SANTHU BAI (died) vs THE JOINT COLLECTOR-II AND 13 OTHERS
- Court
- High Court for the State of Telangana
*THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
+ C.R.P. Nos.1842, 1855, 1869 and 1870 of 2008
Between :
Santhu Bhai (died) per LRs …. Petitioners
AND
Joint Collector – II,
Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad and others ….Respondents
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 22.09.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
1. Whether Reporters of Local
newspapers may be allowed to see
the Judgment ?
: Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of judgment
may be marked to Law
Reports/Journals
: Yes/No
3.
Whether Their Lordship/Ladyship
wish to see the fair copy of
judgment
:
Yes/No
___________________________________
VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J
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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
C.R.P. Nos.1842, 1855, 1869 and 1870 of 2008
% 22.09.2026
Between:
# Santhu Bhai (died) per LRs …. Petitioners
AND
$ Joint Collector – II,
Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad and others ….Respondents
! Counsel for the Petitioners : Sri A. Ravinder Reddy, learned
Senior Counsel representing
Sri Jella Srikanth, learned counsel
on record for the revision
petitioners
^ Counsel for respondents : Sri D.V. Seetharam Murthy,
learned Senior Counsel
representing Sri A. Karthik,
learned counsel on record for the
contesting unofficial respondents
< GIST :
> HEAD NOTE :
? Cases referred :
1. (2016) 15 SCC 102.
2. (1994) 2 SCC 14.
3. (2009) 10 SCC 273.
4. 2006 SCC OnLine AP 564.
5. 1997 SCC OnLine AP 449.
6. 2021 SCC OnLine TS 895.
7. 2007 (1) ALD 614.
8. 2001 SCC OnLine AP 861.
9. 2021 SCC OnLine TS 703.
10. (2007) 11 SCC 410.
11. 1997 (5) ALD 82.
12. 1997 (1) ALD 440.
13. (1998) 9 SCC 183.
14. (2002) 6 SCC 416
15. (1994) 1 SCC 611.
16. AIR 1954 SC 340.
17. (1990) 1 SCC 193.
18. (2000) 3 SCC 350.
19. (2008) 4 SCC 594.
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HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
C.R.P. Nos.1842, 1855, 1869 and 1870 of 2008
Date: 22.09.2026
Reserved on: 22.06.2026 Pronounced on: 22.09.2026
Uploaded on: 22.09.2026
CRP No.1842 of 2008
(CNR No. HBHC010518282008)
Between:
Santhu Bhai (died) per LRs … Petitioners
AND
Joint Collector – II,
Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad and others …Respondents
CRP No.1855 of 2008
(CNR No. HBHC010506392008)
Between:
Santhu Bhai (died) per LRs … Petitioners
AND
Joint Collector – II,
Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad and others …Respondents
CRP No.1869 of 2008
(CNR No. HBHC010085782008)
Between:
Santhu Bhai (died) per LRs … Petitioners
AND
Joint Collector – II,
Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad and others …Respondents
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CRP No.1870 of 2008
(CNR No.HBHC010506252008)
Between:
Santhu Bhai (died) per LRs … Petitioners
AND
Joint Collector – II,
Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad and others …Respondents
COMMON ORDER:
These four Civil Revision Petitions, preferred under Section
91 of the Telangana Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950
(originally the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, and hereinafter referred to as “the
Tenancy Act”), call in question the common order dated
14.03.2008 passed by the Joint Collector-II, Ranga Reddy District,
in four connected appeals preferred under Section 90 of the
Tenancy Act, whereby the proceedings of the Revenue Divisional
Officer, Chevella Division, dated 18.02.2006 in File
No.G/L/1375/2001, and the consequential proceedings dated
14.06.2006, came to be set aside.
2. The particulars of the four Civil Revision Petitions and of the
corresponding proceedings before the Joint Collector-II, Ranga
Reddy District, are as follows:
(i) C.R.P.No.1842 of 2018 – against the order dated
14.03.2008 inCase No.F2/710/2007;
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(ii) C.R.P.No.1855 of 2018 – against the order dated
14.03.2008 in Case No.F2/4162/2006;
(iii) C.R.P.No.1869 of 2018 – against the order dated
14.03.2008 in Case No.F2/5651/2006; and
(iv) C.R.P.No.1870 of 2018 – against the order dated
14.03.2008 in Case No.F2/6435/2006.
3. The revision petitioner in all the four Civil Revision Petitions
was one Santhu Bai, W/o. Ganapat Singh. She died during the
pendency of these proceedings, and petitioners 2 to 7 have been
brought on record as her legal representatives and are prosecuting
the Civil Revision Petitions. For convenience, the original revision
petitioner is hereinafter referred to as “the petitioner”.
4. As the petitioner in all the four Civil Revision Petitions is one
and the same, as the orders under challenge were passed by the
same authority on the same date upon a common set of facts, and
as the questions arising for determination are identical, the four
Civil Revision Petitions were heard together and are being disposed
of by this common order.
5. Heard Sri A. Ravinder Reddy, learned Senior Counsel
representing Sri Jella Srikanth, learned counsel on record for the
revision petitioners and Sri D.V. Seetharam Murthy, learned Senior
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Counsel representing Sri A. Karthik, learned counsel on record for
the contesting unofficial respondents. The record was perused.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
6. The subject lands are situated in Sy.Nos.181 and 182 of
Janwada Village, Shankerpally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District,
admeasuring in all about Ac.22-00 gts. Smt. Prameela Devi was
the original Landholder and Pattadar. Late T. Narayan Singh was
recorded as the Protected Tenant in respect of the subject lands.
That Narayan Singh held the status of a protected tenant under
the Tenancy Act is not in serious dispute before this Court, and the
entire controversy proceeds upon that common foundation.
7. The rival claims run along two distinct lines. The petitioner
claims as a successor of the protected tenant: she asserts that she
is the daughter of one Tulja Ram Singh, a predeceased son of late
T. Narayan Singh, and that she is therefore the granddaughter of
the protected tenant and entitled, by force of Section 40 of the
Tenancy Act, to succeed to the protected tenancy and consequently
to ownership under Section 38-E. The contesting respondents, on
the other hand, claim as purchasers deriving title from Laxman
Singh and Tulja Ram Singh.
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8. The claim set up by Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram Singh,
through whom the contesting respondents trace their right, is itself
twofold. First, they claimed and obtained an ownership certificate
under Section 38-E of the Tenancy Act upon the assertion that
they were the legal heirs of late T. Narayan Singh, being, on their
own showing before this Court, the sons of late Sheetal Singh, who
was the brother of Narayan Singh. Secondly, and independently,
they set up title under a registered Sale Deed dated 09.11.1971
bearing Document No.1050 of 1971, said to have been executed in
their favour by the original landholder, Smt. Prameela Devi. It is
from Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram Singh that the several
respondents, including respondents 14 and 15, claim to have
purchased different portions of the subject lands under successive
registered conveyances, followed by mutations and entries in the
revenue records and the issuance of pattadar pass books and title
deeds.
9. There is a further transaction pleaded by the petitioner. It is
asserted that late T. Narayan Singh had himself purchased the
subject lands from the original landholder for valuable
consideration in or about the year 1952, and that the said
purchase found reflection in the Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-
55. Significantly, the contesting respondents also rely upon the
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very same transaction, though to the opposite end, contending that
the purchase altered the character of the holding and that Narayan
Singh thereafter figured in the revenue records as pattadar rather
than as protected tenant. It is common ground that the transaction
of 1952, if it took place, was not evidenced by a registered
instrument.
