SRI RAVI S/O HANUMANTHAPPA BETAGERI vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD

TH
DATED THIS THE 9 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CRIMINAL PETITION NO.102117 OF 2026

(482(Cr.PC)/528(BNSS))
BETWEEN:

SRI. RAVI S/O. HANUMANTHAPPA BETAGERI,
AGE: 59 YEARS, OCC: COMPUTER OPERATOR,
R/O: SIDDARAMESHWARA NAGARA,
DIST: GADAG – 582 101.




…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. S.A. SONDUR, ADVOCATE)

AND:

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
THROUGH LOKAYUKTA POLICE STATION, GADAG,
FORMERLY ACB POLICE STATION GADAG,
REPRESENTED BY SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH – 560 001.







…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. K.L. PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. ANIL KALE, ADVOCATE)

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA R/W 482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING
TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE
PETITIONER/ACCUSED NO.7 IN GADAG A.C.B. POLICE STATION
CRIME NO.17/2019 WHICH IS REGISTERED AS SPL (S.V.C.)
NO.09/2021 ON THE FILE OF PRL. DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE
AND SPECIAL COURT, GADAG, FOR OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER
SECTIONS 7-A AND 12 OF PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1988
(AMENDMENT ACT 2018), IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND
EQUITY.

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS
DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA


Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench

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ORAL ORDER

This petitioner is before the Court calling in question the
proceedings in Special (SVC) No.9 of 2021 arising out of Crime
No.17 of 2019 registered for the offences punishable under
Sections 7(a), 7A, 12 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short).

2. Heard Sri. S.A. Sondur, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner and Sri.Anil Kale, learned counsel appearing
for the respondent/Lokayukta.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that the present petitioner is accused No.7 and qua the
accused No.1, this Court has quashed the proceedings in
Criminal Petition No.101560/2023, decided on 20.12.2023 on
the score that the basis ingredients of demand and acceptance
are not present, wherein this Court has held as follows:
“The petitioner is before this Court calling in
question proceedings in Special (SVC) No.9 of 2021
arising out of Crime No.17 of 2019 registered for
offences punishable under Sections 7(a), 7A, 12 and
13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). The
petitioner is accused No.1.

2. Facts adumbrated are as follows:-

An anonymous complaint emerges against the
functioning of the Sub-Registrar’s office at Gadag. The

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allegation was that all the staff in the office is in the
habit of demanding bribe and, therefore, a request was
made to personally visit the Sub-Registrar’s office, look
at the truth and initiate proceedings. The complaint was
made to the Deputy Superintendent of Police of the
Anti-Corruption Bureau. Based upon this, a crime is
registered in Crime No.17 of 2019, a search warrant
was secured and office of the Sub-Registrar, Gadag was
searched. What was found, according to the search so
conducted, from the hands of the petitioner was
allegedly Rs.9390/- and all others who were in the office
of the Sub-Registrar at the time of search were either
licensed deed writers or private parties who had come to
get the documents registered. Based upon the search,
alleging that there was demand and acceptance against
the staff of the Sub-Registrar’s office and private
persons, an investigation is taken up. The investigation
leads to filing of charge sheet and filing of charge sheet
leads to securing sanction from the hands of the
competent authority to prosecute the petitioner as
obtaining under Section 19 of the Act. After the
sanction being placed before the concerned Court, the
concerned Court takes cognizance of the offence and
registers Special case No.9 of 2021. It is at that point in
time the petitioner knocks at the doors of this Court in
Criminal Petition No.100368 of 2022 in which an interim
order of stay of further proceedings was granted. The
said criminal petition comes to be disposed of by an
order of the co-ordinate Bench on 06-07-2023 on the
score that the office of Anti Corruption Bureau by then
stood abolished by a judicial order and liberty was
reserved to file a fresh petition by arraigning the
Lokayukta as a party respondent. It is, therefore, the
present petition has emerged. This Court, in the light of
the earlier interim order subsisting till the disposal of
the petition, granted an interim order of stay of all
further proceedings in the subject petition as well.
Therefore, further proceedings have not taken place in
Special case No.9 of 2021 qua the petitioner/accused
No.1.

3. Heard Smt G. Bharati, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner and Sri Anil Kale, learned
Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent.

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4. The learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner would vehemently contend that there is no
ingredient of demand and acceptance for an allegation
under Section 7 or 7A of the Act, be it under un-
amended or amended Act. The learned counsel would
further submit that an anonymous complaint emerges, a
search warrant is taken on that strength and the office
of the Sub-Registrar, Gadag is searched. There are no
trap proceedings conducted, there is no bait money, no
test was conducted for the notes being the same and all
that the Police of the ACB would do is search the office,
found totally Rs.27,000/- and attribute it to the
petitioner and other staff of the office. She would
further emphasise that without there being any demand
or acceptance Section 7 or Section 7A of the Act cannot
be laid against the petitioner.

5. Per-contra, the learned Special Public
Prosecutor Sri Anil Kale who has filed a statement of
objections would submit that certain amount was
recovered from the hands of the petitioner which was
beyond Rs.100/- and from the hands of several private
parties. Therefore, it was a case where Section 7 (a) or
Section 7A of the Act would clearly get attracted. He
would submit that all these factors are a matter of trial
and, therefore, the trial should be permitted to continue,
as the office of the Sub-Registrar at Gadag had been
brooding rampant corruption.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the respective learned counsel
and have perused the material on record.

7. Before embarking upon consideration of the
issue on merits of the matter, I deem it appropriate to
notice the provisions of the Act that are alleged against
the petitioner and their interpretation by the Apex Court
and then proceed to make the facts applicable to the
law as declared by the Apex Court.

8. The provisions of the Act that are alleged are
as follows:

“7. Offence relating to public servant
being bribed. —Any public servant who,—

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(a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain
from any person, an undue advantage,
with the intention to perform or cause
performance of public duty improperly
or dishonestly or to forbear or cause
forbearance to perform such duty either
by himself or by another public servant;
or

(b) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an
undue advantage from any person as a
reward for the improper or dishonest
performance of a public duty or for
forbearing to perform such duty either by
himself or another public servant; or

(c) performs or induces another public servant
to perform improperly or dishonestly a public
duty or to forbear performance of such duty
in anticipation of or in consequence of
accepting an undue advantage from any
person,

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than three years
but which may extend to seven years and
shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation 1.—For the purpose of this
section, the obtaining, accepting, or the
attempting to obtain an undue advantage
shall itself constitute an offence even if the
performance of a public duty by public
servant, is not or has not been improper.

Illustration.—A public servant, ‘S’ asks
a person, ‘P’ to give him an amount of five
thousand rupees to process his routine ration
card application on time. ‘S’ is guilty of an
offence under this section.

Explanation 2.—For the purpose of this
section,—

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(i) the expressions “obtains” or “accepts”
or “attempts to obtain” shall cover
cases where a person being a public
servant, obtains or “accepts” or
attempts to obtain, any undue
advantage for himself or for another
person, by abusing his position as a
public servant or by using his personal
influence over another public servant;
or by any other corrupt or illegal
means;

(ii) it shall be immaterial whether such
person being a public servant obtains
or accepts, or attempts to obtain the
undue advantage directly or through a
third party.]

7-A. Taking undue advantage to
influence public servant by corrupt or
illegal means or by exercise of personal
influence.—Whoever accepts or obtains
or attempts to obtain from another
person for himself or for any other
person any undue advantage as a
motive or reward to induce a public
servant, by corrupt or illegal means or
by exercise of his personal influence to
perform or to cause performance of a
public duty improperly or dishonestly or
to forbear or to cause to forbear such
public duty by such public servant or by
another public servant, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than three
years but which may extend to seven
years and shall also be liable to fine.
… …
…
12. Punishment for abetment of
offences.—Whoever abets any offence
punishable under this Act, whether or
not that offence is committed in
consequence of that abetment, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a

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term which shall be not less than three
years, but which may extend to seven
years and shall also be liable to fine.

