judgment on 13 December, 2018. Between the dates of
th
judgment being reserved and its pronouncement, an order dated 13
44
June, 2019 was passed by this Court (Vacation Bench) on a writ petition
filed by the Managing Committee of Majna High Madrasah. The said order,
which is of some significance as would unfold hereafter, reads as follows:
“Let this writ petition be placed before the Bench which has passed the order
dated 13.12.2018 in Civil Appeal No.5808 of 2017 etc., immediately after the
vacation.
In the meanwhile, in terms of the Notification dated 04.03.2016, to which
there is no challenge, the process of appointment of teachers on short term
contract basis may be commenced. However, the appointments shall be
finalized with the leave of this court.
Needless to mention that persons who possess the prescribed qualifications
shall be considered for appointment.”

d). Soon thereafter, the Secretary, ERSA Sr. Madrasah published an
th
advertisement in, inter alia , an English newspaper on 5 July, 2019,
inviting applications from eligible candidates for filling up 10 (ten) posts
of Assistant Teachers in various subjects. It is reflected from the legible
paper cutting produced in Court that it was an advertisement for
recruitment as per N OTIFICATION -II.

44
Writ Petition (C) No.758 of 2019
32

e). It is this petitioner’s case that 1 (one) post of Assistant Teacher in
Social Science had been sanctioned for ERSA Sr. Madrasah vide
th
sanctioning order bearing P.P.No.20/1(1) PAT dated 4 June, 2013.
Vacancy on the post of Assistant Teacher in Geography (Pass) was one of
10 (ten) vacancies that was advertised. She had responded to such
rd
advertisement, appeared in the written test on 23 October, 2019 and
th
was interviewed on 26 October, 2019. Being the holder of a Master’s
degree in Geography and a Bachelor’s degree in Education, it was her
claim that she was duly qualified for appointment. She was ultimately
th
selected and an appointment letter dated 14 November, 2019 issued,
pursuant whereto she joined as an Assistant Teacher in Social Science on
th
20 November, 2019.
th
f). The affidavit dated 14 December, 2025 filed by this petitioner
reveals that the Secretary, ERSA Sr. Madrasah had, vide his letter dated
th
16 July, 2019, forwarded to the DIoS concerned the schedule of dates
of written examination and interview for filling up the 10 (ten) vacant
th
posts. Reference was made therein to the order of this Court dated 13
June, 2019, as if this Court had permitted ERSA Sr. Madrasah to proceed
with the recruitment process as per N OTIFICATION -II (though the fact is
that the writ petition had been instituted by Majna High Madrasah and the
Secretary of its Managing Committee).
th
g). Two questions arise here. First, whether the order dated 13 June,
2019 permitted ERSA Sr. Madrasah to proceed with the recruitment
process following N OTIFICATION -II, as referred to in the Secretary’s letter
33

th
dated 16 July, 2019? If yes, did the Secretary, ERSA Sr. Madrasah have
the authority to finalize the appointment of the petitioner without
obtaining leave of this Court?
h). While venturing to answer the first question, we undertook a search
to find out whether on any writ petition instituted by ERSA Sr. Madrasah,
this Court passed any order similar to the one passed on the writ petition
of the Managing Committee of Majna High Madrasah. Our search has
revealed that ERSA Sr. Madrasah did not file any independent writ petition
seeking permission from this Court to proceed with the recruitment
process. In such view of the matter, we hold that ERSA Sr. Madrasah could
th
not have initiated recruitment process by referring to the order dated 13
June, 2019 passed by the Vacation Bench of this Court. The said order
being confined to the writ petition of the Managing Committee of Majna
High Madrasah, we hold that the Secretary of ERSA Sr. Madrasah
th
misrepresented facts in his letter dated 16 July, 2019 by projecting such
an order as the source of validation for the recruitment process initiated
by him.
th
i). Assuming that the order dated 13 June, 2019 passed by the
Vacation Bench of this Court or similar such order did apply to ERSA Sr.
Madrasah too, the terms of such order permitted commencement of
recruitment process on short term contract basis and appointments could
be finalized only with the leave of this Court. The appointment letter
issued to this petitioner neither refers to appointment on short term
34

