ULTRAVIBRANT INTEGRATED ENERGY LIMITED vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN
- Court
- Rajasthan High Court
[2026:RJ-JP:46365]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
(1) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16017/2026
CNR: RJHC020795102026 | URN: CW / 34026U / 2026
MIPHI Semicon India Private Limited, (A Subsidiary/Special
Purpose Vehicle of Micromax Informatics Limited) is a Company
incorporated and registered under the provisions of Companies
Act having its registered office at 21/14, Block-A, PH-2, Naraina
Industrial Area, Naraina Industrial Estate, New Delhi, South West
Delhi- 110028, Delhi through its authorized signatory Mr.
Narendra Kumar.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, Energy
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Main Building
Government Secretariat Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
2. Union of India, Ministry of Power (NRE Section) through
its Director, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi
110001.
3. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (RVUNL),
through its Chairman, having its office at Vidyut Bhawan,
Janpath, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur -302005, Rajasthan.
4. Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC),
through its Secretary, Vidhyut Viniyamak Bhawan,
Sahakar Marg, Near State Motor Garage, Jaipur 302001,
Rajasthan.
5. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited (RVPN),
through its Managing Director, having its office at Vidyut
Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
6. Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Limited
(RRECL), through its Managing Director, having its Office
at E-166, Yudhister Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur-302005,
Rajasthan.
7. Rajasthan Urja Vikas and IT Services Limited (RUVITL),
Chairman and Managing Director, having its office at
Vidyut Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
Connected With
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(2) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7761/2026
CNR: RJHC020391942026 | URN: CW / 17003U / 2026
Ultravibrant Integrated Energy Limited, (formerly known as
Ultravibrant Solar Energy Limited, prior to that Ultravibrant Solar
Energy Private Limited) is a company incorporated and
registered under the provisions of Companies Act having its
registered office at Plot No. F-20A, Malviya Industrial Area,
Malviya Nagar, Near Hotel Hill View, Jaipur-302017, Rajasthan
through its authorized signatory Mr. Nitesh Kumar Jangir S/o
Nandlal Jangir, aged about 28 years.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, Energy
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Main Building
Government Secretariat Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
2. Union of India, Ministry of Power (NRE Section) through
Its Director, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi
- 110001.
3. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (RVUNL),
through its Chairman, having its office at Vidyut Bhawan,
Janpath, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur -302005, Rajasthan.
4. Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC),
through its Secretary, Vidhyut Viniyamak Bhawan,
Sahakar Marg, Near State Motor Garage, Jaipur - 302001,
Rajasthan.
5. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited (RVPN),
through its Managing Director, having its office at Vidyut
Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
6. Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Limited
(RRECL), through its Managing Director, having its office
At E-166, Yudhister Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur-302005,
Rajasthan.
7. Rajasthan Urja Vikas and IT Services Limited (RUVITL),
Chairman and Managing Director, having its office at
Vidyut Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
(3) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7901/2026
CNR: RJHC020392032026 | URN: CW / 17310U / 2026
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Diwakar Renewable and Indra Private Limited, is a company
incorporated and registered under the provisions of Companies
Act having its registered office at 18, Deepak Vatika, Badarwas
Gopalpura Bypass, Mansarovar , Jaipur, Rajasthan and Corporate
Office at Office No.31 and 31A, 5Th Floor, Mahima Trinity Mall,
Swej Farm, Jaipur through its Authorized Signatory Mr. Robin
Kumar Goyal S/o. Mr. Rajesh Kumar Goyal, Aged About 33 years.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, Energy
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Main Building
Government Secretariat Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
2. Union of India, Ministry of Power (NRE Section) through
its Director, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi -
110001.
3. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (RUVNL),
through its Chairman, having its Office at Vidyut Bhawan,
Janpath, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur -302005, Rajasthan.
4. Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC),
through its Secretary, Vidhyut Viniyamak Bhawan,
Sahakar Marg, Near State Motor Garage, Jaipur - 302001,
Rajasthan.
5. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited (RVPN),
through its Managing Director, having its office at Vidyut
Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
6. Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Limited
(RRECL), through its Managing Director, having its Office
at Vidyut Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
7. Rajasthan Urja Vikas and IT Services Limited (RUVITL),
Chairman and Managing Director, having its office at
Vidyut Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
(4) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11026/2026
CNR: RJHC020599522026 | URN: CW / 24500U / 2026
Bhagwati Industrial Group Limited, (formerly known as Bhagwati
Lacto Vegetarian Exports Private Limited) is a company
incorporated and Registered under the provisions of Companies
Act having its registered office at 18-1/2, Old Anaj Mandi,
Ferozepur Cantt.-152001, Punjab, India through its Authorized
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Signatory Mr. Munish Goyal.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, Energy
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Main Building
Government Secretariat Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
2. Union of India, Ministry of Power (NRE Section) through
its Director, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi -
110001.
3. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (RVUNL),
through its Chairman, having its office at Vidyut Bhawan,
Janpath, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur -302005, Rajasthan.
4. Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC),
through its Secretary, Vidhyut Viniyamak Bhawan,
Sahakar Marg, Near State Motor Garage, Jaipur - 302001,
Rajasthan.
5. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited (RVPN),
through its Managing Director, having its office at Vidyut
Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
6. Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Limited
(RRECL), through its Managing Director, having its office
at E-166, Yudhister Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur-302005,
Rajasthan.
7. Rajasthan Urja Vikas and IT Services Limited (RUVITL),
Chairman and Managing Director, having its office at
Vidyut Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
(5) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13197/2026
CNR: RJHC020686562026 | URN: CW / 28934U / 2026
M/s Stockwell Solar Services Private Limited, through its
Authorized Signatory, Mr. Bhawani Singh Gaur, having its
registered office at Office No. A-303, 304, III Floor, A Block, KGK
Lehariya, Sanganer, Jaipur, Rajasthan- 302029.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, Energy
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Main Building
Government Secretariat Jaipur, Rajasthan- 302005.
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2. Union of India, Ministry of Power (NRE Section) through
its Director, Shram Shakti Bhawa, Rafi Marg, New Delhi-
110001.
3. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (RVUNL),
through its Chairman, having its office at Vidyut Bhawan,
Janpath, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan- 302005.
4. Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC),
Through its Secretary, Vidyut Viniyamak Bhawan,
Sahakar Marg, Near State Motor Garage, Jaipur,
Rajasthan- 302001.
5. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited (RVPN),
through its Managing Director, having its office at Vidyut
Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan- 302005.
6. Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Limited
(RRECL), through its Managing Director, having its office
at D-166, Ydhister Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur, Rajasthan-
302005.
7. Rajasthan Urja Vikas and IT Services Limited (RUVTL),
Chairman and Managing Director, having its office at
Vidyut Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan- 302005
----Respondents
(6) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18594/2026
CNR: RJHC020882272026 | URN: CW / 38571U / 2026
RRI BESS Charge Private Limited, (a Subsidiary/Special Purpose
Vehicle of Rama Reflection India Private Limited) is a company
incorporated and registered under the provisions of Companies
Act having its registered office at 203, 2Nd Floor, Blue City Mall,
Ratanada, Jodhpur, Jodhpur- 342011, Rajasthan through its
authorized signatory Mr. Ram Bharosh.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, Energy
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Main Building
Government Secretariat Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
2. Union of India, Ministry of Power (NRE Section) through
its Director, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi
– 110001.
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3. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (RVUNL),
through its Chairman, having its office at Vidyut Bhawan,
Janpath, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur -302005, Rajasthan.
4. Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC),
through its Secretary, Vidhyut Viniyamak Bhawan,
Sahakar Marg, Near State Motor Garage, Jaipur - 302001,
Rajasthan.
5. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited (RVPN),
through its Managing Director, having its office at Vidyut
Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
6. Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Limited
(RRECL), through its Managing Director, having its office
at E-166, Yudhister Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur-302005,
Rajasthan.
7. Rajasthan Urja Vikas and IT Services Limited (RUVITL),
Chairman and Managing Director, having its office at
Vidyut Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
(7) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20210/2026
CNR: RJHC020961402026 | URN: CW / 42149U / 2026
Vrindavan Solar Private Limited, (a Special Purpose Vehicle of
Onward Solar Power Private Limited) is a company incorporated
and registered under the provisions of Companies Act having its
registered office at 904, Krishna Apra, NSP, Pitampura,
Shakurpur I Block, Delhi, North West Delhi- 110034, Delhi
through its authorized signatory Mr. Durgesh Kumar Gupta.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, Energy
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Main Building
Government Secretariat Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
2. Union of India, Ministry of Power (NRE Section) through
its Director, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi -
110001.
3. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (RVUNL),
through its Chairman, having its office at Vidyut Bhawan,
Janpath, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur -302005, Rajasthan.
4. Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC),
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through its Secretary, Vidhyut Viniyamak Bhawan,
Sahakar Marg, Near State Motor Garage, Jaipur - 302001,
Rajasthan.
5. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited (RVPN),
through its Managing Director, having its office at Vidyut
Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
6. Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Limited
(RRECL), through its Managing Director, having its office
at E-166, Yudhister Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur-302005,
Rajasthan.
7. Rajasthan Urja Vikas and IT Services Limited (RUVITL),
Chairman and Managing Director, having its office at
Vidyut Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
(8) S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20211/2026
CNR: RJHC020961462026 | URN: CW / 42150U / 2026
MSL Solar Projects-3 Private Limited, (a Special Purpose Vehicle
of Mecpower Solutions Limited) a company incorporated and
registered under the provisions of Companies Act having its
registered office at 4Th Floor, Office No. 02/03, Landmark, Nr
Priya Cinema, Sevasi, Vadodara, Vadodara- 391101, Gujarat
through its Director Mr. Setul Shah.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, Energy
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Main Building
Government Secretariat Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
2. Union of India, Ministry of Power (NRE Section) through
its Director, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi -
110001.
3. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (RVUNL),
through its Chairman, having its office at Vidyut Bhawan,
Janpath, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur -302005, Rajasthan.
4. Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC),
through its Secretary, Vidhyut Viniyamak Bhawan,
Sahakar Marg, Near State Motor Garage, Jaipur - 302001,
Rajasthan.
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5. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited (RVPN),
through its Managing Director, having its office at Vidyut
Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
6. Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Limited
(RRECL), through its Managing Director, having its Office
at E-166, Yudhister Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur-302005,
Rajasthan.
7. Rajasthan Urja Vikas and IT Services Limited (RUVITL),
Chairman and Managing Director, having its office at
Vidyut Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
(9) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20322/2026
CNR: RJHC020971412026 | URN: CW / 42338U / 2026
Kalka Green Energy Private Limited, (A Special Purpose Vehicle
of Mineralia Impex Private Limited) is a Company incorporated
and registered under the provisions of Companies Act having its
registered office at 109 F R9 Rajnagar, Ghaziabad, Uttar
Pradesh, 201002 through its Director and Authorized Signatory
Mr. Prashant Pareek.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, Energy
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Main Building
Government Secretariat Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
2. Union of India, Ministry of Power (NRE Section) through
its Director, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi -
110001.
3. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (RVUNL),
through its Chairman, having its office at Vidyut Bhawan,
Janpath, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur -302005, Rajasthan.
4. Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC),
through its Secretary, Vidhyut Viniyamak Bhawan,
Sahakar Marg, Near State Motor Garage, Jaipur - 302001,
Rajasthan.
5. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited (RVPN),
through its Managing Director, having its office at Vidyut
Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
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6. Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Limited
(RRECL), through its Managing Director, having its office
at E-166, Yudhister Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur-302005,
Rajasthan.
7. Rajasthan Urja Vikas and IT Services Limited (RUVTIL),
Chairman and Managing Director, having its office at
Vidyut Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
(10) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21905/2026
CNR: RJHC021045822026 | URN: CW / 46031U / 2026
RCRS SPV BESS One Private Limited, (a Special Purpose Vehicle
of RCRS Innovations Limited) is a company incorporated and
registered under the provisions of Companies Act having its
registered office at Building No.13, Office No.403, Veer Savarkar
Block, Shakarpur, East Delhi - 110092, Delhi, through its
Director and Authorized Signatory Mr. Aayush Goyal.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, Energy
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Main Building
Government Secretariat Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
2. Union of India, Ministry of Power (NRE Section) through
its Director, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi -
110001.
3. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (RVUNL),
through its Chairman, having its office at Vidyut Bhawan,
Janpath, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur -302005, Rajasthan.
4. Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC),
through its Secretary, Vidhyut Viniyamak Bhawan,
Sahakar Marg, Near State Motor Garage, Jaipur - 302001,
Rajasthan.
5. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited (RVPN),
through its Managing Director, having its office at Vidyut
Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
6. Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Limited
(RRECL), through its Managing Director, having its office
at E-166, Yudhister Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur-302005,
Rajasthan.
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7. Rajasthan Urja Vikas and IT Services Limited (RUVITL),
Chairman and Managing Director, having its office at
Vidyut Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
(11) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 22046/2026
CNR: RJHC021049372026 | URN: CW / 46424U / 2026
Galaxy V&Y Energies Private Limited, (a Subsidiary/ Special
Purpose Vehicle of Galaxy Mining and Royalties Private Limited)
having its registered office at SB 113 SB 114, 10Th Floor, Galaxy
Avenue, Bapu Nagar, Tonk Road Jaipur-302015 through its
Director Sh. Ishan Chaturvedi.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, Energy
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Main Building
Government Secretariat Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
2. Union of India, Ministry of Power (NRE Section) through
its Director, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi-
110001.
3. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (RVUNL),
through its Chairman, having its office at Vidyut Bhawan,
Janpath, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
4. Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC),
through its Secretary, Vidhyut Viniyamak Bhawan,
Sahakar Marg, Near State Motor Garage, Jaipur -302001,
Rajasthan.
5. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited (RVPN),
through its Managing Director, having its office at Vidyut
Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005, Rajasthan.
6. Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Limited
(RRECL), through its Managing Director, having its office
at E-166, Yudhister Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur-302005,
Rajasthan.
7. Rajasthan Urja Vikas and IT Services Limited (RUVITL),
through its Chairman and Managing Director, having its
office at Vidyut Bhawan, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur-302005,
Rajasthan.
----Respondents
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For Petitioners : Mr. Vikas Baliya Senior Advocate
through Video Conferencing
assisted by Mr. Manish Priyadarshi
Advocate,
Mr. G.S. Bapna, Senior Advocate
assisted by Ms. Mansi Jain Advocate &
Ms. Vidhi Jain Advocate.
Mr. Kamlendra Sihag Advocate.
Mr. Pradeep Kumar Advocate.
Mr. Waseem Ahmed Qureshi
Advocate.
Mr. Parth Singh Dhakad Advocate.
Mr. Gaurav Choudhary Advocate.
Mr. Kamlendra Singh Rathore
Advocate.
Mr. Ranjan Mehta Advocate.
Mr. Keshav Khandelwal Advocate.
For Respondents : Mr. Rajendra Prasad Advocate General
assisted by Mr. Sheetanshu Sharma
Advocate,
Ms. Harshita Thakral Advocate,
Mr. V.P. Mathur Advocate,
Mr. Kartik Bhatnagar Advocate,
Mr. Naval K. Mali Advocate,
Ms. Astha Sharma Advocate,
Ms. Mudita Sharma Advocate,
Ms. Pragya Sethia Advocate,
Mr. Samit Bishnoi Advocate,
Mr. Lalit Bhardwaj Advocate,
Mr. Sandeep Pathak Advocate,
Mr. Shashwat Purohit Advocate.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
Date of conclusion of arguments :: 03.11.2026
Date on which judgment was reserved :: 03.11.2026
Whether the full judgment or only
the operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement :: 18.11.2026
1. Since all the above writ petitions have arisen out of the
same cause of action and questions for consideration in all the
above petitions are also similar, therefore, with the consent of
learned counsel for both the sides, they were heard analogously
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and are being decided by this common judgment. For the sake of
convenience and ease of understanding, the facts narrated in S.B.
Civil Writ Petition No. 7761/2026 (Ultravibriant Integrated Energy
Limited vs. State of Rajasthan & Others) are being taken into
consideration, unless the context otherwise requires.
2. Facts, in brief, as pleaded by the petitioners are that:
2.1. The petitioner-companies are engaged in the renewable
energy sector, including Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS)
and solar EPC services. The Ministry of Power, Government of
India, issued Guidelines dated 10.03.2022 for procurement and
utilisation of Battery Energy Storage Systems under Section 63 of
the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of
2003’). Subsequently, the Ministry introduced a Viability Gap
Funding (VGF) Scheme, supported through the Power System
Development Fund (PSDF), vide communication dated
09.06.2025, providing financial assistance up to Rs.18 lakh per
MWh for development of BESS projects. The scheme contemplated
implementation through tariff-based competitive bidding under the
Build-Own-Operate model (BOO model) and prescribed the
execution of the Battery Energy Storage Purchase Agreement
(BESPA) within the stipulated period.
2.2. The Government of Rajasthan nominated Rajasthan
Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited ( for short ‘RVUNL’),
(Respondent No. 3) as the Battery Energy Storage System
Implementing Agency and Intermediary Procurer. Accordingly,
Respondent No.3, in consultation with the concerned State
agencies, finalised the Request for Selection (RfS) along with the
draft Battery Energy Storage Purchase Agreement (BESPA) and
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Battery Energy Storage Sale Agreement (BESSA), for
establishment of 500 MW/2000 MWh standalone BESS projects in
the State of Rajasthan.
2.3. Respondent No.3 issued the RfS dated 08.08.2025,
inviting bids for establishment of the aforesaid BESS projects
through tariff-based global competitive bidding, with VGF support
under the BOO model. The petitioners participated in the bidding
process after examining the terms and conditions of the RfS and
furnished bid security as prescribed. Thereafter, The technical bids
were opened on 04.11.2025, wherein 27 bidders, including the
petitioner, were found technically qualified. Thereafter, the
financial bids were opened on 18.11.2025, and 25 bidders were
found eligible to participate in the e-reverse auction. In the
ensuing auction, six bidders, including the petitioner, emerged
successful by quoting an identical lowest tariff of Rs.2,85,000/-
per MW per month.
2.4. Pursuant thereto, Respondent No.3 issued Letters of
Intent dated 03.12.2025 to the successful bidders. The petitioner
accepted the Letter of Intent on 05.12.2025. Thereafter,
Respondent No.3 issued the Letter of Award dated 19.12.2025,
which was duly accepted by the petitioner on 23.12.2025. Similar
process also took place in the cases of other petitioners. So far as
Petitioners in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16017/2026 and S.B. Civil
Writ Petition No. 13197/2026 are concerned, they have also
executed BESPA pursuant to aforesaid process and also submitted
performance guarantee.
2.5. Thus, according to the petitioner, upon issuance and
acceptance of the Letter of Award, the competitive bidding process
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stood concluded and the contractual relationship between the
parties stood crystallised on the basis of the terms and conditions
of the RfS and the Letter of Award, including the discovered tariff
and the corresponding obligations of the parties.
2.6. As per the petitioners, on the date of issuance as well
as acceptance of the Letter of Award, no condition prescribing
minimum 20% local content, including the requirement of
indigenously developed EMS software, formed part of the RfS, the
bidding conditions or the Letter of Award.
2.7. However, immediately thereafter, the Ministry of
Power, Government of India, vide communication dated
24.12.2025, issued certain directions concerning implementation
of BESS projects under the VGF Scheme. The said communication
clarified that BESS was not included in the list of items notified for
exclusive procurement from Class-I local suppliers under the
Public Procurement (Preference to Make in India) framework. The
aforesaid communication also stipulated that procuring entities
should ensure minimum local content of 20% of the total project
cost, including indigenously developed EMS software.
2.8. The petitioners have emphasised upon Clause 6 of the
aforesaid communication, which dealt with cases where tenders
had already been invited without any specific stipulation regarding
local content. According to the petitioners, the said clause merely
permitted the procuring entities to obtain an undertaking from the
bidders and proceed with the award of contracts accordingly. It
did not authorise the retrospective imposition of a fresh
substantive condition upon contracts which had already been
awarded and accepted.
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2.9. Thereafter, Respondent No.3 issued communication
dated 07.01.2026, relying upon the Ministry's letter dated
24.12.2025, requiring the successful bidders to comply with the
minimum 20% local content requirement and furnish an
undertaking within seven days. The petitioners contended that the
said direction amounted to the introduction of an additional
substantive obligation after conclusion of the bidding process and
acceptance of the Letter of Award, or execution of BESPA, as the
case may be.
2.10. The petitioners in all the above writ petitions, except in
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20211/2026 (MSL Solar Projects Private
Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others), furnished an undertaking
dated 10.01.2026, stating that they would ensure minimum 20%
local content in the project, including indigenously developed EMS
software. The petitioners subsequently contended that the
undertaking was furnished in response to the insistence of
Respondent No.3 which is also affected by the misleading facts
stated in communication dated 07.01.2026 and could not be
construed as a voluntary renegotiation or consensual alteration of
the concluded contractual arrangement.
2.11. Meanwhile, Respondent No.3 extended the timeline for
execution of BESPA vide office order dated 19.01.2026.
Thereafter, vide communication dated 02.02.2026, the successful
bidders were called upon to furnish Performance Bank Guarantees
(PBG)/Insurance Surety Bonds and proceed with execution of
BESPA.
2.12. The petitioner sought extensions vide letters dated
10.02.2026, 19.02.2026, 20.02.2026 and 02.03.2026, stating that
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the project involved a relatively new category of infrastructure,
therefore, the banking institutions required additional time for
internal risk assessment and credit appraisal for issuance of the
requisite performance security.
2.13. In the meantime, Respondent No.3 filed petition before
the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC) under
Section 63 of the Act of 2003, seeking adoption of the tariff
discovered through the competitive bidding process. The RERC
vide order dated 06.03.2026 adopted the discovered tariff.
2.14. The petitioner has further contended that the Ministry's
communication dated 24.12.2025, which introduced the aforesaid
local content requirement, was not placed before the Commission
in the tariff adoption proceedings, despite having a bearing upon
the project structure, procurement strategy and commercial
obligations of the successful bidders.
2.15. Respondent No.3 thereafter extended the time for
furnishing PBG and execution of BESPA up to 24.03.2026 vide
communication dated 10.03.2026. Respondent No.3, vide
communication dated 24.03.2026, pointed out that the petitioner
had failed to furnish PBG within the stipulated period and granted
time up to 03.04.2026, while indicating that failure to comply
could result in cancellation of the allotted BESS capacity. The
petitioner, vide communication dated 03.04.2026, informed
Respondent No.3 that it had initiated the process for issuance of
performance security and expected to furnish the same by
08.04.2026.
2.16. Thereafter, Respondent No.3 issued notice dated
10.04.2026, calling upon the petitioner to furnish the requisite
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performance security by 22.04.2026 and show cause regarding
forfeiture of bid security. The petitioner submitted a detailed
reply/representation dated 15.04.2026, explaining the
circumstances responsible for the delay and raising objections
concerning the post-award imposition of the local content
requirement, its impact upon project economics and the
consequential difficulties in arranging financial security.
2.17. The petitioners thereafter approached this Court
challenging the communication dated 07.01.2026 and notice dated
10.04.2026, principally on the ground that the respondents could
not have introduced or enforced a fresh substantive contractual
obligation after issuance and acceptance of the Letter of Award
dated 19.12.2025, or execution of BESPA, as the case may be.
3. Respondent No.3 has opposed the writ petition by way
of filing reply to the writ petition, contending therein that:
3.1. The dispute arises out of a purely commercial
contractual arrangement, therefore, the petitioner having
voluntarily participated in the tender process and accepted the
Letter of Award without protest cannot invoke the extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Court to avoid its contractual obligations.The
petitioner was fully aware of the terms of the RfS, the Letter of
Intent and the Letter of Award and was specifically obligated to
furnish PBG/Insurance Surety Bond and execute BESPA within the
prescribed timelines. The respondent has relied upon Clauses
1.12, 1.13 and 1.23 of the Letter of Award, contending that
Clause 1.23 expressly incorporated compliance with the Public
Procurement (Preference to Make in India) Order, 2017, and
subsequent notifications of the 2021 issued by the Government of
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India from time to time.The Ministry's communication dated
24.12.2025 did not introduce any new contractual obligation but
merely clarified the existing policy framework. It is contended that
the communication was issued under the PSDF-supported VGF
Scheme and was binding upon all implementing agencies and
successful bidders.
