MOHAMMAD ASHRAF MIR vs WAZIRA RESHI

IN HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR.

CRM(M) No. 278/2026
CrlM No. 663/2026

Reserved on: 03.06.2026
Pronounced on:06 .06.2026
Uploaded on:06.06 .2026
Whether full judgment or
operative has been pronounced: Full


MOHAMMED ASHRAF MIR (AGED:55 YEARS)
S/O MOHAMMAD FATEH MIR
R/O WARPOHA ALUASTANG DISTRICT, GANDERBAL

… Petitioner(s)
Mr.Aazim Pandith, Advocate
Through:
Mr. Mohsin-ul-showkat Qadiri, Sr.AAG (Amicus Curiae)


Vs.

WAZIRA RESHI (60 YEARS)
W/O MOHAMMED YOUSAF RESHI
R/O KHANIYAR SRINAGAR
A/P: WARPOHA ALUASTANG DISTRICT,
GANDERBAL …..Respondent(s)

Through:


CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE.

JUDGMENT
1.



BRIEF FACTS:
1. The petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Section
528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, seeking quashment of
order dated 04.11.2025 passed by the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Baramulla at Sopore, whereby an application filed by the
respondent under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 for grant of interim compensation came to be allowed.
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Challenge is also thrown to the order dated 27.02.2026 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sopore, whereby the revision
petition preferred by the petitioner against the aforesaid order was
dismissed and the order of the Trial Court was affirmed.
2. The facts, as pleaded in the petition, reveal that the respondent
instituted a complaint against the petitioner under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act alleging dishonour of a cheque
amounting to ₹80,00,000/-. During the pendency of the complaint
proceedings, the respondent moved an application under Section 143-
A of the Negotiable Instruments Act seeking grant of interim
compensation. The petitioner contested the said application by filing
objections.
3. Upon consideration of the matter, the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Baramulla at Sopore, vide order dated 04.11.2025,
allowed the application and directed payment of interim
compensation in terms of Section 143-A of the Negotiable
Instruments Act.
4. Feeling aggrieved of the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred a
revision petition before the Court of learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Sopore. The revisional court, however, vide judgment dated
27.02.2026, dismissed the revision petition and upheld the order
passed by the Trial Court.
5. Still dissatisfied and aggrieved by the concurrent findings returned by
the Courts below, the petitioner has now approached this Court by
way of the present petition seeking quashment of the aforesaid orders
and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the
impugned orders passed by the Learned Trial Court as well as the
Revisional Court, directing payment of interim compensation under
Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, are ex facie illegal,
arbitrary, and unsustainable in law, and therefore liable to be set
aside.
7. It was argued that the power under Section 143-A of the Act is
discretionary and not mandatory. It is settled that where discretion is
vested in a court, the same must be exercised judiciously and on
sound legal principles. In the present case, however, the discretion
has been exercised in a routine and mechanical manner, without
recording any objective satisfaction or cogent reasons, thereby
defeating the very purpose of the provision.
8. It was further contended that the application seeking interim
compensation was devoid of any cogent or compelling grounds. The
petitioner had filed detailed objections raising substantial and relevant
issues; however, the same have neither been considered nor dealt
with by the courts below. Such non-consideration of material
pleadings renders the impugned orders unsustainable.
9. It was next argued that the petitioner has raised a consistent and
plausible defence, which stands borne out from the cross-examination
of the complainant and other witnesses. Material contradictions and
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inconsistencies have emerged on record, and the testimony of the
Bank Manager further lends support to the defence of the petitioner.
In such circumstances, where the defence cannot be termed illusory
or sham, the direction to pay interim compensation is unwarranted.
10. It was also contended that the reliance placed on the presumption
under Section 139 of the Act is misplaced. The presumption is
rebuttable in nature and operates within the domain of trial upon
appreciation of evidence. The same cannot be invoked as a matter of
course to justify grant of interim compensation, particularly when a
tenable defence has been raised.
11. It was further argued that the financial capacity of the petitioner has
not been considered. The petitioner is facing financial constraints and
is not in a position to comply with the direction of interim
compensation. The failure to consider this relevant factor renders the
impugned orders inequitable.
12. It was also submitted that the impugned orders are non-speaking and
bereft of reasons. It is settled that any order having civil
consequences must disclose due application of mind. The absence of
reasons indicates arbitrariness and vitiates the orders.
13. It was further contended that the quantum of interim compensation
awarded is arbitrary and without any rational basis. The impugned
orders do not indicate the reasons for determining the percentage,
thereby rendering the same legally unsustainable.
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14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, inter alia , placed reliance
upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Ranjan
Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand, (2024) 4 SCC 419 and the
judgments of this Court in Nazir Ahmad Chopan v. Abdul Rehman
Chopan, CRM(M) No. 50/2020, decided on 23.12.2022, and
Nargees Javaid v. Ghulam Jeelani Nengroo, CRM(M) No.
185/2026 , decided on 20.04.2026 , to contend that the impugned
orders are liable to be set aside.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF AMICUS CURIE
15. Since learned counsel for the petitioner raised an important question
concerning the scope and ambit of Section 143A of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, this Court asked Mr. Mohsin Qadri, learned Senior
Additional Advocate General, to assist the Court as amicus curiae.
16. Assisting the Court, Mr. Qadri submitted that the power conferred
upon the trial Court under Section 143A of the Negotiable
Instruments Act to award interim compensation is not mandatory but
discretionary in nature. According to him, the legislature has
consciously employed the expression "may" in Section 143A(1),
which clearly indicates that the grant of interim compensation is not
automatic upon the framing of notice or plea of the accused. The
Court is required to exercise its discretion judiciously after
considering the facts and circumstances of each case.
17. Learned amicus curiae further submitted that though, in certain
circumstances, the expressions "may" and "shall" have been
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construed interchangeably by courts to give effect to legislative
intent, the judicial interpretation that has evolved around Section
143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act leaves little room for doubt
that the provision does not contemplate an automatic or mechanical
award of interim compensation. The consistent judicial view is that
the power under Section 143A is discretionary and is required to be
exercised upon a prima facie evaluation of the material on record.