10. The material on record discloses the following chronology of
proceedings, which it is necessary to set out before turning to the
rival contentions:
(i) An application preferred by the petitioner claiming
succession to the protected tenancy, registered as File
No.LRW/165/1975 on the file of the competent authority,
came to be rejected by order dated 30.05.1975;
(ii) O.S.No.9 of 1974, a suit for perpetual injunction, was
instituted and was carried in appeal in A.S.No.18 of 1986,
which was disposed of by judgment and decree dated
22.07.1987, wherein findings were recorded adverse to the
petitioner’s asserted relationship with late T. Narayan Singh;
(iii) An ownership certificate under Section 38-E of the
Tenancy Act was issued in favour of Laxman Singh and Tulja
Ram Singh in respect of part of the subject lands on the
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footing that they were the legal heirs of late T. Narayan
Singh;
(iv) The appeal preferred by the petitioner against the
grant of that certificate was allowed by the Joint Collector,
Ranga Reddy District, by order dated 31.03.2001 in File
No.F2/4786/1997; the proceedings granting the certificate
were set aside and the matter was remanded to the Revenue
Divisional Officer for fresh consideration, the Joint Collector
recording in the course of that order that it was prima facie
established that the appellant was the daughter of Tulja Ram
Singh and the granddaughter of Narayan Singh, the said
relationship not having been disputed before him;
(v) Upon remand, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella
Division, by proceedings dated 18.02.2006 in File
No.G/L/1375/2001, cancelled the earlier Section 38-E
ownership certificate and held the petitioner entitled to
succeed to the protected tenancy rights of late T. Narayan
Singh; consequential proceedings followed on 14.06.2006;
and
(vi) The persons who had purchased portions of the
subject lands from Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram Singh
preferred four appeals under Section 90 of the Tenancy Act,
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which were allowed by the Joint Collector-II, Ranga Reddy
District, by the common order dated 14.03.2008 now under
challenge.
THE REASONING OF THE JOINT COLLECTOR-II
11. The Joint Collector-II, in the common order dated
14.03.2008, proceeded in substance upon three lines of reasoning.
First, he took the view that the question of the petitioner’s
succession to late T. Narayan Singh stood concluded by the
judgment and decree dated 22.07.1987 in A.S.No.18 of 1986,
wherein the petitioner had failed to establish the relationship
asserted by her, and that it was not open to the revenue
authorities to reopen that question. Secondly, he held that the
proceedings culminating in the order dated 18.02.2006 had been
conducted without notice to, and without the participation of, the
persons who had by then acquired interests in the subject lands
under registered conveyances, and further that Tulja Ram Singh
had died before those proceedings were taken. Thirdly, he held that
the earlier order dated 30.05.1975 rejecting the petitioner’s
succession claim had not been effectively displaced and continued
to hold the field. Upon that reasoning, the proceedings of the
Revenue Divisional Officer dated 18.02.2006 and the consequential
proceedings dated 14.06.2006 were set aside.
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12. It is convenient to record at the outset that the Joint
Collector-II nowhere adverted to Sections 19, 38-D, 38-E or 40 of
the Tenancy Act, nor to the effect of Section 99 thereof upon the
findings rendered by the Civil Court. That omission lies at the
heart of the controversy in these revisions.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE REVISION PETITIONERS
13. Sri A. Ravinder Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing
Sri Jella Srikanth, learned counsel on record for the revision
petitioners, would submit that the status of late T. Narayan Singh
as the protected tenant of the subject lands is not in dispute, and
that the rights of the parties must therefore be tested exclusively
by reference to the scheme of the Tenancy Act and not by reference
to the ordinary law of transfer of property.
14. It is submitted that Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram Singh
obtained the Section 38-E ownership certificate by representing
that they were the sons and legal heirs of late T. Narayan Singh,
whereas they were in truth the sons of late Sheetal Singh, the
brother of the protected tenant. The certificate was thus procured
upon a representation which was, on the respondents’ own present
showing, untrue; and a certificate so obtained cannot be permitted
to stand.
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15. It is next submitted that, the subject lands having already
been dealt with in favour of Narayan Singh in or about 1952, the
subsequent Sale Deed dated 09.11.1971 executed by Smt.
Prameela Devi in favour of Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram Singh
could convey no lawful right; and that those claiming through the
said vendees can, on the elementary principle that a transferee
takes no better title than his transferor, acquire no right higher
than that of their vendors, their claims being in any event subject
to the restrictions imposed by the Tenancy Act.
16. The learned Senior Counsel would place considerable
reliance upon the order dated 31.03.2001 of the Joint Collector,
wherein the petitioner’s relationship with the protected tenant was
recorded as prima facie established and as undisputed before that
authority, and would contend that the said finding went
unchallenged and ought to have weighed with the Joint Collector-II
while dealing with the appeals preferred by the subsequent
purchasers.
17. Upon the effect of the civil proceedings, it is submitted that
A.S.No.18 of 1986 arose out of a suit for perpetual injunction, in
which the matter directly and substantially in issue was
possession and the entitlement to an injunction, and that any
observation therein touching relationship or succession was
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collateral and incidental. Such an observation could not be treated
as conclusively determining a statutory entitlement arising under a
special enactment, particularly where the proceedings before the
revenue authorities concerned succession to a protected tenancy
under Section 40 and the consequent conferment of ownership
under Section 38-E.
18. It is further submitted that Section 99 of the Tenancy Act
bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of matters which
the Act requires to be settled, decided or dealt with by the
authorities constituted under it. The revenue authorities were
therefore bound to determine the rights of the parties
independently and in accordance with the statutory provisions,
and could not abdicate that jurisdiction by treating the findings
rendered in a suit for injunction as determinative of succession or
of ownership under Section 38-E.
19. Finally, it is submitted that there was no valid termination of
the protected tenancy in the manner prescribed by Section 19 of
the Tenancy Act, and that the rights flowing from the protected
tenancy therefore subsisted and devolved upon the successors of
Narayan Singh. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in B. Bal Reddy v. Teegala Narayana
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1
Reddy , for the proposition that the interest of a protected tenant
continues to be operative and subsisting so long as the protected
tenancy is not validly terminated, and that even a loss of
possession does not by itself bring the protected tenancy to an end.
20. It is accordingly prayed that the Civil Revision Petitions be
allowed, that the common order dated 14.03.2008 be set aside,
and that the proceedings of the Revenue Divisional Officer dated
18.02.2006 be restored, with such consequential reliefs as are
permissible in law.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS 14 AND 15
21. Sri D.V. Seetharam Murthy, learned Senior Counsel
representing Sri A. Karthik, learned counsel on record for the
contesting unofficial respondents, would submit at the threshold
that the Civil Revision Petitions are liable to be dismissed for want
of locus standi . The petitioner’s claim to be the legal heir and
successor of late T. Narayan Singh was considered and rejected by
a competent Civil Court in the proceedings culminating in
A.S.No.18 of 1986, and the judgment and decree dated 22.07.1987
attained finality. It is not open to the petitioner to re-agitate the
self-same question indirectly in proceedings under the Tenancy
1
(2016) 15 SCC 102.
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2
Act. Reliance is placed upon Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair
3
and Ramchandra Dagdu Sonavane v. Vithu Hira Mahar .