3.2. Clause 6 of the Ministry's communication dated
24.12.2025 permitted the procuring entities, in cases where
tenders had already been invited without specific local content
stipulations, to obtain undertakings from the bidders and proceed
with the award of contracts. It is contended that the
communication dated 07.01.2026 was issued uniformly to all
successful bidders in exercise of the aforesaid permission and did
not alter the bidding methodology, discovered tariff or capacity
allocation.
3.3. The petitioners in almost all the petitions,(except in
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13197/2026), voluntarily submitted an
undertaking dated 10.01.2026, without any protest, reservation or
qualification, agreeing to comply with the minimum 20% local
content requirement, including deployment of indigenously
developed EMS software. Having furnished such undertaking, the
petitioners are estopped from challenging the applicability of the
requirement or characterising the same as an additional
contractual burden.
3.4. In the Minutes of Meeting dated 16.04.2026 of the
Ministry of Power, it has been clarified therein that no amendment
had been made to the parent guidelines and the communication
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dated 24.12.2025 was merely a clarification of the existing policy
framework.
3.5. The petitioners in above writ petitions repeatedly
sought extensions for submission of PBG and execution of BESPA
(except the petitioners in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16017/2026
and S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13197/2026) on the ground of
internal banking, administrative and financial difficulties. Such
circumstances are commercial risks attributable to the petitioner
and cannot constitute force majeure or a valid justification for
failure to perform contractual obligations.
3.6. The petitioners initially sought time to furnish
performance security without raising any objection, therefore, the
subsequent objection raised by the petitioners against the local
content requirement is nothing but an afterthought.
3.7. Vide email dated 30.01.2026 addressed to the
Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission, the petitioner stated
that it had no objection to the petition filed by Respondent No.3
seeking adoption of tariff. Hence, having expressed no objection
to the tariff adoption proceedings, the petitioner cannot
subsequently question the bidding framework or the tariff adopted
by the Commission.
3.8. The petitioners are seeking to avoid their own
contractual defaults and frustrate implementation of an important
public infrastructure project.
4. No reply to the writ petition was filed on behalf of the Union of
India.
5. Mr. G. S. Bapna, learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Vikas
Balia, learned Senior Advocate and Mr. Pradeep Choudhary,
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learned counsel appearing for the petitioners vehemently argued
that:
5.1. The controversy in the present case is not relating to
any ordinary breach of contractual obligation but relates to the
arbitrary action of a State instrumentality in introducing a fresh
and substantive condition after the bidding process had attained
finality and the Letter of Award had already been issued and
accepted, or BESPA has been executed.
5.2. The petitioners submitted their respective bids after
calculating the cost and other financial aspects strictly in
accordance with the RfS dated 08.08.2025 and the conditions
disclosed therein. The financial bids were opened on 18.11.2025,
thereafter, the Letter of Intent was issued on 03.12.2025 and
later on the Letter of Award was issued on 19.12.2025, which was
accepted on 23.12.2025. Thus, the contractual relationship
between the parties stood concluded before the Ministry issued its
communication dated 24.12.2025. Moreso, in S.B. Civil Writ
Petition No. 16017/2026 and S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.
13197/2026, even BESPA has already been executed.
5.3. The requirement of minimum 20% local content,
including the stipulation concerning indigenously developed EMS
software, was neither disclosed in the tender documents nor
incorporated in the Letter of Award. The requirement has a direct
bearing upon the technical specifications, sourcing arrangements,
project cost, financial modelling and commercial viability of the
project. Its subsequent introduction, therefore, cannot be
regarded as a mere administrative clarification.
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5.4. Clause 6 of the Ministry's communication dated
24.12.2025 has been completely misconstrued by Respondent
No.3. The said clause contemplated obtaining undertakings in
cases where tenders had already been invited without any local
content stipulation so that the procuring entities could proceed
with the award of contracts. It did not authorise the reopening or
modification of contracts which had already been awarded by
issuing letter of award or by executing BESPA.
5.5. The said communication dated 24.12.2025 was meant
for Class-I local suppliers, whereas the petitioners are non-local
suppliers, hence, the respondents cannot apply the said
communication upon the petitioners.
5.6. Clause 1.23 of the Letter of Award cannot be
interpreted as conferring an unrestricted power upon Respondent
No.3 to introduce any additional commercial obligation at any
stage after award. Such a clause could only incorporate those
subsequent governmental directions which were legally applicable
to the contract and could not be employed to retrospectively alter
the essential commercial terms of an already concluded
arrangement.
5.7. The undertaking dated 10.01.2026 was furnished on
account of distorted and misleading facts presented and due to
the insistence of Respondent No.3 on the basis of misrepresented
facts and could not be treated as a mutually negotiated
amendment of the concluded contract. In S.B. Civil Writ Petition
No. 13197/2026, no such undertaking has been submitted by the
petitioner.
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5.8. No novation of contract or alteration in terms of Section
62 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, could be brought about
unilaterally by the procuring agency. Even clause 7 of Public
Procurement (Preference to Make in India) Order, 2017 also make
it clear that purchase preference of Make in India shall be
specified in terms of Notice inviting Tender or other forms of
procurement solicitation and shall not be varied during a particular
procurement transaction.
5.9. The respondents, being State instrumentalities, were
bound to act fairly, reasonably and consistently with their own
representations. The petitioner had participated in the bidding
process on the legitimate expectation that the contractual
obligations would remain governed by the disclosed tender
conditions and the Letter of Award. The subsequent imposition of
a fresh obligation defeated such legitimate expectation and
violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
5.10. With regard to the objection of maintainability, it was
argued that the petitioner was not seeking adjudication of an
ordinary monetary claim or enforcement of a disputed contractual
entitlement. Rather, it was challenging an arbitrary executive
action of a State instrumentality which sought to impose an
obligation dehors the concluded contractual framework. The
existence of a contractual relationship, therefore, could not oust
the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.
5.11. In support of aforesaid submissions, learned counsels
for the Petitioners relied upon the judgments rendered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of ABL International Ltd. &
Another vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India
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Ltd. & Others, (2004) 3 SCC 553, Joshi Technologies
International Inc. vs. Union of India & Others, (2015) 7
SCC 728, Unitech Limited & Others Vs. Telangana State
Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (TSIIC) & Others,
(2021) 16 SCC 35, Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission
Corporation Limited & Another vs. CG Power & Industrial
Solutions Limited & Another, (2021) 6 SCC 15, Padia
Timber Company Private Limited vs. Board of Trustees of
Visakhapatnam Port Trust through its Secretary, (2021) 3
SCC 24 , Dresser Rand S.A. vs. Bindal Agro Chem Ltd.,
(2006) 1 SCC 751, Mihan India Limited vs. GMR Airports
Limited & Others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 574, Reliance Energy
Ltd. & Another vs. Maharashtra State Road Development
Corpn. Ltd. & Others, (2007) 8 SCC 1 , W. B. State Electricity
Board vs. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. & Others, (2001) 2 SCC
451 , Surguja Bricks Industries Company vs. State of
Chhattisgarh & Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2916 , Prakash
Asphaltings & Toll Highways (India) Limited vs. Mandeepa
Enterprises & Others (2026) 4 SCC 310 , Citi Bank N.A. vs.
Standard Chartered Bank & Others, (2004) 1 SCC 12 ,
Suresh Kumar Wadhwa vs. State of Madhya Pradesh &
Others, (2017) 16 SCC 757 , Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
& Another vs BPL Mobile Cellular Limited & Others, (2008)
13 SCC 597 , Delhi Development Authority & Another vs.
Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats & Others,
(2008) 2 SCC 672 , Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (1979) 2 SCC 409 , IFGL
Refractories Ltd. Vs. Orissa State Financial Corporation and
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Others, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 28, Union of India & Others vs.
Hindustan Development Corporation & Others, (1993) 3
SCC 499 , Food Corporation of India vs. M/s Kamdhenu
Cattle Feed Industries, (1993) 1 SCC 71 , Kumari Shrilekha
Vidyarthi & Others vs. State of U.P. & Others, (1991) 1 SCC
212 and decision of Bombay High Court in GMR Airports Limited
& Another vs. Mihan India Limited & Another, (2021) SCC
OnLine Bom 2132 .
6. Per contra, Mr. Rajendra Prasad, learned Advocate
General appearing on behalf of the State of Rajasthan, ably
assisted by Mr. Shashwat Purohit and Mr. Sandeep Pathak,
learned counsel for Respondent No.3 and Mr. Samit Bishnoi,
learned counsel for Union of India while opposing the writ petition
strenuously argued that:
6.1. The Letter of Award was expressly subject to
compliance with the Public Procurement (Preference to Make in
India) Order, 2017, and subsequent governmental notifications
issued in the year 2021. The petitioners were, therefore, bound by
the Ministry's communication dated 24.12.2025, which merely
clarified the existing policy position and did not introduce any
fresh condition.
6.2. The requirement of procuring local content was already
embedded in the prevailing policy framework of the Government
of India much prior thereto. In this regard, reference was made to
Clause 1.23 of the LoA, which specifically mandates compliance
with the Public Procurement (Preference to Make in India) Order,
2017, issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry with the
objective of promoting domestic manufacturing and production of
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goods and services in India, thereby enhancing income and
employment opportunities. The aforesaid Order defines Class-I
and Class-II Local Suppliers as well as Non-Local Suppliers,
prescribes their respective eligibility criteria and provides for
purchase preference to promote local content. In particular,
Clause 5 prescribes the minimum local content requirements,
Clause 9 provides for verification thereof, and Clause 10 mandates
specification of local content requirements and eligibility conditions
in every tender and other procurement solicitation. It was further
submitted that the aforesaid policy was supplemented by the
Order dated 16.11.2021 issued by the Ministry of Power,
Government of India, which contains, in its Annexure-I, a detailed
list of goods and services in respect of which sufficient local
capacity is available. Admittedly, BESS finds specific mention in
the aforesaid policy framework. Thus, according to learned
Advocate General, the requirement relating to local content was
already in existence and within the contemplation of the parties
much before issuance of the RfS and the LoA and its subsequent
enforcement cannot be characterised as introduction of an entirely
new or unforeseen condition.
6.3. The communication dated 07.01.2026 was issued
uniformly to all successful bidders and was only intended to secure
compliance with the Central Government's directions. The
petitioners, in most of the writ petitions, themselves accepted the
requirement by furnishing undertaking dated 10.01.2026, hence,
they cannot now be permitted to resile from their own respective
undertaking.
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6.4. The petitioners failed to furnish PBG and execute BESPA
(except in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16017/2026 and S.B. Civil
Writ Petition No. 13197/2026) despite repeated extensions. Their
inability to arrange performance security was attributable to their
own internal financial and banking arrangements. Such
commercial difficulties cannot be treated as lawful justification for
non-performance.
6.5. The petitioners had expressly conveyed their no-
objection to the tariff adoption proceedings before the RERC and
cannot now question the bidding process or its commercial
consequences. The respondents have acted in furtherance of a
time-bound public infrastructure project and any interference by
this Court would adversely affect the implementation of the VGF
Scheme.
6.6. While demonstrating the importance and urgency of
installation of BESS, learned Advocate General sought to explain
that BESS is a technology designed to store electricity generated
from sources such as solar power, wind power or the electricity
grid and supply the stored energy whenever required. It operates
on the principle of rechargeable batteries, wherein electrical
energy is stored in the form of chemical energy and subsequently
converted back into electrical energy for use. A BESS generally
comprises battery cells, an inverter, a Battery Management
System and an Energy Management System, which collectively
regulate the storage, conversion, safety and supply of electricity.
The principal function of BESS is to store surplus electricity during
periods of excess generation or low demand and release it during
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periods of high demand or reduced power generation. For
instance, electricity generated through solar power during the
daytime can be stored in BESS and supplied during evening or
night hours when solar generation is unavailable. The system also
facilitates efficient utilisation of renewable energy, helps maintain
grid stability, manages peak-hour demand and reduces
dependence on conventional sources of electricity. It was also
stated that in Rajasthan, excess electricity is being generated
through wind mill and solar panel system, but on account of
paucity of energy storage facility, enabling electricity generated at
one point of time to be utilised at a later stage, the excess
electricity generated in the State goes waste. Hence, RfS was
issued for expediting the installation of BESS, which would be in
the larger interest of citizens of the State. However, stay orders
operating in these cases have virtually stalled the entire project.