13. Criminal misconduct by a
public servant .—(1) A public servant is said
to commit the offence of criminal
misconduct,—

(a) if he dishonestly or fraudulently
misappropriates or otherwise converts
for his own use any property entrusted
to him or any property under his
control as a public servant or allows
any other person so to do; or

(b) if he intentionally enriches himself
illicitly during the period of his office.

Explanation 1.—A person shall be
presumed to have intentionally enriched
himself illicitly if he or any person on his
behalf, is in possession of or has, at any time
during the period of his office, been in
possession of pecuniary resources or
property disproportionate to his known
sources of income which the public servant
cannot satisfactorily account for.

Explanation 2.—The expression
“known sources of income” means income
received from any lawful sources.

(2) Any public servant who
commits criminal misconduct shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall be not less than four
years but which may extend to ten years
and shall also be liable to fine.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 directs that any public servant who accepts or
attempts to obtain from any person undue advantage
with an intention to perform or cause performance of

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public duty or to forbear such performance either by
himself or by another public servant is said to have
committed the offence of bribe. Therefore the soul of
Section 7(a) is demand and acceptance for the
performance of public duty or forbearance of such
performance. Section 7A deals with taking undue
advantage to influence public servant by corrupt or
illegal means or by exercise of personal influence. The
section mandates that whoever accepts or obtains or
attempts to obtain from another person for himself or
for any other person undue advantage for performance
of a public duty or its forbearance is amenable for
punishment. Here again it should be demand and
acceptance by himself or through some other person.
Section 12 deals with abatement of offence which
cannot be applicable to the petitioner. Section 13(2)
deals with punishment for criminal misconduct.
Criminal misconduct is defined in Section 13(1)(a) that
whoever dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or
otherwise converts for his own use any property
entrusted to him or enriches himself illicitly during the
period of his office. These are the offences alleged
against the petitioner. Since the soul is Section 7 either
under the un-amended Act or under the amended Act,
the interpretation of Section 7(a) or Section 7A by the
Apex Court qua un-amended Act or the amended Act is
germane to be noticed.

INTERPRETATION UNDER THE UN-AMENDED ACT :

9. The Apex Court in the case of B.JAYARAJ v.
1
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH interprets Section 7 of
the Act and holds as follows:

“ 7. Insofar as the offence under
Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled
position in law that demand of illegal
gratification is sine qua non to constitute the
said offence and mere recovery of currency
notes cannot constitute the offence under
Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all
reasonable doubt that the accused
voluntarily accepted the money knowing it

1

(2014) 13 SCC 55

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to be a bribe. The above position has been
succinctly laid down in several judgments of this
Court. By way of illustration reference may be
made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of
A.P. [(2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri)
89] and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [(2009) 3
SCC 779: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1].”

(Emphasis supplied)

In the case of N.VIJAYAKUMAR v. STATE OF
2
TAMILNADU the Apex Court holds as follows:

“26. It is equally well settled that
mere recovery by itself cannot prove the
charge of the prosecution against the
accused. Reference can be made to the
judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI,
(2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1]
and in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B.
Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 :
(2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In the aforesaid
judgments of this Court while considering
the case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i) and
(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge,
it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused voluntarily accepted money
knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of
demand for illegal gratification and mere
possession or recovery of currency notes is not
sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said
judgments it is also held that even the
presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be
drawn only after demand for and acceptance of
illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly
well settled that initial presumption of
innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets
doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.

27. The relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 of
the judgment in B. Jayaraj [B.

2

(2021) 3 SCC 687

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Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 :
(2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] read as under:
(SCC pp. 58-59)

“7. Insofar as the offence under
Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled
position in law that demand of illegal
gratification is sine qua non to constitute
the said offence and mere recovery of
currency notes cannot constitute the
offence under Section 7 unless it is
proved beyond all reasonable doubt that
the accused voluntarily accepted the
money knowing it to be a bribe. The
above position has been succinctly laid
down in several judgments of this Court.
By way of illustration, reference may be
made to the decision in C.M.
Sharma v. State of A.P. [C.M.
Sharma v. State of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1 :
(2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89] and C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI,
(2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] .

8. In the present case, the complainant
did not support the prosecution case insofar as
demand by the accused is concerned. The
prosecution has not examined any other
witness, present at the time when the money
was allegedly handed over to the accused by
the complainant, to prove that the same was
pursuant to any demand made by the accused.
When the complainant himself had disowned
what he had stated in the initial complaint
(Ext. P-11) before LW 9, and there is no other
evidence to prove that the accused had made
any demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the
contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to
come to the conclusion that the above material
furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made
by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to
hold that the learned trial court as well as the
High Court was not correct in holding the
demand alleged to be made by the accused as
proved. The only other material available is

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the recovery of the tainted currency notes
from the possession of the accused. In fact
such possession is admitted by the accused
himself. Mere possession and recovery of the
currency notes from the accused without proof
of demand will not bring home the offence
under Section 7. The above also will be
conclusive insofar as the offence under
Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in
the absence of any proof of demand for illegal
gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal
means or abuse of position as a public servant
to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage cannot be held to be established.

9. Insofar as the presumption
permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of
the Act is concerned, such presumption can
only be in respect of the offence under Section
7 and not the offences under Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it
is only on proof of acceptance of illegal
gratification that presumption can be drawn
under Section 20 of the Act that such
gratification was received for doing or
forbearing to do any official act. Proof of
acceptance of illegal gratification can follow
only if there is proof of demand. As the same
is lacking in the present case the primary facts
on the basis of which the legal presumption
under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly
absent.”

The abovesaid view taken by this Court fully
supports the case of the appellant. In view of
the contradictions noticed by us above in the
depositions of key witnesses examined on
behalf of the prosecution, we are of the view
that the demand for and acceptance of bribe
amount and cell phone by the appellant, is not
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having
regard to such evidence on record the
acquittal recorded by the trial court is a
“possible view” as such the judgment [State of
T.N. v. N. Vijayakumar, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad

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7098] of the High Court is fit to be set aside.
Before recording conviction under the
provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
the courts have to take utmost care in
scanning the evidence. Once conviction is
recorded under the provisions of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a social
stigma on the person in the society apart from
serious consequences on the service rendered.
At the same time it is also to be noted that
whether the view taken by the trial court is a
possible view or not, there cannot be any
definite proposition and each case has to be
judged on its own merits, having regard to
evidence on record.”
(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court, later, in the case of
3
K.SHANTHAMMA v. STATE OF TELANGANA has
held as follows:

“10. We have given careful
consideration to the submissions. We have
perused the depositions of the prosecution
witnesses. The offence under Section 7 of the
PC Act relating to public servants taking bribe
requires a demand of illegal gratification and
the acceptance thereof. The proof of
demand of bribe by a public servant and
its acceptance by him is sine qua non for
establishing the offence under Section 7
of the PC Act.

11. In P. Satyanarayana
Murthy v. State of A.P. [P. Satyanarayana
Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152 :
(2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 11] , this Court has
summarised the well-settled law on the
subject in para 23 which reads thus : (SCC p.
159)

“23. The proof of demand of
illegal gratification, thus, is the

3

(2022) 4 SCC 574

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gravamen of the offence under Sections
7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and
in absence thereof, unmistakably the
charge therefor, would fail. Mere
acceptance of any amount allegedly by
way of illegal gratification or recovery
thereof, dehors the proof of demand,
ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient
to bring home the charge under these
two sections of the Act. As a corollary,
failure of the prosecution to prove the
demand for illegal gratification would be
fatal and mere recovery of the amount
from the person accused of the offence
under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would
not entail his conviction thereunder.”
(emphasis supplied)

12. The prosecution's case is that the
appellant had kept pending the return of
commercial tax filed by the said Society for the
year 1996-97. The appellant had issued a
notice dated 14-2-2000 to the said Society
calling upon the said Society to produce the
record. Accordingly, the necessary books were
produced by the said Society. The case made
out by PW 1 is that when he repeatedly visited
the office of the appellant in February 2020,
the demand of Rs 3000 by way of illegal
gratification was made by the appellant for
passing the assessment order. However, PW 1,
in his cross-examination, accepted that the
notice dated 26-2-2000 issued by the
appellant was received by the said Society on
15-3-2000 in which it was mentioned that
after verification of the books of accounts of
the said Society, exemption from payment of
commercial tax as claimed by the said Society
was allowed. PW 1 accepted that it was stated
in the said notice that there was no necessity
for the said Society to pay any commercial tax
for Assessment Year 1996-97.