22. It is submitted that the material on record establishes that
late Narayan Singh acquired the subject lands from the original
pattadar, Smt. Prameela Devi, under an unregistered transaction
in or about 1952, which was reflected in the Khasra Pahani for
1954-55, whereafter he came to be recorded as pattadar and the
character of the holding stood altered. The petitioners cannot, it is
urged, invoke the protected-tenancy status of Narayan Singh
separated from the subsequent revenue entries and from the
adjudication of the Civil Court. On the limits of the jurisdiction of
the tenancy and revenue authorities where a question stands
already adjudicated by a competent Civil Court, reliance is placed
4
upon Syed Abdul Majeed v. Joint Collector-II, Ranga Reddy District ,
5
Omprakash Agarwal v. Joint Collector and B. Malla Reddy v. State
6
of Telangana .
23. It is pointed out that the petitioner had, as early as in 1975,
asserted the very same status and had filed a succession
application in File No.LRW/165/1975, which came to be rejected
by order dated 30.05.1975. That order was never effectively
2
(1994) 2 SCC 14.
3
(2009) 10 SCC 273.
4
2006 SCC OnLine AP 564.
5
1997 SCC OnLine AP 449.
6
2021 SCC OnLine TS 895.
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displaced in accordance with law and continued to operate; and a
challenge, after a substantial lapse of time, to a consequential
proceeding could not revive or reopen the original determination.
Reliance is placed upon Lakshmi Bai v. Pedda Lakshman (died) by
7
LRs. for the proposition that a concluded adjudication cannot be
circumvented by instituting subsequent proceedings in another
form.
24. It is further submitted that the order dated 31.03.2001 of the
Joint Collector and the consequential order dated 18.02.2006 of
the Revenue Divisional Officer were made without adverting to the
effect of the Civil Court judgment, and without impleading or
effectively hearing the persons who had by then acquired rights
under registered conveyances from Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram
Singh. It is particularly emphasised that Tulja Ram Singh had died
prior to those proceedings. Reliance is placed upon G. Venu Gopal
8
Reddy v. P. Anantha Reddy and Vorla Ramachandra Reddy v.
9
Joint Collector-I .
25. The registered conveyances relied upon by the respondents,
it is submitted, were for valuable consideration and were followed
by successive registered transfers, mutations and revenue entries,
including the issuance of pattadar pass books and title deeds. The
7
2007 (1) ALD 614.
8
2001 SCC OnLine AP 861.
9
2021 SCC OnLine TS 703.
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respondents are therefore persons claiming under registered
instruments and cannot be divested of accrued rights by an order
passed behind their back. Reliance is placed upon Boddam
10
Narsimha v. Hasan Ali Khan .
26. It is submitted that the respondents, upon coming to know
of the proceedings which affected them, rightly invoked the
statutory remedy of appeal under Section 90 of the Tenancy Act,
and that the necessity of affording an effective opportunity to
persons whose substantive rights are directly affected by revenue
or tenancy proceedings is well settled, reliance being placed upon
11
Prabhulingam v. Y. Ramiah and Jupudi Bhushanam v. Joint
12
Collector, Khammam .
27. Meeting the argument founded upon Section 99 of the
Tenancy Act, the learned Senior Counsel would urge that the
respondents do not seek to confer upon the Civil Court a
jurisdiction entrusted exclusively to the tenancy authorities; they
rely only upon the final adjudication of the Civil Court concerning
the petitioner’s own asserted relationship, succession and
possession. The statutory authorities were bound to take that
adjudication into account and could not grant a consequential
certificate under Section 38-E by virtually reopening what stood
10
(2007) 11 SCC 410.
11
1997 (5) ALD 82.
12
1997 (1) ALD 440.
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determined. Reliance is placed upon Ponnala Narsing Rao v.
13
Nallolla Pentaiah and upon the decisions already cited.
28. Lastly, it is submitted that the absence of a contest by
Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram Singh in the later tenancy
proceedings cannot be read as an admission of the petitioner’s
status, more particularly because Tulja Ram Singh was by then
dead, and because no inference drawn from the conduct of a party
can operate to create or transfer substantive rights in immovable
property as against the subsequent purchasers, who were
strangers to those proceedings. It is accordingly prayed that the
Civil Revision Petitions be dismissed.
THE STATUTORY SCHEME UNDER THE TENANCY ACT
29. Since the rival claims of both sides are founded upon, and
must ultimately be tested by, the provisions of the Tenancy Act, it
is necessary to set out the material provisions and the scheme
which emerges from them. The provisions are extracted only to the
extent necessary for the adjudication of the present controversy.
30. Chapter IV of the Tenancy Act deals with protected tenants.
Section 34 identifies the persons who are deemed to be protected
tenants and Section 35 provides for the decision of claims by the
13
(1998) 9 SCC 183.
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Tahsildar, a declaration under that provision being conclusive.
Section 38 confers upon a protected tenant the right to purchase
the landholder’s interest, subject to the ceiling conditions in sub-
section (7). Sections 38-A, 38-B, 38-C and 38-D provide for the
several further modes by which, and the conditions upon which,
the landholder’s interest may pass, and regulate the landholder’s
power to sell to a stranger. Section 38-E provides for the
compulsory transfer of ownership from a notified date. Section 40
makes the rights of a protected tenant heritable and, by its
Explanation, exhaustively defines who alone may be treated as his
heir. Section 19 prescribes the only modes by which a tenancy may
be terminated. Section 99 bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in
respect of questions which the Act entrusts to the authorities
constituted under it.
31. Section 19, reads:
“19. Termination of tenancy. — (1) Notwithstanding any
agreement or usage or any decree or order of a Court of law, but
subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), no tenancy of land
shall be terminated before the expiration of the period for which
the land is leased or deemed to be leased otherwise than, —
(a) by the tenant by surrender of his rights to the landholder at
least a month before the commencement of the year:
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Provided that such surrender is made by the tenant in writing
and is admitted by him before and is made in good faith to the
satisfaction of the Tahsildar; or
Provided further that where the land is cultivated jointly by joint
tenants or members of an undivided Hindu family, unless the
surrender is made by all of them, it shall be ineffective in
respect of such joint tenants as have not joined in the
application for surrender, irrespective of the fact that the names
of all the joint tenants are not mentioned in the certificate];
(b) by the landholder on a ground specified in sub-section (2).”
32. Two features of Section 19 are material. The provision opens
with a non- obstante clause which overrides not merely agreements
and usages but also “any decree or order of a Court of law”. And it
prescribes an exhaustive and formal route for termination: a
surrender in writing, admitted by the tenant before the Tahsildar
and found by that officer to be genuine, or a termination by the
landholder upon one of the grounds enumerated in sub-section (2)
preceded by six months’ notice in writing. The necessary
consequence is that a protected tenancy is not brought to an end
by the mere execution of a conveyance by the landholder, by the
tenant ceasing to be in possession, or by a change in the revenue
entries.
33. Sections 38 and 38-A to 38-D together constitute a graded
code regulating the passing of the landholder’s interest to the
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protected tenant, and it is necessary to notice them because both
sides invoke transactions said to have been entered into between
the landholder and others. Section 38(1) confers upon a protected
tenant, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, usage
or contract, the right to purchase the landholder’s interest in the
land held by him as a protected tenant; sub-sections (2) to (6)
prescribe the machinery of offer, determination of reasonable price
by the Tribunal, deposit and certificate. Section 38-A provides for
the case where the landholder consents to sell and the reasonable
price is agreed between them, in which event sub-section (7) of
Section 38 does not apply and either party may apply to the
Tribunal. Section 38-B provides for a relinquishment by the
landholder without consideration. Section 38-C confers upon a
landholder holding not more than three family holdings the option,
on receipt of a notice of purchase from the protected tenant, either
to terminate the tenancy in the manner and within the limits of
Section 44 or to sell the land to the tenant.