6.7. While explaining Viability Gap Funding (VGF) scheme
for development of BESS supported through PSDF issued by
Ministry of Power, Government of India, learned Advocate General
vehemently argued that as per guidelines, for getting the funding
under the above scheme, project of BESS is required to be
commissioned with a period of 18 months from the date of
execution of BESPA and the eligible entity shall also be responsible
for compliance with the provisions of General Financial Rules,
2017 and VGF amount (Grant-in-aid) shall be subject to chapter 9
of the GFR, 2017 read with Government of India’s decisions from
time to time. Thus, as per learned Advocate General, where GFR,
2017 and guidelines of central government provide for
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procurement of minimum local content and when such VGF
scheme was also part of RfS in question, the petitioners cannot
raise an argument that new conditions have been imposed upon
them subsequent to letter of Award/ execution of BESA, as the
case may be, in the form of communication dated 24.12.2025 of
the Ministry followed by letter/communication dated 07.01.2026
requiring the petitioners to give undertaking in respect of the
provisions already prescribed in VGF scheme appended to the RfS.
6.8. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has
been placed by learned counsels for the respondents upon the
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Radhakrishna
Agarwal & Others vs. State of Bihar & Others, (1977) 3 SCC
457, State of Punjab & Another vs. Devans Modern
Breweries Ltd. & Another, (2004) 11 SCC 26, Energy
Watchdog vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission &
Others, (2017) 14 SCC 80, National High Speed Rail
Corporation Limited vs. Montecarlo Limited & Another,
(2022) 6 SCC 401, N.G. Projects Limited vs. Vinod Kumar
Jain & Others, (2022) 6 SCC 127 and Jaipur Vidyut Vitran
Nigam Limited & Others vs. MB Power (Madhya Pradesh)
Limited & Others, (2024) 8 SCC 513.
7. I have considered the rival submissions advanced by
learned counsel for the parties, examined the pleadings and
material placed on record as also considered the legal position.
8. At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the
controversy. The petitioners are not challenging the authority of
the Central Government to formulate a policy for promotion of
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indigenous manufacturing or to prescribe local content
requirements in public procurement. Nor are the petitioners
seeking any exemption from a statutory requirement which was
applicable to the subject transaction from its inception. The limited
controversy is whether the particular requirement communicated
by the Ministry on 24.12.2025 could be imposed upon the
petitioner after issuance and acceptance of the Letter of Award
dated 19.12.2025 (or execution of BESPA in two writ petitions),
when the original bidding documents did not contain such a
substantive stipulation.
9. It is equally necessary to observe that the respondent's
objection that the dispute involved in these writ petitions being
purely of contractual nature cannot be accepted as a ground to
deny consideration to the petitioners in the present writ petitions.
The existence of a contractual relationship with the State does not
confer immunity upon the State or its instrumentalities from the
constitutional obligation to act fairly, reasonably and without
arbitrariness.
10. In ABL International Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court recognised that a writ petition arising out of a
contractual obligation is maintainable where the action of a State
instrumentality involves violation of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. Guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
this regard are as under:
“ 27. From the above discussion of ours, the following legal
principles emerge as to the maintainability of a writ petition:
(a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State
or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual
obligation is maintainable.
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(b) Merely because some disputed questions of fact arise for
consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to
entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule.
(c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of
monetary claim is also maintainable.
28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the
maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the court should bear in mind the fact
that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226
of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by
any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court
having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to
entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has
imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this
power. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks
[(1998) 8 SCC 1] .) And this plenary right of the High Court
to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by
the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless
such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary
and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate
of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for
which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said
jurisdiction.
11. The position was subsequently explained in Joshi
Technologies International Inc. (supra), wherein it was held
that although the writ jurisdiction is not ordinarily exercised for
adjudication of purely private contractual disputes, the High Court
can intervene where the action of the State has a public law
element and is arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair.
12. Judgment delivered in the case of ABL International
Ltd.(supra) was subsequently followed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Unitech Limited & Others (supra), wherein it was held
as under:
“ 39. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in ABL International
Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd. [ABL
International], (2004) 3 SCC 553 analysed a long line of
15
precedent of this Court to conclude that writs under Article
226 are maintainable for asserting contractual rights against
the State, or its instrumentalities, as defined under Article
12 of the Indian Constitution.
39.1. Speaking through N. Santosh Hegde, J. the Court held
: (ABL International case [ABL International Ltd. v. Export
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Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553] ,
SCC p. 572, para 27)
“27. … the following legal principles emerge as to the
maintainability of a writ petition:
(a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a
State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a
contractual obligation is maintainable.
(b) Merely because some disputed questions of fact
arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to
refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a
matter of rule.
(c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of
monetary claim is also maintainable.”
This exposition has been followed by this Court, and has
been adopted by the three-Judge Bench decisions of this
Court in State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC
706 and Popatrao Vyankatrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra,
(2020) 19 SCC 241.
39.2. The decision in ABL International, cautions that the
plenary power under Article 226 must be used with
circumspection when other remedies have been provided by
the contract. But as a statement of principle, the jurisdiction
under Article 226 is not excluded in contractual matters.
39.3. Article 23.1 of the development agreement in the
present case mandates the parties to resolve their disputes
through an arbitration. However, the presence of an
arbitration clause within a contract between a State
instrumentality and a private party has not acted as an
18
absolute bar to availing remedies under Article 226 .
39.4. If the State instrumentality violates its constitutional
mandate under Article 14 to act fairly and reasonably, relief
under the plenary powers of Article 226 of the Constitution
would lie. This principle was recognised in ABL International:
(ABL International case, SCC p. 572, para 28)
“28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the
maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the court should bear in mind the
fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under
Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is
not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution.
The High Court having regard to the facts of the case,
has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ
petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain
restrictions in the exercise of this power. (See Whirlpool
Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [Whirlpool Corpn. v.
Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1] .) And this
plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative
writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the
exclusion of other available remedies unless such action
of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and
unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate
of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for
which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said
jurisdiction.”
(emphasis supplied)
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39.5. Therefore, while exercising its jurisdiction under
Article 226, the Court is entitled to enquire into whether the
action of the State or its instrumentalities is arbitrary or
unfair and in consequence, in violation of Article 14. The
jurisdiction under Article 226 is a valuable constitutional
safeguard against an arbitrary exercise of State power or a
misuse of authority.
39.6. In determining as to whether the jurisdiction should
be exercised in a contractual dispute, the Court must,
undoubtedly eschew, disputed questions of fact which would
depend upon an evidentiary determination requiring a trial.
But equally, it is well settled that the jurisdiction under
Article 226 cannot be ousted only on the basis that the
dispute pertains to the contractual arena. This is for the
simple reason that the State and its instrumentalities are
not exempt from the duty to act fairly merely because in
their business dealings they have entered into the realm of
contract. Similarly, the presence of an arbitration clause
does (sic not) oust the jurisdiction under Article 226 in all
cases though, it still needs to be decided from case to case
as to whether recourse to a public law remedy can justifiably
be invoked.
39.7. The jurisdiction under Article 226 was rightly invoked
by the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in this case, when the foundational
representation of the contract has failed. T SIIC , a State
instrumentality, has not just reneged on its contractual
obligation, but hoarded the refund of the principal and
interest on the consideration that was paid by Unitech over
a decade ago. It does not dispute the entitlement of Unitech
to the refund of its principal.”
13. Similar view has also been taken by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh Power
Transmission Corporation Limited & Another (supra),
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the following
principles :
“ 66. Even though there is an arbitration clause, the
petitioner herein has not opposed the writ petition on the
ground of existence of an arbitration clause. There is no
whisper of any arbitration agreement in the counter-affidavit
filed by U PPTCL to the writ petition in the High Court. In any
case, the existence of an arbitration clause does not debar
the court from entertaining a writ petition.
67. It is well settled that availability of an alternative
remedy does not prohibit the High Court from entertaining a
writ petition in an appropriate case. The High Court may
entertain a writ petition, notwithstanding the availability of
an alternative remedy, particularly : (i) where the writ
petition seeks enforcement of a fundamental right; (ii)
where there is failure of principles of natural justice or (iii)
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where the impugned orders or proceedings are wholly
without jurisdiction or (iv) the vires of an Act is under
challenge. Reference may be made to Whirlpool Corpn. v.
Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 and Pimpri
Chinchwad Municipal Corpn. v. Gayatri Construction Co.,
(2008) 8 SCC 172, cited on behalf of Respondent 1.
68. In Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2
SCC 107, this Court allowed the appeal from an order of the
High Court dismissing a writ petition and set aside the
impugned judgment of the High Court as also the impugned
order of the Indian Oil Corporation terminating the
dealership of the appellants notwithstanding the fact that
the dealership agreement contained an arbitration clause.
69. It is now well settled by a plethora of decisions of this
Court that relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India may be granted in a case arising out of contract.
However, the writ jurisdiction under Article 226, being
discretionary, the High Courts usually refrain from
entertaining a writ petition which involves adjudication of
disputed questions of fact which may require analysis of
evidence of witnesses. Monetary relief can also be granted in
a writ petition.”
14. The principle emerging from the aforesaid judgments is
that the nature of the action complained of, rather than merely
the existence of a contract, determines the availability of judicial
review. In the present case, the challenge is directed against the
action of a State instrumentality seeking to impose a fresh
obligation upon a successful bidder after conclusion of a public
competitive bidding process. Such action has an evident public law
element, particularly because it affects transparency, equality of
opportunity and the sanctity of public procurement.
15. The judgments relied upon by Respondent No.3,
including Radhakrishna Agarwal & Others (supra), Energy
Watchdog (supra), Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited &
Others vs. MB Power (Madhya Pradesh) Limited & Others
(supra), and Joshi Technologies International Inc. (supra) ,
do not lay down an absolute prohibition against exercise of writ
jurisdiction in contractual matters. They caution against using
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Article 226 of the Constitution of India as a substitute for ordinary
contractual remedies or for avoiding voluntarily undertaken
obligations. They do not authorise a State instrumentality to act
arbitrarily or unilaterally rewrite the terms of an existing contract.
Thus, the preliminary objection raised by the respondents relating
to maintainability of the writ petitions is hereby rejected.
16. The chronology of events is quite significant and not
seriously disputed. The petitioners participated in the tender
process under the RfS dated 08.08.2025. Their respective bids
were evaluated, the financial bids were opened and the e-reverse
auction was also conducted. Thereafter, the Letter of Intent was
issued on 03.12.2025 and the Letter of Award was issued on
19.12.2025. The petitioners accepted the Letter of Award on
23.12.2025. In two writ petitions, i.e., in S.B. Civil Writ Petition
No. 16017/2026 and S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13197/2026, even
BESPA was executed between the contracting parties.
17. It is also not under dispute that the Ministry's
communication dated 24.12.2025, which is the foundation of the
subsequent local content requirement, came into existence only
after issuance as well as acceptance of the Letter of Award.
18. Upon consideration of the pleadings, documents and
correspondence on record, this Court is satisfied that prior to
above communication dated 24.12.2025, the parties had reached
consensus on all essential terms of the transaction. The offer
made by the petitioners in the form of bids was accepted by the
respondents and accordingly letter of Award was issued in favour
of the petitioners, which was again accepted by the petitioners
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unqualifiedly and without any further condition, as required by
Section 7 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (for short ‘the Act of
1872’). The material terms, including the subject matter,
consideration, and respective obligations of the parties were
apparently definite and agreed. The proceedings till the date of
issuance of award satisfy the requirements of Section 10 of the
Act of 1872, namely free consent, competency of parties, lawful
consideration, and lawful object. The subsequent conduct of the
parties, including letter of award further corroborates the
existence of a binding agreement. In terms of Section 2(h) of the
Act of 1872, such agreement is enforceable by law and, therefore,
constitutes a valid contract binding both the parties. In the case of
Padia Timber Company Private Limited (supra) , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that for constituting a concluded contract
acceptance must be absolute and unqualified, which is admittedly
in existence in the present cases.