13. According to the case of PW 1, on
23-3-2000, he visited the appellant's office to

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request her to issue final assessment order.
According to his case, at that time, initially,
the appellant reiterated her demand of Rs
3000. But she scaled it down to Rs 2000.
Admittedly, on 15-3-2000, the said Society
was served with a notice informing the said
Society that an exemption has been granted
from payment of commercial tax to the said
Society. Therefore, the said Society was not
liable to pay any tax for the year 1996-97. The
issue of the final assessment order was only a
procedural formality. Therefore, the
prosecution's case about the demand of bribe
made on 23-3-2000 by the appellant appears
to be highly doubtful.

14. PW 1 described how the trap was
laid. In the pre-trap mediator report, it has
been recorded that LW 8, Shri R. Hari Kishan,
was to accompany PW 1 — complainant at the
time of offering the bribe. PW 7 Shri P.V.S.S.P.
Raju deposed that PW 8 Shri U.V.S. Raju, the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB, had
instructed LW 8 to accompany PW 1 —
complainant inside the chamber of the
appellant. PW 8 has accepted this fact by
stating in the examination-in-chief that LW 8
was asked to accompany PW 1 and observe
what transpires between the appellant and PW
1. PW 8, in his evidence, accepted that only
PW 1 entered the chamber of the appellant
and LW 8 waited outside the chamber. Even
PW 7 admitted in the cross-examination that
when PW 1 entered the appellant's chamber,
LW 8 remained outside in the corridor. Thus,
LW 8 was supposed to be an independent
witness accompanying PW 1. In breach of the
directions issued to him by PW 8, he did not
accompany PW 1 inside the chamber of the
appellant, and he waited outside the chamber
in the corridor. The prosecution offered no
explanation why LW 8 did not accompany PW
1 inside the chamber of the appellant at the
time of the trap.

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15. Therefore, PW 1 is the only witness
to the alleged demand and acceptance.
According to PW 1, firstly, the demand was
made of Rs 3000 by the appellant on 24-2-
2000. Thereafter, continuously for three days,
she reiterated the demand when he visited the
appellant's office. Lastly, the appellant made
the demand on 29-2-2000 and 23-3-2000. On
this aspect, he was cross-examined in detail
by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the appellant. His version about the demand
and acceptance is relevant which reads thus:

“In the vicinity of office of AO the
jeep, in which we went there was stopped
and I was asked to go into the office of AO
and the trap party took vantage positions.
Accordingly, I went inside the office of AO.
I wished AO. At that time apart from AO
some other person was found in the office
room of AO and he was talking to the AO.
AO offered me a chair. After discussion
with the AO the said other person left the
room of AO. I informed AO that I brought
the bribe amount as demanded by her and
also asked her to issue the final
assessment orders. Then I took the said
tainted currency notes from my shirt
pocket and I was about to give the same to
the AO and on which instead of taking the
same amount directly by her with her
hands she took out a diary from her table
drawer, opened the diary and asked me to
keep the said amount in the diary.
Accordingly, I kept the amount in the said
diary. She closed the said diary and again
kept the same in her table drawer and
locked the drawer and kept the keys in her
hand bag which was hanging to her seat.
She pressed the calling bell and a lady
attender came into the room of AO, then
she instructed the lady attender to call
ACTO concerned to her along with the
society records concerned.

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Accordingly, ACTO came to AO along with record.
After going through the ledger and cash book, etc.
AO signed on the last page of the said ledger and
cash book mentioning 26-2-2000 below her
signature in the said register though she signed on
27-3-2000 in my presence. AO directed her
attender to affix official rubber stamp below her
signature in the ledger and cash book and
accordingly attender affixed the same. AO also
signed on the office note of final assessment orders
at that time. Thereafter, I collected the general
ledger and cash book from the attender after
affixing the said rubber stamp thereon and came
out of the office of AO and relayed the pre-
arranged signal to the trap party.”
(emphasis supplied)

16. Thus, PW 1 did not state that the
appellant reiterated her demand at the time of
trap. His version is that on his own, he told her
that he had brought the amount. What is material
is the cross-examination on this aspect. In the
cross-examination, PW 1 accepted that his
version regarding the demand made by the
appellant on various dates was an improvement.
The relevant part of the cross-examination of the
appellant reads thus:

“I did not state to ACB Inspector in Section
161 CrPC statement that on the evening of 24-2-
2000 I met the AO and that she demanded the
bribe. I did not mention in Ext. P-3 complaint that
continuously for 3 days after 24-2-2000 I met the
AO and the AO reiterated her demand. I did not
mention in Ext. P-3 complaint that on 29-2-2000
I approached the AO and the AO demanded bribe
of Rs 3000 and that unless I pay the said bribe
amount she will not issue final assessment
orders. I did not state in my Section 164
statement before the Magistrate that 13-3-2000
to 16-3-2000 I was on leave and from 1-3-2000
to 12-3-2000, I was engaged in recovering the
dues of the society. It is not true to suggest that I
did not meet the AO continuously 3 days i.e. on
25-2-2000, 26-2-2000 and 27-2-2000 and that

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27-2-2000 is Sunday. It is not true to suggest
that I did not meet the AO in the evening of 24-2-
2000 and that AO did not demand any money
from me. I did not state in my Section 161 CrPC
statement to Inspector of ACB that before I left
the office of DSP on the date of trap I made a
phone call enquiring about the availability of AO
and the AO was in the office and informed me
that she should be available in the office from
6.00 to 7.00 p.m. on that day so also in my
Section 164 CrPC. I made such a phone call from
the office of the DSP, ACB. I do not remember as
to from which phone number I made phone call
on that day. I cannot describe office telephone
number of the AO. It is not true to suggest that I
did not make any such phone call to AO and that
she did not give any such reply to me. I did not
state to ACB Inspector in my Section 161 CrPC
statement or to the Magistrate in my Section 164
CrPC statement that I went inside the office of AO
and I wished AO and at that time apart from AO
some other person was found in the office room
of AO and that he was talking to the AO and that
the AO offered me a chair and that after
discussion with the AO the said person left the
room of AO and then I informed the AO that I
brought the bribe amount. I did not state that
said aspects to DSP during the post trap
proceedings also.”
(emphasis supplied)

17. Thus, the version of PW 1 in his
examination-in-chief about the demand made by
the appellant from time to time is an
improvement. As stated earlier, LW 8 did not
enter the appellant's chamber at the time of trap.
There is no other evidence of the alleged demand.
Thus, the evidence of PW 1 about the demand for
bribe by the appellant is not at all reliable. Hence,
we conclude that the demand made by the
appellant has not been conclusively proved.

18. PW 2, Shri B.D.V. Ramakrishna had no
personal knowledge about the demand. However,
he accepted that on 15-3-2000, the said Society

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received a communication informing that the said
Society need not pay any tax for the year 1996-
97. PW 3 Shri L. Madhusudhan was working as
Godown Incharge with the said Society. He stated
that on 15-3-2000, when he visited the
appellant's office, ACTO served the original notice
dated 26-2-2000 in which it was mentioned that
the Society was not liable to pay any tax. It is his
version that when he met the appellant on the
same day, she enquired whether he had brought
the demanded amount of Rs 3000. However, PW
3 did not state that the appellant demanded the
said amount for granting any favour to the said
society.