34. Two provisions within Section 38 require particular notice.
First, sub-section (7) subjects the right of purchase to a ceiling,
limiting it, where the protected tenant holds no land as a
landholder, to the extent of a family holding for the local area
concerned, and requiring that not less than twice a family holding
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be left with the landholder. That limitation is carried into Section
38-E (1), which effects the statutory vesting “subject to the
condition laid down in sub-section (7) of section 38”. Secondly, and
of direct relevance here, the second proviso to clause (b) of sub-
section (7) reads:
“Provided further that in the case of purchase by any
person other than the protected tenant, the rights and interests
of the said tenant in the lease land, shall continue as before.”
35. The Legislature has thus declared, in the plainest language,
that a purchase by a stranger leaves the rights and interests of the
protected tenant untouched. That proviso is a complete answer to
any contention that a conveyance executed by the landholder in
favour of a third party operates to displace or diminish the
protected tenancy.
36. Section 38-D, which governs the situation where the
landholder proposes to sell the land held by the protected tenant,
reads:
“38-D. Procedure when landholder intends to sell land to a
protected tenant. —
(1) If the landholder at any time intends to sell the land held by
the protected tenant, he shall give a notice in writing of his
intention to such protected tenant and offer to sell the land to
him. In case the protected tenant intends to purchase the land, he
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shall intimate in writing his readiness to do so within six months
from the date of the receipt of such notice…
(2) If the protected tenant does not exercise the right of purchase
in response to the notice given to him by the landholder under
sub-section (1) such protected tenant shall forfeit his right of
purchase of the same and the landholder shall be entitled to sell
such land to any other person. On such a purchase by another
person, the protected tenant shall forfeit all his rights in the land
save those provided for in section 41.”
37. Section 38-D therefore confers a statutory pre-emptive right
in favour of the protected tenant. The landholder’s power to sell to
a stranger is not an unqualified one: it arises only upon the
protected tenant, having been served with a written notice and
offer, declining or failing to exercise his right of purchase. A sale to
a stranger effected without that antecedent notice and offer is a
sale made in derogation of the statute. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held in B. Bal Reddy’s case (supra) that a transaction of sale
by the landholder in favour of third parties, of agricultural land
under the holding of a protected tenant, is contrary to Section 38-
D of the Tenancy Act. The relevant paragraph is as under:
“9. Section 38-D of the Act prescribes the procedure to be
followed when landholder intends to sell the land held by a
protected tenant. Accordingly, the land must first be offered by
issuing a notice in writing to the protected tenant and it is only
when the protected tenant does not exercise the right of purchase
in accordance with the procedure, that the landholder can sell
such land to any other person. The effect of this provision and
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non-compliance thereof was considered by this Court in Kotaiah
v. Property Assn. of Baptist Churches (P)Ltd. and it was laid-
down: (SCC pp. 431-32, para 22):
“22. (iv) Section 38-D prohibits the landholder from
alienating the tenanted land to third parties. If the
landholder intends to sell the land, he must give notice in
writing of his intention to the protected tenant. The first offer
must be given to the protected tenant. It is only when the
protected tenant does not exercise the right to purchase, the
landholder could sell the land to third parties. The
alienation made in contravention of these provisions has no
legal effect.”
38. Section 38-E, which effects a compulsory transfer of
ownership, reads thus:
“38-E. Ownership of lands held by protected tenants to stand
transferred to them from a notified date.—(1) Notwithstanding
anything in this Chapter or any law for the time being in force or
any custom, usage, judgment, decree, contract or grant to the
contrary, the Government may, by notification in the Telangana
Gazette, declare in respect of any area and from such date as
may be specified therein, that ownership of all lands held by
protected tenants which they are entitled to purchase from their
land-holders in such area under any provision of this Chapter
shall, subject to the condition laid down in sub-section (7) of
section 38, stand transferred to and vest in the protected tenants
holding them and from such date the protected tenants shall be
deemed to be the full owners of such lands…
Explanation.—If a protected tenant, on account of his being
dispossessed otherwise than in the manner and by order of the
Tahsildar as provided in section 32, is not in possession of the
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land on the date of the notification issued hereunder, then for the
purposes of this sub-section, such protected tenant shall,
notwithstanding any judgement, decree or order of any Court, or
the order of the Board of Revenue or Tribunal or other authority,
be deemed to have been holding the land on the date of the
notification…
(2) A certificate in the prescribed form declaring him to be owner
shall be issued by the Tribunal after holding such enquiry as
may be prescribed, to every such protected tenant and notice of
such issue shall simultaneously be issued to the landholder.
Such certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the protected
tenant having become the owner of the land with effect from the
date of the certificate as against the landholder and all other
persons having any interest therein…”
39. The features of Section 38-E which bear directly upon this
case are these. The vesting operates by force of the statute upon
the notified date, and not by reason of any act of parties. The
opening non obstante clause overrides, in terms, any “judgment,
decree, contract or grant to the contrary”. The Explanation goes
further and provides that a protected tenant who has been
dispossessed otherwise than by an order of the Tahsildar under
Section 32 shall, “notwithstanding any judgement, decree or order
of any Court”, be deemed to have been holding the land on the
notified date. The certificate contemplated by sub-section (2) is not
the source of the right; it is evidence of a right which has already
vested. And, critically, the certificate is conclusive only when
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issued to “every such protected tenant” — that is, to a person who
answers that statutory description.
40. The notified date for the Telangana area is 01.01.1973, and
the benefit of Section 38-E is available only to those who held the
lands as protected tenants and continued so to hold them on that
date.
41. Section 40, which governs devolution, is of decisive
importance in the present matters and reads:
“40. Rights of protected tenant heritable- (1) All rights of a
protected tenant shall be heritable.
(2) If a protected tenant dies, his heir or heirs shall be entitled to
hold the tenancy on the same terms and conditions on which
such protected tenant was holding the land at the time of his
death and such heirs may, notwithstanding anything contained
in this Act, sub-divide inter se according to their shares the land
comprised in the tenancy to which they have succeeded.
(3) If a protected tenant dies without leaving any heirs, all his
rights shall be extinguished.
Explanation. —The following persons only shall be deemed to
be the heirs of a protected tenant for the purposes of this
section: —
(a) his legitimate lineal descendants by blood or adoption;
(b) in the absence of any such descendants, his widow for so
long as she does not remarry.
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(4) The interest of a protected tenant in the land held by him as
a protected tenant shall form sixty per cent of the market value
of all the interests in the land and that of the landholder and of
persons claiming under him shall be limited to the remaining
forty per cent.”
42. The Explanation to Section 40 is exhaustive and restrictive
in the plainest terms. The word “only” admits of no addition to the
two categories enumerated. Succession to a protected tenancy is
thus confined to the legitimate lineal descendants of the protected
tenant, by blood or by adoption, and, in their absence, to his
unmarried widow. Collaterals — brothers, and the sons of brothers
— are conspicuously excluded. It follows that a person who is not
within the Explanation cannot succeed to a protected tenancy at
all, and cannot therefore be a person to whom ownership can
stand transferred under Section 38-E in the character of a
successor to the protected tenant. Sub-section (4) is equally
significant: it fixes the protected tenant’s interest at sixty per cent
of the market value of all interests in the land and confines the
landholder “and of persons claiming under him” to the residuary
forty per cent — a statutory recognition that a purchaser from the
landholder does not step into the shoes of the protected tenant.