19. In the case of Dresser Rand S.A. (supra), even a
letter of intent with further stipulation that formal contract shall be
executed later on, was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
as concluded contract. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“ 40. It is no doubt true that a letter of intent may be
construed as a letter of acceptance if such intention is
evident from its terms. It is not uncommon in contracts
involving detailed procedure, in order to save time, to issue a
letter of intent communicating the acceptance of the offer
and asking the contractor to start the work with a stipulation
that the detailed contract would be drawn up later. If such a
letter is issued to the contractor, though it may be termed as
a letter of intent, it may amount to acceptance of the offer
resulting in a concluded contract between the parties. But the
question whether the letter of intent is merely an expression
of an intention to place an order in future or whether it is a
final acceptance of the offer thereby leading to a contract, is
a matter that has to be decided with reference to the terms
of the letter. Chitty on Contracts (para 2.115 in Vol. 1, 28th
Edn.) observes that where parties to a transaction exchanged
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letters of intent, the terms of such letters may, of course,
negative contractual intention; but, on the other hand, where
the language does not negative contractual intention, it is
open to the courts to hold that the parties are bound by the
document; and the courts will, in particular, be inclined to do
so where the parties have acted on the document for a long
period of time or have expended considerable sums of money
in reliance on it. Be that as it may.”
20. In the case of GMR Airports Limited & Another vs.
Mihan India Limited & Another (supra) , the Bombay High
Court has considered the letter of award as a concluded contract
by observing as under:
“ 50. Apart from what is stated above, letter dated 7-3-2019
leaves no choice with Petitioner 1 to reject it without
suffering the consequence of forfeiture and appropriation of
the bid security amount furnished by Petitioner 1 with no
claim available against Respondent 1 as regards such
forfeiture. This is really a Hobson's choice; a choice to show
on face but a compulsion beneath the face. This condition of
letter dated 7-3-2019 was in accordance of Clause 3.3.5, and
it being what it was, Petitioner 1 accepted as it was. Now,
can Respondent 1 justifiably say that letter dated 7-3-2019
was a harmless communication only informing Petitioner 1
that its bid was accepted and nothing more? The answer is
no, given the consequences that are threatened to visit
Petitioner 1, if it rejected the acceptance. It, therefore, does
not matter that the letter dated 7-3-2019 does not contain
the sentence “letter of award is issued to you”. It is the
intention of the parties which, together with spirit and
substance of an act, decides the nature of an act. The
forfeiture clause together with the contents of the said letter
and attending circumstances clearly points out that the
intention of the parties was to treat the said letter as letter of
award and they proceeded further considering it to be so,
irrespective of its nomenclature and some play of words in it.
51. We, therefore, find that the letter of acceptance dated 7-
3-2019 is indeed a letter of award and not a letter merely
communicating that the bid is accepted and this letter of
award has resulted into a concluded contract between the
parties.”
21. Aforesaid judgment rendered by the Bombay High
Court was put to challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and
after meticulous examination, the judgment was affirmed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mihan India Limited vs.
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GMR Airports Limited & Others (supra), by giving following
observations:
“ 18.1. (i) Whether the letter dated 7-3-2019 endorsing GAL
as a selected bidder and on communication by GAL on a
duplicate copy to MIL on 12-3-2019 would amount to LoA in
terms of Clause 3.3.5 of RFP and, would it be treated as a
concluded contract?
35. As per the above discussion, we do not have any
hesitation to hold that letter dated 7-3-2019 is an LoA after
selecting GAL as the highest bidder and it acquired the status
of concessionaire. It was only the concession agreement
required to be executed and there was no fault on the part of
GAL in complying with the provisions of RFP. The conduct of
the appellant MIL also indicates that concession agreement is
required to be executed by concessionaire (GAL). Thus, after
proposal of the highest revenue share on issuing the letter of
acceptance and also as reflected by conduct, it has become a
concluded contract.
72. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, we are of
the considered opinion that the findings recorded by the High
Court allowing the writ petition are in accordance with law.
Those findings do not suffer from any illegality, warranting
interference by this Court in exercise of the power under
Article 136 of the Constitution. All these appeals are hereby
dismissed. The parties to bear their own costs.”
22. It is a settled principle of contract law that a concluded
contract comes into existence when there is an offer and an
unconditional acceptance thereof, provided the parties intended to
create legal relations and the essential terms of the transaction
stand settled. The nomenclature of the document or the
subsequent execution of a formal agreement is not, by itself,
decisive. The intention of the parties has to be gathered from the
tender documents, the Letter of Award and the surrounding
circumstances. In the present case, the Letter of Award identified
the successful bidder, the awarded capacity, the discovered tariff
and the governing terms and conditions. The petitioner accepted
the same without any reservation. Thus, the essential commercial
elements of the transaction had been determined and accepted.
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23. The contention that PBG was required to be furnished
and BESPA was required to be executed subsequently does not, by
itself, establish that no contractual relationship had come into
existence. The performance security and execution of BESPA were
subsequent contractual obligations and implementation
milestones. The subsequent execution of BESPA was intended to
give effect to the awarded project in accordance with the terms
already settled.
24. Consequently, the communication dated 24.12.2025
cannot be treated as a condition existing at the time of submission
of bids or acceptance of the Letter of Award. Its applicability to the
concluded arrangement must be independently examined in the
light of its language, purpose and the terms of the existing
contract.
25. The most important document for deciding the
controversy is the Ministry of Power's communication dated
24.12.2025, particularly Clause 6 thereof. The interpretation of
the said clause must be undertaken by reading the communication
as a whole and keeping in view the stage at which the bidding
process had reached on the date of its issuance. Clauses 3 to 6 of
Communication dated 24.12.2025 is being reproduced hereunder:
“3. As per the Public Procurement (Preference to Make in
India) Orders issued by DPIIT and the Ministry of Power
Order No. A-1/2021-FSC-Part (5) dated 16.11.2021, certain
power sector items with adequate domestic manufacturing
capacity and competition have been notified for procurement
exclusively from Class-l local suppliers. Battery Energy
Storage System (BESS) is presently not included in the
notified list. However, where an item has not been notified
by the nodal Ministry/Department, both Class-l and Class-II
local suppliers are eligible to participate in the procurement
process.
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4. Further, as per the amendment to the VGF
Guidelines issued on 04.08.2025, the Ministry of Power has
mandated indigenous development of the Energy
Management System (EMS) application software for all BESS
capacity Implemented under the Scheme.
5. In view of the above, for the purpose of
disbursement of funds under the Power System
Development Fund (PSDF) Guidelines. States and procuring
entities shall ensure a minimum local content of 20% of the
total project cost in BESS procurements under the VGF
Scheme. This minimum local content requirement shall
include, inter-alia, the indigenously developed EMS
application software.
6. In cases where tenders have already been
invited without specific mention of local content, States may
obtain an undertaking from the bidders to meet the
aforementioned local content requirement and proceed with
the award of contract accordingly.”
26. A plain reading of the aforesaid clause-6 indicates that
the Ministry intended to provide a transitional arrangement for
those procurement processes which had commenced without
incorporating the local content requirement, but where the award
of contracts was yet to take place. The expression permitting the
procuring entities to obtain undertakings and proceed with the
award of contracts is significant. It contemplates obtaining such
undertakings as a step preceding the award, rather than as a
means of reopening an award which had already been made and
accepted.
27. Had the Ministry intended that the local content
requirement would also be imposed retrospectively upon contracts
already awarded and accepted, it could have expressly provided
so. In the absence of any such clear stipulation, the
communication cannot be interpreted to confer an unrestricted
power upon implementing agencies to introduce additional
substantive obligations into concluded contractual arrangements.
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28. The respondent's interpretation would effectively render
the distinction between tenders already invited and contracts
already awarded meaningless. The transitional provision cannot be
interpreted in a manner which defeats the very distinction arising
from the different stages of procurement.
29. The position is further strengthened by the fact that the
Ministry's communication itself was issued on 24.12.2025,
whereas the Letter of Award had already been accepted by the
petitioner on 23.12.2025. Therefore, even assuming that the
communication was binding upon the implementing agency for
future procurement or pending award processes, its application to
the present petitioners required consideration of the already
concluded contractual arrangement.
30. The respondents have placed considerable reliance
upon Clause 1.23 of the Letter of Award, which, according to it,
required the petitioner to comply with the Public Procurement
(Preference to Make in India) Order, 2017 and subsequent
notifications issued by the Government of India from time to time.
Clauses 1.4 and 1.23 of the letter of award are being reproduced
as under:
“1.4 The award of the above Project is subject to the
Guidelines including amendments/clarifications issued by
Government of India & Govt. of Rajasthan and terms and
conditions of the RfS document including its
clarifications/amendments/ elaborations/notifications issued
by RVUNL.
1.23 "The Developer shall take due cognizance of the
provisions of the Public Procurement (Preference to Make in
India) Order, 2017 and subsequent amendments or
notifications issued thereunder by the Government of India.
The Ministry of Power, under the said Order, has notified an
itemized list (Annexure-1) specifying Minimum Local Content
(MLC) requirements for various equipment categories in the
power sector. Accordingly, the Developer shall ensure
adherence to these provisions, to the extent applicable,
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during installation, commissioning, and operation of the
Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) project being
implemented under the Power System Development Fund
(PSDF) Scheme. Compliance or exemption, as may be
directed by the Ministry of Power in this regard, shall be duly
observed as a part of the project implementation
obligations.””
31. However, the existence of a general provision requiring
compliance with governmental procurement policies cannot be
construed as conferring unlimited authority upon the respondents
to introduce new commercial or technical obligations at any stage
of a concluded contract. Clause 1.23 of the Letter of Award must
be read harmoniously with its other terms and the applicable
policy framework and cannot be interpreted to mean that every
subsequent administrative communication automatically becomes
an additional contractual covenant binding upon the successful
bidder.
32. The Public Procurement (Preference to Make in India)
Order, 2017, issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to
promote domestic manufacturing and production, defines Class-I
and Class-II Local Suppliers and Non-Local Suppliers, prescribes
their eligibility and purchase preferences, and provides for
minimum local content requirements under Clause 5, requirement
for specification in advance under clause 7, verification thereof
under Clause 9 and specification of such requirements in every
tender and procurement solicitation under Clause 10. It would be
relevant to refer clause 7 of the aforesaid Order of 2017, which
lays down as under:
“7. Requirement for specification in advance: The
minimum local content, the margin of purchase preference
and the procedure for preference to Make in India shall be
specified in the notice inviting tenders or other form of
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procurement solicitation and shall not be varied during a
particular procurement transaction.”
33. Bare reading of aforesaid Clause 7 of the Public
Procurement (Preference to Make in India) Order, 2017 would
make it clear that the specifications of purchase preference, local
contents or other requirements as per Make in India policy are
also required to be given in advance by the procuring agency in
NIT or any other procurement process and such specifications
given in advance shall not be changed during a particular
procurement transaction.
34. The subsequent Order dated 16.11.2021 issued by the
Ministry of Power also specified, in its Annexure-I, goods, services
and works for which sufficient local capacity was available.
However, BESS was included in the relevant list only
subsequently, on 04.08.2025. In any event, the mere existence of
the aforesaid policy framework does not establish that the
petitioner was contractually bound to procure a prescribed
percentage of local content or comply with a particular technical
requirement which was neither specified in the original RfS nor
demonstrated to be applicable to the subject project under any
binding notification at the time of issuance and acceptance of the
Letter of Award. There is a clear distinction between a general
policy favouring indigenous procurement and a specific,
enforceable contractual obligation.
35. In this backdrop, the Ministry's communication dated
24.12.2025 cannot be treated as a mere administrative
clarification. It stipulated a minimum local content requirement of
20% of the total project cost and additionally mandated the use of
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indigenously developed EMS software. Such requirements have a
direct bearing upon the procurement and sourcing strategy,
technical specifications, selection of equipment and software,
project cost, financial modelling and commercial calculations of
the developer. The original RfS did not prescribe either the
aforesaid 20% local content requirement or the specific condition
relating to indigenously developed EMS software. Further, the fact
that BESS was not included in the list of items notified for
exclusive procurement from Class-I, local suppliers, as
acknowledged in the Ministry's communication itself, necessitated
a clear examination of the source, scope and time frame
applicability of the subsequently imposed requirement. The same
could not have been dispensed with merely by describing the
communication as a clarification.
36. The distinction between clarification of an existing
obligation and introduction of a new substantive obligation cannot
be overlooked. A clarification may explain or give effect to an
obligation already forming part of the contract or applicable law,
but it cannot be employed to enlarge its scope or impose an
additional financial or technical burden not contemplated at the
time of bidding. Clause 1.23 of the Letter of Award, therefore,
cannot be construed as authorising Respondent No.3 to
retrospectively incorporate the specific 20% local content
requirement and the condition concerning indigenously developed
EMS software into an already concluded contractual arrangement.