19. PW 4 Ahmed Moinuddin was ACTO at
the relevant time. He deposed that on 27-3-2000,
the appellant instructed him to prepare the final
assessment order, which was kept ready in the
morning. He stated that he was called at 6 p.m.
to the chamber of the appellant along with books
of the said Society. At that time, PW 1 was sitting
there. He stated that the appellant subscribed her
signature on a Register of the said Society and
put the date as 26-2-2000 below it. He was not a
witness to the alleged demand. However, in the
cross-examination, he admitted that the appellant
had served a memo dated 21-3-2000 to him
alleging that he was careless in performing his
duties.”

The afore-quoted judgments were rendered
interpreting Section 7 as it stood prior to
amendment. The Apex Court holds that demand and
acceptance are sine qua non for an offence under
Section 7 of the Act.

JUDGMENTS POST AMENDMENT:

10. The Apex Court has further interpreted
Section 7(a) post amendment in the case of
NEERAJ DUTTA v. STATE (GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF
4
DELHI and holds as follows:

4

2023 SCC OnLine SC 280

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“ 8 . Before we analyze the evidence, we
must note that we are dealing with Sections 7
and 13 of the PC Act as they stood prior to the
amendment made by the Act 16 of 2018 with
effect from 26th July 2018. We are referring to
Sections 7 and 13 as they stood on the date of
commission of the offence. Section 7, as existed
at the relevant time, reads thus:

“ 7. Public servant taking
gratification other than legal
remuneration in respect of an official
act.—

Whoever, being, or expecting to be a
public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees
to accept or attempts to obtain from any
person, for himself or for any other person,
any gratification whatever, other than legal
remuneration, as a motive or reward for
doing or forbearing to do any official act or
for showing or forbearing to show, in the
exercise of his official functions, favour or
disfavour to any person or for rendering or
attempting to render any service or
disservice to any person, with the Central
Government or any State Government or
Parliament or the Legislature of any State or
with any local authority, corporation or
Government company referred to in clause
(c) of section 2, or with any public servant,
whether named or otherwise, shall be
punishable with imprisonment which shall be
not less than three years but which may
extend to seven years and shall also be liable
to fine.

Explanations.-

(a) “Expecting to be a public servant”- If a
person not expecting to be in office obtains
a gratification by deceiving others into a
belief that he is about to be in office, and
that he will then serve them, he may be

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guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the
offence defined in this section.

(b) “Gratification”. The word “gratification” is
not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or
to gratifications estimable in money.

(c) “Legal remuneration”- The words “legal
remuneration” are not restricted to
remuneration which a public servant can
lawfully demand, but include all
remuneration which he is permitted by the
Government or the organisation, which he
serves, to accept.
(d) “A motive or reward for doing”. A person
who receives a gratification as a motive or
reward for doing what he does not intend
or is not in a position to do, or has not
done, comes within this expression.

(e) Where a public servant induces a person
erroneously to believe that his influence
with the Government has obtained a title
for that person and thus induces that
person to give the public servant, money or
any other gratification as a reward for this
service, the public servant has committed
an offence under this section.”

9. Section 13(1)(d), as existed at the relevant
time, reads thus:

“ 13. Criminal misconduct by a public
servant.—

(1) A public servant is said to commit the
offence of criminal misconduct,-

(a) ………………………………
(b) ………………………………
(c) ………………………………
(d) if he,-


(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for
himself or for any other person any

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valuable thing or pecuniary advantage;
or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public
servant, obtains for himself or for any
other person any valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage; or

(iii) while holding office as a public servant,
obtains for any person any valuable thing
or pecuniary advantage without any
public interest; or
(e) ………………………………….”

10. The demand for gratification and the
acceptance thereof are sine qua non for the
offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC
Act.

4
11. The Constitution Bench was called
upon to decide the question which we have
quoted earlier. In paragraph 74, the conclusions
of the Constitution have been summarised,
which read thus:

“ 74. What emerges from the aforesaid
discussion is summarised as under:

(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of
illegal gratification by a public servant
as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a
sine qua non in order to establish the
guilt of the accused public servant
under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and
(ii) of the Act.

(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the
accused, the prosecution has to first
prove the demand of illegal gratification
and the subsequent acceptance as a
matter of fact. This fact in issue can be
proved either by direct evidence which
can be in the nature of oral evidence or
documentary evidence.

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(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the
proof of demand and acceptance of
illegal gratification can also be proved
by circumstantial evidence in the
absence of direct oral and documentary
evidence.

(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely,
the demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by the public servant, the
following aspects have to be borne in mind:

(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe
giver without there being any demand from
the public servant and the latter simply
accepts the offer and receives the illegal
gratification, it is a case of acceptance as
per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case,
there need not be a prior demand by the
public servant.
ii) On the other hand, if the public servant
makes a demand and the bribe giver
accepts the demand and tenders the
demanded gratification which in turn is
received by the public servant, it is a case
of obtainment . In the case of obtainment,
the prior demand for illegal gratification
emanates from the public servant. This is an
offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of
the Act.

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the
offer by the bribe giver and the demand
by the public servant respectively have
to be proved by the prosecution as a
fact in issue. In other words, mere
acceptance or receipt of an illegal
gratification without anything more
would not make it an offence under
Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d), (i) and
(ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore,
under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring
home the offence, there must be an offer
which emanates from the bribe giver which
is accepted by the public servant which

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would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior
demand by the public servant when
accepted by the bribe giver and in turn
there is a payment made which is
received by the public servant, would be
an offence of obtainment under Section
13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.

(e) The presumption of fact with regard to
the demand and acceptance or
obtainment of an illegal gratification
may be made by a court of law by way
of an inference only when the
foundational facts have been proved by
relevant oral and documentary evidence
and not in the absence thereof. On the
basis of the material on record, the Court
has the discretion to raise a presumption of
fact while considering whether the fact of
demand has been proved by the prosecution
or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is
subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the
absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

(f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’,
or has died or is unavailable to let in his
evidence during trial, demand of illegal
gratification can be proved by letting in the
evidence of any other witness who can again
let in evidence, either orally or by
documentary evidence or the prosecution
can prove the case by circumstantial
evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it
result in an order of acquittal of the accused
public servant.

(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is
concerned, on the proof of the facts in
issue, Section 20 mandates the court to
raise a presumption that the illegal
gratification was for the purpose of a
motive or reward as mentioned in the
said Section. The said presumption has to
be raised by the court as a legal presumption
or a presumption in law. Of course, the said

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presumption is also subject to rebuttal.
Section 20 does not apply to Section
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under
Section 20 of the Act is distinct from
presumption of fact referred to above in
point

(e) as the former is a mandatory presumption
while the latter is discretionary in nature.”

(emphasis added)

12. The referred question was answered
in paragraph 76 of the aforesaid judgment,
which reads thus:

“76. Accordingly, the question
referred for consideration of this
Constitution Bench is answered as under:

In the absence of evidence of
the complainant (direct/primary,
oral/ document-tary evidence), it is
permissible to draw an inferential
deduction of culpability/guilt of a
public servant under Section 7 and
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) of the Act based on other
evidence adduced by the
prosecution .”
(emphasis added)

13. Even the issue of presumption under
Section 20 of the PC Act has been answered by
the Constitution Bench by holding that only on
proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates
the Court to raise a presumption that illegal
gratification was for the purpose of motive or
reward as mentioned in Section 7 (as it existed
prior to the amendment of 2018). In fact, the
Constitution Bench has approved two decisions by
the benches of three Hon'ble Judges in the cases
1 2
of B. Jayaraj and P. Satyanarayana Murthy .

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There is another decision of a three Judges' bench
in the case of N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil
5
Nadu , which follows the view taken in the cases
1 2
of B. Jayaraj and P. Satyanarayana Murthy . In
paragraph 9 of the decision in the case of B.
1
Jayaraj , this Court has dealt with the
presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act. In
paragraph 9, this Court held thus:

“9. Insofar as the
presumption permissible to be
drawn under Section 20 of the Act is
concerned, such presumption can
only be in respect of the offence
under Section 7 and not the
offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i)
and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is
only on proof of acceptance of
illegal gratification that
presumption can be drawn under
Section 20 of the Act that such
gratification was received for doing
or forbearing to do any official
act. Proof of acceptance of illegal
gratification can follow only if there is
proof of demand. As the same is lacking
in the present case the primary facts on
the basis of which the legal presumption
under Section 20 can be drawn are
wholly absent.”