43. Section 99, which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court,
reads:
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“99. Bar of jurisdiction-
1) Save as provided in this Act no Civil Court shall have
jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is
by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with
by the Tahsildar, Tribunal or Collector or by the Board of
Revenue or Government.
(2) No order of the Tahsildar, Tribunal or Collector or of the
Board of Revenue or Government made under this Act, shall be
questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court.”
44. The section operates in two distinct ways, and both are
material to these revisions. Sub-section (1) withdraws from the
cognisance of the Civil Court every question which the Act requires
to be settled, decided or dealt with by the designated authorities.
Sub-section (2) goes further and places the orders of those
authorities beyond challenge in any Civil or Criminal Court. The
14,
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dhruv Green Field Ltd. v. Hukam Singh
while considering an analogous statutory bar, held that where a
Special Act expressly bars the jurisdiction of a Civil Court in
respect of matters specified therein, the jurisdiction of the ordinary
Civil Court stands excluded. The Court further held that where a
particular matter is empowered by the statute to be determined by
the designated authority, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in
respect of that matter is barred. The relevant para is being
extracted below for ready reference:
14
(2002) 6 SCC 416
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“10. In the light of the above discussion, the following
principles may be restated:
(1) If there is express provision in any special Act barring the
jurisdiction of a civil court to deal with matters specified
thereunder the jurisdiction of an ordinary civil court shall
stand excluded.
(2) If there is no express provision in the Act but an
examination of the provisions contained therein leads to a
conclusion in regard to exclusion of jurisdiction of a civil court,
the court would then inquire whether any adequate and
efficacious alternative remedy is provided under the Act; if the
answer is in the affirmative, it can safely be concluded that
the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred. If, however, no such
adequate and effective alternative remedy is provided then
exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be inferred.
(3) Even in cases where the jurisdiction of a civil court is
barred expressly or impliedly, the court would nonetheless
retain its jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the suit
provided the order complained of is a nullity.
(emphasis supplied)’’
45. The ambit of the bar has been considered by the Hon’ble
15
Supreme Court in Saraswati v. Lachanna , wherein it was held
that the exclusion operates only in respect of those questions
which the Act itself requires to be decided by the designated
authorities, and does not extend to matters lying outside that
description. The converse proposition follows with equal force:
15
(1994) 1 SCC 611.
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where a question does fall within that description, the Civil Court
has no jurisdiction to decide it, and where an order has been made
under the Act, the Civil Court cannot sit in judgment upon it. The
relevant para reads as follows:
“7. Where a particular Act creates a right and also
provides a forum for enforcement of such right and bars the
jurisdiction of the civil court then ouster of the civil court
jurisdiction has to be upheld. But the situation will be different
where the statute neither creates the right in question nor
provides any remedy or having created any right or liability no
forum for adjudication of any dispute arising out of such right
or liability is provided. In such a situation, the ouster of the
civil court's jurisdiction is not to be easily inferred….”
45. Two further provisions require notice. Section 90(1) provides
an appeal to the Collector from every order, other than an interim
order, passed by the Tahsildar, the Deputy Collector or the
Tribunal. Section 91 confines the revisional jurisdiction of this
Court to three grounds, namely, that the original or appellate
authority exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, that it
failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or that in following the
procedure or in passing the order it acted illegally or with material
irregularity. The jurisdiction of this Court under Section 91 is
therefore supervisory and not appellate; it is not open to this Court
to reappreciate evidence and substitute its own conclusions of fact
for those of the statutory authorities.
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46. The scheme which emerges may be summarised thus. A
protected tenancy, once it comes into existence, subsists until it is
terminated in the manner and by the authority prescribed by
Section 19. During its subsistence the landholder’s power of
alienation is fettered by Section 38-D. Upon the notified date the
ownership of the land stands transferred by operation of law to the
protected tenant then holding it, notwithstanding any judgment,
decree, contract or grant to the contrary. Upon the death of the
protected tenant those rights devolve, and devolve only, upon the
persons enumerated in the Explanation to Section 40. All these are
questions which the Act entrusts to the authorities constituted
under it, and to that extent the jurisdiction of the Civil Court
stands excluded by Section 99.
POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION
47. Upon the pleadings, the material on record and the
submissions advanced on either side, the following points arise for
consideration:
(i) Whether the findings recorded by the Civil Court in the
suit for perpetual injunction, as affirmed by the
judgment and decree dated 22.07.1987 in A.S.No.18 of
1986, operate as res judicata or otherwise conclude
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the question of succession to the protected tenancy of
late T. Narayan Singh in the proceedings under the
Tenancy Act, having regard to Section 99 thereof;
(ii) Whether Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram Singh, claiming
as the sons of Sheetal Singh, the brother of the
protected tenant, were “heirs” of late T. Narayan Singh
within the meaning of the Explanation to Section 40,
and whether the ownership certificate granted to them
under Section 38-E on that footing is sustainable;
(iii) Whether the Sale Deed dated 09.11.1971 executed by
the landholder and the successive alienations made
thereunder conferred upon the contesting respondents
any right superior to, or in derogation of, the protected
tenancy, having regard to Sections 19, 38-D and 38-E
of the Tenancy Act;
(iv) Whether the order dated 30.05.1975 in File
No.LRW/165/1975 and the delay in questioning it
disentitle the petitioner from maintaining her claim,
and whether the petitioner has established her status
as a legitimate lineal descendant of the protected
tenant; and
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(v) Whether the proceedings of the Revenue Divisional
Officer dated 18.02.2006 and the common order of the
Joint Collector-II dated 14.03.2008 are sustainable;
and to what relief the parties are entitled.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
48. Before turning to the individual points, it is necessary to
record one matter which is common ground and which supplies
the foundation for all that follows. Neither side disputes that late T.
Narayan Singh was the recorded protected tenant of the subject
lands. The respondents’ own claim to an ownership certificate
under Section 38-E rests upon their assertion that they are his
heirs, and that assertion is intelligible only upon the footing that
he was a protected tenant. The entire controversy therefore
proceeds from an admitted protected tenancy, and the question in
every branch of the case is what became of the rights which flowed
from it.
Point (i) – The effect of the findings recorded by the Civil Court
in the suit for perpetual injunction
49. The Joint Collector-II treated the judgment and decree dated
22.07.1987 in A.S.No.18 of 1986 as concluding the question of
succession, and upon that view declined to examine the matter for
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himself. In the opinion of this Court, that approach is erroneous on
three independent grounds.
50. The first ground is one of jurisdiction. Succession to a
protected tenancy is governed by Section 40 of the Tenancy Act,
and the conferment of ownership upon a protected tenant, together
with the issuance and cancellation of the certificate evidencing it,
is governed by Section 38-E. These are matters which the Act
requires to be settled, decided and dealt with by the authorities
constituted under it. Sub-section (1) of Section 99 accordingly
excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of them, and
sub-section (2) forbids any order made under the Act from being
questioned in a Civil or Criminal Court. It follows that a Civil Court
trying a suit for perpetual injunction had no jurisdiction to decide,
as between the parties before it, who was entitled to succeed to the
protected tenancy of late T. Narayan Singh under Section 40; and
it had no jurisdiction to sit in judgment upon the orders made from
time to time by the tenancy authorities. If, as the respondents
contend, the Civil Court in fact proceeded to determine the
petitioner’s succession to the protected tenancy, it did what
Section 99 forbade it to do. A determination rendered by a Court
which lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter is a nullity; its
invalidity may be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be
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relied upon, and such a determination cannot find a plea of res
judicata. That principle is settled by Kiran Singh v. Chaman
16 17
Paswan and Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra .
51. The second ground rests upon the nature of the earlier suit.
A suit for perpetual injunction simpliciter is concerned with
possession. The matter directly and substantially in issue in such
a suit is whether the plaintiff was in lawful possession and whether
he is entitled to be protected in it. A finding upon title, relationship
or succession rendered in the course of such a suit is ordinarily
collateral and incidental, and a finding which is merely collateral or
incidental does not operate as res judicata. The observation in
Sulochana Amma (supra) upon which the respondents place
reliance is not to the contrary. As explained in Sajjadanashin
18
Sayed v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer and in Anathula Sudhakar v. P.
19
Buchi Reddy , a finding on title in a suit for injunction binds in
later proceedings only where title was directly and substantially in
issue, where there were pleadings and a specific issue in that
behalf, and where the determination of title was necessary for the
grant of the injunction. The respondents, who set up the plea, did
not place before the tenancy authorities the plaint, the written
statement or the issues framed in O.S.No.9 of 1974, and the Joint
16
AIR 1954 SC 340.
17
(1990) 1 SCC 193.
18
(2000) 3 SCC 350.
19
(2008) 4 SCC 594.
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Collector-II did not examine whether the finding relied upon
satisfied that test. He was therefore not entitled to assume that it
did. The relevant paragraph from Anathula Sudhakar’s case
(supra) is extracted hereunder:
“19. This Court in Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr. v.
Musa Dadabhai Ummer [(2000) 3 SCC 350] (at SCC pp. 362-63,
para 24) noticed the apparent conflict in the views expressed in
Vanagiri [Vanagiri Sri Selliamman Ayyanar
Uthirasomasundareswarar Temple v. Rajanga Asari, AIR 1965
Mad 355] and Sulochana Amma [AIR 1965 Mad 355] and
clarified that the two decisions did not express different views,
but dealt with two different situations, as explained in Corpus
Juris Secundum (Vol. 50, para 735, p. 229):
“Where title to property is the basis of the right of
possession, a decision on the question of possession is res
judicata on the question of title to the extent that
adjudication of title was essential to the judgment; but
where the question of the right to possession was the only
issue actually or necessarily involved, the judgment is not
conclusive on the question of ownership or title.”
52. The third ground is furnished by the statute itself. Section
38-E(1) opens with a non-obstante clause which overrides any
“judgment, decree, contract or grant to the contrary”, and the
Explanation to that sub-section provides in terms that a
dispossessed protected tenant shall, “notwithstanding any
judgement, decree or order of any Court”, be deemed to have been
holding the land on the notified date. Section 19(1) likewise
overrides “any decree or order of a Court of law”. The Legislature
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has thus expressly provided that the statutory vesting and the
statutory protection are not to be displaced by a civil decree. To
treat a decree in an injunction suit as extinguishing rights
conferred by Sections 19, 38-E and 40 is to defeat the very
provisions which the Legislature enacted to secure them.
53. This Court is, however, unable to accept the submission of
the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in its wider form,
namely, that the civil proceedings are to be disregarded altogether.
Section 99 denies to the Civil Court the jurisdiction to decide
questions entrusted to the tenancy authorities; it does not render
the record of the civil proceedings inadmissible. The judgment and
decree dated 22.07.1987, and the evidence which was led in that
litigation upon the petitioner’s parentage, remain relevant material
which the tenancy authority is bound to consider, along with the
rest of the evidence, in arriving at its own independent conclusion.
The distinction is between treating an adjudication as conclusive,
which the Joint Collector-II wrongly did, and treating it as evidence
to be weighed, which he was required to do.
54. Point (i) is answered accordingly: the findings recorded in the
suit for perpetual injunction do not operate as res judicata upon,
and do not conclude, the question of succession to the protected
tenancy; they constitute relevant material to be considered by the
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competent authority under the Tenancy Act in reaching its own
determination. To the extent that the Joint Collector-II treated
those findings as conclusive and thereby declined to enter upon
the enquiry which the statute required him to make, he failed to
exercise a jurisdiction vested in him by law within the meaning of
Section 91(b) of the Tenancy Act.
Point (ii) – Whether Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram Singh were
heirs within the Explanation to Section 40
55. This point admits of a short answer upon the respondents’
own case. It is now asserted on their behalf that Laxman Singh and
Tulja Ram Singh were the sons of late Sheetal Singh, who was the
brother of late T. Narayan Singh. If that be so, they were the
nephews of the protected tenant. They were not his legitimate
lineal descendants by blood or by adoption. The Explanation to
Section 40 enumerates those two categories and no others, and
prefaces the enumeration with the word “only”. Collaterals are
excluded, and the exclusion is deliberate; the protected tenancy is
a personal statutory protection conferred upon a cultivator, and
the Legislature has confined its devolution to the tenant’s own line.
56. It follows that Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram Singh could not,
in the character of heirs of late T. Narayan Singh, succeed to the
protected tenancy at all; and not being successors to the protected
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tenancy, they could not be persons in whom ownership stood
transferred under Section 38-E in that character. A certificate
under Section 38-E(2) is conclusive evidence of ownership; but
sub-section (2) speaks of a certificate issued to “every such
protected tenant”, that is, to a person who answers the statutory
description. The conclusiveness attaches to a certificate validly
issued under the section; it cannot cure a want of the very
jurisdictional fact upon which the power to issue it depends. A
certificate issued to a person who is, ex hypothesi, outside Section
40 is issued without jurisdiction, and no amount of conclusiveness
can breathe validity into it.
57. There is a further difficulty in the respondents’ position
which the Joint Collector-II failed to notice, and which goes to the
root of their case. The two limbs of the claim advanced on behalf of
Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram Singh are mutually destructive. To
claim ownership under Section 38-E as the heirs of the protected
tenant is necessarily to admit that the protected tenancy of
Narayan Singh subsisted and that it was that tenancy which
ripened into ownership. To claim under the Sale Deed dated
09.11.1971 executed by the landholder is to assert that the
landholder was competent to convey the land unencumbered by
any protected tenancy. A party cannot approbate and reprobate in
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this fashion. The authorities below were bound to require the
respondents’ predecessors to elect, and to examine which of the
two inconsistent foundations, if either, was made out. Neither the
Revenue Divisional Officer nor the Joint Collector-II addressed this
question at all.
58. It is necessary, however, to enter one important qualification.
The proposition that Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram Singh were the
sons of Sheetal Singh is a proposition of fact. It is asserted by the
petitioners and is, on the record as it presently stands, also the
position taken on behalf of the contesting respondents before this
Court; but the representation upon which the Section 38-E
certificate was originally obtained was the opposite one, namely,
that they were the sons of Narayan Singh. A finding upon that
question of fact has never been recorded after a proper enquiry
upon evidence by the competent authority. Exercising jurisdiction
under Section 91, this Court cannot itself record such a finding.
What this Court does hold, and holds unqualifiedly, is the
proposition of law: if Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram Singh were the
sons of the brother of the protected tenant, the Section 38-E
certificate granted to them qua heirs of the protected tenant is void
and is liable to be cancelled, and no question of limitation, delay or
acquiescence can sustain it.
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59. Point (ii) is answered accordingly.
Point (iii) – The effect of the Sale Deed dated 09.11.1971 and
of the successive alienations
60. The respondents’ alternative case rests upon the registered
Sale Deed dated 09.11.1971 executed by Smt. Prameela Devi and
upon the conveyances which followed it. That case must be tested
against Sections 19, 38-D and 38-E of the Tenancy Act.