contract basis nor does it record that the same was preceded by leave
obtained from this Court.
j). On these grounds alone, the claim of this petitioner ought to fail.
k). Mr. Kamat, however, sought to draw support for the validity of the
st
recruitment process by referring to the interim order dated 31 August,
2017 of the High Court on the writ petition filed by Md. Ruhulla Gazi.
l). What was observed and permitted by the High Court vide its order
st
dated 31 August, 2017 in relation to functionality of the Ad hoc Managing
Committee has been noted above and is, thus, not repeated. For the same
reasons that we have assigned while dealing with the claim of Raj Kumar
Bag, we reject the argument of Mr. Kamat that in terms of the interim
st
order dated 31 August, 2017, the Ad hoc Managing Committee of ERSA
Sr. Madrasah was competent to initiate and conclude the recruitment
process.
th
m). Nonetheless, the advertisement dated 5 July, 2019 and the
th
appointment letter dated 14 November, 2019 issued to this petitioner
clearly stipulated that the appointment shall be subject to the final
outcome of Civil Appeal No. 5808 of 2017, which was pending before this
Court at the relevant time. Civil Appeal No. 5808 of 2017 having been
allowed by this Court vide Sk. Mohd. Rafique (supra), the vires of the
MSC Act stood upheld. Appointments of teachers and non-teaching staff
in the madrasahs could, therefore, be made only in terms of the
recommendations of the Commission and not otherwise. This petitioner
35

can, therefore, derive no benefit of the recruitment process in which she
allegedly participated.
n). Before parting with the claim of this petitioner, we wish to
additionally observe that the advertisement published in the English daily
th
on 5 July, 2019 placed by Mr. Kamat before us has caused quite an
unease and meets our disapproval. Publication of the advertisement in
the said newspaper, in our opinion, failed to have the requisite impact.
Inviting applications for appointment to the post of teachers in a village
madrasah, located within the jurisdictional limits of Police Station Kulpi in
the district of South 24-Parganas (which is towards the extreme southern
tip of West Bengal and lying on the transit corridor to the Sunderbans) by
issuing an advertisement which is printed on a page where tender notices
45
were majorly published , smacks of an attempt to keep deserving
candidates unaware and restrict the selection to a limited zone of
consideration, and thereby frustrate the object of wide publicity. Such an
attempt can and should never be countenanced by any court, much less
this Court.
o). Be that as it may, appointment of Salma Sultana being clearly
illegal, she has no enforceable legal right and, therefore, no justiciable
claim.
29. No. 7 – Shikha Khatun:

45
by Jawahar Lal Nehru Port Trust, Maharashtra Pollution Control Board, Central Power Research Institute, South
Eastern Railway, Eastern Railway, Asansol Municipal Corporation, etc.
36

a). This petitioner claimed that she was appointed as an Assistant
th
Teacher on 6 April, 2016 to teach English in Ghola NHM High Madrasah,
Milki, district Murshidabad.
b). The Committee recorded that despite notice being served, this
petitioner did not turn up for verification of her credentials. From the
documents that were produced before the Committee by the Teacher-in-
Charge of Ghola NHM High Madrasah, it was established that neither the
recruitment rules were followed nor did she ever work as an Assistant
Teacher. The claim was rejected as false and fabricated.
c). Mr. Roy contended on behalf of this petitioner that after her
appointment, the proposal for approval of service was forwarded to the
DIoS concerned and this, by itself, is proof of her appointment.
d). However, statements made by the State in its counter affidavit
reveals that no communication at all was received from the Managing
Committee of Ghola NHM High Madrasah with regard to initiation and/or
completion of the selection process, as required by N OTIFICATION -I.
Reliance has been placed on the report submitted by the DIoS in this
regard in which he categorically stated that there was no communication
relating to recruitment of this petitioner. Furthermore, the State in its
affidavit has also relied upon the report of the Committee to reiterate its
observation regarding the claim of this petitioner being false and
fabricated.
e). Rejoinder affidavit of this petitioner does not bring on record any
documentary evidence to disprove the assertion of the State that the
37