Significantly, Clause 6 of the very same communication dated
24.12.2025 contemplates obtaining undertakings and proceeding
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with awards in cases where tenders had already been invited
without such stipulation, which itself lends support to the
distinction between prospective applicability and its imposition
upon concluded procurement arrangements.
37. The principles governing public procurement require
transparency, fairness, predictability and non-discrimination.
Tender conditions constitute the foundation upon which bidders
assess their eligibility, technical capabilities, financial exposure
and commercial viability. Competitive bidding is a structured
exercise in which all participants formulate their offers on the
basis of a common set of disclosed conditions. Its sanctity
depends upon the assurance that the governing terms shall not be
altered to the prejudice of successful bidders after the bidding
process has attained finality. Consequently, the general policy
framework relied upon by the State cannot furnish authority to
unilaterally introduce additional substantive obligations so as to
alter the commercial and technical basis of an already concluded
procurement process. The stand of the respondents, therefore,
cannot be sustained.
38. In Reliance Energy Ltd. & Another (supra) , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised the importance of the level
playing field in tender matters and held that vagueness or
subjectivity in tender conditions may result in discriminatory
treatment, hence, tender conditions must prescribe clear norms
and benchmarks to ensure legal certainty.
39. Similarly, in W. B. State Electricity Board (supra) ,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognised the necessity of
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maintaining the sanctity of tender conditions and cautioned
against permitting departures from the prescribed tender
requirements and held that substantive changes after opening of
the bid cannot be permitted in a manner which would undermine
fairness and equality in the bidding process.
40. After considering the above judgment in the case of W.
B. State Electricity Board (supra), the Hon’ble supreme Court
in the case of Surguja Bricks Industries Company (supra) ,
has observed as under:
“ 24. We are of the unhesitant view that an eligibility criteria should
be clear and unambiguous. Otherwise, it may lead to arbitrary
exercise of power by the State disqualifying a tenderer who would
otherwise meet the eligibility criteria. In West Bengal State
8
Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering , this Court declared that to
hold that a State or its agencies can reject a tender for breach of a
term or condition in the tender document which is not explicit in the
tender documents is to give room to the State or its agencies to
arbitrarily reject tenders even when clear terms or conditions of
tender documents are complied with. Therefore, it is the
responsibility of the tendering authority to issue clear and
unambiguous instructions in a NIT. As pointed out by this Court in
Patel Engineering (supra), when there is vagueness or subjectivity
in the norms, it may result in an unequal and discriminatory
treatment and provide room for manipulation to suit the whims of
the State agencies in picking and choosing a bidder for awarding
contracts.
25. In Reliance Energy Ltd., this Court was examining the
conditions in the global tender floated by the State of Maharashtra
through the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation
Limited for completing the Mumbai Trans Harbour Link between
Mumbai and Navi Mumbai on a BOT basis. In the aforesaid tender
process, the tendering authority decided to exclude the appellants.
Without entering into the details of the judgment in Reliance Energy
Ltd., we can gainfully extract the below mentioned portion from the
said decision:
38. When tenders are invited, the terms and conditions must
indicate with legal certainty, norms and benchmarks. This “legal
certainty” is an important aspect of the rule of law. If there is
vagueness or subjectivity in the said norms it may result in
unequal and discriminatory treatment. It may violate doctrine of
“level playing field”.
27. There is no dispute to the proposition that the tender inviting
authority is the best judge to understand and appreciate its
requirements and interpret its documents. In Afcons Infrastructure
Ltd. and in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. as well as in subsequent
decisions, this Court has upheld this principle observing that
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ordinarily constitutional courts should defer to the understanding of
the tender inviting authority of the tender documents. However,
this principle has its own limitations. If the interpretation of the
tender inviting authority or its understanding of the tender
conditions is vitiated by mala fides or perversity, there is no
question of a constitutional court showing deference to such
understanding. Likewise, if the interpretation of the tender inviting
authority of a particular condition of tender, such as, an eligibility
criteria as in the present case is irrational or absurd leading to
arbitrary consequences, it would be the duty of a constitutional
court to interdict such a decision making process. To hold otherwise
would render the very object of judicial review otiose.”
41. The aforesaid principles have got vital significance after
completion of the bidding process and issuance of the Letter of
Award. Before finalisation of the bids, a procuring authority may,
subject to the applicable rules and principles of fairness, amend
the tender conditions and provide equal opportunity to all
prospective bidders. However, once the process has culminated in
an award and the successful bidder has accepted the same, a
substantive alteration of the commercial framework cannot
ordinarily be introduced unilaterally.
42. The requirement of minimum 20% local content was
not a mere procedural formality. It was capable of influencing the
commercial calculations of every prospective bidder. A bidder
aware of such a requirement at the inception of the process might
have adopted a different sourcing arrangement, selected different
technology, made different financial projections or even quoted a
different tariff. The fact that the tariff quoted by the petitioner has
not been altered does not answer the petitioner's grievance. The
financial viability of a project is determined not merely by the
revenue side represented by the discovered tariff, but also by the
cost and technical obligations which the developer is required to
undertake. An additional obligation affecting procurement and
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project cost may materially alter the economic balance of the
contract even where the tariff remains unchanged.
43. The respondents’ contention that the local content
requirement was uniformly imposed upon all successful bidders
also does not cure the fundamental defect. Even uniform
application of a condition after completion of the bidding process
cannot, by itself, validate its retrospective imposition. The relevant
question is not merely whether all successful bidders were treated
alike after the award, but whether all participants competed on
the basis of the same disclosed conditions at the stage when their
bids were formulated and evaluated.
44. As regards the submission of the learned Advocate
General, based upon the VGF scheme appended to RfS and
applicability of General Finance Rules, 2017, this Court finds that
there can be no quarrel with the proposition that the beneficiary of
financial assistance under the VGF Scheme is required to comply
with the applicable guidelines and the provisions of the GFR, 2017.
However, the general obligation to comply with such guidelines
cannot be construed as an authority to introduce a fresh
substantive contractual obligation which was neither specifically
stipulated in the RfS, nor made an essential condition of the
bidding process. The stipulation regarding commissioning of the
BESS project within 18 months from execution of BESPA relates to
the timeline for implementation of the project, while the provisions
of the GFR, 2017 regulate the disbursement and accounting of
grant-in-aid and the same neither, by itself, prescribes a minimum
20% local content requirement or imposes a corresponding
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obligation upon the successful bidders. Further, the Public
Procurement (Preference to Make in India) Order, 2017, read with
Rule 153(iii) of the GFR, 2017, contemplates specification of the
minimum local content and related conditions in the notice inviting
tenders or procurement documents so as to ensure transparency,
certainty and a level playing field amongst bidders. The
requirement of minimum local content, has significant financial
and technical implications and may materially affect the choice of
technology, procurement arrangements, project cost and tariff
quoted by the bidders. Therefore, it cannot be treated as a mere
procedural formality or an inconsequential clarification. The fact
that the communications dated 24.12.2025 and 07.01.2026
permit obtaining an undertaking even in respect of tenders
already invited without such stipulation does not, by itself, confer
authority upon the procuring agency to impose a fresh substantive
obligation after issuance and acceptance of the Letter of Award or
execution of BESPA, unless such power is demonstrably reserved
under the bidding documents or otherwise available in law.
Moreover, the obligation of the eligible entity to comply with the
conditions governing VGF cannot automatically be transposed into
an additional contractual obligation upon the BESS developer
without an express stipulation or clear incorporation thereof in the
contractual documents. The legitimate object of promoting
indigenous manufacturing and domestic value addition cannot be
disputed, nevertheless, such policy objectives must be pursued
consistently with the settled principles of transparency, fairness
and contractual certainty governing public procurement. Thus, the
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general reference to the VGF Scheme and the GFR, 2017 cannot
be treated as sufficient authority to impose the subsequently
prescribed minimum local content requirement upon the
petitioners in respect of an already concluded contractual
arrangement.
45. It is equally important to reiterate that the petitioners
are not claiming that the respondents were prohibited from
adopting a new procurement policy. The grievance is that the
respondents sought to apply a subsequently communicated
substantive requirement to an already concluded contractual
arrangement without demonstrating any lawful basis for such
retrospective application.
46. While narrating the importance of the project sought to
be implemented, learned Advocate General also emphasised upon
the public interest in implementing “the make in India” policy of
the Government of India. While dealing the question of public
interest in tender matters, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Prakash Asphaltings & Toll Highways (India) Limited
(supra) , has observed as under:
“ 45. The above proposition has been followed by another
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Subodh Kumar Singh
Rathour v. Chief Executive Officer, (2024) 15 SCC 461,
when it examined the concept of public interest in
administrative decisions relating to the award of contracts.
This Court held that even assuming for a moment that there
was a technical fault in the tender, which if rectified had the
possibility of generating more revenue, the same by no
stretch could be said to be a cogent reason for concealing an
already existing tender. This Court highlighted the
importance of maintaining the sanctity of tenders in
governmental procurement processes. Public tenders are the
cornerstone of governmental procurement processes, being
competitive and ensuring fairness and transparency in the
allocation of public resources. Public tenders are designed to
provide a level playing field for all potential bidders,
fostering an environment where competition thrives. The
integrity of this process ensures that public projects and
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resources are delivered efficiently and effectively, benefitting
the society at large. Therefore, the sanctity of public tenders
and contract is a fundamental principle that underpins the
stability and predictability of legal and commercial
relationships. In fact this Court put in a word of caution that
considerations of public interest should not be narrowly
confined to the financial aspect only.
46. Applying the above legal principles to the facts of the
present case, we are of the view that the Division Bench of
the High Court clearly fell in error in directing Respondents 2
to 4 to allow rectification of the financial bid of Respondent 1
by treating the amount offered by it as the per day figure
and on that basis to compute the total amount for the entire
contractual period of 1095 days. Such an exercise is clearly
impermissible, having regard to the terms and conditions of
the contract which are required to be understood on the
anvil of this Court's judgments. The authority granted to the
tendering authority by Clause 5-B(v) of the Instruction to
Bidders cannot be stretched to construe the price bid of
Respondent 1 as the per day offer, contrary to the bid
declaration of Respondent 1 itself, and thereafter, on that
basis to work out a new bid amount for the entire
contractual period making it the highest. In the present
case, Respondent 1 was not at all vigilant; rather, it
displayed a very casual approach. In such circumstances,
Clause 5-B(v) cannot be invoked to resurrect the bid of
Respondent 1 to make it H1. Clause 5-B(v) of the
Instruction to Bidders has to be read conjointly with Clause
4(g) of the notice inviting electronic bid.
47. While judicial review is not excluded to assail
administrative decisions even in matters of tenders and
contract, the long line of consistent judicial pronouncements
tells us that the Constitutional Courts should exercise
utmost restraint in interfering with a tender process unless
the threshold of judicial review are met, as explained in
Jagdish Mandal (supra) and in Afcons Infrastructure Limited
(supra).
49. The expression “public interest” in the arena of
commercial transactions cannot and should not be confined
to any straitjacket definition. While benefit or accrual of
more revenue to the public exchequer is certainly an
important aspect, equally important, if not more, is
adherence to the rules and conditions of tender; sanctity of
the tender process being paramount and should be
maintained at all cost.”
47. The public interest in promoting indigenous technology
and local manufacturing is undoubtedly a legitimate governmental
objective. However, the means adopted to achieve such objective
must also conform to the requirements of fairness and legality. A
legitimate policy objective cannot, by itself, justify an otherwise
impermissible alteration of an existing contractual arrangement.
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48. Consequently, the action of Respondent No.3 in seeking
to impose the specific local content requirement upon the
petitioner after issuance and acceptance of the Letter of Award is
contrary to the principles governing fair public procurement and
cannot be sustained merely on the ground that the requirement
was communicated by the Ministry of Power after completion of
the bidding process.
49. Once the contractual relationship between the parties
stood crystallised upon acceptance of the Letter of Award or even
on execution of contract (BESPA in the present cases), any
subsequent alteration of its substantive terms was required to
conform to the principles governing alteration and novation of
contracts.
50. Section 62 of the Act of 1872 provides that if the
parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, or to
rescind or alter it, the original contract need not be performed.
The statutory provision thus proceeds on the fundamental
requirement of an agreement between the parties. Novation or
alteration of a contract is not a unilateral exercise of power
available to one contracting party.
51. In Citi Bank N.A. (supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court
explained that novation, rescission or alteration of a contract
under Section 62 of the Act of 1872 requires the agreement of the
parties and cannot be brought about unilaterally.