18. He further submits that the provision envisages an adjudicatory
exercise whereby the Court is required to apply its mind to the merits
of the complaint, the nature of the defence raised by the accused, and
other relevant circumstances before determining whether the case
warrants the grant of interim compensation. Thus, the mere filing of a
complaint under Section 138 of the Act or the framing of notice
against the accused does not, by itself, entitle the complainant to an
order of interim compensation as a matter of course.
19. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material
available on record.
LEGAL ANALYSIS:
20. The principal grievance projected by the petitioner is that the order
dated 04.11.2025 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Baramulla at Sopore, directing payment of interim compensation
under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, is a non-
speaking order and that the discretion vested in the Court under the
said provision has been exercised mechanically and without due
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application of mind. It has further been contended that the Revisional
Court failed to appreciate the legal infirmities attending the order of
the Trial Court and erroneously affirmed the same.
21. For a proper appreciation of the submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the petitioner, it becomes necessary to examine the scope
and ambit of Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
For facility of reference, the provision is reproduced hereunder:
“143A. Power to direct interim compensation.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the Court trying an offence under section
138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim
compensation to the complainant—
(a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not
guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and
(b) in any other case, upon framing of charge.
(2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not
exceed twenty per cent. of the amount of the cheque.
(3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days
from the date of the order under subsection (1), or within such
further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by
the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the
cheque.
(4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall
direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of
interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as
published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the
beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from
the date of the order, or within such further period not
exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on
sufficient cause being shown by the complainant.
(5) The interim compensation payable under this section may
be recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or the
amount of compensation awarded under section 357 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall be
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reduced by the amount paid or recovered as interim
compensation under this section.”
22. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision reveals that the legislature
has empowered the Court trying an offence under Section 138 of the
Act to direct the accused to pay interim compensation, not exceeding
twenty per cent of the cheque amount, at the stage contemplated
under the provision. The power, however, is discretionary in nature
and not mandatory. It is, therefore, expected that such discretion be
exercised on the basis of relevant considerations and supported by
reasons reflecting application of mind to the facts of the case.
23. Whether such discretion has been exercised in accordance with the
requirements of law would necessarily depend upon the contents of
the order impugned and the reasons, if any, recorded therein. The
Court is, therefore, required to examine whether the learned Trial
Court has taken into consideration relevant factors germane to the
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 143-A of the Act and whether
the reasons which weighed with it are discernible from the order
itself.
24. Having considered the impugned order dated 04.11.2025 in the light
of the submissions advanced, this Court finds no merit in the
contention that the learned Trial Court exercised the jurisdiction
under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act mechanically
or without application of mind. The order, when read as a whole,
reflects due consideration of the relevant facts, the objections raised
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by the accused and the legal principles governing the exercise of
power under the aforesaid provision.
25. A perusal of the order reveals that the learned Magistrate was
conscious of the nature of the discretion vested under Section 143-A
and did not proceed on the premise that grant of interim
compensation was automatic or mandatory. The order further
demonstrates that the learned Trial Court examined the material
available on record, took note of the stage of the proceedings and
evaluated the circumstances which, in its opinion, warranted exercise
of the jurisdiction under the said provision.
26. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has referred to the governing
precedents, noticed the conduct of the accused during the proceedings
and considered the necessity of balancing the interests of the
complainant with the rights of the accused before directing payment
of interim compensation. The relevant observations made by the
learned Trial Court read as under:
“9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Ranjan
Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (Criminal Appeal
No. 741 of 2024, decided on 15.03.2024) clarified that Section
143-A is discretionary, not automatic. The Court must prima
facie assess the merits of the complaint and the nature of
defence, and consider factors such as the accused’s conduct,
financial capacity, and likelihood of the trial being delayed.
10. Likewise, in G.J. Raja v. Tejraj Surana (2019 SCC Online
SC 989), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the object of
Section 143-A is to strike a balance between the rights of the
complainant and the accused and to prevent abuse of process
through prolonged litigation or deliberate absence.
11. Upon consideration of the material on record, this Court
finds that (a) the cheque, dishonour memo, and statutory
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notice stand duly proved on record; (b) the accused has
admitted the cheque and signature, denying only liability; (c)
there have been repeated defaults by the accused in
appearance; and (d) the exemption obtained by him to travel
abroad carries a real possibility of him protracting the
proceedings or evading trial. These factors cumulatively justify
invocation of Section 143-A to protect the complainant’s
interest.
12. However, it is equally a matter of judicial balance that the
accused’s right to defend cannot be prejudiced by an excessive
or disproportionate interim order. The discretion under
Section 143-A must be exercised judiciously—not as
punishment, but as a safeguard.
13. Considering the conduct of the accused, the advanced
stage of proceedings, and the potential risk of delay and flight,
this Court finds it just and equitable to direct payment of 10%
of the cheque amount, i.e., ₹8,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Lakh
only) as interim compensation within a period of sixty (60)
days from today, either by deposit before this Court or by
furnishing a valid bank guarantee or fixed deposit of
equivalent value.”