terms of the relevant recruitment rules were not followed. Queries put to
Mr. Roy were also not answered to our satisfaction. Neither is it proved by
this petitioner that there was an advertisement inviting applications
published in two daily newspapers as required by clause 5 of N OTIFICATION -
I and that steps as required by clause 7 of such notification were taken,
nor is it shown that she came to be appointed following due recruitment
process where she was made to compete with other equally eligible
aspirants for securing an appointment.
f). We, thus, do not feel persuaded to agree with the contention that
Shikha Khatun has been wrongfully deprived of the benefits of a
legitimate appointment.
30. No. 8 – Rajiun Kasfima:
th
a). Claim of this petitioner is that she was appointed on 18 December,
2015 as a Clerk in Debkunda High Madrasah, district Murshidabad.
b). The Committee recorded having perused the Resolution Book of the
Managing Committee, Debkunda High Madrasah and found no resolution
in relation to appointment of this petitioner. Moreover, the Teacher-in-
Charge and the DIoS concerned appeared before the Committee and
stated that the documents filed by this petitioner were false and
fabricated.
c). Similar to the case of Shikha Khatun, the State has specifically
averred in its affidavit that no selection process was followed in case of
this petitioner’s appointment and it has placed reliance on the report of
the Committee, which records the same finding. The State has also
38

averred that no advertisement inviting applications was published in the
State-level daily newspapers and no publication has been placed on
record by this petitioner. Furthermore, no communication regarding this
petitioner’s appointment was ever made to the DIoS concerned, a fact
duly corroborated by the report submitted by such inspector.
d). While we have no valid reason to doubt the observations of the
Committee, we made a query regarding the advertisement inviting
applications. Queerly, it is not the case of this petitioner too that she
noticed an advertisement published in any daily newspaper pursuant to
which she responded and offered her candidature. As per this petitioner’s
th
own showing, the advertisement dated 9 September, 2015 (Annexure
R-3) upon issuance by the Secretary, Debkunda High Madrasah was
displayed at Beldanga Block Development Office, Beldanga Railway
Station, Beldanga Bus Stand and Beldanga Police Station. At best, this is
localised advertising instead of Statewide publication, which the
recruitment rules ordained and is also expected by the Courts for
appointment on public posts in terms of Article 16.
e). In view of the above, we conclude that no injustice has been caused
to Rajiun Kasfima.
31. No. 9 - Md. Eliyas:
a). This petitioner claimed that he was appointed as an Assistant
th
Teacher on 13 July, 2018 to teach Bengali in Milangarh Senior Madrasah,
th
district Malda and has been discharging his duty since 16 July, 2018.
39

b). During the hearing, it emerged that a fair and transparent
recruitment process was not followed in terms of N OTIFICATION -II, which
laid down the guiding principle. No advertisement was issued, and the
petitioner obtained employment based on a walk-in interview. Neither
OTIFICATION OTIFICATION
N -I nor N -II contemplates a walk-in interview.
c). Ms. Acharya representing this petitioner had to concede that the
norms/guidelines laying down the selection process were observed in
complete breach. She, however, claimed this petitioner’s regularisation in
46
service based on the decisions of this Court in Jaggo v.Union of India
47
and Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam .
d). We find no merit in such prayer. First, this petitioner has not
claimed the relief of regularisation in the writ petition. Grant of relief
beyond the prayer clauses, though normally impermissible, could be
considered in exceptional cases. This does not qualify to be an exceptional
case warranting departure from the settled rule of “no prayer, no relief”.
Secondly, the question of regularisation in service does not arise in this
case because of the nature of breach that has occasioned. This Court in
Jaggo (supra) and even in the most recent decision in Sukhendu
Bhattacharjee (supra) might have taken a liberal view but such views
have to be read as confined to its own facts rather than laying down law
which is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution. State of

46
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826
47
2026 SCC OnLine SC 909
40