52. In Suresh Kumar Wadhwa (supra) , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that a party to the contract has no right
to unilaterally alther the terms and conditions of the contract, nor
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have they any right to add any additional term. It would be
relevant to refer following relevant part of the above judgment:
“ 26. Equally well-settled principle of law relating to contract
is that a party to the contract can insist for performance of
only those terms/conditions, which are part of the contract.
Likewise, a party to the contract has no right to unilaterally
“alter” the terms and conditions of the contract and nor they
have a right to “add” any additional terms/conditions in the
contract unless both the parties agree to add/alter any such
terms/conditions in the contract.
27. Similarly, it is also a settled law that if any party adds
any additional terms/conditions in the contract without the
consent of the other contracting party then such addition is
not binding on the other party. Similarly, a party, which
adds any such term/condition, has no right to insist on the
other party to comply with such additional terms/conditions
and nor such party has a right to cancel the contract on the
ground that the other party has failed to comply with such
additional terms/conditions.
40. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the
considered opinion that the appellant did not commit any
breach of the term(s) and condition(s) of the notice inviting
bids and on the other hand, it was the respondents who
committed breaches. In these circumstances, the State had
no right to forfeit the security amount and instead it should
have been returned when demanded by the appellant.”
53. In the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited &
Another vs BPL Mobile Cellular Limited & Others (supra) ,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that any novation in the
contract was required to be done on the same terms as are
required for entering into a concluded contract. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court laid down as under:
“ 44. If the parties were ad idem as regards terms of the
contract, any change in the tariff could not have been made
unilaterally. Any novation in the contract was required to be
done on the same terms as are required for entering into a
valid and concluded contract. Such an exercise having not
been resorted to, we are of the opinion that no interference
with the impugned judgment is called for.
51. In the instant case, the resources to be leased out were
subject to agreement. The terms were to be mutually
agreed upon. The terms of contract, in terms of Section 8 of
the Contract Act, fructified into a concluded contract. Once a
concluded contract was arrived at, the parties were bound
thereby. If they were to alter or modify the terms thereof, it
was required to be done either by express agreement or by
necessary implication which would negate the application of
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the doctrine of “acceptance sub silentio”. But, there is
nothing on record to show that such a course of action was
taken. The respondents at no point of time were made
known either about the internal circulars or about the letters
issued from time to time not only changing the tariff but
also the basis thereof.”
54. The same principle was reiterated in Delhi
Development Authority & Another vs. Joint Action
Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats & Others (supra) , wherein
the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that a party to a contract
cannot, at a later stage, impose terms and conditions which were
not part of the original offer by issuing unilateral office orders.
55. Applying the aforesaid principles, Respondent No.3
could not, merely by issuing the communication dated
07.01.2026, incorporate a new substantive obligation into the
contractual arrangement already concluded on 23.12.2025. The
authority of Respondent No.3 to administer and implement the
contract was necessarily subject to the terms of the contract and
the applicable law.
56. The contention of Respondent No.3 that the petitioners
furnished undertaking dated 10.01.2026 and, therefore,
voluntarily agreed to the additional condition also requires
consideration. It is not disputed that the petitioners, except the
petitioner in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13197/2026, furnished
the undertaking without recording any express reservation
therein. Such conduct cannot be ignored and the undertaking
cannot simply be treated as non-existent. Nevertheless, the legal
effect of the said document has to be examined in the background
in which it was furnished. The undertaking was submitted within a
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few days of the communication dated 07.01.2026, which itself
required compliance within seven days and was issued by the very
authority controlling the award and implementation of the project.
The petitioners were already the successful bidders and had
letters of Award in their favour. The undertaking was thus
furnished in response to a direction of the procuring agency in the
course of implementation of the awarded project. The mere
submission of such an undertaking, without anything more, cannot
be treated as a negotiated substitution or consensual alteration of
the essential terms of the Letter of Award. The respondents have
not demonstrated that the parties entered into any bilateral
arrangement expressly modifying the original contractual
framework or that the petitioner was afforded an informed choice
to accept or reject a fresh contractual proposal without
jeopardising the already awarded project.
57. More importantly, an undertaking furnished in response
to an administrative direction cannot confer upon the authority a
power which it did not otherwise possess. If the direction itself
was beyond the permissible scope of the existing contract and
contrary to the applicable transitional provision of the Ministry's
communication, the subsequent undertaking cannot validate the
exercise of such power. The doctrine of estoppel cannot be
invoked to compel a party to submit to an action which is
otherwise contrary to law or to permit a State instrumentality to
exercise a power beyond its lawful authority. Nor can an
undertaking be construed as an unconditional waiver of the
constitutional right to challenge arbitrary State action.
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58. Even otherwise, a bare perusal of the communication
dated 07.01.2026 reveals that, while requiring the petitioners to
furnish an undertaking regarding procurement of the prescribed
local content, Respondent No.3 conveyed the requirement in a
manner suggesting that the earlier communication issued by the
Ministry of Power was equally applicable to cases where the
tenders/ Awards had already been issued. Such an impression is,
however, not borne out by the language of the Ministry's
communication dated 24.12.2025. A mere reference to the said
communication of the Ministry could not absolve Respondent No.3
of its obligation to clearly and unambiguously apprise the
petitioners of the actual position, particularly when the
communication was likely to have a material bearing upon their
contractual rights and obligations. The petitioners could not have
been expected to independently scrutinise the Ministry's
communication and to clarify the correct legal position and, on
that basis, decide whether or not to furnish the undertaking. It
was incumbent upon the respondents themselves to communicate
the requirement accurately, transparently and without creating
any misleading impression, rather than leaving the petitioners to
ascertain the true intent and applicability of the Ministry's
communication at their own risk.
59. This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that
the undertaking dated 10.01.2026 does not, in the peculiar facts
and circumstances of the present case, establish a mutually
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agreed novation of the original contractual arrangement within the
meaning of Section 62 of the Act of 1872.
60. It is accordingly held that the communication dated
07.01.2026, insofar as it seeks to impose the specific minimum
20% local content requirement, including indigenously developed
EMS software, upon the petitioner under the concluded Letter of
Award, amounts to an impermissible unilateral alteration of the
contractual framework.
61. The petitioner has also invoked the doctrines of
promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. Both doctrines,
though related in their underlying concern for fairness and
consistency in State action, operate in distinct fields and require
separate consideration.
62. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is founded upon
the principle that where one party, by a clear and unequivocal
representation, intentionally creates an expectation that a
particular state of affairs would continue and the other party acts
upon such representation and alters its position, the maker of the
representation may be precluded from going back upon it where it
would be inequitable to permit such departure.
63. In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. (supra),
the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognised that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel can operate against the Government and the
Government cannot ordinarily be permitted to resile from a
representation upon which a party has acted to its detriment,
subject to the established limitations of the doctrine.
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64. It would be relevant to refer recent judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of IFGL Refractories Ltd.
(supra), wherein after meticulously discussing the principles of
promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation and after lucidly
analysing the earlier judgments in paragraph 100 to 113 and by
mainly relying upon the judgment in the case of Motilal
Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has observed as under:
“ 114. As briefly discussed above, the operation of doctrine
of promissory estoppel against government instrumentalities
finds its reference in a pivotal decision of this Court in the
case of Motilal Padampat (supra). In this case, the State
Government of UP in 1968 had taken a policy decision to
grant the incentive of exemption from sales tax for a period
of three years to all new industrial units being established
within the State. Pursuant to this policy, the appellant
addressed a communication to the Director of Industries,
stating that, in view of the sales-tax exemption announced
by the Government, it intended to set up a plant unit for the
manufacture of vanaspati and sought confirmation regarding
the availability of the exemption. The Director of Industries
affirmed the position, and the assurance was further
endorsed and confirmed by the Chief Secretary to the State
Government. Acting on the strength of these assurances,
the appellant proceeded to establish the plant unit. In and
around 1969, the State Government expressed reservations
regarding the grant of exemption and requested the
appellant to attend a meeting, during which the appellant
reiterated that the government had already granted sales-
tax exemption and that it had proceeded with the
establishment of the plant unit on the strength of that
assurance. Subsequently, in 1970, the State Government
adopted a revised policy decision whereby new vanaspati
units in the State that commenced commercial production
by 30.09.1970 would be entitled only to a partial concession
in sales tax. Although the appellant's unit went into
commercial production on 02.07.1970, the State
Government once again altered its policy and, on
12.08.1970, communicated its decision to rescind the
concession earlier granted in favour of the appellant. On this
note, this Court thoroughly examined the doctrine of
promissory estoppel and observed that it is a principle
evolved by equity to avoid injustice. It is neither in the
realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel.
115. According to this Court, the true principle of
promissory estoppel seemed to be that where one party has,
by his words or conduct, made to the other a clear and
unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal
relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future,
knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the
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other party to whom the promise is made. Where it is in fact
so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be
binding on the party making it, and he would not be entitled
to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to
do so, having regard to the dealings which have taken place
between the parties. This would be so irrespective of
whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the
parties or not.
116. It was further observed that it is not necessary, in
order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, that the promisee, acting on the
promise, should suffer any detriment. What is necessary is
only that the promisee should have altered his position in
reliance on the promise. This Court was of the view that the
doctrine of promissory estoppel is also applicable against the
government, where the government makes a promise
knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the
promisee. Where, in fact, the promisee, acting on it, alters
his position, the government would be held bound by the
promise. The promise would be enforceable against the
government at the instance of the promisee,
notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the
promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a
formal contract.
123. The High court, while relying on Motilal Padampat
(supra) and applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel as
explained therein, observed that although the scheme itself
stated that the State Government might, from time to time,
review the list of industries excluded from its purview and
may remove, amend, or add any item to that list, yet such a
stipulation did not render the assurance held out by the
State Government a conditional one. By incorporating such a
statement in the resolution, the State Government merely
indicated the power it already possessed i.e., it made
explicit what was otherwise implicit. The court was of the
opinion that on the strength of this clause, it could not have
been inferred that the assurance extended under the
scheme was that a new industrial unit would continue to
receive benefits only so long as its industry was not included
in the list of excluded industries. The assurance was not a
limited or qualified one. It was not intended to mean that
the benefit would be available only until the industry came
to be excluded from the scheme. Where a new industrial
unit had set up an industry not excluded from the purview of
the scheme and had commenced commercial production
before that industry was subsequently included in the
exclusion list, it would be unreasonable and unjust to
deprive such an industrial unit of the benefit of the scheme,
especially when it had already become eligible and had
started receiving the incentives. In other words, the
Government may withdraw an exemption previously
granted, but only if such withdrawal does not offend the
doctrine of promissory estoppel or deprive an industrial unit
of an exemption which it is otherwise entitled to claim by
virtue of that doctrine. Where the Government has offered
an incentive of exemption to a new industry, and where an
industry has been established in reliance on such
representation in order to avail the benefit, that new
industry may legitimately contend that the exemption
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cannot thereafter be withdrawn. The relevant observation is
as under:
“Though it is true that in the scheme itself it is
declared that the Government might review the list of
industries excluded from the purview of the scheme from
time to time and remove, amend or add any item from
and to the said list, it cannot be said that the assurance
which the Government held out under the scheme was a
conditional one. As rightly pointed out by the learned
counsel for the petitioner, by stating such a thing in the
resolution what the Government had done was merely to
indicate the power which it possesses. Thus, by stating
like that in the resolution, what the Government did was
to make explicit what was implicit. On the basis of such a
statement in the scheme, it is not possible to hold that
the assurance which the Government held out was that
the new industrial unit will continue to get the benefit
under the scheme so long as it is an industry not included
in the list of industries excluded from the purview of the
scheme. The assurance held out by the Government was
not a limited one in the sense that the benefit under the
scheme was to be available to the new units so long as
that industry was not excluded from the purview of the
scheme. If a new unit had set up an industry which was
not excluded from the purview of the scheme and had
started commercial production before it came to be
included in that list, it would be unreasonable and unjust
to deprive that new industrial unit of the benefit of the
scheme even though it had become eligible under the
scheme and had started receiving benefits under the
scheme […]
[…] In other words, the Government can withdraw
an exemption granted by it earlier if such withdrawal can
be done without offending the rule of promissory estoppel
and depriving an industry entitled to claim exemption
from payment of tax under the said rule. If the
Government grants exemption to a new industry and if on
the basis of the representation made by the Government
an industry is established in order to avail of the benefit
of exemption, the new industry can legitimately raise a
grievance that the exemption cannot be withdrawn except
by means of legislation.