61. The starting point is that a protected tenancy is not
extinguished by a conveyance executed by the landholder. Section
19(1) permits termination only by a surrender made in writing,
admitted by the tenant before the Tahsildar and found by him to
be genuine, or by the landholder upon a ground specified in sub-
section (2) after six months’ notice in writing. There is nothing on
the record to suggest that either course was ever adopted in
respect of the protected tenancy of late T. Narayan Singh. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in B. Bal Reddy’s case (supra) has held
that the interest of a protected tenant continues to be operative
and subsisting so long as the protected tenancy is not validly
terminated, and that even the loss of possession does not by itself
terminate it; the interest devolves upon his legal heirs and
representatives, who may claim restoration of possession. To the
same effect is Boddam Narsimha’s case (supra), relied upon by the
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respondents themselves, in which it was held that a plea of adverse
possession is not available against a protected tenant.
62. Next, Section 38-D forbids a sale by the landholder to a
stranger except after a written notice and offer to the protected
tenant and his failure or refusal to purchase. There is no material
on the record to show that any such notice or offer preceded the
Sale Deed dated 09.11.1971. On the law declared in B. Bal Reddy’s
case (supra), such a transaction is contrary to Section 38-D.
63. Thirdly, and assuming in the respondents’ favour that the
Sale Deed dated 09.11.1971 was validly executed and operative, it
could at its highest convey the landholder’s own interest and no
more. A vendee takes subject to the subsisting protected tenancy.
That this is the statutory position is placed beyond doubt by two
provisions. The second proviso to clause (b) of sub-section (7) of
Section 38 declares that in the case of a purchase by any person
other than the protected tenant, the rights and interests of the
tenant in the leased land shall continue as before. And Section
40(4) confines the landholder “and of persons claiming under him”
to forty per cent of the market value of all interests in the land,
leaving sixty per cent with the protected tenant. The vendees under
the 1971 instrument therefore acquired, at most, the residuary
interest of the landholder, encumbered by the protected tenancy;
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and upon the notified date of 01.01.1973 even that residuary
interest was liable to be extinguished by the vesting worked by
Section 38-E(1) in favour of the protected tenant then holding the
land. The successive purchasers from Laxman Singh and Tulja
Ram Singh can stand in no better position than their vendors.
64. The reliance placed by the respondents upon the alleged
unregistered purchase by Narayan Singh in or about 1952 does not
assist them; if anything, it tells against them. An unregistered
instrument of sale of immovable property of the value of one
hundred rupees and upwards conveys no title, and the transaction
of 1952 could not therefore have clothed Narayan Singh with
ownership. What the transaction could not do, however, is to
destroy his status as a protected tenant, which, once acquired, was
capable of being brought to an end only in the manner prescribed
by Section 19. The respondents’ argument thus proves too little
and too much at once: too little, because the unregistered
transaction conveyed no ownership; too much, because if it did
convey ownership to Narayan Singh, the landholder had nothing
left to convey to Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram Singh in 1971. It
may be added that Section 50-B, which provides a machinery for
the validation of certain unregistered alienations, expressly
declares by sub-section (3) that such validation shall not affect a
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right accrued to any person under Section 37-A, Section 38 or
Section 38-E.
65. Nor do the revenue entries carry the respondents to their
destination. Entries in the Khasra Pahani, the Pahani and the
record of rights, and the issuance of pattadar pass books and title
deeds, are not documents of title. They afford evidence of
possession and of the nature of enjoyment and raise a rebuttable
presumption in that behalf; they do not create, transfer or
extinguish rights, least of all rights which the Legislature has
vested by statute and protected by a non obstante clause.
66. This is not to say that the contesting respondents are
without any standing. They are purchasers under registered
instruments for consideration, whose interests are directly and
adversely affected by the cancellation of the Section 38-E certificate
under which their vendors claimed. They were plainly entitled to be
heard before any order was passed to their detriment, and their
appeals under Section 90 were maintainable. What they are not
entitled to is a right superior to that of their vendors, or a title free
of the protected tenancy.
67. Point (iii) is answered accordingly: neither the Sale Deed
dated 09.11.1971 nor the successive alienations made thereunder
could confer upon the contesting respondents any right in
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derogation of the protected tenancy of late T. Narayan Singh or of
the rights which devolved from it under Section 40 and vested
under Section 38-E.
Point (iv) – The order dated 30.05.1975, the delay, and the
petitioner’s status under Section 40
68. The findings recorded upon Points (i) to (iii) dispose of the
respondents’ case as it was presented, but they do not by
themselves establish the petitioner’s claim. The petitioner does not
succeed merely because her opponents fail. She claims through
Section 40, and the Explanation to that section makes her status
as a legitimate lineal descendant of the protected tenant the
jurisdictional fact upon which her whole claim depends. That fact
she must establish.
69. Upon the record as it stands, that fact is not established,
and this Court is constrained to observe that a serious
inconsistency in the petitioner’s own case has never been resolved
by any authority. The petitioner asserts that she is the daughter of
Tulja Ram Singh and that Tulja Ram Singh was a predeceased son
of late T. Narayan Singh. The respondents assert that Tulja Ram
Singh, their vendor, was a son of Sheetal Singh, the brother of
Narayan Singh. Whether the Tulja Ram Singh through whom the
petitioner claims descent is the same Tulja Ram Singh who, with
Laxman Singh, obtained the Section 38-E certificate and executed
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the conveyances in favour of the respondents, or a different person
of the same name, is a question of identity and parentage which
the record before this Court does not answer. It is a question which
lies at the centre of the dispute; and until it is answered upon
evidence, neither the petitioner’s claim nor the respondents’
defence can be said to rest upon a determined factual foundation.
70. The petitioners’ reliance upon the order dated 31.03.2001 of
the Joint Collector cannot be accepted in the form in which it was
pressed. That order was an order of remand. The observation
contained in it, that the appellant’s relationship with the protected
tenant was prima facie established and had not been disputed
before that authority, was, in terms, a prima facie observation
made for the limited purpose of setting aside the proceedings and
directing a fresh enquiry. A prima facie observation in an order of
remand does not attain the character of a conclusive
determination, and it certainly cannot bind persons who were not
parties to that proceeding. The Revenue Divisional Officer, upon
remand, was required to determine the question afresh upon
evidence; he was not entitled to treat it as already decided.
71. As to the order dated 30.05.1975 in File No.LRW/165/1975,
the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents is right in saying
that it has never been formally set aside, and it is a circumstance
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which the competent authority must take into account. It does not,
however, operate as an absolute bar for two reasons. First, the
material placed before this Court does not disclose the ground
upon which that application was rejected, and an order rejecting
an application for want of proof at a given point of time upon the
material then available stands on a different footing from an
adjudication upon the merits of status. Secondly, and more
fundamentally, the question presently agitated is the validity of a
Section 38-E certificate granted to persons who, if they are
collaterals, were incompetent to receive it. That question may be
examined by the Collector suo motu under sub-section (5) of
Section 38-E and under sub-section (4) of Section 50-B, powers
which are not circumscribed by the period of sixty days prescribed
by Section 93 for appeals and revisions. A void certificate does not
acquire validity by the passage of time.
72. Delay is, nevertheless, a relevant consideration, though not
upon the lines urged. The transactions in favour of the
respondents and their predecessors were entered into and acted
upon over a long period, and third-party interests have intervened.
These are matters which the competent authority must weigh while
moulding the relief that may ultimately follow upon its findings;
they are not matters which can defeat at the threshold an enquiry
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into the validity of a certificate granted, if the petitioners are right,
upon a misrepresentation of relationship.