48 49
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) and Official Liquidator v. Dayanand
are larger Bench decisions of this Court. The ratio laid down therein has
neither been doubted nor diluted by any Bench of co-equal strength. The
principle of stare decisis and Article 141 of the Constitution leaves us with
no choice. Article 141 commands and the law declared in Umadevi
(supra) and Dayanand (supra) binds all. Ratio, if any, laid down in the
said decisions of Benches of lesser strength is debatable and we are not
persuaded to follow the same.
e). Md. Eliyas, thus, has not suffered any legal grievance and has
absolutely no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on.
32. No. 10 – Kazi Md. Jahirul Hassan:
th
a). Claiming that this petitioner was appointed on 20 December, 2019
as an Assistant Teacher in Physics in Abdul Motalib High Madrasah,
Dhunki, district Howrah, Mr. Bhattacharya appearing on his behalf argued
OTIFICATION
that the terms of N -II were duly followed and the Committee
erred in returning a contra-finding.
b). The specific case pleaded in the counter affidavit of the respondents
is that of non-adherence to the terms of N OTIFICATION -II. Neither the DME,
WB nor the DIoS concerned was informed of the steps taken by the
Managing Committee to conduct the selection process as well as the
norms and the procedure for selection as per clause 5 of N OTIFICATION -II.

48
(2006) 4 SCC 1
49
(2008) 10 SCC 1
41

c). Pleadings in the writ petition being deficient, we permitted filing of
additional/supplementary affidavit to provide the relevant particulars in
th
terms of the order dated 19 November, 2025. Though this petitioner filed
two applications to bring on record additional documents – one prior to
th
and the other post the order dated 19 November, 2025 – and a
“ STATEMENT WITH ALL ORDERS ”, the contents thereof do not advance his case.
d). It is revealed from the earlier application supported by an affidavit
th
dated 17 November, 2025 that the Managing Committee of Abdul Motalib
High Madrasah had initiated recruitment process for appointment on 12
(twelve) posts of Assistant Teachers by publishing a combined
th
advertisement on 12 July, 2019.
th
e). An appointment letter dated 20 December, 2019 issued to this
petitioner reflects a conditional appointment. Expressly, it was mentioned
that salary would be admissible as and when such appointment is
approved by the competent authority; also, appointment, joining and
payment of salary would be subject to the result of pending case, if any,
in this regard before this Court.
f). Similarly worded appointment letters bearing the same reference
th
no. (09/2019) and even date (20 December, 2019) issued to two others,
viz. Rubina Amin [appointed as Assistant Teacher in Arabic (Pass)] and
Sk. Samsul Bari [appointed as Assistant Teacher in Mathematics
(Hons/PG)] have been placed on record by such application.
g). It is interesting to note that not only are the joining letters of this
petitioner, Rubina Amin and Sk. Samsul Bari verbatim same (except the
42

posts on which they were appointed), the dates of joining of all 3 (three)
th
are also the same, i.e., 28 December, 2019. Moreover, from a letter
st
dated 31 December, 2019 of the Secretary, Abdul Motalib High Madrasah
addressed to the DIoS concerned seeking approval of service of all 12
th
(twelve) teachers, it appears that all of them joined on 28 December,
2019. Although not impossible, it seems quite strange that all 12 (twelve)
appointees would join on the same date.
h). There is, however, more than what meets the eyes. This petitioner
th
filed another application supported by an affidavit dated 11 December,
th
2025 in pursuance of our order dated 19 November, 2025. Such
st
application also has the letter dated 31 December, 2019, referred to
above, as an annexure.
i). As per the subsequent application, Abdul Motalib High Madrasah
has a sanctioned strength of 33 (thirty-three) teachers. Since 12 (twelve)
vacancies were to be filled simultaneously, it seems to be clear that more
rd
than 1/3 of the sanctioned posts were vacant. If indeed a recruitment
process had been undertaken in accordance with law culminating in the
th
appointees reporting for joining on 28 December, 2019, one would have
expected expedition in seeking approval of the services of the teachers.
st
However, it defies logic as to why the letter dated 31 December, 2019 of
the Secretary, Abdul Motalib High Madrasah was served in the office of
th
the DIoS concerned on 18 February, 2020. We sought an explanation
from Mr. Bhattacharya, but in vain. He could not throw light on why the
Secretary delayed his approach.
43