(emphasis added)

14. The presumption under Section 20 can
be invoked only when the two basic facts required
to be proved under Section 7, are proved. The
said two basic facts are ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’
of gratification. The presumption under Section 20
is that unless the contrary is proved, the
acceptance of gratification shall be presumed to
be for a motive or reward, as contemplated by
Section 7. It means that once the basic facts of
the demand of illegal gratification and acceptance
thereof are proved, unless the contrary are
proved, the Court will have to presume that the

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gratification was demanded and accepted as a
motive or reward as contemplated by Section 7.
However, this presumption is rebuttable. Even on
the basis of the preponderance of probability, the
accused can rebut the presumption.

5
15. In the case of N. Vijayakumar ,
another bench of three Hon'ble Judges dealt with
the issue of presumption under Section 20 and
the degree of proof required to establish the
offences punishable under Section 7 and clauses
(i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) of PC Act. In paragraph 26, the bench held
thus:

“ 26. It is equally well settled that
mere recovery by itself cannot prove the
charge of the prosecution against the
accused. Reference can be made to the
judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009)
2 SCC (Cri) 1] and in B. Jayaraj v. State
of A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of
A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC
(Cri) 543] In the aforesaid
judgments of this Court while
considering the case under
Sections 7, 13(1) (d)(i) and (ii) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 it is reiterated that to prove
the charge, it has to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused voluntarily accepted money
knowing it to be bribe. Absence of
proof of demand for illegal gratification
and mere possession or recovery of
currency notes is not sufficient to
constitute such offence. In the said
judgments it is also held that even the
presumption under Section 20 of the Act
can be drawn only after demand for and
acceptance of illegal gratification is
proved. It is also fairly well settled that
initial presumption of innocence in the

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criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by
acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

(emphasis added)

16. Thus, the demand for gratification and
its acceptance must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.

th
17. Section 7, as existed prior to 26 July
2018, was different from the present Section 7.
The unamended Section 7 which is applicable in
the present case, specifically refers to “any
gratification”. The substituted Section 7 does not
use the word “gratification”, but it uses a wider
term “undue advantage”. When the allegation is
of demand of gratification and acceptance thereof
by the accused, it must be as a motive or reward
for doing or forbearing to do any official act. The
fact that the demand and acceptance of
gratification were for motive or reward as
provided in Section 7 can be proved by invoking
the presumption under Section 20 provided the
basic allegations of the demand and acceptance
are proved. In this case, we are also concerned
with the offence punishable under clauses (i) and
(ii) Section 13(1)(d) which is punishable under
Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Clause (d) of sub-
section (1) of Section 13, which existed on the
th
statute book prior to the amendment of 26 July
2018, has been quoted earlier. On a plain reading
of clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d), it is
apparent that proof of acceptance of illegal
gratification will be necessary to prove the
offences under clauses (i) and (ii) of Section
13(1)(d). In view of what is laid down by the
Constitution Bench, in a given case, the demand
and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public
servant can be proved by circumstantial evidence
in the absence of direct oral or documentary
evidence. While answering the referred question,
the Constitution Bench has observed that it is
permissible to draw an inferential deduction of
culpability and/or guilt of the public servant for
the offences punishable under Sections 7 and

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13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
The conclusion is that in absence of direct
evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can
always be proved by other evidence such as
circumstantial evidence.

18. The allegation of demand of
gratification and acceptance made by a public
servant has to be established beyond a
reasonable doubt. The decision of the Constitution
Bench does not dilute this elementary
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Constitution Bench was dealing with the issue
of the modes by which the demand can be
proved. The Constitution Bench has laid down
that the proof need not be only by direct oral or
documentary evidence, but it can be by way of
other evidence including circumstantial evidence.
When reliance is placed on circumstantial
evidence to prove the demand for gratification,
the prosecution must establish each and every
circumstance from which the prosecution wants
the Court to draw a conclusion of guilt. The facts
so established must be consistent with only one
hypothesis that there was a demand made for
gratification by the accused. Therefore, in this
case, we will have to examine whether there is
any direct evidence of demand. If we come to a
conclusion that there is no direct evidence of
demand, this Court will have to consider whether
there is any circumstantial evidence to prove the
demand .”

Subsequent to NEERAJ DUTTA’S case the Apex
5
Court in the case of SOUNDARAJAN v. STATE
has held as follows:

“ FINDING ON PROOF OF DEMAND

9. We have considered the submissions. It
is well settled that for establishing the
commission of an offence punishable under
Section 7 of the PC Act, proof of demand of

5

(2023) SCC OnLine SC 424

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gratification and acceptance of the gratification is
a sine qua non. Moreover, the Constitution Bench
3
in the case of Neeraj Dutta has reiterated that
the presumption under Section 20 of the PC
Act can be invoked only on proof of facts in issue,
namely, the demand of gratification by the
accused and the acceptance thereof.

10. As stated earlier, complainant PW-2
has not supported the prosecution. He has not
said anything in his examination-in-chief about
the demand made by the appellant. The public
prosecutor cross-examined PW-2. The witness
stated that there was no demand of a bribe made
by the appellant. According to him, he filed a
complaint as the return of the sale deed was
delayed. Though PW-2 accepted that he had filed
the complaint, in the cross-examination, he was
not confronted with the material portions of the
complaint in which he had narrated how the
alleged demand was made. The public prosecutor
ought to have confronted the witness with his
alleged prior statements in the complaint and
proved that part of the complaint through the
concerned police officer who had reduced the
complaint into writing. However, that was not
done.

11. Now, we turn to the evidence of the
shadow witness (PW-3). In the examination-in-
chief, he stated that the appellant asked the PW-2
whether he had brought the amount. PW-3 did
not say that the appellant made a specific
demand of gratification in his presence to PW-2.
To attract Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand for
gratification has to be proved by the prosecution
beyond a reasonable doubt. The word used in
th
Section 7, as it existed before 26 July 2018, is
‘gratification’. There has to be a demand for
gratification. It is not a simple demand for money,
but it has to be a demand for gratification. If the
factum of demand of gratification and acceptance
thereof is proved, then the presumption under
Section 20 can be invoked, and the Court can
presume that the demand must be as a motive or

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reward for doing any official act. This presumption
can be rebutted by the accused.

12. There is no circumstantial evidence of
demand for gratification in this case. In the
circumstances, the offences punishable under
Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section
13(1)(d) have not been established. Unless both
demand and acceptance are established, offence
of obtaining pecuniary advantage by corrupt
means covered by clauses (i) and (ii) of Section
13(1)(d) cannot be proved.”

The Apex Court in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA
( supra ) was clarifying and interpreting the judgment
in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA which was rendered
by a Constitution Bench and further holds that proof
of demand and acceptance of gratification is sine
qua non for any allegation under Section 7 of the
Act, be it pre-amendment or post-amendment. This
is reiterated in the case of SOUNDARAJAN ( supra ).

11. On a coalesce of the judgments rendered
by the Apex Court, as quoted supra, the soul of
Section 7 is demand and acceptance. The
unmistakable inference on the interpretation, in the
considered view of the Court would be, if there is
demand but no acceptance it would not make an
offence under Section 7. If there is acceptance but
no demand, it would then also make no offence
under Section 7. An act alleged under Section 7
should have the ingredients of demand and
acceptance and it is for the performance of a public
duty or forbearance from performance. Therefore,
demand and acceptance should be for the purpose
of performance of some duty. For such performance
there should be work pending at the hands of the
public servant against whom Section 7 is alleged.

APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS OF
THE CASE:

12. What triggers registration of the crime is
an anonymous complaint. The complaint is made to

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the Deputy Superintendent of Police of the then Anti
Corruption Bureau. It reads as follows:

“UÉ,
gÀªÀjUÉ
r.J¸ï.¦, J.¹.¦

¸Àgï,
«µÀAiÀÄ: ¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀ ºÀwÛPÀÄ̪À PÀÄjvÀÄ.

¸Àgï ªÉÄð£À «µÀAiÀÄPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ £ÁªÀÅUÀ¼ÀÄ £ÉÆAzÀ ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ
¥ÀlÖt ºÁUÀÆ ¥ÀlÖtzÀ ¸ÀÄvÀÛªÀÄÄvÀÛ°£À d£ÀgÀ ¥ÀgÀªÁV vÀªÀÄä°è
«£ÀAw¹PÉƼÀÄîªÀÅzÉãÉAzÀgÉ, £ÀªÀÄä ¸À¨ï jf¸ÁÖçgï PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ°è zÀ¯Áè½UÀ¼À ºÁªÀ½
«Äw«ÄÃjzÀÄÝ, ¤AiÀÄAvÀætPÉÌ §gÀzÀ PÁgÀt £Á£ÀÄ vÀªÀÄä°è
¤ªÉâ¹PÉƼÀÄîªÀÅzÉãÉAzÀgÉ ¸ÀzÀj PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ°è ºÀtzÀ D¸ÉUÉ «ÄÃwUÉ ¥ÁgÀªÉÃ
E¯Áè, E°ègÀĪÀ C¢üPÁj ªÀUÀðzÀªÀgÁUÀ° ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¹§âA¢UÀ¼ÁUÀ° ºÁUÀÆ CªÀgÀ
¨ÁAqï gÉÊlgïUÀ¼ÁUÀ° ºÀt E®èzÉà AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà PÉ®¸ÀªÀ£ÀÄß ªÀÄÄlÄÖªÀÅ¢¯Áè,
£ÁªÀÅ F §UÉÎ ªÀiÁ£Àå ¸À¨ï gÉf¸ÁÖçgï £ÀªÀgÀ°è «£ÀAw¹zÁUÀ CªÀgÀÄ ¹¸ÀÖªÀiï
ºÉÃVzÉ CzÉà jÃw PÉ®¸ÀªÀ£ÀÄß ªÀiÁr¹PÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃUÀ¨ÉÃPÀÄ, AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà jÃwAiÀÄ
ªÁzÀ«ªÁzÀPÉÌ zÁj E®è CAvÁ £ÀªÀÄUÉ §Ä¢Þ ªÀiÁvÀ£ÀÄß ºÉý ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÉýzÀµÀÄÖ
ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß PÉÆlÄÖ PÉ®¸ÀªÀ£ÀÄß ªÀiÁr¹PÉÆAqÀÄ ¸ÀgÀ¼À jÃw¬ÄAzÀ ºÉÆÃUÀ¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ
ºÉüÀÄvÁÛgÉ. DzÀÝjAzÀ EªÀgÀ ªÀiÁw¤AzÀ £ÉÆAzÀ £ÁªÀÅ ¤ªÀÄä°è
«£ÀAw¹PÉƼÀÄîªÀÅzÉãÉAzÀgÉ E°è §AzÀÄ vÁªÀÅUÀ¼ÀÄ RÄzÁÝV ¥Àj²Ã°¹zÀgÉ vÀªÀÄUÉ
¸ÀzÀj PÀbÉÃj §UÉÎ ¸ÀvÁå ¸ÀvÀåvÉ w½AiÀÄÄvÀÛzÉ, EzÀÄ vÀ«ÄäAzÀ ¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀ vÀUÀÄÎvÀÛzÉ
JAzÀÄ £Á£ÀÄ ¨sÁ«¹zÉÝãÉ; DzÀÝjAzÀ ªÀiÁ£ÀågÀªÀgÀÄ EzÀgÀ §UÉÎ PÀÆ®APÀµÀªÁV
¥Àj²Ã°¹ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ PÀæªÀĪÀ£ÀÄß vÉUÉzÀÄPÉƼÀî¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ £Á£ÀÄ F ªÀÄÆ®PÀ £ÉÆAzÀ
¥ÀlÖt ºÁUÀÆ UÁæªÀÄ ¤ªÁ¹UÀ¼À ¥ÀgÀªÁV PÉýPÉƼÀÄîvÉÛÃ£É ¸Àgï.”

Certain persons claiming to be aggrieved have made
the complaint, but against whom is not clear and
against what staff of the Sub-Registrar’s office who
are alleged to have indulged themselves in the act of
demanding money for the purpose of registration of
document is also not forthcoming. Post the said
complaint, a Police Inspector makes a
communication to the ACB. The communication
reads as follows:


“EªÀjUÉ,

¥Éưøï G¥Á¢üÃPÀëPÀgÀÄ,
¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀ ¤UÀæºÀ zÀ¼À ¥Éưøï oÁuÉ
UÀzÀUÀ EªÀjUÉ.

ªÀiÁ£ÀågÉ,

- 32 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:16872
CRL.P No. 102117 of 2026


CNR: KAHC020139172026

«µÀAiÀÄ: ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ°èAiÀÄ
¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀzÀ «gÀÄzÀÞ ¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀ ¤UÀæºÀ PÁAiÉÄÝ 1988 gÀ
C£ÀéAiÀÄ PÀæªÀÄ dgÀÄV¸À®Ä PÉÆÃj.

G¯ÉèÃR: vÀªÀÄä DzÉñÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ: 06.12.2019.

ªÉÄîÌAqÀ «µÀAiÀÄPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ, £Á£ÀÄ, «±Àé£ÁxÀ.ºÉZï, ¥Éưøï
E£ïì¥ÉPÀÖgï ¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀ ¤UÀæºÀ zÀ¼À, ¥Éưøï oÁuÉ UÀzÀUÀ, F ªÀÄÆ®PÀ F ¢£À
¸À°è¸ÀÄwÛgÀĪÀ ªÀgÀ¢ K£ÉAzÀgÉ,

UÀzÀUÀ f¯ÉèAiÀÄ ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ ¥ÀlÖtzÀ°èAiÀÄ G¥À£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁj PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ
C¢üPÁj ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¹§âA¢UÀ¼ÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀgÀÄ, zÀ¯Áè°UÀ¼ÀÄ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀ
¸ÀPÁðj PÉ®¸À PÁAiÀÄð ªÀiÁrPÉÆqÀ®Ä CPÀæªÀĪÁV ¸ÁPÀµÀÄÖ ®AZÀzÀ ºÀt ¥ÀqÉzÀÄ,
PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁr PÉÆqÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ, EzÀ£ÀÄß ¥Àæ²ß¹zÀªÀjUÉ ªÀåªÀ¸ÉÜAiÉÆA¢UÉ ºÉÆA¢PÉÆAqÀÄ
ºÉÆÃUÀ¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ w½¸ÀÄwÛgÀĪÀªÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÞ PÀæªÀÄ PÉÊUÉƼÀÄîªÀAvÉ CAZÉ ªÀÄÆ®PÀ §AzÀ
CfðAiÀÄ §UÉÎ ¢£ÁAPÀ:06.12.2019gÀAzÀÄ £À£ÀUÉ ¸ÀÆZÀ£É ¤Ãr, CfðAiÀÄ°èAiÀÄ
«µÀAiÀÄzÀ §UÉÎ ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ ¥ÀlÖtzÀ°èAiÀÄ G¥À£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁj PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ
¸ÀÄvÀÛªÀÄÄvÀÛ°£À zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀgÀ PÉÃAzÀæUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ eÉgÁPïì ¸ÉAlgïUÀ¼À PÁAiÀÄð
ZÀlĪÀnPÉUÀ¼À §UÉÎ UË¥ÀåªÁV ªÀiÁ»w ¸ÀAUÀ滸À®Ä ¸ÀÆa¹zÀÄÝ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.