73. Point (iv) is answered accordingly: the petitioner’s status as a
legitimate lineal descendant of late T. Narayan Singh within the
meaning of the Explanation to Section 40 is neither established nor
disproved upon the present record, and must be determined afresh
upon evidence; the order dated 30.05.1975 is a relevant
circumstance but does not bar that enquiry.
Point (v) – The sustainability of the orders under challenge,
and relief
74. It remains to consider the validity of the two orders which
occupy the field, and the relief to which the parties are entitled.
75. The proceedings of the Revenue Divisional Officer dated
18.02.2006 cannot be sustained. Those proceedings cancelled an
ownership certificate and recognised succession in favour of the
petitioner, and thereby directly and adversely affected the rights of
the several persons who had by then purchased portions of the
subject lands under registered conveyances. It is not in dispute
that they were neither impleaded nor heard. It is equally not in
dispute that Tulja Ram Singh, one of the two certificate-holders,
had died before those proceedings, and there is nothing to show
that his legal representatives were brought on record. An order
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which destroys a title and is made behind the back of those whom
it destroys is contrary to the most elementary requirements of
natural justice, and the statute itself insists upon compliance: the
proviso to Section 38-E(5) and the proviso to Section 50-B(4) each
forbid the passing of an order adversely affecting a person unless
he has had an opportunity of making his representation. The
Revenue Divisional Officer, in proceeding as he did, acted with
material irregularity within the meaning of Section 91(c) of the
Tenancy Act.
76. The common order of the Joint Collector-II dated 14.03.2008
is equally unsustainable, though for different reasons. He was right
in holding that the subsequent purchasers were entitled to be
heard, and to that extent his conclusion that the proceedings dated
18.02.2006 could not stand was correct. But having so held, the
course open to him was to remit the matter for a fresh enquiry with
notice to all concerned. Instead, he proceeded to conclude the
controversy against the petitioner upon a view of the law which, for
the reasons recorded upon Point (i), is erroneous: he treated a
finding rendered in a suit for perpetual injunction as conclusive of
a question which Section 99 of the Tenancy Act withdraws from the
cognisance of the Civil Court, and upon that footing declined to
enter upon the enquiry which Sections 38-E and 40 required him
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to make. He did not advert to Section 19, to Section 38-D, to the
vesting effected by Section 38-E, or to the exhaustive character of
the Explanation to Section 40. In failing to exercise the jurisdiction
vested in him, he brought his order within Section 91(b).
77. This Court is conscious that the jurisdiction under Section
91 is supervisory. It is for that very reason that this Court declines
the invitation of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners to
restore the proceedings dated 18.02.2006. Those proceedings are
themselves vitiated for want of notice, and to restore them would
be to perpetuate the very illegality which the Joint Collector-II
rightly identified. Equally, this Court declines to record findings
upon the disputed questions of parentage, identity and
relationship, which are questions of fact for the competent
authority to determine upon evidence.
78. For completeness, it is necessary to record that the course
suggested in the alternative, namely, that the parties be relegated
to a competent Civil Court to have their rights, title and succession
determined, would not be a lawful course. Succession to a
protected tenancy under Section 40, the validity of a certificate
granted under Section 38-E, and the question whether a protected
tenancy was terminated in accordance with Section 19, are
questions which the Tenancy Act requires to be settled, decided
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and dealt with by the authorities constituted under it, and Section
99 in terms denies cognisance of them to the Civil Court. To
relegate the parties to a civil suit upon those questions would be to
direct them to a forum which the Legislature has closed. This is
not to say that the Civil Court is excluded altogether: questions
lying outside the description in Section 99, such as a dispute
among the heirs of a protected tenant as to their respective shares
in the land which has devolved upon them, or a claim of title
founded upon a source independent of the tenancy remain within
its jurisdiction, and nothing in this order shall be construed as
barring recourse to the Civil Court in respect of such matters.
79. The proper course, in the circumstances, is to set aside both
the common order dated 14.03.2008 and the proceedings dated
18.02.2006 together with the consequential proceedings dated
14.06.2006, and to remit the matter to the competent authority for
a fresh enquiry and determination in accordance with law, after
notice to all persons interested. The enquiry has been pending in
one form or another since 1997, and the matters relate to events
reaching back to 1952; it is therefore necessary to fix a time frame
and to indicate the questions which fall for determination.
80. Point (v) is answered accordingly.
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CONCLUSION AND RESULT
81. For the reasons recorded above, the Civil Revision Petitions
are allowed in part, and the following order is passed:
(i) The common order dated 14.03.2008 passed by the
Joint Collector-II, Ranga Reddy District, in Case
Nos.F2/710/2007, F2/4162/2006, F2/5651/2006
and F2/6435/2006 is set aside.
(ii) The proceedings of the Revenue Divisional Officer,
Chevella Division, dated 18.02.2006 in File
No.G/L/1375/2001, and the consequential
proceedings dated 14.06.2006, are also set aside.
(iii) The matter is remitted to the Revenue Divisional
Officer, Chevella Division, functioning as the
competent authority under Section 38-E of the
Tenancy Act, for a fresh enquiry and determination in
accordance with law.
(iv) The competent authority shall issue notice to all
persons interested, including the legal representatives
of the original revision petitioner, the legal
representatives of the deceased Laxman Singh and
Tulja Ram Singh, and every person who claims to have
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purchased any portion of the subject lands under a
registered conveyance, and shall afford each of them a
reasonable opportunity of adducing evidence, and of
being heard.
(v) The competent authority shall determine, upon the
evidence so adduced, the following questions: whether
the original revision petitioner was a legitimate lineal
descendant of late T. Narayan Singh within the
meaning of the Explanation to Section 40 of the
Tenancy Act; whether Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram
Singh were such legitimate lineal descendants or were
the sons of Sheetal Singh, the brother of the protected
tenant; whether the protected tenancy of late T.
Narayan Singh was terminated in the manner
prescribed by Section 19 of the Tenancy Act at any
time before 01.01.1973; whether the requirements of
Section 38-D were complied with before the execution
of the Sale Deed dated 09.11.1971; the extent to which
the statutory vesting under Section 38-E(1) could
operate, having regard to the condition laid down in
sub-section (7) of Section 38 and to the area of a family
holding determined under Section 4 for the local area
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concerned; and, upon those findings, whether the
ownership certificate granted under Section 38-E in
favour of Laxman Singh and Tulja Ram Singh is valid
or is liable to be cancelled, and in whom, and to what
extent, the ownership of the subject lands stood vested
upon the notified date.
(vi) The competent authority shall conduct the enquiry
uninfluenced by the findings recorded in A.S.No.18 of
1986, which, for the reasons recorded in this order, do
not operate as res judicata upon the questions arising
under the Tenancy Act, but shall consider the record
of those proceedings as relevant material along with
the rest of the evidence.
(vii) The enquiry shall be completed and a reasoned order
passed as expeditiously as possible, and in any event
within a period of six months from the date of receipt
of a copy of this order.
(viii) Pending the fresh determination, possession of the
subject lands shall not be disturbed otherwise than in
accordance with law, and no party shall create any
third-party interest in respect of the subject lands.
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(ix) Nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion upon the disputed questions of
fact, which shall be determined by the competent
authority upon the evidence placed before it. The
rights and contentions of all parties upon those
questions are left open.
82. There shall be no order as to costs.
Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in these Civil
Revision Petitions shall stand closed.
____________________________________
VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J
Date: 22.09.2026
Note: LR copy to be marked.
B/o.AS