st th
j). Service of the letter dated 31 December, 2019 as late as on 18
February, 2020, more particularly after this Court in Sk. Mohd. Rafique
th
(supra) had upheld the MSC Act as intra vires on 6 January, 2020, is
sufficient to arouse suspicion [in light of the appointment letters bearing
the same reference number, the verbatim same joining letters of the 3
(three) appointees referred to above and all 12 (twelve) appointees
joining on the same date] and to support a reasonable inference that the
documents relating to appointment, joining and seeking approval of
service of the appointees have been ante-dated to lend colour of a prior
recruitment process which is ex facie illegal, a nullity and thus cannot
confer any right on the beneficiaries.
k). We, therefore, unhesitatingly record that the entire exercise is
vitiated by manifest fraud. The appointment of this petitioner, in view of
the ante-dated documents, pollutes the stream of public employment and
strikes at the foundation of a fair and transparent recruitment process.
l). Thus, Kazi Md. Jahirul Hassan is held to have failed to disclose any
legal right, much less its infringement, warranting interference.
33. No. 11 – Sk. Saifuddin:
a). The name of this petitioner appears in the compilation chart
provided by Mr. Ahmadi combined with Raj Kumar Bag as a co-petitioner
in WP (C) 557 of 2024, and not against a separate serial number.
th
b). It is claimed that he was appointed as a Group D Staff on 20
st
January, 2016 in GWH Madrasah pursuant whereto he joined on 1
February, 2016.
44

c). The reason for not entertaining the claim of Raj Kumar Bag applies
mutatis mutandis to this petitioner. The Ad hoc Managing Committee for
th
GWH Madrasah, constituted in terms of the interim order dated 17 June,
th
2014 and continued by the final order dated 24 July, 2014 of the Division
Bench of the High Court, lacked the authority to initiate the recruitment
process.
d). The Ad hoc Managing Committee having undertaken the
recruitment process without authority, the claim of Sk. Saifuddin must
also fail.
34. No.12 – Mosaddek Hossain:
a). This petitioner figures in the compilation chart provided by Mr.
Ahmadi along with Abdur Rahman Gazi as a co-petitioner in WP (C) 653
of 2024, and not against a separate serial number.
b). It is claimed that he was appointed as a Laboratory Attendant on
th
30 January, 2016 in SHMTAAH Madrasah, district North 24 Parganas
th
pursuant whereto he joined on 8 February, 2016.
c). Whatever has been found against Abdur Rahman Gazi squarely
applies to this petitioner too.
d). Proper recruitment procedure not having been followed, the claim
of Mosaddek Hossain cannot be entertained.
35. No. 13 – Md. Mir Mosarraf Hossain:
a). The claim of this petitioner (not included in the compilation chart
provided by Mr. Ahmadi) is being considered based on a justified appeal
th
made by Ms. Choudhury. Referring to paragraph 7 of our order dated 19
45

November, 2025, Ms. Choudhury submitted that 5 (five) cases of non-
teaching staff were allowed to be projected. Since the cases of only 3
(three) non-teaching staff have been projected and argued, she prayed
for an opportunity. We found Ms. Choudhury to be right in her submission;
hence, we proceed with consideration of the claim of this petitioner which
stands on a slightly different footing.
th
b). This petitioner’s claim is that he was appointed on 8 October, 2015
50
on the post of Clerk in Milangarh Sajjadia High Madrasah , district Malda.
th
The appointment letter dated 8 October, 2015 issued to this petitioner
reads as follows:
“By the order of the Management as per decision on Dated 08/10/2015,
vide meeting No.13/M.C./2015, I am to inform you that you are appointed
to act as Clerk of the Madrasah in the vacancy of Non Teaching Group-C
staff in the Madrasah under the 10% Management Quota of the above
mentioned Govt. Notification (Item No.6).
Salary will be admissible as and when the letter of your appointment is duly
approved by the competent authority with the salary of Rupees 8,840/-
(Basic Pay) including Grade Pay and Other Allowances per month as per G.A.
Rule in the Scale of Pay Rupees 5,400/--25,200/- and Grade Pay of Rupees
2,600/- with effect from the date of joining in the said Madrasah.
You are also requested to join the duty of the Madrasah within seven (7)
day.
It is noted that all these would be subject to the result of pending case if
any in this regard before the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court/Supreme Court.”