27. The aforesaid extract demonstrates that the learned Trial Court was
conscious of the legal position governing the exercise of power under
Section 143-A and specifically noticed that the provision does not
mandate grant of interim compensation as a matter of course. The
learned Magistrate referred to the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court governing the field and thereafter proceeded to examine the
facts of the case in the light of the principles laid down therein.
28. Significantly, the Trial Court recorded specific findings that the
cheque, dishonour memo and statutory notice stood proved on record;
that the accused had admitted the issuance of the cheque and his
signatures thereon, disputing only the underlying liability; that there
had been repeated defaults in appearance on the part of the accused;
and that the permission obtained by him to travel abroad created a
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possibility of delay in conclusion of the proceedings. These are not
extraneous considerations but factors directly relevant for
determining whether the discretion under Section 143-A ought to be
exercised.
29. The order further reveals that the learned Magistrate did not proceed
solely on the basis of the complainant’s claim. On the contrary, the
Court remained alive to the requirement of maintaining a balance
between the rights of the complainant and those of the accused and
specifically observed that interim compensation cannot assume the
character of punishment. It is only after noticing the conduct of the
accused, the stage of the proceedings and the possibility of delay in
conclusion of trial that the Court considered it appropriate to award
interim compensation.
30. Thus, the reasons which weighed with the learned Trial Court in
invoking Section 143-A are clearly discernible from the order itself.
The order cannot, therefore, be termed as a non-speaking order or one
suffering from non-application of mind. Rather, it reflects a conscious
exercise of judicial discretion founded upon relevant and germane
considerations.
31. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the
judgment of this Court in Nazir Ahmad Chopan v. Abdul Rehman
Chopan, CRM(M) No. 50/2020, decided on 23.12.2022, and
Nargees Javaid v. Ghulam Jeelani Nengroo, CRM(M) No.
185/2026 , decided on 20.04.2026 , to contend that the impugned
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orders are liable to be set aside. However, the reliance placed on the
aforesaid judgments is misconceived and misplaced.
32. A careful reading of the said judgments reveals that the orders
impugned therein were interfered with primarily on account of the
failure of the courts concerned to record reasons while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
The orders under challenge in those cases were found to be non-
speaking and reflective of non-application of mind to the relevant
considerations governing the exercise of discretion under the said
provision.
33. The facts of the present case stand on an entirely different footing.
The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, while allowing the application
under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, has recorded
reasons and has adverted to the relevant material available on record.
The revisional court has also independently examined the matter and
affirmed the said view by a reasoned order. Thus, the impugned
orders cannot be termed as cryptic or unreasoned. Since the factual
basis on which the aforesaid judgments were rendered is
conspicuously absent in the present case, the same are clearly
distinguishable and do not advance the case of the petitioner.
34. The petitioner has further placed reliance upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of
Jharkhand, (2024) 4 SCC 419. There can be no dispute as to the
proposition laid down therein that the power under Section 143A of
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the Negotiable Instruments Act is discretionary in nature and that
while considering an application under the said provision, the Court
is required to record brief reasons demonstrating consideration of the
relevant factors. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also emphasised that
the Court must prima facie assess the merits of the complaint and the
defence put forth by the accused before exercising such discretion.