In our opinion, on true interpretation of the
resolution of 1980, it will have to be held that the
Government did give a promise to the entrepreneurs that
if a new unit or project was set up on the basis of the
assurance held out under the scheme, and that the new
st
industrial project was commissioned on or after 1 June,
1980, then it was entitled to the benefits available under
that scheme, if by the time it was commissioned, i.e., by
the time it commenced commercial production, the said
industry was not included in the list of excluded
industries. As the scheme was operative for a period of
st
five years only from 1 June, 1980, it will have to be
further held that the assurance of benefits was available
to those new industrial units or projects which had started
st
commercial production on or after 1 June, 1980, but
st
before 31 May, 1985, and which were not excluded
earlier from the benefits of the scheme. So far as the
petitioner is concerned, the petitioner had started
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st
commercial production on 31 March, 1982. The industry
in which it was engaged came to be included in the list of
th
excluded industries on 15 September, 1982, that is after
it started commercial production, and as we are not called
upon to decide in this case whether it stood excluded by
th
the resolution dated 7 January, 1982, it will have to be
held that the petitioner was entitled and continued to
remain entitled to the sales tax deferment benefit under
the scheme for the full period, if other conditions were
satisfied by it […]”
(Emphasis Supplied)”
65. In the present case, the petitioner participated in the
competitive bidding process on the basis of the conditions
contained in the RfS dated 08.08.2025. The petitioner formulated
its technical and financial bid, participated in the e-reverse auction
and emerged as a successful bidder. The respondents thereafter
issued the Letter of Award dated 19.12.2025, which was accepted
by the petitioner on 23.12.2025. The representation flowing from
the aforesaid process was not merely an expectation that the
petitioner would be selected. It was a representation that the
project would be awarded and implemented in accordance with
the disclosed tender conditions, the discovered tariff and the
contractual terms incorporated in the Letter of Award. The
petitioner altered its commercial position by participating in the
process, furnishing bid security and accepting the Letter of Award.
The respondent, in turn, proceeded on the basis of the petitioner's
successful bid and concluded the competitive procurement
process. The parties thus acted upon the contractual framework
which had been disclosed and accepted. The subsequent
insistence upon an additional technical and financial obligation,
which had not formed part of the original bidding conditions and
was not incorporated in the Letter of Award, defeats the legitimate
expectation arising from the concluded procurement process.
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66. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is particularly
relevant where a public authority, having adopted a particular
course of action and induced persons to arrange their affairs on
that basis, seeks to depart from the same without adequate
justification or adherence to the requirements of fairness.
67. In Union of India & Others vs. Hindustan Development
Corporation & Others (supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court
explained that legitimate expectation is founded upon the
requirement of fairness in administrative action and that its denial
may, in appropriate circumstances, attract judicial review.
68. Further, in Food Corporation of India vs. M/s
Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, (supra) , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court recognised that public authorities are required to
act fairly and reasonably and that legitimate expectations must
receive due consideration in administrative decision-making. In
the present case, the legitimate expectation of the petitioner was
founded upon an identifiable and concluded procurement process,
rather than a mere hope or anticipation of receiving a contract.
The petitioner had already emerged successful and accepted the
Letter of Award before the Ministry's communication dated
24.12.2025 came into existence.
69. The respondents have not demonstrated any overriding
public interest requiring retrospective application of the additional
requirement to the already awarded contract, particularly when
the Ministry's own communication contemplated a transitional
mechanism for tenders already invited without local content
stipulations.
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70. Thus, the action of Respondent No.3 has not only
defeated the petitioner's legitimate expectation but has also failed
the test of fairness and reasonableness mandated under Article 14
of the Constitution of India.
71. Further, the petitioner's acceptance of the discovered
tariff in the proceedings before the RERC does not operate as a
waiver of its right to question the subsequent imposition of an
additional contractual condition. The tariff adoption proceedings
under Section 63 of the Act of 2003, were concerned with
adoption of the tariff discovered through competitive bidding. The
present controversy concerns the applicability of a subsequent
local content requirement to an already awarded project. The
petitioner's email dated 30.01.2026, stating that it had no
objection to the tariff adoption petition, therefore, cannot be
construed as an unconditional acceptance of every subsequent
implementation direction or as a waiver of its right to challenge
the legality of the communication dated 07.01.2026. Equally, the
order of the RERC adopting the discovered tariff does not
adjudicate the legality of the subsequent local content
requirement. This Court is not called upon in the present
proceedings to set aside the tariff adopted by the Commission.
The validity of that tariff order and the legality of the subsequent
administrative direction are distinct issues.
72. The State and its instrumentalities do not shed their
constitutional obligations when they enter into contractual
relationships with private entities. Their actions, even in the
contractual field, must conform to the requirements of fairness,
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reasonableness, transparency and non-arbitrariness. In Kumari
Shrilekha Vidyarthi & Others (supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that the State is required to act fairly and reasonably
even in contractual matters and that the nature of the State as a
public authority continues to characterise its actions
notwithstanding the contractual nature of relationship.
73. In the present case, the respondents were required to
examine whether the Ministry's communication dated 24.12.2025
could lawfully be applied to the Letter of Award already issued and
accepted. It was equally required to consider the specific
transitional provision contained in Clause 6 and the effect of the
completed bidding process. Instead, Respondent No.3 proceeded
to issue the communication dated 07.01.2026, directing
compliance with the minimum local content requirement within
seven days, without adequately addressing the legal distinction
between an invited tender and an already awarded contract.
74. This Court, therefore, finds that the impugned
communication dated 07.01.2026, insofar as it seeks to impose
the minimum 20% local content requirement upon the petitioner
under the concluded Letter of Award, suffers from non-application
of mind, an erroneous interpretation of the Ministry's
communication and arbitrariness within the meaning of Article 14
of the Constitution of India.
75. However, the respondents’ contention that the
petitioners were in default cannot be examined in complete
isolation from the circumstances arising after the Letter of Award.
The respondents introduced an additional local content
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requirement after the award and insisted upon an undertaking
within seven days. The petitioners thereafter continued to
correspond with the respondents and sought time for completion
of the contractual formalities.
76. At the same time, the petitioner cannot use the present
judgment as a blanket protection against the independent
consequences of failure to furnish PBG or execute BESPA under
the original terms of the RfS and Letter of Award.
77. The notice dated 10.04.2026, however, cannot be
sustained to the extent it proceeds upon the assumption that non-
compliance with the subsequently imposed local content
requirement constitutes a valid ground for initiating coercive
action against the petitioner. Respondent No.3 cannot disregard
the aforesaid circumstances and proceed mechanically towards
cancellation of the awarded capacity or forfeiture of bid security
without first determining the petitioner's obligations under the
original contractual framework, excluding the additional condition
which this Court has found impermissible.
78. Respondent No.3 has also relied upon the Minutes of
Meeting dated 16.04.2026 of the Ministry of Power, contending
that the Ministry clarified that no amendment had been made to
the parent guidelines and that its communication dated
24.12.2025 was merely a clarification under the existing VGF
Scheme. The aforesaid submission does not materially alter the
above conclusion reached by this Court. Even if the
communication dated 24.12.2025 is treated as a clarification of
the existing policy framework and not as an amendment to the
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parent guidelines, the question which remains to be answered is
whether the particular requirement could be enforced against a
contract which had already been awarded and accepted before
issuance of the communication.
79. It is, therefore, appropriate to grant the petitioner a
reasonable and final opportunity to complete the remaining
contractual formalities under the original RfS and Letter of Award,
without making compliance with the subsequently introduced local
content requirement a condition precedent.
80. This Court is conscious of the settled principle that
judicial interference in matters concerning public infrastructure
projects and commercial tender processes must be exercised with
restraint. The judgments in N.G. Projects Limited vs. Vinod
Kumar Jain & Others (supra), National High Speed Rail
Corporation Limited vs. Montecarlo Limited & Another,
(supra) and emphasise the necessity of respecting the
commercial wisdom of procuring agencies and avoiding
unnecessary judicial interference which may impede public
projects.
81. However, judicial restraint does not mean judicial
abdication. The discretion of a public authority in contractual
matters is subject to the constitutional limitations under Article 14
of the Constitution of India. Where the authority acts contrary to
the disclosed tender conditions, misconstrues the applicable policy
and seeks to impose an additional substantive obligation after
conclusion of the contract, judicial intervention becomes necessary
to preserve the fairness and legality of public procurement. The
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present case does not require this Court to substitute its
commercial assessment for that of the procuring agency, interfere
with the discovered tariff or prescribe any technical specification
for the BESS project. The limited interference is directed only
against an additional condition which, in the facts of the present
case, was sought to be introduced after issuance and acceptance
of the Letter of Award without any demonstrated legal authority
for its retrospective application.
82. Such interference would rather uphold the sanctity of
the competitive bidding process and reinforce the principle that
State instrumentalities are equally bound by the terms upon which
they invite bids and make contractual awards.
83. The respondents cannot be permitted to insist that the
petitioner must strictly comply with the original tender conditions
while simultaneously claiming an unrestricted right to introduce
additional substantive obligations after the petitioner has accepted
the award. Fairness in public procurement demands reciprocal
adherence to the disclosed contractual framework.
84. In the considered opinion of this Court, the impugned
action cannot be sustained on the grounds of administrative
convenience, public interest or the general objective of promoting
indigenous manufacturing, particularly when the specific
transitional arrangement contained in the Ministry's own
communication has not been adhered to.
85. The communication dated 07.01.2026, insofar as it
sought to impose the specific minimum 20% local content
requirement upon the petitioner under the already accepted Letter
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of Award, therefore, amounts to an impermissible unilateral
alteration of the contractual arrangement. Such alteration is
inconsistent with the principles underlying Section 62 of the Act of
1872 and the settled law governing concluded contracts.
86. Consequently, the impugned communication dated
07.01.2026, to the extent it seeks to impose and enforce the
aforesaid minimum 20% local content requirement, including the
requirement of indigenously developed EMS software, upon the
petitioner under the Letter of Award dated 19.12.2025, is quashed
and set aside.
87. However, the petitioners remain bound by the original
terms and conditions of the RfS and the Letter of Award, including
the obligation to furnish PBG/Insurance Surety Bond and execute
BESPA, as the case may be.
88. In view of the foregoing discussion, all the writ petitions
are allowed in the following terms:
(i) The communication dated 07.01.2026 issued by Respondent
No.3 is quashed and set aside insofar as it seeks to impose and
enforce the minimum 20% local content requirement, upon the
petitioners under the concluded contractual arrangement arising
out of the Letter of Award/ BESPA, as the case may be.
(ii) It is declared that the aforesaid local content requirement, as
communicated vide Ministry of Power's letter dated 24.12.2025,
cannot be retrospectively imposed upon the petitioners under the
already awarded and accepted Letter of Award dated 19.12.2025
and under the BESA, as the case may be, in the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
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(iii) The notice dated 10.04.2026 is quashed to the extent it seeks
to initiate coercive action against the petitioners on account of
non-compliance with the aforesaid subsequently imposed local
content requirement.
(iv) Respondent No.3 is directed not to cancel the BESS capacity
allotted to the petitioners or forfeit bid security solely on account
of failure to furnish an undertaking or comply with the additional
local content requirement sought to be imposed vide
communication dated 07.01.2026.
(v) The petitioners shall, however, remain bound by the original
terms and conditions of the RfS and Letter of Award, including the
obligation to furnish the requisite PBG/Insurance Surety Bond and
execute BESPA. Respondent No.3 shall grant the petitioners a
period of 15 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of
this judgment to complete the aforesaid contractual formalities,
subject to the original contractual conditions and applicable law.
(vi) In the event, the petitioners fail to comply with the aforesaid
directions within the stipulated period, Respondent No.3 shall be
at liberty to proceed in accordance with the original RfS and Letter
of Award/ BESPA, after considering the petitioners’
representations and passing an appropriate reasoned order in
accordance with law. The respondents shall not treat non-
compliance with the subsequently introduced local content
requirement as an independent ground of default.
(viii) It is clarified that the tariff adoption orders passed by the
Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission have not been
disturbed by this judgment.
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89. Pending application (s), if any, shall also stand disposed
of.
90. Office is directed to place copy of this judgment on
record of each connected writ petition.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI
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