th
c). A letter written by this petitioner on 8 October, 2015, addressed
th
to the Secretary of MSH Madrasah, reveals that he joined his post on 14
October, 2015. The discrepancy is telling, which is not explained.
d). In any event, the appointment letter cautioned this petitioner that
his appointment and joining would be subject to the result of the pending

50
MSH Madrasah
46

case before the High Court/this Court. This is clear indication that the
appointment was conditional.
e). Insofar as the mode and manner of appointment of this petitioner
is concerned, it is clear that he was accommodated in the 10%
OTIFICATION
management quota permitted by clause 6 of N -I. Clause 6
reads as follows:
“6. Not more than 10% of the total sanctioned posts including the
post of the Headmaster/Headmistress/Assistant Headmaster/Assistant
Headmistress of the concerned school may be kept reserved and to be filled
up from the members of the minority organization to which the educational
institution belongs. No separate advertisement will be required. But the
minimum academic qualification, professional qualifications, teaching
experience, age limit and citizenship as specified for recruitment for the post
shall not be relaxed under any circumstance.”

f). Bare perusal of clause 6 evinces that no advertisement was
required to be issued. Anyone being a member of the minority
organisation to which the educational institution belongs, subject to
fulfilment of academic and professional qualifications, age and citizenship,
could be appointed as per the choice of the Managing Committee. This
clause, introduced subsequent to striking down of the provisions of the
MSC Act, effectively negated merit-based selection at least in respect of
10% of the sanctioned posts thereby offending the mandate flowing from
law.
g). However, because of his conditional appointment, this petitioner
has no legally protected right which can be judicially enforced. With the
decision in Sk. Mohd. Rafique (supra), the MSC Act was upheld and
N OTIFICATION -I ( qua the recognised aided madrasahs) and N OTIFICATION -II,
which held the field in the interregnum, stood impliedly repealed and
47

ceased to be operative. Since this petitioner’s appointment was subject
to the result of pending cases, if any, before the High Court/this Court,
allowing of Civil Appeal No.5808 of 2017 rendered such appointment non-
est , being contrary to law.
OTIFICATION
h). Even otherwise, though not challenged, clause 6 of N -I
is wholly unconstitutional. Appointment on a post entailing expenditure
from the public exchequer cannot be made save by a procedure consistent
with the principle of equality and equal opportunity enshrined in the
Constitution. Such clause sanctions a closed-door appointment process
for posts funded from the public exchequer, thereby taking it outside the
ambit of safeguards for public employment. A regime where public money
is used to sustain private patronage in appointments cannot, thus, be
countenanced.
i). Keeping these principles in mind, it seems that this petitioner stole
a march merely because he is a Muslim. Why any other Muslim aspirant
was not considered, is not forthcoming. Competition among eligible
members of the Muslim community would have brought about a
semblance of fairness, transparency and legitimacy in the recruitment
process, which at least could be urged as a factor for sustaining clause 6.
j). Appointment without facing any competition being the anti-thesis
of Articles 14 and 16, a complete exemption from competition is
indefensible once Government aid is received. Aid without accountability
is constitutionally unsustainable. Minority right under clause (1) of Article
30 of the Constitution does not and cannot include the right to burden the
48