35. However, far from supporting the petitioner's case, the aforesaid
judgment reinforces the validity of the impugned orders. The
requirement spelt out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that the Court
must disclose reasons while exercising discretion under Section
143A.
36. In the case at hand, the learned Magistrate has complied with the said
mandate by assigning reasons and recording satisfaction on the basis
of the material available before the Court. The judgment does not lay
down that a reasoned order passed upon due consideration of the
relevant factors would still be vulnerable to interference merely
because the accused disputes the conclusions reached by the Court.
Consequently, the reliance placed upon the aforesaid judgment is of
no assistance to the petitioner.
CONSLUSION :
37. In view of the forgoing discussion, this Court is satisfied that the
discretion vested in the learned Trial Court under Section 143-A of
the Negotiable Instruments Act has been exercised upon
consideration of relevant factors and for reasons duly recorded. The
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quantum of interim compensation awarded i.e., ten per cent of the
cheque amount, is also well within the statutory limit prescribed
under the provision. No arbitrariness, perversity or jurisdictional error
can be said to have crept into the order warranting interference in
exercise of inherent jurisdiction.
38. Accordingly, this Court finds no infirmity in the order dated
04.11.2025 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Baramulla at Sopore, directing payment of interim compensation
under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Equally, the
judgment dated 27.02.2026 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Sopore, affirming the said order in revision, does not call for
interference. Both the orders are, therefore, upheld.
39. The writ petition, as such, being devoid of merit, is accordingly
dismissed along with connected application(s).
(Wasim Sadiq Nargal)
Judge
Srinagar:
06.06.2026
“Mubashir”

i. Whether the Judgment is Reportable: Yes/No

ii. Whether the Judgment is Speaking: Yes


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