¤ªÀÄä ¸ÀÆZÀ£ÉAiÀÄAvÉ £Á£ÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ:07.12.2019 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 10.12.2019 gÀAzÀÄ
¹§âA¢, JA.J£ï.PÀjUÁgÀ, ¹¦¹ EªÀgÉÆA¢UÉ ®PÉëöäñÀégÀPÉÌ ¨sÉÃn ¤Ãr, ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ
PÉÆÃlð ºÀwÛgÀ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀZÉÃj ºÁUÀÆ CzÀgÀ®°gÀĪÀ zÀ¸ÀÄÛ
§gÀºÀUÁgÀgÀ PÉÃAzÀæzÀ°è dgÀÄUÀĪÀ ªÀåªÀºÁgÀUÀ¼À §UÉÎ UË¥ÀåªÁV ¥Àj²Ã®£É ªÀiÁr
ªÀiÁ»w ¸ÀAUÀ滹zÉ£ÀÄ.

G¥À£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjUÉ §gÀĪÀ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀ PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁrPÉÆqÀ®Ä
PÉ®ªÀÅ zÀ¯Áè½UÀ¼ÀÄ, zÀ¸ÀÄÛ§gÀºÀUÁgÀgÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ eÉgÁPïì ¸ÉAlgï£ÀªÀgÀÄ G¥À-
£ÉÆÃAzÀ£Á¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ C¢üPÁj ºÁUÀÆ ¹§âA¢AiÀÄ ¥ÀgÀªÁV ¸ÀPÁðgÀzÀ
¤UÀ¢vÀ ±ÀÄ®ÌQÌAvÀ ºÉaÑ£À ºÀt ªÀ¸ÀÆ° ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛgÀĪÀ DA±À UÀªÀÄ£ÀPÉÌ §A¢gÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
®AZÀzÀ ºÀt ¤ÃrzÀ°è ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀ PÉ®¸À ¨ÉÃUÀ DUÀÄvÀÛzÉ JAzÀÄ ¥ÀĸÀ¯Á¬Ä¸ÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ,
ªÉAPÀtÚ UÀÄr JA§ zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀ ¥Àæ¨sÁ« ªÀåQÛAiÀiÁVzÀÄÝ, ¸À¨ï jf¸ÁÖçgï PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ
¥ÀæªÀÄÄR ªÀÄzsÀåªÀwðAiÀiÁVgÀÄvÁÛ£É JAzÀÄ w½zÀÄ §A¢zÉ. EªÀgÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄÄ ¸À¨ï
jf¸ÁÖçgï PÀbÉÃj ºÀwÛgÀzÀ ªÉAPÀmÉñÀégÀ zÉêÀ¸ÁÜ£ÀzÀ DªÀgÀtzÀ°ègÀÄvÀÛzÉ. G¥À-
£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÁAiÀÄðªÉÊRjAiÀÄ §UÉÎAiÀÄÆ ¸ÀºÀ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀ°è M¼ÉîAiÀÄ
C©ü¥ÁæAiÀÄ EgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀÄ CvÀȦÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ªÀåPÀÛ¥Àr¸ÀÄwÛzÀÝ£ÀÄß UË¥ÀåªÁV
UÀªÀĤ¸À¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.

CfðAiÀÄ°è £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹zÀ ªÀÄ°èPÁdÄð£À ºÁUÀÆ EvÀgÉà ªÀåQÛUÀ¼À §UÉÎ
¥Àj²Ã°¸À¯ÁV ºÁUÀÆ ¥sÉÆÃ£ï ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁV ¸ÀA¥ÀPÀðPÉÌ zÉÆgÉwgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. UË¥Àå
¸ÁܤPÀ ¥Àj²Ã®£ÉAiÀÄ ¸ÀAzÀ¨sÀðzÀ°è CfðAiÀÄ «µÀAiÀÄzÀ°è £ÉÊdvÉ EgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ
ªÀÄ£ÀªÀjPÉAiÀiÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. F jÃwAiÀiÁzÀ ¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀªÀ£ÀÄß vÀqÉUÀnÖ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀÄ
¤gÁvÀAPÀªÁV vÀªÀÄä ªÀåªÀºÁUÀªÀ£ÀÄß ¥ÀÆgÉʹPÉƼÀÄîªÀÅzÀPÉÌ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À
PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ C¢üPÁj ºÁUÀÆ ¹§âA¢, zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀgÀÄ, ªÀÄzÀåªÀwðUÀ¼À «gÀÄzÀÞ
¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀ ¥Àæw§AzsÀPÀ PÁAiÉÄÝ 1988 gÀr ¥ÀæPÀgÀt zÁR°¹, ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ G¥À-
£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃj, zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀgÀ PÉÃAzÀæ, ªÉAPÀtÚ UÀÄr EªÀgÀ
ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£É ªÀiÁrzÀ°è ¸ÁªÀðf¤PÀjAzÀ CPÀæªÀĪÁV ¸ÀAUÀ滹zÀ ºÀt,
¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀ ºÁUÀÆ ¸ÀPÁðgÀPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀ zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼ÀÄ zÉÆgÉAiÀÄĪÀ ¸ÁzsÀåvÉ

- 33 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:16872
CRL.P No. 102117 of 2026


CNR: KAHC020139172026

EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. PÁgÀt F §UÉÎ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ PÀæªÀÄPÉÊUÉƼÀÄîªÀÅzÀÄ CªÀ±Àå«gÀÄvÀÛzÉ JAzÀÄ
ªÀiÁ£ÀåjUÉ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¤ªÉâ¹PÉÆArgÀÄvÉÛãÉ.

vÀªÀÄä «±Áé¹

UÀzÀUÀ ¸À»/
¢£ÁAPÀ:12.12.2019 («±Àé£ÁxÀ.ºÉZï)
¥Éưøï E£Àì¥ÉPÀÖgï-2, J.¹.©.UÀzÀUÀ”


It appears that on 07-12-2019 and 10-12-2019 the
Police Inspector of ACB, Gadag along with his staff
appears to have watched the functioning of the office of
sub-registrar and comes to know that there was
corruption on those two days. The petitioner has
produced documents to demonstrate that he was not
even present on 07-12-2019. But, the communication
records that he was present and was in the habit of
demanding bribe. This results in registration of crime in
Crime No.17 of 2019 for the aforesaid offences.
Pursuant to registration of crime, a search is conducted
in the office of the Sub-Registrar on 12-12-2019. The
search report depicts that search was conducted on 12-
12-2019 and certain amount was recovered from
several persons including the petitioner. A search
panchanama is drawn. In terms of search panchanama
what could be gathered against the petitioner is as
follows:
“…. …. ….

®PÉëöäñÀégÀ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ°ègÀĪÀ J®è ¯ÁPÀgïUÀ¼À£ÀÄß, ¸À¨ï
gÀf¸ÁÖçgï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ E£ÀÆß½zÀ PÉ®¸ÀUÁgÀgÀÄ PÀĽvÀÄ PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁqÀĪÀ ¸ÀܼÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥Àj²Ã®£É
ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁVzÀÄÝ, G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÉÆgÀvÀÄ¥Àr¹,
C£ÀĪÀiÁ£Á¸ÀàzÀ zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼ÀÄ, £ÀUÀzÀÄ ºÀt zÉÆjwgÀĪÀÅ¢®è.

zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀ ²æà ªÉAPÀmÉñÀ UÀÄr EªÀgÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£Á PÁAiÀÄðPÉÌ
ºÉÆÃVzÀÝ zsÁgÀªÁqÀ J.¹.©.¦.L. gÀªÀgÀÄ ¸ÁAiÀÄAPÁ® 6-30 UÀAmÉUÉ zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀ ²æÃ
ªÉAPÀmÉñÀ UÀÄr EªÀgÉÆA¢UÉ ªÀÄgÀ½ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjUÉ §AzÀÄ r.J¸ï.¦.
gÀªÀjUÉ ¨sÉÃnAiÀiÁV, ªÉAPÀmÉñÀ EªÀgÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£Á PÁ®PÉÌ zÉÆgÉvÀ £ÀUÀzÀÄ ºÀt
55360 gÀÆ ºÁUÀÆ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁj PÀbÉÃjUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀ zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼ÀÄ
zÉÆgÉwgÀĪÀ §UÉÎ ªÀgÀ¢ ªÀiÁr, ¸ÀzÀj £ÀUÀzÀÄ ºÀt ºÁUÀÆ zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£Á
¥ÀAZÀ£ÁªÉÄAiÀÄ PÁ®PÉÌ d¥ÀÛ ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀÅzÁV w½¹ ºÁdgÀ¥Àr¹zÀgÀÄ. r.J¸ï.¦. gÀªÀgÀÄ
¸ÀzÀj zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £ÀUÀzÀÄ ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß vÀªÀÄä ªÀ±ÀPÉÌ ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀgÀÄ.