exchequer with appointments made through a non-competitive, opaque
process.
k). Md. Mir Mosarraf Hossain’s appointment being based on clause 6 of
N OTIFICATION -I cannot, therefore, persuade us to hold that the same was
validly made.
36. The stage has now reached to record our conclusions.
37. A wholesome consideration of the materials placed on record completely
contradict the claims of the 13 (thirteen) petitioners that they were validly
appointed in the madrasahs concerned. Spurious claims have been raised
by these 13 (thirteen) petitioners, which obviously are devoid of any
merit. The appointments in question are a blot on the system; they must,
therefore, be erased and not protected.
38. The above 13 (thirteen) petitioners, it was claimed, were the worst victims
of arbitrary action. If this be the high-water mark of arbitrariness alleged,
the cases of the other petitioners must necessarily be still weaker and
undeserving of attention. One can only speculate as to what merit, if any,
the cases of the others disclose to justify invocation of the writ jurisdiction
of this Court for relief. Since none of these 13 (thirteen) petitioners has
set up any case for interference, we are not inclined to look into the claim
of any of the other petitioners.
39. We now proceed to consider the argument of Mr. Ahmadi, recorded in
paragraph 18. Such an argument commands attention for providing an
additional reason in law to invalidate the appointments of all the
49

th
petitioners who came to be appointed after 14 March, 2016, without this
Court’s leave.
40. In this connection, we bear in mind the distinction carved out by this Court
between quashing of an order and staying operation of an order. In Shree
Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust
51
Association , a 3-Judge Bench explained:
10. … While considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation
of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing
of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in
the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of the passing of the
order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not,
however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been
stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order
and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence.
… .

th
41. In view of the order dated 14 March, 2016 granting stay, the judgment
and order of the Division Bench under appeal, in which the judgment and
th
order dated 12 March, 2014 of the Single Judge had merged, did not get
“wiped out from existence” . However, definitely the same was the
th
operative judgment and order until 14 March, 2016; and, as soon as the
stay was granted, it became inoperative. The order of stay read with the
th
subsequent order dated 17 May, 2018, referred to above, thus, created
a vacuum. Neither the MSC Act nor N OTIFICATION -I or N OTIFICATION -II could
operate, which were issued in the aftermath of the two judicial decisions
(Single Bench and Division Bench) of the High Court. To overcome the
stalemate regarding filling up of vacancies, the Managing Committees of

51
(1992) 3 SCC 1
50

the madrasahs seeking to fill up vacant posts ought to have approached
this Court to guide them as to which law should they follow. They could
not have, on their own, proceeded with the appointment process
perceiving N OTIFICATION -I or N OTIFICATION -II to be still valid and operative
qua the madrasahs. As a stream cannot rise above its source,
N OTIFICATION -I and N OTIFICATION -II, owing its existence to the judgments of
th
the Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court dated 12 March,
th
2014 and 9 December, 2015, respectively, could not remain operational
once the latter judgment was stayed. Indeed, appointments came to be
made in a couple of cases post reservation of judgment in Civil Appeal
No.5808 of 2017 by this Court. The undue haste in making the
appointments without waiting for pronouncement of the reserved
judgment and/or the ante-dating of documents to evade the
consequences thereof, speak for itself. Finding merit in Mr. Ahmadi’s
argument, and apart from what we have held above as to unsustainability
of the petitioners’ claims, we also hold that any appointment made in any
th
madrasah after 14 March, 2016 without obtaining express permission of
this Court is also ex facie illegal and cannot be sustained.
42. Consequently, we do hereby reject the claims of all the petitioners. Since
the claims stand rejected, there is no question of these petitioners being
entitled to any arrears of salary and allowances. Appointments not having
OTIFICATION OTIFICATION
been made either in accordance with N -I or N -II, the
State cannot be fastened with any liability to release payment. Orders
passed on the writ petitions restraining the respondents from dislodging
51

these petitioners from service and/or directing payment of admissible
salary and allowances stand vacated forthwith.
43. For the reasons aforesaid, the entire batch of writ petitions fails and are,
hereby, dismissed.
44. Since the interim orders have been vacated, the vacant sanctioned posts
may now be filled up as per the recommendations of the Commission.
45. The writ petitions being thoroughly misconceived, we would have been
justified in imposing costs. However, since we are not directing release of
arrears of salary and allowances and also taking a lenient view, we refrain
from burdening the petitioners with costs.
46. Connected applications, if pending, shall stand disposed of.



…………………......…………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)




……………………….…………………J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 13, 2026.







52