®PÉëöäñÀégÀ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ PÁå±ï rPÉëÃgÉñÀ£ï gÀf¸ÁÖçgïzÀ°è
¸À¨ï gÀf¸ÁÖçgÀ gÀªÀgÀÄ vÀªÀÄä §½ 100/- gÀÆ EgÀĪÀÅzÁV £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹zÀÄÝ, ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£ÉAiÀÄ PÁ®PÉÌ
CªÀgÀ §½ 9390/- gÀÆ zÉÆgÉwgÀÄvÀÛªÉ. CzÀgÀAvÉ EAzÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ:12.12.2019 gÀAzÀÄ
£ÉÆÃAzÀtÂAiÀiÁzÀ PÁUÀzÀUÀ¼À ªÀ¸ÀÆ° ªÀiÁrzÀ MlÄÖ ±ÀÄ®Ì, ¸À¨ï gÀf¸ÁÖçgÀ ²æà ¸ÀĨÁæAiÀÄ ¨sÀmï

- 34 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:16872
CRL.P No. 102117 of 2026


CNR: KAHC020139172026

ºÁUÀÆ CªÀgÀ PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ dªÁ£À ºÁUÀÆ ªÀÄzsÀåªÀwð ²æà UÀuÉñÀ CAUÀr EªÀgÀ §½ zÉÆgÉvÀ
gÀÆ.17200/- UÀ½UÉ vÁ¼ÉAiÀiÁUÀĪÀÅ¢®è. C®èzÉà zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀ ªÉAPÀmÉñÀ UÀÄr EªÀgÀ
§½ zÉÆgÉvÀ £ÀUÀzÀÄ ºÀt ªÀÄvÀÄÛ CªÀgÀ ªÁ¸ÀzÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è zÉÆgÉvÀ £ÀUÀzÀÄ ºÀtzÀ §UÉÎ
ªÉAPÀmÉøÀ UÀÄr EªÀgÀÄ AiÀiÁªÀzÉà «ªÀgÀuÉ ¤ÃrgÀĪÀÅ¢®è ºÁUÀÆ £ÉÆÃAzÁuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À
PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ zÀ¸ÁÛªÉÃdUÀ¼ÀÄ CªÀgÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è zÉÆgÉwgÀÄvÀÛªÉ. DzÀÝjAzÀ 1)²æÃPÁAvï ¸ÀĨÁæAiÀiï
¨sÀmï, G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁj ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ, 2) UÀuÉñÀ ¹zÀÝ¥Àà CAUÀr, dªÁ£À ºÁUÀÆ
ªÀÄzsÀåªÀwð, ªÁ¸ÀoÀoÀ : PÉAZÀ¯Á¥ÀÆgÀ ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ vÀªÀÄä §½ ºÁUÀÆ vÀªÀÄä ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è
£ÀUÀzÀÄ ºÀt ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß
ElÄÖPÉÆAqÀ zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀ ºÁUÀÆ ªÀÄzsÀåªÀwðAiÀiÁzÀ 3) ²æà ªÉAPÀmÉñÀ gÁWÀªÉÃAzÀæ UÀÄr,
ªÁ¸À : ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ EªÀjUÉ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è zÀ¸ÀÛVj ªÀiÁqÀĪÀÅzÁV r.J¸ï.¦.gÀªÀgÀÄ w½¹zÀgÀÄ.
DUÀ ¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄ ¸ÀAeÉ 7 UÀAmÉAiÀiÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.

²æÃPÁAvï ¸ÀĨÁæAiÀiï ¨sÀmï, G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁj ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ EªÀgÀ£ÀÄß zÀ¸ÀÛVj
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The panchanama or the examination at the time of
conduct of search of persons nowhere reveals that there
was any demand from the hands of the petitioner nor he
has accepted bribe. The amount that was recovered

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allegedly from the hands of the petitioner was Rs.9390/-
and from his pocket Rs.50/-. The petitioner immediately
at the time of search itself has explained about cash
that cash was received for registration of document and
which document was also shown to the search party.
Even otherwise, from where does the demand and
acceptance spring is a mystery. For an offence under
Section 7(a) of the Act which is now alleged against the
petitioner, there must be demand and acceptance and if
trap is to be laid nuances of trap must be present for
which demand and acceptance is again a sine qua non .
There must be work pending on the table of the
petitioner for the complainant to be aggrieved of such
demand. The concept of demand and acceptance cannot
spring from air. There must be a complainant and there
must be public servant; the public servant must have
demanded from the complainant and accepted bribe
from the complainant for performing a duty or
forbearing such performance. These ingredients are
necessary in any of the documents that the prosecution
wants to rely on. If there is not even an iota of
semblance of demand and acceptance in a given case,
though the matter is still at the stage of preliminaries,
permitting further proceedings would become an abuse
of the process of law.

13. The learned counsel for the respondent would
submit that Section 20 of the Act raises a presumption
of guilt against the accused, though rebuttable. Section
20 of the Act reads as follows:

“20. Presumption where public servant
accepts any undue advantage.— Where, in any trial
of an offence punishable under Section 7 or under
Section 11, it is proved that a public servant accused of
an offence has accepted or obtained or attempted to
obtain for himself, or for any other person, any undue
advantage from any person, it shall be presumed,
unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or
obtained or attempted to obtain that undue advantage,
as a motive or reward under Section 7 for performing or
to cause performance of a public duty improperly or
dishonestly either by himself or by another public
servant or, as the case may be, any undue advantage

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without consideration or for a consideration which he
knows to be inadequate under Section 11.”

Section 20 has also borne interpretation by the Apex
Court in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA ( supra ). The
interpretation is that even for presumption to operate,
basic ingredients of demand and acceptance must be
present in a given case. I reiterate that the basic
ingredients of demand and acceptance are not present
in the case at hand. Therefore, the plea of presumption
that the learned counsel for the respondent would urge
would also tumble down due to lack of basic ingredients
that are necessary to lay an offence under Section 7 or
Section 7A of the Act.

14. A scrutiny of the documents appended to the
petition, as analysed hereinabove, would clearly indicate
that further proceedings cannot be permitted to
continue against the petitioner. It is one thing to
contend that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., should not interfere
unless it would result in miscarriage of justice. It is
another thing to say that if this Court would not
interfere in certain cases despite there being clear
documentary evidence for no offence being made out
would by itself result in miscarriage of justice.
Therefore, in a proceeding not to result in miscarriage of
justice, I deem it appropriate to exercise my jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and obliterate the
proceedings against the petitioner/accused No.1, failing
which it would be permitting a process to become an
abuse of the process of law.

15. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the
following:

O R D E R

(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.

(ii) Proceedings in Special (SVC) No.9 of 2021
pending before the Principal District and
Sessions Judge, Gadag stand quashed qua
the petitioner/accused No.1.

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(iii) It is made clear that the observations made
in the course of the order are only for the
purpose of consideration of the case of
petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and
the same shall not bind or influence the
proceedings against any other accused
pending before any other fora. “


4. The reason so rendered in the afore-said case
would enure to the benefit of the present petitioner as well.

5. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER

i) Criminal Petition is allowed .

ii) The proceedings in Special (SVC) No.9 of
2021 pending before the Principal District
and Sessions Judge, Gadag stand quashed
qua the petitioner/accused No.7 .





Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE



JTR
CT: ASC
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 3